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 “Debating Difference in an Age of Reform: Liberal Praxis and Representation in mid-
Nineteenth-Century Britain” explores the function of difference and the nature of equality in the 
Victorian period. Focusing on the 1850s and 1860s, the dissertation offers a distinctive account 
of liberal thought, organizing, and aesthetics at a key moment of historical transformation in 
British society. It identifies how the expansion of the citizenry and the public sphere of readers 
revealed the fact of difference and why difference challenged democratic ideals of equality. The 
central question is this: how did liberal thinkers, organizers, and writers navigate the 
contradiction between equality’s unrealized promise and the actually-existing hierarchy of 
differences in which they lived? 
 Scholarship on Victorian liberalism often prioritizes liberal over liberal action. This 
dissertation seeks to redress the imbalance by focusing on the strategies and forms of 
representation that evolved in order to accommodate new sets of people as political actors. The 
first chapter sets the parameters of liberal thought by presenting an analysis of the way J. S. 
Mill’s conception of difference informed his political practice. I argue that in his political 
speeches, “The Negro Question” (1850), On Liberty (1859), and The Subjection of Women 
(1869) Mill’s empirical uncertainty about the cause of difference – whether it was natural or 
socially constructed – underpins the liberal equality that he worked to bring about throughout his 
political career. The second chapter turns to an account of the way that difference structured the 
organizing work of the feminist collective known as the Langham Place group. My analysis of 
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the group’s letters and articles from their mouthpiece, the English Woman’s Journal (1858-
1864), shows how the group represented an attempt to expand the democratic public sphere 
through the production of difference as the basis for forging collective bonds. The third chapter 
considers the strategies of representation in three novels of reform – George Eliot’s Felix Holt, 
The Radical (1866), Margaret Oliphant’s Miss Marjoribanks (1866), and Anthony Trollope’s 
Phineas Finn (1869). The novels thematize ideas about difference, commonness, and publicity in 
an age of reform. I argue that the representation of liberal equality they formalized left a legacy 
that was in many ways more enduring than the liberal action I discuss in Chapters One and Two.  
 The aim of my dissertation is to offer a comprehensive picture of the political claims it 
was possible to make in response to difference as the basis for and challenge to the liberal public 
sphere in the mid-nineteenth century. Each chapter provides detailed analysis of the ways in 
which liberals came to terms with an expanded sense of plurality as the political condition of life, 
and how they worked to represent and live with the fundamental condition of difference 
structuring life in common. Ultimately, I argue that the novel offered a unique solution to the 
problem of how to live with difference because, in formalizing a structure that demands the 
reader encounter the text as a mass subject, it relied on disidentification and detachment as much 
as sympathetic identification. By revealing the common project underlying diverse forms of 
liberal action and representation – political campaigns, activist organizing, and literary works – I 
therefore show how publics, as politically effective social spaces, engaged in definitional 









The Meaning of Difference in Nineteenth-Century Liberal Thought 
 
In the preface to Equals (2002), the psychologist Adam Phillips wrote, “That people are not 
identical, but that it is possible for them to be equal in certain ways, is one of our modern 
political hopes.”1 Phillips emphasizes the aspirational nature of political equality: we must hope 
for the coexistence of equality and difference, rather than comfortably take it for granted. In so 
doing, he points not only to the work required to sustain a basic premise of democracy, but also 
to one of democracy’s constitutive paradoxes. Difference (of thought, opinion, and position) is a 
necessary condition of democracy, signaling the dissensus that is the engine of the democratic 
process, and without which we approach the homogeny of totalitarianism. Yet differences (of 
class, status, gender, or ability) are also democracy’s stumbling block, for what Phillips terms the 
“reflex” to inscribe hierarchy onto difference is conceptually at odds with a form of political life 
based on the absence of any superior individual or group. Difference, when it cannot be seen 
without also seeing hierarchy, therefore challenges the form of political association necessary in 
democratic life, which assumes that the increasing numbers of people granted the rights of the 
citizen can choose their own government based on an unshakeable, inherent equality and an 
equivalence with respect to political power. 
                                               




The questions to which the fact of difference gives rise are enduring ones. As Phillips 
asks, “what kind of equality is viable in the light of difference?” (27). We might also ask, less 
optimistically, whether in the light of difference equality is at all possible? And, further, if 
equality endures as a political hope though not a political fact, how might we negotiate the 
contradiction of equality’s unrealized promise and, too, the actually-existing hierarchy of 
differences in which we live? Alexis de Tocqueville saw this kind of dynamic at play in the 
democratic social relations of America, in which, he observed, “public opinion” can bring people 
“to a common level” to create “a sort of imaginary equality in spite of the actual inequality of 
their social condition.”2 But of what does imaginary equality consist? Can a form of equality that 
is only theoretical or imaginary change actually existing social relations, as Tocqueville 
maintained it could change the relations between master and slave by altering their forms of 
thoughts? These are the questions I take up in this dissertation, which explores the function of 
difference and the nature of equality in liberal thought, organizing, and aesthetics in the 
Victorian period, focusing specifically on the decade before the Second Reform Act of 1867. 
This was a period of economic expansion, when, as Eric Hobsbawm notes in his account of the 
period 1848 to 1875, economic prosperity coincided with political activity.3 In Victorian Britain, 
prosperity was built on economic liberalism and free trade. Britain’s imperial power enabled its 
people to encounter the difference of non-European nations, if only through Britain’s ability to 
purchase food and materials cheaply to bolster its economy. Of course, as Lauren Goodlad 
observes, “rubbing against the agreeable idea of British commerce as the engine of world peace 
and prosperity was the far less desirable awareness of a ‘free trade’ reliant on the continuous 
                                               
2 Alexis de Tocqueville. Democracy in America and Two Essays on America (1835-1840). 
Translated by Gerald E. Bevan. London: Penguin, 2003, p. 668. 
3 Eric Hobsbawm. The Age of Capital: 1848-1875. 1975. London: Vintage, 1996, p. 32. 
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exercise of military power.”4 At home, the emergence of liberalism as a philosophy and political 
practice was coterminous with a period of reform, and saw the passage of the Reform Acts of 
1832, 1867, and 1884. The First Reform Act redistributed the franchise by eliminating so-called 
“rotten” boroughs with disproportionately small electorates and extended the vote to men who 
met the property qualification. It was the Second Reform Act, the 1867 Representation of the 
People Act, which extended the franchise to men of legal age who were householders or lodgers 
in the boroughs and lowered the property threshold in the counties; it effectively doubled the 
franchise and fundamentally reshaped the definition of citizenship in Britain.5  
Rising literacy rates, technological improvements in printing, and the railway, which 
created a market for cheap entertainment and enabled a better distribution network, changed the 
shape of the reading public in Victorian Britain. The expansion of the reading public, as much as 
the expansion of the citizenry, changed the composition of the public sphere and the kinds of 
political bids that it was possible to make. For Jürgen Habermas, the nineteenth century saw the 
rise of mass print culture and the consequent loss of the rational debate that had been possible in 
the eighteenth-century gentlemanly world of letters. Published in German in 1962, and translated 
into English rather later in 1989, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere made the 
case that the “continual expansion” of the public sphere to “include more and more participants,” 
though necessary for the “requirements of democracy,” brought about the “degeneration” in the 
quality of public discourse.6 Critics have noted the exclusions of the public sphere, specifically in 
relation to class and gender. This work was initiated by scholars, including Seyla Benhabib, 
                                               
4 Lauren M. E. Goodlad. The Victorian Geopolitical Aesthetic: Realism, Sovereignty, and 
Transnational Experience. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015, p. 7. Subsequent page 
references in text. 
5 UK Parliament. An Act further to amend the Laws relating to the Representation of the People 
in England and Wales (“The Second Reform Act, 1867”). 15 August 1867.  
6 Craig Calhoun. “Introduction: Habermas and the Public Sphere.” Habermas and the Public 
Sphere. Edited by Craig Calhoun. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1992: 1-48, p. 3. 
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Nancy Fraser, Geoff Eley, and Mary P. Ryan, who contributed to Craig Calhoun’s edited 
collection published after the September 1989 conference marking the English translation of 
Habermas’ text.7 My dissertation is clearly indebted to such work, as well as the work of queer 
theorists such as Michael Warner and Lauren Berlant, who took up and extended Fraser’s 
concept of subaltern counterpublics as “parallel discursive arenas where members of 
subordinated social groups invent and circulate counterdiscourses.”8 In particular, the second 
chapter of this dissertation, which focuses on the group of feminist organizers who became 
known as the Langham Place Group, builds on and contributes to the nuanced version of the 
public sphere that these scholars shaped.  
 
The rationale 
Following those who have challenged Habermas’ claim that the public sphere lost its 
political function in the nineteenth century, this dissertation explores the political claims it was 
possible to make in response to difference as the basis for and challenge to the liberal public 
sphere in the mid-nineteenth century. In his famous lecture on the two concepts of liberty, Isaiah 
Berlin defined politics as the struggle to define the ends of common life. How we achieve what is 
determined as the good is a mechanical question, not a political one: “Where ends are agreed, the 
only questions left are those of means, and these are not political, but technical, that is to say, 
capable of being settled by experts or machines like arguments between engineers or doctors.”9 
                                               
7 Craig Calhoun, editor. Habermas and the Public Sphere. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1992. 
8 Nancy Fraser. “Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually 
Existing Democracy.” Social Text 25/26 (1990): 56-80, p. 67. 
9 Isaiah Berlin. Two Concepts of Liberty. An Inaugural Lecture Delivered before the University 




If politics is the working out of ends, recognition and not liberty becomes the crucial good.10 
Thus, for Berlin, John Stuart Mill’s notion of the limits of liberty in the dangers of doing harm 
does not “allow for the variety of human wishes” (47). Positive freedom in Berlin’s analysis is a 
form of liberty in which I am free to be who I am, and just as crucially to be seen as I am: I am a 
member of a group in which the other members “understand me, as I understand them; and this 
understanding creates within me the sense of being somebody in the world” (42). This 
recognition is not exactly freedom, but it is equality or the basis for it: “it is more closely related 
to solidarity, fraternity, mutual understanding, need for association on equal terms” (43).  
If we abandon the idea that there is what Berlin evocatively calls a “final solution” (52), 
we must accept the commonplace that “neither political equality nor efficient organization is 
compatible with more than a modicum of individual liberty, and certainly not with unrestricted 
laissez-faire; that justice and generosity, public and private loyalties, the demands of genius and 
the claims of society can conflict violently with each other” (53). We must also accept that “not 
all good things are compatible” (53), even if it means that we feel the “universe is not a cosmos, 
not a harmony” and that “conflicts of values may be an intrinsic, irremovable element in human 
life” (53). Doing so challenges our ability to see wholeness in the idea of human collectivity, 
forcing a recognition of difference as a fundamental condition of not merely assembly but in 
some sense what it means to be human: “To admit that the fulfillment of some of our ideals may 
in principle make the fulfillment of others impossible is to say that the notion of total human 
fulfillment is a formal contradiction, a metaphysical chimera” (53). We must, in the end, choose 
                                               
10 See also Charles Taylor: “our identity is partly shaped by recognition or its absence, often by 
the misrecognition of others, and so a person or group of people can suffer real damage, real 
distortion, if the people or society around them mirror back to them a confining or demeaning or 
contemptible picture of themselves. Nonrecognition or misrecognition can inflict harm, can be a 
form of oppression, imprisoning someone in a false, distorted, and reduced mode of being.” “The 
Politics of Recognition.” Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition. Edited by 
Amy Gutman. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1994: 25-73, p. 25. 
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“between ultimate values”: people “choose as they do, because their life and thought are 
determined by fundamental moral categories and concepts that are as much a part of their being 
and conscious thought and sense of their own identity, as their basic physical structure” (57). If 
politics is the working out of ends, and if we take up our position in relation to those ends not 
merely because of what we think, but because of who we are, then it becomes clear why 
recognition is for Berlin a necessary condition of equality insofar as it is achievable. The 
working out of ends – namely, politics – becomes a struggle between competing values and 
therefore identities, the struggle to achieve the forms of association and being in common that 
allow us to be seen for who we are.  
Berlin’s two concepts of liberty are thus useful in laying out the terms on which my 
exploration of nineteenth-century liberal thought, action, and aesthetics depends: namely, 
politics, identity, representation, recognition, and difference. According to Berlin’s “ideal of 
freedom to live as one wishes” and the concomitant pluralism it demands (57), struggle is an 
inherent part of association: competing versions of the good are “in perpetual rivalry with one 
another” (56). The case studies that comprise this dissertation respond to the questions to which 
Berlin’s account gives rise: do differences always entail struggle? Does formal contradiction 
always signal disharmony? If by the 1950s it was more difficult to think about liberal collectivity 
except in terms emphasizing conflict and disharmony, I propose that the 1860s represented a 
moment in which liberal actors tried to think and bring about forms of collectivity and 
association in which difference did not inevitably lead to conflict, or at least such conflict need 
not necessarily lead to resolution (Berlin’s final solution). In understanding the problem 
difference posed to liberal collectivity as a formal one, and in looking for formal responses to the 
politics of representation and the relationship with equality and difference, I join a number of 
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literary scholars whose work reassesses the legacies of liberalism, and who are interested in the 
intertwining of liberal aesthetics and modes of thought.  
Take, for instance, a special issue of the journal Occasion, published in January of 2018, 
which is devoted to the intersection of liberalism and the emotions, exploring “some of the ways 
in which the specifically affective content and function of literature promoted, confronted, or 
undermined liberal assumptions, values, ideals, and states of behavior over the long nineteenth 
century.”11 Critics like Regenia Gagnier, Helen Groth, and David Ellison use feeling as a 
framework to explore what culture can do in exposing the limits of liberalism; in Gagnier’s case, 
registering the shift to neoliberalism in which “market ideology takes precedence over other 
values.”12 Throughout this dissertation, feelings are an important place to think about the way in 
which liberals negotiate living as though they are equal with others despite their differences. 
Tocqueville’s idea of imagined equality, for instance, posits an equality that is thought or felt, 
but not experienced.13 The work that feelings do here, in mediating between an idealized and 
fictional equality and an actually existing inequality, is something these chapters explore.  
In their introduction to the Occasion issue, Jock Macleod and Peter Denney pay rare 
attention to the fact that many liberals, such as Mill, were not just committed to philosophy or 
                                               
11 Jock Macleod and Peter Denney. “Liberalism, Literature, and the Emotions in the Long 
Nineteenth Century.” Occasion 11 (2018): 1-20, p. 7. 
12 Regenia Gagnier. “Global Circulation and Some Problems in Liberalism, Liberalization, and 
Neoliberalism.” Occasion 11 (2018): 1-14, p. 3. (Occasion is an online journal hosted by 
Stanford University’s digital salon, Arcade. Each article has discrete, not consequential, page 
numbers.) 
13 See Kerry Larson’s argument that equality, for Tocqueville, is a “kind of ideology,” a 
“generative force” that alters the psychology of a nation as it “emerges as a generative force that 
cuts across multiple domains of public and private life, modifying everything it touches.” 
Imagining Equality in Nineteenth-Century American Literature. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2011, pp. 1-2. This dissertation is indebted to Larson’s formulation of 
Tocquevillean equality as a “vast formalism,” a “grammar more than a language” (9). 
Understood as such in relation to liberal thought, both the possibilities and challenges of 
difference for liberal thinkers and activists are brought in starker relief.  
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letters but were “deeply engaged in the hurly-burly of public life” (8). If we recognize equality as 
fictional, or at best aspirational, then there is a gap between liberal theory and liberal life. What 
Macleod and Denney term “hurly-burly” was the underexplored attempt by liberal theorists and 
writers to attempt to close that gap in practice. Many of the subjects of this study – Mill, 
Anthony Trollope, the Langham Place group – were politicians and organizers in addition to 
producing the cultural products for which they are primarily known. The way they thought about 
difference had real political effects, and they tried to realize their ideals of representation in the 
lived world beyond the literary public sphere. But to what ends? What forms of commonness, 
association, and publicity did liberal organizing shape? 
In answering those questions, this dissertation will also address a longstanding debate 
about the purpose of culture, specifically regarding the nature of the relationship between politics 
and literature.14 Isobel Armstrong identifies Catherine Gallagher as the initiator of a “brilliant 
and honourable” tradition of what she critiques as “default conservative readings” of literature.15 
Critics such as Lauren Goodlad, Pam Morris, Patrick Parrinder, Mary Jean Corbett, and Elaine 
Hadley, she goes on to say, “follow Gallagher’s understanding that the poetics of the novel are 
shaped by politics,” and “explore histories that recognize the grip of conservative ideologies or 
of historical conditions that close down an inclusive and egalitarian society” (52). As Armstrong 
notes, Gallagher’s argument in The Industrial Reformation of English Fiction (1985) – that in the 
context of industrialism, “the debate and the fiction shape each other” – is an influential one, 
directing the way later critics have understood the function of literature and its relationship to the 
                                               
14 On the politicization of culture, and relationship of culture to the “tensions and bonds between 
Liberalism’s individualist past and its collectivist future” (4), see Jordana Bailkin. The Culture of 
Property: The Crisis of Liberalism in Modern Britain. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2004. 
15 Isobel Armstrong. Novel Politics: Democratic Imaginations in Nineteenth-Century Fictions. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016, p. 8. Subsequent page references in text. 
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historical forces that shape it.16 This dissertation is indebted to, but does not follow, the models 
for understanding the relationship between politics and culture offered by both Gallagher and 
Armstrong. Armstrong’s contention is that a “democratic aesthetic shapes narrative form” (3). 
The political novel, she claims in her analysis of George Eliot’s Felix Holt, The Radical (1866), 
is the wrong place to look for “political energy” (8).17 Her argument that a democratic 
imagination emerges through “praxis… the capacity to image states and conditions, not through 
discursive definition” assumes that politics happens elsewhere (7), not in the explicit enacting of 
laws but in the imagining of “the constructed fragility of social forms and how they could be 
otherwise” (15). Although I disagree with Armstrong’s contention that the political novel is not 
the place to look for politics, underlying her analysis are several questions that are also 
preoccupations of my project. What is the site of politics? What is the relationship between 
politics and culture?  
If, when Armstrong invokes the idea of the “democratic imagination,” she means 
something like publicity – as her use of John Dewey’s definition of democracy as a “mode of 
associated living, of conjoint communicated experience” would suggest (6) – then the idea of 
difference raises a further question: what does associated living mean, and to what extent can we 
conceive of experience as conjoint, when difference threatens the premise of democratic 
                                               
16 Catherine Gallagher. The Industrial Reformation of English Fiction: Social Discourse and 
Narrative Form 1832-1867. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985, p. xii. 
17 See also Irene Tucker’s argument that “liberalism can be seen as an engagement with the 
variousness of individual subjects’ historical location, but also with the way the process of 
understanding that variety, created and inflected by expressly social categories, might itself 
become the ground of a new sort of sociality. And in this version of the social constituted out of 
the common experience of an unpredictable, irreducible historicity, the realist novel, with its 
fictionalized—abstracted—detailing of particularities, stands not as a symptom of the desire to 
escape culture but as an instrument producing a subject whose imagining of his or her agency is 
limited and enabled not simply by its existence at a specific moment in time but by its movement 
through time.” A Probable State: The Novel, the Contract, and the Jews. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2000, p. 12. 
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equality? Regarding Felix Holt, Armstrong claims that “its designation as a ‘political’ novel is 
precisely what gets in the way of a radical reading, rather as the tag ‘condition of England novel’ 
circumscribes those texts that come under this description. To look for the radical here through 
political institutions is to look in the wrong place” (16). Yet if we take Armstrong’s claim that 
the novelist’s “egalitarian project” was to explore “the forms of thinking that enable a 
reimagining of the social” (28), need it follow that 1) the novel’s egalitarian project must be 
radical (and if so, radical in what sense) and 2) that those forms of thinking are not evident in the 
politics of the novel? It is my contention in this dissertation that “the forms of thinking that 
enable a reimagining of the social” occur in election novels like Felix Holt precisely in the way 
they think about representation, campaigning, and the public sphere: in short, in the political 
institutions that lack political energy in Armstrong’s estimation. Public sphere theory offers us a 
way of thinking about the social effects of the political that I find more compelling, as Geoff 
Eley acknowledges when he writes that “[w]hat I have always liked about ‘public sphere’ as a 
theory term, as a framework that we can take from Habermas, is that it provides a way of 
conceptualizing an expanded notion of the political. It forces us to look for politics in other 
social places.”18 
Public sphere theory also complicates Armstrong’s argument against the default 
conservatism that “assumes a normative politics, an all-embracing dominant ideology that 
organizes cultural production” (54). Even relating the novel to the “unceasing” debates about the 
public sphere – from “the revolutionary anti-aristocratic democracy of Painite radicalism in the 
late Enlightenment, to the concern with governance and representation around the 1832 Reform 
Act, to the obsession with universal suffrage” around the Second Reform Act (54) – “would be 
                                               
18 Geoff Eley. “Politics, Culture, and the Public Sphere.” positions: east Asia cultures critique. 
10.1 (2002): 219-36, p. 231. 
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to forget that it is the circulation of multiple paradigms of democracy and competing readings of 
the democratic that drove debate. It created different possibilities for thinking. It generated 
democratic imaginations, not a single agenda, not a single imaginary, but many forms of 
thought” (54). I am not sure that Armstrong’s point redresses the assumption of normative 
politics so much as it indicates what has always been an element of public sphere theory. This 
dissertation is similarly interested in the many forms of thought democratic paradigms enable or 
require, but departing from Armstrong will explore the ways in which those competing 
possibilities for thinking are inherent in the idea of the public sphere as a space of contestation. 
For Michael Warner, for instance, the significance of publics is that they are a “motivating” idea, 
as “when people address publics, they engage in struggles – at varying levels of salience to 
consciousness, from calculated tactic to mute cognitive noise – over the conditions that bring 
them together as a public.”19 In other words, it is not in spite of engaging with debates about the 
public sphere that novels remind us about the “multiple paradigms of democracy,” but precisely 
because they do.  
My interest in the motivating fiction of publics is the way the concept addresses the 
political question of equality in a period in which increasingly more groups of people could 
begin to conceive of themselves as members of the voting public. Publics, as politically effective 
social spaces, engaged in definitional struggles over ways of organizing, representing, and 
imagining a form of citizenship that could withstand its expanded sense. As Fraser notes, in any 
classed society we cannot genuinely commit to an uncontested notion of the common good, since 
consensus will have been reached by “deliberative processes tainted by the effects of dominance 
and subordination” (73). Reshaping the idea of not only the common good but also the common 
itself is what Armstrong might term an egalitarian project.  
                                               
19 Michael Warner. Publics and Counterpublics. New York: Zone Books, 2002, p. 12. 
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This dissertation is an account of difference that attends to form. As such, it responds to 
recent work that shares formalist preoccupations, loosely grouped together as the new formalist 
movement.20 Caroline Levine’s recent Forms: Whole, Rhythm, Hierarchy, Network (2018) is a 
noted example of such formalist work. Herein, Levine “makes a case for expanding our usual 
definition of form in literary studies to include patterns of sociopolitical experience,”21 and 
argues that it is “the work of form to make order. And this means that forms are the stuff of 
politics” (3). Despite her promise to address politics, the book is curiously drained of power and 
the political purchase of form. Politics is reduced to a vague notion of that which can “effect 
social change” (68), in the imprecise progressive ways of the liberal left. In a book that is so 
carefully attentive to the specificity of form, this imprecision about politics is frustrating. As 
Marijeta Bozovic puts it in the PMLA issue devoted to Forms, the “central argument of the book, 
in a sense, is that various enduring forms collide in interesting ways and that the results could 
well be emancipatory.”22 In Levine’s response, she allows questions to stand in for making 
(broad, sweeping) claims: “is political power really so singular and monolithic as invoking ‘the 
structure’ would suggest?”; “Will rearranging one aspect of social life distract us from deeper 
injustices, or will rearrangement constitute the very work of revolution, the reordering of the 
conditions of all our lives?”23 She wants it to be the latter, but if her book succeeds in suggesting 
that we can reorder the conditions of our lives, and thereby do the “work of revolution,” it is not 
because power is non-monolithic, but because, in her book, it is not there at all. Power amounts 
only to some kind of vague and imprecise homogenizing force, a “powerfully homogenizing, 
                                               
20 See Marjorie Levinson. “What Is New Formalism?” PMLA 122.2 (2007): 558-569. 
21 Caroline Levine. Forms: Whole, Rhythm, Hierarchy, Network. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2015, p. 2. Subsequent page references in text. 
22 Marijeta Bozovic. “Whose Forms? Missing Russians in Caroline Levine’s Forms.” PMLA 
132.5 (2017): 1181-7, p. 1185. 




unifying order on the social” that is just as likely to be benevolent as coercive (Forms 80). There 
is no distinction between the operations of this vague force in different realms, or the way in 
which power might structure different kinds of lives in different ways, just a formal organization 
that structures everything: “Forms do organize us, but on a daily basis we are organized at once 
by multiple social, political, biological, and aesthetic rhythms, each imposing a different order 
and following a different logic” (80). The conclusion Levine seems to draw is that whatever else 
power does, it does not function like power:  
 
If Barrett Browning is right – if it is true that many conflicting and overlapping 
organizing principles merely try to impose monolithic laws on experience, while often 
instead producing confusing and shapeless blots rather than integrated power – then a 
new formalism will have to take account of the temporal patterns of art and life as 
organizing and shaping, yes, but also as plural and colliding, jumbled and constantly 
altered, each, thanks to the others, incapable of imposing its own dominant order (81). 
 
It may well be time to challenge the dominance of Foucauldian paradigms in literary studies, but 
this persistent, happy anarchy of form that invalidates the operation of power does not manage to 
do so effectively. It is breathtaking to watch Levine acknowledge the formal constraints that 
signal power’s operation and then insistently ignore the evidence of her own argument. Is not the 
imagined “particular person” in her chapter on rhythms, subject to the “overlaid” rhythms of life 
(49), also subject to the operations of power precisely because of the colliding, jumbled temporal 
patterns that for Levine are a celebrated resistance to power? It is the persistence of the liberal 
discomfort with inequality that enables Levine to depict the struggle “to balance work and school 
schedules, remembering when to pay the electric bill, see a probation officer, take communion, 
and swallow a pill, pausing at regular intervals to accommodate the need for food and sleep and 
to celebrate significant events on individual, family, national, and religious calendars” (49-50), 
and then to claim that the organizing principles that stand in for power “merely try” to impose 
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monolithic laws on experience. I would imagine the particular person seeing their probation 
officer feels subject to integrated power rather than a shapeless blot. 
Levine cares about liberal equality; she cares about shaping a world in common with 
people subject to different temporal rhythms than she is. But to shape that world by occluding 
the reality of those differences does not remove them. It is a recuperative impulse that, to my 
mind, fails to account for the material conditions of the inequality it does not wish to see. This 
failure also characterizes the work of scholars who seek to redeem liberal values or Victorian 
liberalism more specifically. For example Daniel S. Malachuk’s bid to pry the legacy of 
Victorian liberalism from the hands of the “communitarians” to champion “Victorian liberals’ 
earnest convictions about ideas like the state and moral perfection,”24 or David Wayne Thomas’ 
attempt to “reassert aesthetic values without resorting to a neoconservative nostalgia for a 
dubiously conceived golden era of appreciation.”25 Amanda Anderson points to the recuperative 
tendencies of Malachuck in particular as a “renewed defense of individual practices of moral 
perfectionism and a critique of anti-Statism,” and notes that such work “tends to have an 
individualist bias – in a sense reinscribing one of the features of liberalism itself.”26 This project 
seeks to reassess a particular mode of liberal thought without engaging in such recuperative 
tendencies. 
Some models for this kind of project exist in the work of scholars including Anderson 
herself, Lauren Goodlad, and Elaine Hadley. Goodlad’s careful parsing of the “conceptually 
protean” (3) nature of liberalism is a useful framework for this dissertation, as she shows that 
                                               
24 Daniel S. Malachuck. Perfection, the State, and Victorian Liberalism. New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2005, p. 3, p. 1. 
25 David Wayne Thomas. Cultivating Victorians: Liberal Culture and the Aesthetic. 
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004, p. x. 
26 Amanda Anderson. Bleak Liberalism. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2016, p. 144 n. 
25, p. 14. Subsequent page references in text.  
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liberalism can mean “a democratic political philosophy; a theory of progress, freedom, equality 
or tolerance; a universalizing perspective; a cosmopolitan ethics; a procedural ethics rooted in 
theories of democratic consent; an economic doctrine; or a basis for either promoting or rejecting 
imperial pursuits” (4). My work benefits from Goodlad’s framing, as well as her example of 
bridging the gap resulting from “the tendency for ethical approaches to literature and culture to 
isolate themselves from historicism’s focus on material conditions and vice versa” (11). 
Anderson’s work, including her most recent book Bleak Liberalism, makes an incredibly 
important contribution in acknowledging the philosophical complexities attending liberal 
thought, which “allows us to begin to conceptualize, and to disclose, a richer tradition of liberal 
aesthetics, especially given the complex ways literary works both register the dual vision and 
give resonant expression to the lived experience of political aspirations” (4). Hadley’s 
remarkable book, Living Liberalism, is a “study of a particular historical moment’s theorization 
of politics as practice.”27 For Hadley, liberalism is “a practical politics; it had a party, it informed 
legislation, and most crucially, it had individuals identifying with and expressing it as opinion” 
(3). My project shares Hadley’s commitment to “treat the very presumption of ‘individual 
opinion’ and liberalism’s commitment to diversity as objects of scrutiny in a history of 
becoming” (32). 
Like much of the work mentioned above, this dissertation aims to contribute to recent 
reconsiderations of Victorian liberalism by focusing on its underexplored elements. In its attempt 
to explore the practical effects of liberal engagement with difference in an era of political reform, 
there are strong affinities with Hadley’s Living Liberalism and with Anderson’s Bleak 
Liberalism, both of which attend not only to the substance but also to the form of liberal thought 
                                               
27 Elaine Hadley. Living Liberalism: Practical Citizenship in Mid-Victorian Britain. The 
University of Chicago Press, Chicago 2010, p. 3. Subsequent page references in text. 
 
 16 
and are consequently major contributions to the field of liberal aesthetics. Yet my focus diverges 
from both books in significant ways. Although the title of Hadley’s book is Living Liberalism, its 
concern is largely formal, focusing on liberal practice in terms of modes of thought or formal 
structures like the ballot. In her chapter on body of thought, for instance, her interest is in the 
formal rather than psychological effects of the way that liberalizing subjects are “at odds with 
themselves and others,” seeing this “oddness” as “a function of the logic of the individual as 
form rather than a feature of the individual’s psychic richness” (66). My interest in the 
constitutive oddness of liberalism, however, is as the premise of life in common, underlying the 
specific, material ways that “liberalizing subjects” found to organize, work, and live together. I 
am less concerned with the form of the individual than with the practical means of liberal living, 
given the inevitable fact of difference and when equality is the ideology structuring life in 
common. I share Anderson’s commitment to exploring the “formal and conceptual complexity 
involved in literary engagements with liberal thinking” (3), and her desire to close the gap 
between political and aesthetic liberalism. Yet where Anderson aims to show how literary works 
“register the dual vision and give resonant expression to the lived experience of political 
aspirations” (3-4), I am primarily interested in the lived experience itself – and in literary works 
as a form of lived experience that, more than simply giving expression to a politics, have a 
political effect. The centrality of the public sphere as a way of understanding the role of liberal 
aesthetics and its relation to and action in the political sphere is therefore also a departure from 
the aims and focus of both Anderson and Hadley.28 Theories of the public sphere allow me to 
concentrate on the correspondence between the form of community and aesthetic form.  
                                               
28 Anderson notes that literary scholars, including Michael Warner, Pam Morris, and John Plotz, 
identify an “underappreciated liberal tradition” in the “theory of the public sphere and the 
practices associated with it” (13). 
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Victorian scholars have joined the recent wave of literary scholarship resisting a 
Foucauldian reading of power as discursive to attend to its material effects. An example of such 
work in the field of Victorian liberalism is Nathan K. Hensley’s book, Forms of Empire (2016). 
Hensley resists power’s “designation as a Foucauldian field of discursive or representational 
possibility,” instead offering a “form of empire” that is “not a primarily a discursive construction 
or effect of language—that is, a matter of cultural representation—but material force exerted on 
human bodies.”29 My aim in this dissertation is similarly to concentrate on the specificity of 
Victorian liberalism as the lived experience of life in common rather than a purely discursive 
ideology. However, I stop short of claiming, as Hensley does, that a focus on the materiality of 
power can generate a practice of reading that “would maintain solidarity … with nineteenth-
century objects in all their textured specificity” and also with the “remaindered human bodies 
that have their own specificity,” and that have been left behind by “the Victorian era’s promise 
of inclusion” (32). Hensley’s call for a “stance of renewed enchantment toward Victorian 
objects” that “need not cancel, but might instead invigorate a commitment to critical and political 
engagement now” (35) seems to me to be a form of presentism that overstates the political 
potential of literary criticism. The commitment to the past in the pages of this dissertation does 
not presume that scholarship suffices as an act of “solidarity with the human damage still 
accumulating in our post-Victorian modernity” (35). 
                                               
29 Nathan K. Hensley. Forms of Empire: The Poetics of Victorian Sovereignty. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2016, p. 12. Subsequent page references in text. I appreciate Hensley’s 
attention to the materiality of power, but he overplays the extent to which his claims depart from 
the “conventional” position of literary studies. For instance, his position that “Victorian 
progressive idealism came up against the most disorienting challenges to its core conceptual 
assumptions” contributes to what Leigh Boucher calls the “cottage industry of eighteenth- and 
nineteenth-century scholars” who have considered the “complicity” of liberalism and empire, 
asking whether they were paradoxes that were “inherent” in the birth of liberalism in the 
eighteenth century or emerged as “its later contradiction.” Leigh Boucher. “Victorian liberalism 
and the Effect of Sovereignty: A View from the Settler Periphery.” History Australia 13:1 
(2016): 35-51, pp. 39-40.  
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To be clear, this dissertation is a study of a moment in the history of liberalism, when 
political exigencies required a different mode of thinking to negotiate with difference as a 
political and cultural fact, in order to maintain the illusion of equality and cohesion despite the 
realities of competing interests and inequality. My focus is not on liberal ideas, or not as much 
on liberal ideas, as it is on liberal action: the strategies and forms of representation that evolved 
in order to accommodate new sets of people as political actors. In a nation comprised largely of a 
populace not yet enfranchised, and in the context of debates about reform, representation was 
both an explicitly political proposition – gesturing to questions about who gets represented on a 
national political level, and by whom – as well as an artistic one. Armstrong’s argument about 
the novel, not political institutions, as the site of political energy relies on a notion of aesthetic 
representation as inherently political. That raises the question: what is the goal of political 
practice if political energy is in art? Marxist accounts of the “structure of social formation” offer 
an account of political practice that deeply informs my thinking on this question.30 Nicos 
Poulantzas, for instance, defines political practice as “the practice which transforms the unity, to 
the extent that its object constitutes the nodal point of condensation of contradictions of different 
levels within their own historicities and uneven development” (42). This is a useful corrective to 
new formalists like Levine who cannot see power in the very moments they describe it operating, 
as well as scholars of liberalism who want to redeem it from the bogeyman of collectivism or 
neoconservatism, in that it marks the point where literature becomes political practice. What 
transforms the unity of politics in the age of reform is the shifting sense of what representation 
means, and what citizenship could mean, which in turn changes our understanding of who can 
                                               
30 Nicos Poulantzas. Political Power and Social Classes. Trans. Timothy O’Hagan, London: 
New Left Books, 1973, p. 40. 
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make bids not for power but for representation, and how the idea of representation both enabled 
and prohibited bids for equality. 
 
The methodology 
This project began as a study of popular fiction, specifically the genre known as sensation 
fiction that emerged in the late 1850s and, by most critical accounts, disappeared by the 1870s, 
although sensation writers like Mary Elizabeth Braddon continued to write similar books into the 
twentieth century.31 Sensation was a feminized genre; while there were sensation authors who 
were men, such as Wilkie Collins and Charles Reade, women wrote and read the novels, 
cementing the “lesser” status of the genre. Additionally, sensation was a middlebrow genre, 
occupying a position between the extremely cheap penny dreadfuls and the literary works that 
form the Victorian canon.32 Because the genre was so marked by class and gender, the critical 
discussion has largely been shaped by a compulsion to discover subversion and resistance as a 
way to justify the study of texts that do not possess, or are not held to possess, literary merit.33 
Though recent criticism of Victorian popular fiction has moved beyond making the case for 
considering a text on the basis of its exclusion from the canon, so that the category of the 
noncanonical, in the words of John Guillory, “loses its empty significance as merely the sum 
                                               
31 On the genre’s disappearance by the 1870s, which interestingly claims that the narrative about 
sensation fiction in the middle-class press displays an ideological response similar to the class 
anxieties that structured debates about parliamentary reform, see Jonathan Loesberg. “The 
Ideology of Narrative Form in Sensation Fiction.” Representations 13 (Winter 1986): 115-138. 
32 These two concerns intertwine when they are not simply novels but mass cultural products that 
women write for a wage. See Ann Cvetkovich’s point that nineteenth-century concerns about 
mass production and commodification of literature registered through a discourse of aesthetic 
failure. Mixed Feelings: Feminism, Mass Culture, and Victorian Sensationalism. New 
Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1992, p. 16. 
33 For a reaction to this conundrum, see Mary Poovey. “Recovering Ellen Pickering.” Yale 
Journal of Criticism. 13.2 (2000): 437-52, and the responses it provoked, such as Jill Campbell. 




total of what is not included in the canon,”34 some traces of that move remain in the oft-repeated 
insistence on richness in lieu of literary value.35 
“State of the field” discussions within literary studies and the humanities more broadly 
raise related questions.36 Take, for instance, Michael Clune’s “Degrees of Ignorance” (2015), in 
which he regretted the “decoupling of instruction from disciplinary expertise.”37 Clune is not 
against interdisciplinarity as such, merely the failures of interdisciplinary teaching to fulfil what 
he, following Guillory, sees as the promise of a general education to “educate all citizens 
broadly, to render them fit for democracy” (B8). In his more recent piece, “The Bizarro World of 
Literary Studies” (2018), Clune details two scandals (the Sokal hoax article published in Social 
Text in 1996 and the sexual harassment allegations against Avital Ronell in 2018) to argue that 
the “anti-disciplinary thought” in literary studies leads to “an empty, despised professional 
discourse while covering an entirely unprofessional intellectual and personal tyranny over a 
dwindling body of students.”38 There were, of course, responses, including Sarah E. Chinn’s fair 
point that Clune conflates the specific circumstances and issues of his test cases, the Sokal hoax 
and the Ronell affair, and thereby ignores the structural factors (governmental funding, 
                                               
34 John Guillory. Cultural Capital: The Problem of Literary Canon Formation. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1993, p. 9. 
35 See Pamela Gilbert’s introduction to Blackwell’s Companion to Sensation Fiction, which ends 
with an insistence on the “rich material” such fiction provides (9). Pamela Gilbert, editor. A 
Companion to Sensation Fiction. West Sussex: Blackwell, 2011. See also Heather Love’s call to 
think beyond richness as an undisputed good. “Close but not Deep: Literary Ethics and the 
Descriptive Turn.” New Literary History. 41 (2010): 371-91. 
36 One of the other things that they do is risk either overstating or understanding the case for 
works of literature. See Rita Felski. Uses of Literature. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2008. 
37 Michael W. Clune. “Degrees of Ignorance.” The Chronicle Review. December 11, 2015: B7-
B8. His argument culminates in the call for a return to disciplinarity (of an arguably 
methodologically imprecise kind): “Literary studies should be a discipline, not a bizarro world of 
universal knowledge. Our object of study is literature; our method is close reading.” 
38 Michael Clune. “The Bizarro World of Literary Studies.” The Chronicle of Higher Education. 
26 October 2018.  
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corporatization of education, and the neoliberal workplace) that determine the state of the field.39 
Clune’s response is an even more tenacious defense of close reading and a call for English 
professors to “stop doing” bad interdisciplinary work – as opposed to the good kind, of which his 
book, Writing Against Time (2013), serves as an example.40 Clune is not wrong to demand care 
and rigor in interdisciplinary work; nor are his critics wrong to point to the organizational and 
structural matters of power and resources that can prevent scholars from doing good work, or 
even getting jobs at all. But the debates, like the ones that often take place about popular fiction, 
nonetheless begin to feel like echo chambers of infighting.41 My frustrations with the terms of 
these debates and, in the case of sensation, the models of work they offered led me to shift my 
focus from popular fiction to consider the politics of representation more broadly, and to focus 
not on what my chosen novels are (in class, gender, and/or generic terms) but on what they do. 
The work on Margaret Oliphant in my third chapter thus serves as an example of the kind of 
work that I would have done, were the structural organization of graduate school otherwise, on 
popular authors like Braddon and Florence Marryat.  
Methodologically speaking, my work is interdisciplinary in ways that are, I hope, 
thought-provoking and rewarding, but that are also marked by some of the pitfalls Clune 
identifies. There are a number of critical conversations that my work gestures to and is informed 
                                               
39 Sarah E. Chinn. “The Real Cause of the Humanities’ Woes.” The Chronicle of Higher 
Education. 9 November 2018. See also Mark Garrett Cooper and John Marx. “Why We Love to 
Hate English Professors.” The Chronicle of Higher Education. 8 November 2018, which makes 
the case that the issues Clune discusses are organizational, not intellectual, and calls for a 
“collaboration” (since the term interdisciplinarity has failed us) that might look like the forms of 
association I discuss throughout this dissertation.  
40 Michael Clune. “The Problem is Bad Interdisciplinarity.” The Chronicle of Higher Education. 
14 November 2018. 
41 I have not mentioned, but could, similar discussions taking place within the narrower field of 
Victorian studies. For a sample, see Jonathan Loesberg. “Cultural Studies, Victorian Studies, and 
Formalism.” Victorian Literature and Culture 27. 2 (1999): 537-544. Amanda Anderson. 
“Victorian Studies and the Two Modernities.” Victorian Studies 47.2 (2005): 195-203. Kate 
Flint. “Why ‘Victorian’?: Response.” Victorian Studies 47.2 (2005): 230-239. 
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by, but in which I do not wholly and rigorously participate: namely, the long intellectual histories 
of liberalism, democracy, and feminist activism; the extensive scholarship on literary form and 
aesthetics, book history, and literary genres; the intersections between affect theory and queer 
theory; and the substantial bodies of work by and about the thinkers and writers I discuss. Some 
of the more embarrassing exclusions of this dissertation – Mill’s Considerations on 
Representative Government (1861) and George Eliot’s Middlemarch (1871-72) spring to mind – 
can be explained only by way of reference to Middlemarch itself. The difficulty of making this 
dissertation “unimpeachable” may, indeed, weigh like lead upon my mind, but I would prefer 
that it, unlike the Key to all Mythologies, not remain “still unwritten.”42  
During the writing of this dissertation, three concepts have structured the shape and 
selection of my case studies: the right, the expedient, and the beautiful. These are less theoretical 
commitments than means of signaling the sets of questions and discussions that frame each 
chapter. The right deals most explicitly with political questions of equality, justice, citizenship, 
and empire, and is indebted to the work of historians and political scientists like Catherine Hall, 
Jennifer Pitts, and Uday Singh Mehta. The expedient turns to practical politics and liberal 
feminist organizing, and identifies questions that respond to and expand upon work by public 
sphere theorists such as Nancy Fraser and Michael Warner to consider the significance of my 
archival work on the Langham Place group. The beautiful refers less to aesthetic concerns as 
such than to formal and artistic ways of thinking about representation, politics, and identification 




                                               




I have outlined what are, broadly speaking, three approaches to the liberal response to 
difference between the First and Second Reform Acts that correspond to the three chapters of my 
dissertation. The first chapter explores the changing nature of the public sphere through an 
examination of the writing but also, crucially, the political practice of J. S. Mill as one of 
liberalism’s key thinkers. I argue that an empirical uncertainty about what causes difference – 
whether it originated in nature or through social construction – enabled Mill to reconcile his 
belief in the limitless capacity of individual development and an appreciation of difference with 
the more hierarchical understanding of liberalism as not merely one set of values, but inherent 
human values that form a universal notion of the good and the ultimate goal of progress.  
My second case study considers the political instantiation of the liberal public sphere 
through a form that offers some resistance to the model laid out by Mill: the Langham Place 
group, a feminist organization that gathered around their headquarters at 19 Langham Place in 
London’s West End in the 1850s and 1860s. A collection of writers, artists, activists, and 
thinkers founded by Bessie Rayner Parkes and Barbara Leigh Smith Bodichon, the Langham 
Place group was an experiment in reshaping the relationship between the individual and the 
collective, an attempt to live liberal and democratic principles through the form of the group 
itself.  
Chapter Three considers the role of liberal aesthetics in the process of imagining a public. 
I explore three politically-themed novels published in the 1860s: George Eliot’s Felix Holt, The 
Radical (1866), Margaret Oliphant’s Miss Marjoribanks (1866), and Anthony Trollope’s 
Phineas Finn (1869). I argue that the novel posed a unique solution to the problem of how to live 
with difference, by formalizing a structure that demands the reader encounter the text as a mass 
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subject, relying on disidentification and detachment as much as sympathetic identification.43 By 
disidentification, I mean a practice of identifying that involves not being recognized or addressed 
at the same time as you are interpellated. As Judith Butler asks in Bodies That Matter, “[w]hat 
are the possibilities of politicizing disidentification, this experience of misrecognition, this 
uneasy sense of standing under a sign to which one does and does not belong?”44 At a formal 
level – through plot structure and mode of address – these novels model ways for people to 
imagine a social collectivity that absorbs difference yet simultaneously tolerates inequalities 
despite the ideal of liberal equality they posit. 
Taken together, the three chapters are an attempt to think about the legacy of the terms in 
which liberals (broadly defined) thought about, engaged with, and tried to organize difference. 
They dramatize a struggle between, or an attempt to balance, liberal representation and liberal 
praxis. It is possible that this study merely rehearses Hannah Arendt’s prioritization of praxis 
over contemplation, as she explains in The Human Condition: 
 
Action, the only activity that goes on directly between men without the intermediary of 
things or matter, corresponds to the human condition of plurality, to the fact that men, not 
Man, live on the earth and inhabit the world. While all aspects of the human condition are 
somehow related to politics, this plurality is specifically the condition—not only the 
conditio sine qua non, but the conditio per quam—of all political life.45 
                                               
43 This mode of identifying is somewhat similar to what Pam Morris describes as the discursive 
mode of sincerity, as one that is able to “interpellate the collectivity of ‘the people’ as 
simultaneously one and same and different and many.” Morris identifies the egalitarian potential 
of this mode, which she ultimately argues is shown by the authors she studies, including Brontë 
and Thackeray, to be less than utopian in practice. I am less interested in parsing whether the 
disidentificatory practices of these novels is utopian or not than in considering how they enact a 
way to live with difference. Pam Morris. Imagining Inclusive Society in 19th Century Novels: 
The Code of Sincerity in the Public Sphere. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 
2004, p. 21. 
44 Judith Butler. Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of ‘Sex.’ New York: Routledge, 
1993, p. 219. See also José Esteban Muñoz. Disidentifications: Queers of Color and the 
Performance of Politics. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999. 
45 Hannah Arendt. The Human Condition. 1958. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 




For Arendt, the condition of all political life is plurality. For the thinkers, activists, and writers in 
this study, it was only beginning to become so. This dissertation is thus an attempt to understand 
how liberals came to terms with an expanded sense of plurality as the political condition of life, 
and in what ways they worked to represent and live with the fundamental condition of difference 






The Idea of Difference in Mill’s Conception of Liberal Equality 
 
Introduction 
In June of 1868, The Spectator noted a “rumour” that Edward Eyre, the former governor 
of Jamaica responsible for the brutal suppression of the Morant Bay rebellion, was to run as a 
candidate for Westminster against John Stuart Mill, who had spearheaded the Jamaica 
Committee calling for Eyre to be tried for the murder of British subjects.1 “It would be well to 
test British feeling by a plebiscitum of that kind,” The Spectator remarked, “and ascertain once 
for all whether the Householders really desire that riotous black persons, after being quieted by 
the troops, should be hanged and flogged with piano-wire at the discretion of their white 
superiors” (695). Though the tone of The Spectator suggests that British feeling was likely or at 
least ought to fall on the side of Mill, historians like Catherine Hall note that public feeling in the 
later part of the century stood with the Eyre and Carlyle camp; Carlyle’s “Occasional Discourse 
on the Negro Question” (1849), which demonstrated hostility not only towards blacks but also 
the “twin horrors associated with abolition,” the Utilitarians and philanthropists, found a 
                                               
1 “News of the Week.” The Spectator 41: 2085 (13 June 1868), 693-695, p. 695. Subsequent 
page references in text. 
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receptive public in the middle classes who feared “potential anarchy” at home and abroad.2 
Although, in the event, Eyre did not stand for election in Westminster in the November election, 
Mill did not fare well, as the two seats for Westminster went to his fellow Liberal Robert 
Grosvenor and the Conservative William Henry Smith and British feeling thus apparently went 
against Mill in the contest. 
Mill’s speech on the occasion of his loss is an interesting study. Expressing regret “solely 
on public grounds” because accepting the honor of public office had been a constant personal 
“sacrifice,” he laments sending a Tory to the House of Commons to represent a constituency that 
had been “at the head of the Liberal interest.”3 The way Mill styles himself as a public servant, 
sacrificing personal comfort and desires for the public good, fits his aristocratic liberalism if not 
his suspicions of the public hold over the private lives of individuals.4 Given his focus in On 
Liberty (1859) on the Tocquevillean notion of the tyranny of the majority, Mill’s conflation of 
the sectarian interests of the Liberal Party with the good of the country as a whole in this speech 
may seem odd but reveals an important point about the way Mill conceived of difference both as 
a political factor and a cultural one. That is, Mill frames the Tory victory not only as a political 
problem, but also as a broader cultural loss: the failure of the constituency to embrace difference 
as a guiding principle in politics signaled an abandonment of the kind of gentlemanly politician 
                                               
2 Catherine Hall, Keith McClelland, and Jane Rendall. Defining the Victorian Nation: Class, 
Race, Gender and the Reform Act of 1867. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, p. 
283. 
3 John Stuart Mill. “The Westminster Election of 1868” [10]. 18 November 1868. John Stuart 
Mill. The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, Volume XXVIII - Public and Parliamentary 
Speeches Part I November 1850 - November 1868. Edited by John M. Robson and Bruce L. 
Kinzer. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1988, p. 369. 
Subsequent page references in text. 
4 On the idea of aristocratic liberalism, see Alan S. Kahan. Aristocratic Liberalism: The Social 
and Political Thought of Jacob Burckhardt, John Stuart Mill, and Alexis de Tocqueville. New 
Brunswick: Transaction, 2001. 
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who stood for principled opposition. Mill’s tenure in political office taught the public a lesson 
that, he claimed, had ramifications for political representation and also public opinion: 
 
I think it was an encouragement to young men ambitious of parliamentary distinction—it 
was a good lesson to them when they found that a great constituency like this was willing 
to be represented by a man who always told you plainly when he differed in opinion from 
you—who told you that he differed on a few important points, though he agreed on more, 
and that he should maintain his opinion by his vote, and who never, for the sake of 
preserving his seat, ever said or did anything which he would not have thought it his duty 
to if he had not been your representative (369-370).5  
 
The election was not the test of British feeling about racism as The Spectator held , though in 
large part it was an indication of public ambivalence about reform.6 But as Mill frames it here, it 
also signaled a loss of a certain kind of public figure. The ideal parliamentary man as Mill 
depicts him is a public servant, whose duty to the public shapes his behavior, but he is also a 
leader, who guides rather than panders to the public. Moreover, Mill’s language is interesting for 
what it reveals about the constitution of the public: as he slips from a specific reference to 
“young men ambitious of parliamentary distinction” to a specific, though abstract and universal 
“you,” he constitutes the sphere of public opinion as a space for those young, ambitious, 
                                               
5 Interestingly, the way Mill frames his political service bears more than a passing resemblance 
to the way James Mill argued for British imperial reign over India, as a reluctantly performed 
duty for the good of others: “If we wish for the prolongation of an English government in India, 
which we do most sincerely, it is for the sake of the natives, not of England. India has never been 
anything but a burden; and any thing but a burden, we are afraid, it cannot be rendered.” James 
Mill. “Review of Voyage aux Indes Orientales by le P. Paulin de S. Barthelemy, missionary.” 
Edinburgh Review XV (January 1810): 363-84, p. 371. 
6 As Mill noted in his speech on the election day itself: “If the new electors who have supported 
Reform care nothing about the rights that have been acquired, and desire things should go on 
after the Reform Act exactly as they went on before it, they will do quite right to vote for the 
Tory candidate; but if the old electors are as much attached to Reform as ever—if the new 
electors desire that their newly-acquired rights should be exercised to the best advantage—and if 
both new and old electors wish the Reform Bill to bring forth abundant fruits, then they will, I 
have no doubt, vote for the two Liberal candidates” (“The Westminster Election of 1868” [9]. 16 
November 1868, p. 368). 
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parliamentary men. In Mill’s imagined public sphere, it is possible to imagine moments of social 
encounter in which political difference is not only possible but gentlemanly. In this “great 
constituency,” political difference means being unlike (differing on the “few important points”), 
but mostly like one another (agreeing “on more”). If political difference is conceived in this 
gentlemanly way, rather than rendering it as a question of violence in the way the Spectator takes 
a position on the desirability of hanging and flogging of riotous black people, then fidelity to that 
small element of difference in service of public duty becomes a virtue. Put differently, Mill’s 
representation of his defeat suggests that he perceived his loss as a blow to the premise that 
difference could be productive instead of something to be feared.  
Difference, despite its framing in the wake of his election defeat, was not always an 
uncomplicated, productive notion for Mill. Rather, the idea of difference posed major conceptual 
problems in his work (and in the various critical positions that reflect his legacy). The tensions in 
his work between the individual and the collective, free trade and protection, philanthropy and 
Malthusianism have lead him to be claimed by groups of various, and often opposing, political 
stripes.7 For all that political difference is a clear good for Mill in 1868, it is only a good insofar 
as that difference was mostly agreement – the “important points” of difference eclipsed by the 
fact that you “agreed on more.” Moreover, it only encompasses the kind of disagreement that can 
be expressed among peers, the voters that Mill addresses and wishes to represent. In the context 
of Mill’s political career, difference only exists within the parameters of a moral, liberal, 
gentlemanly subjectivity.  
                                               
7 See, for instance, Jose Harris: “Pinpointing Mill’s precise identity on the political spectrum was 
a problem in his lifetime and has been so ever since—his allegiance being claimed by free-
marketeers and collectivists, social democrats and liberal conservatives, paternalists and 
libertarians.” “Mill, John Stuart (1806–1873), philosopher, economist, and advocate of women’s 




Critics have suggested that it was precisely in the years after the Indian Mutiny of 1857 
that racial difference is deployed by Mill as a political category, not loosely in the sense of 
cultural differences, but as a hardened, biological fact.8 Defined in terms of political perspective, 
Mill was renowned for what Dr. Brewer, the man who chaired Mill’s election speech of July 
1868, noted as his “liberal tolerance of differences.”9 Brewer’s depiction of Mill as the 
exemplum of toleration, a man with the ability to “reconcile on the one hand a thorough 
independence, and on the other an enlightened sense of the value and power of that kind of union 
which is designated by the name of political party” (329), sits uneasily with the portrayal of Mill 
as productive of gendered and racialized difference, or, in other words, a thinker who made 
meaningful differences of race and gender when it would have served his philosophy to resist 
such a move.  
The idea of difference is thus a vexed one in the history of Mill’s thought, unstable as 
either a good or a problem to be solved. The purpose of this chapter is not to produce a definitive 
version of Mill as either a liberal champion of difference or a racist apologist for it. Rather, I 
want to track the idea of difference across a selection from Mill’s body of work, illuminating 
various shifts and changes in order to make the case that the two Mills must be understood as 
mutually constitutive. Taking 1859 and On Liberty as a focal point, we will see that the twists 
and turns of difference are folded into his conception of individuality itself. Put simply, the idea 
                                               
8 See Uday Singh Mehta. Liberalism and Empire: A Study in Nineteenth-Century British Liberal 
Thought. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999 and Bart Schultz. “Mill and Sidgwick, 
Imperialism and Racism.” Utilitas 19.1 (March 2007): 104-130, p. 108. See also Catherine Hall. 
“The Economy of Intellectual Prestige: Thomas Carlyle, John Stuart Mill, and the Case of 
Governor Eyre.” Cultural Critique. 12 (Spring 1989): 167-96, pp. 195-6 on notion of the natural 
division of labor. 
9 John Stuart Mill. “The Westminster Election of 1868.” [2] 24 July 1868 The Collected Works of 
John Stuart Mill, Volume XXVIII - Public and Parliamentary Speeches Part I November 1850 - 
November 1868. Edited by John M. Robson and Bruce L. Kinzer. Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1988, p. 329. Subsequent page references in text.  
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of difference as contested and unstable is constitutive of any universalizing claims Mill makes. I 
explore the treatment of racial difference in Mill’s debate with Carlyle on “The Negro Question” 
(1850) as well as Mill’s complex, and often contradictory, construction of the relationship 
between the individual and the social in On Liberty to propose that Mill’s notion of improvement 
properly rests not on the idea that difference is completely constructed, as he suggested in his 
Autobiography, but on the curious admixture of difference as circumstantial, social and historical 
in some contexts, and innate and hierarchal in others. Whereas the question of race and gender in 
Mill’s thought is often expressed in abstract terms, I wish to unpack them and thereby explain, as 
Elizabeth Povinelli puts it, how these constructs “are what organizes, disorganizes and distributes 
power and difference.”10 
Whether it serves as a vexing question, a threatening problem, or (as in his 1868 speech) 
an indisputable good, the complexity of difference in Mill’s thought is also a matter of causality. 
The question that preoccupied Mill of how difference emerges in the first place continues to cast 
a shadow over cultural thought: is difference innate, or is it culturally constructed? We glimpse 
an instance of Mill’s complex negotiation of the meaning of difference when, in his 
Autobiography, he wrestles with the desire to reject the notion of innate difference and the 
contradictory desire to retain the explanatory power of the natural: 
 
I have long felt that the prevailing tendency to regard all the marked distinctions of 
human character as innate, and in the main indelible, and to ignore the irresistible proofs 
that by far the greater part of those differences, whether between individuals, races or 
sexes, are such as not only might but naturally would be produced by differences in 
                                               
10 Kim Turcot DiFruscia. “Shapes of Freedom: An Interview with Elizabeth A. Povinelli.” 
Alterites 7.1 (2010): 88-98, p. 91. 
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circumstances, is one of the chief hindrances to the rational treatment of great social 
questions, and one of the greatest stumbling blocks to human improvement.11 
 
At first blush, Mill’s rejection of innate differences of character seems clear and unambiguous. 
However, the force of his seemingly unshakeable confidence in the cultural construction of 
difference is undercut in various ways by the circumspection of his language. The first thing to 
note is that only the “greater part” of differences are cultural; he is unclear whether the remaining 
part is similarly constructed but simply not supportable as such by “irresistible proofs,” or 
whether innate factors play a smaller but still significant role. The second thing is that, even 
when he firmly insists on the social construction of difference, he does so in language that serves 
to reinscribe the natural as the final determinant of truth (“not only might but naturally would 
be”). When we consider his inability fully to abandon the natural as the explanation that 
undergirds difference, even as he insists on culture as the primary factor, it is clear that, for all 
Mill’s insistence on the “rational treatment” of social questions, the question of difference 
ultimately eschews rationality. 
 
Labor, empire, and naturalizing difference 
In 1849, Thomas Carlyle published an anonymous article, “Occasional Discourse on the 
Negro Question,” in which he purports to present an “occasional discourse, delivered by we 
know not whom.”12 In the guise of an anonymous speaker, who undertakes the “painful” duty of 
commenting on West Indian affairs, Carlyle attacks two different targets: the black people of the 
                                               
11 John Stuart Mill. The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, Volume I - Autobiography and 
Literary Essays [1824]. Edited by John M. Robson and Jack Stillinger. Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981, p. 203. Subsequent page references in 
text. 
12 Thomas Carlyle. “Occasional Discourse on the Negro Question.” Fraser’s Magazine 
(December 1849): 670-9, p. 670. Subsequent page references in text. 
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West Indies, sitting “with their beautiful muzzles up to the ears in pumpkins, imbibing sweet 
pulps and juices” and the philanthropists and anti-slavery lobby responsible for the depraved 
condition of blacks in the West Indies and the resulting miserable condition of British lives. 
Carlyle argues not for slavery as such, but for the blacks to be “servants to those that are born 
wiser than you, that are born lords of you” (676). He blames the abolitionists and philanthropists 
for obscuring the “true relations between Negro and White, their mutual duties under the sight of 
the Maker of them both” by “declaring that Negro and White are unrelated, loose from one 
another, on a footing of perfect equality, and subject to no law but that of Supply and Demand 
according to the Dismal Science” (677). Carlyle’s proposal, for all he proclaims otherwise, is a 
kind of slavery, in the form of an enforced work order by the State: “Wherever, in British 
territory, there exists a Black man, and needful work to the just extent is not to be got out of him, 
such a law, in defect of better, should be brought to bear upon said Black man!” (677). Justice, 
Carlyle’s language suggests, is the measure of how much “needful” work the empire can get “out 
of” black men, rather than any assurance of the rights, liberties, or corporeal safety of the people 
whose labor the British empire is owed.  
Mill’s reply was prefaced, in a funny foreshadowing of his 1868 insistence on toleration 
of opposing views, by an editorial note proclaiming the value of impartiality and offering the 
publication as an object lesson to Exeter Hall in allowing the reader to form their opinions on the 
issue.13 Mill rejected Carlyle’s sketch of abolition as wrongheaded and sentimental, and the 
“gospel of work” – Mill calls it “cant” (27) – through which Carlyle saw the promise of 
salvation. Mill was particularly furious that Carlyle had given ammunition to the American 
opponents of abolition, lambasting Carlyle for flinging “this missile, loaded with the weight of 
                                               
13 John Stuart Mill. “The Negro Question.” Fraser’s Magazine. (January 1850): 25-31. 
Subsequent page references in text. 
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his reputation, into the abolitionist camp” (31). Mill means his claim that Carlyle’s reputation 
bolsters his argument’s force literally, complaining that “the author issues his opinions, or rather 
ordinances, under imposing auspices” (25). Describing it as an ordinance not an opinion, Mill 
represents Carlyle’s piece as not merely advocating for slavery but enacting it, seeing in the 
opinion itself an example of the “law of force and cunning” that compels people to work by the 
whip (25). There is an elision between the opinion and the man that sets Carlyle beyond the pale 
of morality and justice. In questioning the source of Carlyle’s authority, Mill avows: “If by the 
quality of the message we may judge of those who sent it, not from any powers to whom just or 
good men acknowledge allegiance” (25). Advocating for slavery becomes, in other words, a 
form of slavery.  
In eliding the distinction between holding the whip and arguing for it, Mill depicts 
Carlyle as a practitioner rather than an advocate of slavery, and therefore suggests he operates 
outside the realm of tolerable opinion. This is an interesting way of thinking about public 
opinion, largely because it makes the point that the public sphere is a place of political action and 
not merely rational debate. As such, Mill sees Carlyle’s article not merely as an opinion but as an 
act in the world: “Circulated as his dissertation will probably be, by those whose interests profit 
by it, from one end of the American Union to the other, I hardly know of an act by which one 
person could have done so much mischief as this may possibly do” (31).  
The framing of Mill’s piece, which prioritizes impartiality of debate and a public 
discourse based on informed opinion, is arguably more properly liberal than Mill’s disgust at 
Carlyle for being an “instrument” of the devil (31). The suggestion in Mill’s response that not all 
opinions deserve to or should be publicized is all the more surprising when one considers that, 
despite the clear abolitionist motive of Mill’s response to Carlyle, contemporary critics have 
tended to conflate the distinctions between the two positions, seeing both pieces as more or less 
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ambivalent on the problem of race. For instance, David Theo Goldberg notes that, though Mill 
starkly departs from Carlyle’s aggressive racism, the title of Mill’s article indicates that for him 
too blacks “are a problem, rather than that people of African descent in the New World faced 
problems.”14 Goldberg draws a line from Mill’s ambivalence about race to the contemporary 
“liberal ambivalence regarding racial matters” (213), though he is less interested in asking why 
racial difference should pose a problem for Mill than he is in highlighting the “common thread of 
racist presumption and projection” that strings together Mill’s racism (“polite and effete”) and 
Carlyle’s (“bald and vicious”) (214). Concluding that while it is better “in Utilitarian terms to 
have a Mill” than a Carlyle, he notes that “with a Mill, a promoter of abolition is at once a barrier 
to it” (214). At stake in Goldberg’s account is the effacement of a history of domination in 
liberalism writ large; he draws a continuity between Mill’s view of racial difference and the issue 
of race in contemporary liberalism and, in so doing, relies on the fuzziness of resonance: 
 
Mill’s ambivalence over the inherent inferiority of ‘native Negroes’ even as he marked 
the transformation in the terms of racial definition historically from the inescapable 
determinism of blood and brain size to the marginally escapable reach of cultural 
determination has resonated to this day in liberal ambivalence regarding racial matters 
(213).  
 
The presentist focus implied in the notion of resonance here risks naturalizing Mill’s 
ambivalence by constructing his position as naively rather than deliberately racist. It would be 
possible, in Golberg’s estimation, “to enlighten and thus transform such a person” (214) if only 
we could sit him down over the dinner table and bestow upon him the benefit of critical race 
theory.  
                                               
14David Theo Goldberg. “Liberalism’s Limits: Carlyle and Mill on “The Negro Question.” 
Nineteenth-Century Contexts: An Interdisciplinary Journal 22:2 (2000): 203-216, p. 209. 
Subsequent page references in text. 
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In making the claim that Goldberg’s focus on illuminating the “common thread of racist 
presumption and projection” (214) between Mill and Carlyle is anachronistic, I do not want to 
replicate Bart Schultz’s insistence that “it is more anachronistic and judgmental to insist in 
advance on accepting the ‘limits’ of their cultural context” than it is to “worry about racism” in 
the context of a writer such as Mill.15 Of course, we cannot excuse racism on the grounds of 
historical sensitivity, but nor should we fail to question why a supporter of abolition might think 
in terms that threaten that project. The curious thing about Mill’s ambivalence regarding race 
was that it was not necessarily either predictable or inevitable. Catherine Hall goes some way 
towards restoring the weirdness of the problem when she writes:  
 
While Carlyle clung to a notion of hierarchy and order with white Englishmen as the 
ultimate arbiters in the interests of all, Mill dreamed of a more egalitarian society in the 
future in which all individuals, whether black or white, male or female, would have 
achieved civilization. His relationship with Harriet Taylor provided his prefiguring of the 
potential between men and women, yet in the Subjection he still falls back on a notion of 
the natural division of labor between the sexes. Whether there were similar limitations on 
his conceptions of relations between the races, whether there would be, in the end, 
whatever the degree of education achieved by the blacks, a natural division of labor 
between the races remains a problem.16  
 
A “problem” indeed. Why is it that, though Mill could dream of an egalitarian society not 
governed by natural or inherent differences among people, he could not commit intellectually to 
such a concept? The question is not whether a natural division of labor exists in Mill’s 
conception of racial equality – it is clear enough from “The Negro Question” that it does – but 
                                               
15 Bart Schultz. “Mill and Sidgwick, Imperialism and Racism.” Utilitas 19.1 (March 2007): 104-
130, p. 121. Subsequent page references in text. 
16 Catherine Hall. “The Economy of Intellectual Prestige: Thomas Carlyle, John Stuart Mill, and 
the Case of Governor Eyre.” Cultural Critique. 12 (Spring 1989): 167-96, pp. 195-6. 
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why that is so.17 When Mill wrote “The Negro Question,” the scientific conception of racial 
difference had not yet universally hardened into an immutable biological one.18 He was writing 
before the Morant Bay rebellion, and before the Hyde Park riots and the Second Reform Act 
provoked a fear of rebellion at home and abroad. If it was not inevitable from a scientific 
perspective, nor necessary from a political one, why would a thinker who was on the one hand so 
invested in rejecting the idea of innate or biological differences be so quick, on the other hand, to 
reinscribe them?19  
In Mill’s 1868 speech, a loss he addresses to the general public – the “you” of the 
constituency – is really a loss for the “young men ambitious of parliamentary distinction”; the 
interest of that class of ambitious, public-minded, exceptional men is primarily of concern, 
though it is expressed in terms of the good of the whole. Similarly, in “The Negro Question,” the 
problem of slavery is not framed as a problem for those personally subjected to slavery, nor as a 
moral problem for the slave-holders, nor even as merely a question of establishing justice for the 
sake of the social totality; rather, slavery is significant for the opportunity it affords for 
distinguished men to abolish it. Mill’s primary concern in “The Negro Question,” I am 
                                               
17 In other words, if for Mill equality was, as Kerry Larson writes of Tocqueville, a “natural, pre-
conventional value, like the state of nature imagined by theorists of the social contract,” does he 
also reinscribe difference and consequently hierarchy as a state of nature? Imagining Equality in 
Nineteenth-Century American Literature. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011, p. 5. 
18 See Catherine Hall. “Histories, Empires and the Post-Colonial Moment.” The Post-colonial 
Question. Edited by Iain Chambers and Lidia Curti. London: Routledge, 1996, pp. 65-77; Nancy 
Stepan. “Race, Gender, Science, Citizenship.” Gender & History 10.1 (1998): 26–52; and Adrian 
Desmond. The Politics of Evolution: Morphology, Medicine, and Reform in Radical London. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992. 
19 Hall notes the effect of the local threat of working-class uprising on the backlash against the 
militancy of the Jamaica Committee: “the dangers of democracy seemed imminent, and anxieties 
about potential anarchy at home suffused the conservative discourses on the heroic Eyre who had 
saved the beleaguered whites” (“Economy of Intellectual Prestige” 183). 
 
 38 
suggesting, is not the inherent injustice of slavery as a state-sanctioned institution, but the moral 
quandary slavery poses for English gentlemen.20 Thus, the slave trade, Mill explains, 
 
went on, not, like Irish beggary, because England had not the skill to prevent it,—not 
merely by the sufferance, but by the laws of the English nation. At last, however, there 
were found men, in growing number, who determined not to rest until the iniquity was 
extirpated, who made the destruction of it as much the business and end of their lives, as 
ordinary men make their private interests (26). 
 
The narrative Mill tells is a progressive one, but the goal of progress is less the amelioration of 
the condition of the enslaved than the expansive capacity of the “growing number” of 
extraordinary men whose private interests become synonymous with public ones. 
That racial issues were not always primarily about race is a point Mill was to make with 
even greater clarity in a letter on the Jamaica question that he wrote to David Urquhart, a 
Scottish writer and politician, on October 4, 1866. After congratulating Urquhart and himself on 
their rare but “hearty cooperation,” Mill writes: “You approved of my speech because you see 
that I am not on this occasion standing up for the negroes, or for liberty, deeply as both are 
interested in the subject – but for the first necessity of human society, law.”21 We can see a kind 
of conceptual whitewashing here; the issue of slavery is never, for Mill, solely or even primarily 
                                               
20 It is perhaps worth noting, though I cannot pursue this line of argumentation here, the 
instrumental role of women in the abolitionist movement. See Clare Midgley. Women Against 
Slavery: The British Campaigns, 1780-1870. London: Routledge, 1992. 
21 John Stuart Mill. Letter 1000. The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, Volume XVI - The 
Later Letters of John Stuart Mill 1849-1873 Part III. Edited by Francis E. Mineka and Dwight 
N. Lindley. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1972, p. 
1205. In a subsequent letter to Urquhart, Mill writes about “such matters as” the Eyre case and 
the India Mutiny as test cases to argue the point for the franchise, as the “bad feelings, or absence 
of good feelings” in the ruling class comes from having the vote (Letter 1003, p. 1208). The 
problem that Mill diagnoses in the letter is the narrow class interests that prevail when only a 
subset of people have the vote: “I ascribe it to the sympathy of officials with officials & of the 
classes from whom officials are selected with officials of all sorts” (1208); “in a multitude the 
general feelings of human nature are usually more powerful & class feelings proportionately less 
so than in a small body” (1209).  
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about black slaves as much as it is about British law. “His overwhelming concern, throughout the 
Eyre business,” Schultz stresses, “was with the rule of law” (122); and thus, it can be added, 
slavery is merely the occasion for discussing those first principles. In “The Negro Question,” the 
fact that slavery was not merely tolerated or passively accepted but sanctioned by rule of law 
fuels Mill’s outrage at Carlyle’s comparison of the slave-trade with the condition of Ireland. For 
Mill, the issue was not one of “sentiment” or “humane feeling” (26) but of the extension of 
British law from metropole to colony: the “iniquity” Mill refers to in the above passage is not 
human suffering or inequality, but specifically the legal seizure “by force or treachery” of men 
who were “carried off to the West Indies to be worked to death, literally to death” (26). In so 
shifting the focus from the suffering of the slaves to the injustice of the law, Mill makes very 
clear where the stakes of his argument lie: in the law and in those who craft it, and not in the 
issues of race that are for Mill not the salient thing but merely the stuff with which the law 
concerns itself.  
For Mill, the form of the law matters more than the content. I want to explain this 
distinction by reference to Elaine Hadley’s notion of liberal formalism and the ballot box as a 
place where the form of opinion matters more than its content. According to Hadley, the ballot 
exemplifies “a concentration on form, as opposed to content, [which] evinces liberalism’s 
liberality” and “does not seek to dictate particular opinions but simply to formalize their 
expression; thus, “form in this instance makes equivalence possible.”22 My point is that Mill 
renders race, slavery, and abolition as the messy, real-world manifestations of the law, ultimately 
important not in themselves, but because the purity of the law is at stake in those issues; that is, 
equivalence under the law is more important than the actual freedom of enslaved people. The 
                                               
22 Elaine Hadley. Living Liberalism: Practical Citizenship in Mid-Victorian Britain. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2010, p. 50. Subsequent page references in text.  
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significance of abolition is therefore ultimately in the progress brought about by Mill’s 
extraordinary men, rather than the effect of that progress on the lives of the enslaved. Making the 
destruction of slavery “as much the business and end of their lives, as ordinary men make their 
private interests” (26) establishes these men as a peculiar kind of person (we will encounter him 
again in On Liberty) whose interests are capacious enough not merely to align with the interests 
of the social totality, but to become one with them. In “The Negro Question,” these are men “not 
numerous in any age, who have led noble lives according to their lights” (26). The qualifying 
phrase “according to their lights” performs an interesting shift, reinforcing the emphasis not on 
these men’s nobility or public face of virtue, but on their individual capacities. What is most at 
stake in “The Negro Question” is not achieving justice for the slaves, but the naturally acquired 
capacity for justice of Mill’s extraordinary man, who emerges, throughout the essay, as one who 
can absorb the greater good in his own personal sense of private good. 
In a paper presented at the North American Victorian Studies Association conference in 
2012, Sarah Winters suggested that, for Mill, the framing of the Eyre affair as a question of law 
was not only a choice, but also a mistake, as it put black subjects outside the law, and made a 
divide between the colonial subject and the British subject under the law.23 By contrast, I want to 
suggest that the problem of difference is not the result of Mill’s choice to frame the issue in this 
particular way, but is in fact, the driving factor. Insofar as Mill establishes the absorptive 
individual as the standard-bearer of good (an extraordinary person looking very much like the 
kind of man Mill sees himself to be), he does not differ substantially from Carlyle’s position. As 
Catherine Hall points out, the similarities between the two men as “individuals with weight and 
                                               
23 Sarah Winter. “Networked Politics and the Mediated Political Subject: The Governor Eyre 
Controversy, 1865-1868.” NAVSA, University of Wisconsin, Madison. 29 September 2012. 
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prestige who came from the new middle-class world” are greater than their differences.24 
However, one significant way in which they differ centers on the way in which each constructs 
what Hall calls their “voice of authority” (181). For Carlyle, his notion of the good is both 
specific and universally applicable; his writerly authority comes from defining the way of life on 
which happiness for all depends. In “Occasional Discourse on the Negro Question,” happiness 
results from following or being compelled to follow what is the “everlasting duty of all men, 
black or white, who are born into this world.” That duty is work, specifically, the “work the 
Maker of him has intended by the making of him for this world,” and the doing of which whether 
by volition or compulsion is “the eternal law of nature for a man” (673). Mill departs from 
Carlyle here in almost every possible way: the emphasis he places on the unchanging, inherent, 
and divinely-bestowed nature of man, the idea that work in itself is the highest good or duty to 
which we are called, and the idea that we can be compelled to work or pursue any way of life 
against our own desires are all contrary to the argument Mill presents in “The Negro Question” – 
and throughout his work.  
Of particular importance is the fact that Mill balks at the idea that it is possible to 
establish work – or any good – as a universal ideal for all men:  
 
Work, I imagine, is not a good in itself. There is nothing laudable in work for work’s 
sake. To work voluntarily for a worthy object is laudable, but what constitutes a worthy 
object? On this matter, the oracle of which your contributor is the prophet has never yet 
been prevailed on to declare itself. He revolves in an eternal circle round the idea of 
work, as if turning up the earth, or driving a shuttle or a quill, were ends in themselves, 
and the ends of human existence (27). 
 
                                               




Mill rejects the notion that it is possible to define a worthy object of life in concrete and 
universal terms, but he does so in a way that retains a kind of universality. Thus the actual labor 
that we do, in its material and specific form, is not in itself what makes life inherently “worthy”; 
but those same activities, abstracted in the form of a universal and unspecified affect and will, 
can be rendered worthy: “even in the case of the most sublime service to humanity, it is not 
because it is work that it is worthy; the worth lies in the service itself, and in the will to render it 
– the noble feelings of which it is the fruit” (27-8). This perspective contradicts Davidoff and 
Hall’s identification of a general trend in the nineteenth century whereby work, specifically the 
dignity of work, replaces land ownership and birth as the indicator of gentility – or, to put it in 
religious terms, salvation is through what one does not what one is. In shifting to the noble 
feelings with which work is done, Mill is opening up the form of dignity so that gentility is not 
about class as such. Rather than being inextricably aligned with the upper classes, gentility 
becomes a classed idea, but one that is available to all who do any kind of work, including the 
working class and blacks in the West Indies. Notionally, Mill’s young men of ambitious political 
distinction are not more or less capable of such feelings than agricultural and manual laborers 
who do the “real labour,” only they have more leisure to allow them to “rise to the finer 
attributes of their nature” (28). The noble feelings (and the fruit they bear) may thus differ in 
kind, but the form is universal. Like the absorptive individual, whose interests can absorb the 
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differing ones of the people he represents, noble feelings function by establishing a general form 
with which one can identify while also leaving space for personal differences.25  
Mill’s concept of noble feelings might be capacious (certainly more capacious than 
Carlyle’s), though it would be a mistake to think of it as a pluralistic or inherently cosmopolitan 
account of the good. The significance of this is often lost on critics who complain of Mill’s 
Eurocentrism. The question is not, as Schultz asks, whether Mill’s “ethnocentric Eurocentric, and 
colonist or imperialist predilections amounted to racist tendencies” (107), but how Mill 
reconciled his Eurocentric universalism with his insistence on the good of diversity. To put it 
another way: how does Mill’s rejection of the idea of innate difference in favor of explaining 
difference as a factor of historical circumstance enable him to reinscribe hierarchy and a 
naturalized division of labor instead of dispensing with these altogether?26 In “The Negro 
Question,” Mill asserts that incessant labor prevents full development of character, and therefore 
the poor are not inherently inferior but culturally made so (28). Even so, he excludes from this 
                                               
25 It is useful here to think about Raymond Williams’s notion of structures of feeling as 
“practical consciousness of a present kind, in a living and interrelating continuity” (Marxism and 
Literature. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988, p. 132). Structures of feeling set limits on 
experience and action; thus here, noble feelings function as a limit within which different actions 
and dispositions can function. Mill ignores Carlyle’s charge of laziness; to reconcile the radically 
different orientation to life and work posed by the image of black people sitting around eating 
pumpkins all day, Mill turns to feelings in order to make his argument that all people are equally 
worthy in potential if not in fact. Feelings, as an inaccessible core of subjectivity, allows for 
alterity, but forces it within a known and like form. 
26 This is a question of why difference is rendered in a way that makes it salient when it need not 
be. Another way to think about this question is through Lauren Berlant’s gloss on Habermas’s 
distinction between the public and the private (Cruel Optimism. Durham, NC: Duke University 
Press, 2011). The displacement within the capitalist subject between the man of the market and 
the homme of domestic space is what “enables him to disidentify with what’s aggressive in his 
pursuit of desire and interest in all spaces, and to see himself as fundamentally ethical because he 
means to have solidarity with some humans he knows” (181). Is a similar structure at work here 
in Mill’s thought? Maintaining a sense of himself as ethical requires that he repudiate the idea of 
hierarchy − that he is worth inherently more than people who are different by virtue of their race 
(or class or gender). And yet, like the homme whose family life depends on his aggressiveness 
and lack of solidarity in the capitalist public, Mill’s ability to do politics and intellectual work 
depends on the hierarchical structure he wants to repudiate. 
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category the work “done by writers and afforders of ‘guidance,’ an occupation which, let alone 
the vanity of the thing, cannot be called by the same name with the … exhausting, stiffening, 
stupefying toil of many kinds of agricultural and manufacturing labourers” (28). Exempting 
intellectual labor from the category of work is an interesting move. On the one hand, it is a 
recognition of the materially different quality of different forms of labor. On the other hand, it 
reinscribes a hierarchy of work, so that intellectual labor, vain though it may be, need not be 
included in his subsequent call to “reduce very greatly the quantity of work required to carry on 
existence” (28). It is clearly work of a different, and higher, class, already compatible with the 
goal of rising to “the finer attributes” of one’s nature, and such workers are thus in a position to 
work, like the noble men of political ambition, on behalf of the inferior others. 
There is not, Mill is at great pains to maintain, an inherent difference in capacity between 
those who perform intellectual work and those who labor; and moreover any difference that 
exists does not fall nicely along the lines of race. There is an obvious implied hierarchy in his 
call to compare the blacks of the West Indies with “black Haiti” and “white Mexico” and “white 
Spain,” but the hierarchical ordering depends on national identity or proximity to Britishness 
rather than on race alone as its crucial determining factor. Severing the inherent connection 
between cultural hierarchy and race is a crucial step Mill needs to take in order to combat 
Carlyle’s insistence on the necessity of slavery on objective, not merely moral, grounds. Whereas 
Carlyle asserts racial difference is an inherent difference of both ability and capacity – whites are 
born wiser than blacks – and therefore justifies slavery as the inevitable consequence of that fact, 
Mill worries about Carlyle’s argument being used by slave-owners across the pond, and so turns 
to the notion of character to rebut the idea of difference in natural capacity. Curiously, he 
attempts to put aside the question of originary racial difference entirely, as something outside of 
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the realm of empirical study, to focus on how character is made and becomes different in a long 
but crucial passage: 
 
Among the things for which your contributor professes entire disrespect, is the analytical 
examination of human nature. It is by analytical examination that we have learned 
whatever we know of the laws of external nature; and if he had not disdained to apply the 
same mode of investigation to the laws of the formation of character, he would have 
escaped the vulgar error of imputing every difference which he finds among human 
beings to an original difference of nature. As well might it be said, that of two trees, 
sprung from the same stock, one cannot be taller than another but from greater vigour in 
the original seedling. Is nothing to be attributed to soil, nothing to climate, nothing to 
difference of exposure—has no storm swept over the one and not the other, no lightning 
scathed it, no beast browsed on it, no insects preyed on it, no passing stranger stript off its 
leaves or its bark? If the trees grew near together, may not the one which, by whatever 
accident, grew up first, have retarded the other’s development by its shade? Human 
beings are subject to an infinitely greater variety of accidents and external influences than 
trees, and have infinitely more operation in impairing the growth of one another; since 
those who begin by being strongest, have almost always hitherto used their strength to 
keep the others weak. What the original differences are among human beings, I know no 
more than your contributor, and no less; it is one of the questions not yet satisfactorily 
answered in the natural history of the species. This, however, is well known – that 
spontaneous improvement, beyond a very low grade – improvement by internal 
development, without aid from other individuals or peoples – is one of the rarest 
phenomena in history… No argument against the capacity of negroes for improvement, 
could be drawn from their not being one of these rare exceptions (29). 
 
The logic of this passage seems very strange. In service of establishing difference as culturally 
constructed and not natural, Mill translates constructed difference into the language of natural 
difference by way of extended metaphor. This turn has several significant effects.  
The first effect is that it establishes the development of difference as a concrete 
phenomenon, observable to the empirical methods he accuses Carlyle of neglecting. The 
metaphor makes visible the notion of progress: while we may not be able to see capacity for 
improvement in the figure of the Negro lounging about in the West Indies eating pumpkin, we 
can see that a seedling will grow, barring any acts of external aggression, into a tree. In making 
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progress material and thus visible, Mill imposes the teleology of natural growth onto the 
narrative of racial development, and as such he forces a temporal category on the West Indian 
blacks that is not there in Carlyle’s depiction of them as indolent, static, and in some way outside 
of time. In Mill’s rendering, unimproved native people are at a moment in the history of liberal 
improvement, inherently capable, like trees, of future growth in the right environment. Because 
“spontaneous” improvement “beyond a very low grade” is impossible, native character and its 
inherent capacity for improvement with the right “external influences” serves as a justification 
for liberal imperialism.  
The second effect of this passage is how the natural metaphor functions to mute the effect 
of that violence. This is surprising given how insistently Mill acknowledges the violence of the 
colonial project. In much the same way as Darwin would later work to restore a sense of peace 
and fitness to the seemingly purposeless violence of the struggle for existence because it was a 
natural, and therefore inevitable, process, Mill’s natural metaphor functions to rewrite the agent 
of violence not as deliberate human action but as a byproduct of the natural process of human 
development occurring through struggle.27 Though Mill attempts to highlight the violence of the 
British in the West Indies, the language in which he does so emphatically conceals the active 
perpetration of violence. For example, Mill asks: “How many hundred thousand African men 
laid their bones there, after having had their lives pressed out by slow or fierce torture?” (29). 
This sentence, which talks back to Carlyle mourning the bones of the British men scattered under 
Jamaican soil, conceals the actions of the British even as it acknowledges the violent result, 
linguistically attributing responsibility to the Africans for their own deaths. Lives “pressed out” 
                                               
27 See, for instance, Darwin’s conclusion to the chapter on the struggle for existence: “we may 
console ourselves with the full belief that the war of nature is not incessant, that no fear is felt, 
that death is generally prompt, and that the vigorous, the healthy, and the happy survive and 
multiply” (The Origin of Species. 1859. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998, p. 66). 
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rather than murdered: the grammatical structure of the sentence acknowledges those deaths as a 
painful experience of torture while effacing the hand of the torturer. Rather, death becomes the 
accidental result of an inevitable, and agentless, process. The natural metaphor furthers that 
sense, acknowledging the unfairness of one tree thriving because it blocks the sun from another, 
but draining any possibility that violence could be either active or malevolent. Mill’s metaphor 
obscures the power dynamic of the colonial relationship such that colonial violence becomes, in 
the end, nothing but an inevitable accident of a natural process of human development.  
A third effect of Mill’s extended metaphor, with its logic of the indeterminate origin of 
racial difference and the forces which solidify that difference into a cultural hierarchy (albeit 
reinforcing pre-existing natural difference), is to shift the focus of the Negro Question itself. It is 
evident throughout the passage that the important question for Mill is not ultimately the origin of 
racial difference, or why it is that black people have not progressed, according to a British 
understanding of progress. The question is this: with the lack of spontaneous improvement a self-
evident and natural fact, in what way is it best for the noble British gentlemen to improve the 
lives of those inherently weaker? Ultimately, the Negro Question is neither about blackness nor 
about difference, as much as it is about producing and defending a certain kind of whiteness. 
Thus, while British agency is nowhere to be seen in Mill’s account of past violence, it is 
inordinately consequential in how Mill sees the future of the Negro in the West Indies, the future 
of abolition in America, and the question of slavery across all Europe. When Mill writes that 
“though we cannot extirpate all pain, we can, if we are sufficiently determined upon it, abolish 
all tyranny” (31), he seems to be saying that pain is an inevitable consequence of being 
inherently weaker. What matters is not what strength has “hitherto” been used to do, but, having 
attained his rightful position of strength, how a moral and righteous British gentleman chooses to 
use it. The answer is, of course, to aid in the improvement of the weak, to implement the 
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philanthropic program Carlyle rails against as “the unhappy wedlock of Philanthropic Liberalism 
and the Dismal Science” (673). Mill is walking a tricky line: he needs to dispel the fact of natural 
difference insofar as he needs to restore capacity and potential to Carlyle’s figure of the hopeless, 
pumpkin-eating, enslaved negro by explaining his position as a culturally constructed one; but he 
needs to retain enough of the natural to explain the inherent superiority of those exceptional 
noble lives, who break the rules of history by using their strength not to keep others weak, but to 
aid in their improvement. Put differently, “The Negro Question” needs to both naturalize British 
exceptionalism (and thus white supremacy) and serve as a call to action to bring about the social 
conditions that allow that exceptionalism to flourish.  
It is crucial that Mill swiftly dispenses with the question of what caused his two seedlings 
to become different in the first place: whether the greater vigor is initially a natural property or 
whether one seed becomes more vigorous in response to the environment. Preserving the 
indeterminacy of that difference is precisely the point, the lynchpin on which the rest of his 
argument depends. More than that, I am arguing, ambiguity about the origin of difference is not 
merely strange or inconvenient, but central to – or at least a central preoccupation in – all of 
Mill’s social theory, not just as it takes shape in “The Negro Question,” but also in his more 
canonical works like On Liberty. The seedling analogy functions to keep difference 
unobservable, a core of truth or experience that remains inaccessible to the empiricist gaze. The 
result is a positivism that avoids both the justification of slavery based on the idea of a natural 
and fixed difference, as well as a wholly constructionist idea of equality that would undermine 
the naturally existing exceptionalism that Mill never ceases to assert. If difference were 
understood as natural, he could not logically argue against slavery on empirical as well as moral 
grounds; if no amount of difference were natural, then there would be nothing inherently 
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extraordinary to distinguish the exceptional liberal individual. In short, Mill’s understanding of 
the social order rests, logically and formally, on an indeterminate origin of difference. 
I have spent time examining “The Negro Question” because it speaks to contemporary 
thinkers who puzzle over liberalism’s ambivalence about matters of race. Mill’s toleration and 
passionate advocacy for abolition are not at odds with his elitism in this essay, but they are, in a 
sense, what enables it. For Mill, preserving the ambiguity of the origins of difference and 
rendering progress visible while concealing imperial violence imposes a telos on the 
philanthropic project: the Negro’s improvement is always happening, and always in the future. 
With this in mind, I now turn to On Liberty to demonstrate how this potentially improvable but 
not yet improved subject underpins the idea of the individual as a universal. 
 
The feeling of difference: Individualism and the limits of autonomy 
The idea of difference continues to pose problems to conceptualizations of democracy 
and the idea of equality, and it continues to be framed as a problem which liberal theory alone 
cannot sufficiently address. In “Multiculturalism and the Liberal State” (1995), for instance, 
Jürgen Habermas responds to Charles Taylor on the politics of recognition to argue that a 
combination of liberal theory and communitarian theory is required in order to accommodate 
cultural difference and maintain the project of democracy. For Habermas, liberalism “is 
supposed to advocate a state which is blind to skin color and other differences.”28 According to 
Habermas, liberalism offers rights and opportunities regardless of particularities: “It grants equal 
chances to everybody for the development of personal identities, independently of the kind of 
persons they are and their relation to collective identities” (850). In contrast, Habermas maintains 
                                               
28 Jürgen Habermas. “Multiculturalism and the Liberal State.” Stanford Law Review 47.5 (1995): 
849-853, p. 849. Subsequent page references in text.  
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that communitarianism requires that the state intervene to preserve “identity formation and 
maintenance” if groups whose collective identities are based on difference (national, ethnic, 
cultural or religious) are threatened (850). Habermas styles himself as a defender of liberal 
principles in this debate, maintaining that “liberalism does allow for an interpretation of equal 
rights that requires the state to grant the equal coexistence of majority and minority cultures” 
(850). However, he is also critical of liberal theory’s ability to resolve the problem difference 
poses to the state, advocating for a solution that melds aspects of both liberal and communitarian 
theory. Before proceeding, it is helpful to note his objections to liberal theory. First, it is 
insufficiently “intersubjectivist” and requires an acknowledgement that the “legal person is 
individuated through socialization processes no less than are natural persons” (850). That is to 
say, what liberalism in the abstract sense fails to understand is that any community is “ethically 
impregnated” and not neutral: “Citizens share a political culture shaped by a particular history” 
(851). Second, there cannot be an a priori distinction between the public and private identities of 
citizens. Public and private rights may be distinct, in Habermas’s conception, but must be 
considered as mutually constitutive: “Citizens can make adequate use of their public autonomy 
only if, on the basis of their equally protected private autonomy, they are sufficiently 
independent. They can, on the other hand, arrive at an agreement about the regulation of their 
private autonomy only if they make adequate use of their political autonomy” (851). Freedom in 
the public sphere is only possible with the presumption of equality and independence as private 
persons; that independence can only exist by contractually limited agreement if as a political 
actor the individual is also equal. Private and public equality require one another or by definition 
they cannot exist.  
For Habermas, the problem difference poses to liberal theory lies in the shift from natural 
to legal personhood. While he defends the liberal self as not necessarily “atomistic, disembodied, 
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and desocialized concept of the person,” he proposes that we must draw from communitarian 
theory to think about the abstract carrier of rights as also intersubjective or socially embedded. 
The “members of a community of legal consociates who are supposed to recognize each other as 
free and equal” must equally apply – and the suggestion is that in liberal theory it does not – to 
“the context of those intersubjective relationships which are constitutive for their identities as 
natural persons” (852). The artificial persons of liberalism must be recognized as equal not in 
spite of but on the basis of their particularities and constitutive differences as natural persons. 
According to Habermas’s account of liberal and communitarian theory, then, difference is 
understandable within a social framework, but has still to be made understandable vis-à-vis the 
state. Habermas’s problem is that the salience of difference is not recognized in the supposition 
of “a state which is blind to skin color and other differences” (849).  
Where Habermas frames the problem in terms of the relationship – and, crucially, the 
non-equivalence – between natural and legal persons, or the specific, particular, unique self and 
the abstract, equal subject, for Mill the significant relation is between the individual and the 
powers of domination that would suppress individuality. As Lauren Goodlad points out, the state 
can be, but is not alone sufficient as,  
 
a safeguard against the further decline of individuality. Rather, civilization advances 
through a self-perpetuating dynamic: as the scale and complexity of the ‘general 
arrangements’ on which individuals depend become ever greater, power passes from 
individuals to masses. Political forms – for example, local as opposed to centralized 
government – reverse the alienation of power only insofar as they are successful in 
fortifying individuality.29  
 
                                               
29 Lauren Goodlad. Victorian Literature and the Victorian State: Character and Governance in a 
Liberal Society. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003, p. 28. Subsequent page 
references in text. 
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On Liberty is a work that is primarily concerned with the dynamic of power between the 
individual and the social, rather than the individual and political (or even the political-individual 
and the social-individual). As Mill states in its opening pages, it deals with “Civil, or Social 
Liberty: the nature and limits of the power which can be legitimately exercised by society over 
the individual.”30 To put it in terms from “The Negro Question,” what Mill is most interested in, 
over and above the liberal state as Habermas defines it, is the relationship between the 
“maleficent powers” of domination as opposed to “human life” (25). Although “The Negro 
Question” clearly ends with a political message, as Mill chastises the anonymous writer with 
flinging a “missile, loaded with the weight of his reputation, into the abolitionist camp” (31), the 
problem of difference is not merely a political question, as it primarily is for Habermas. Rather, 
the problem of difference and the way that Mill, in “The Negro Question,” frames racial 
difference as both culturally constructed and also naturalized are problems that are folded into 
the very definition of individualism.  
To understand how this stickiness of difference shapes Mill’s concept of the individual in 
On Liberty, it is helpful to take up what Goodlad notes as a “fascinating overlap” (27) between 
Mill’s analysis of mass society’s saturating effect and Foucault’s work on governmentality. 
Goodlad’s point, that there are other ways of thinking about Mill’s relationship to Foucault than 
a framework based on Discipline and Punish, is especially apt in a consideration of how Mill 
constructs racial difference throughout his work. In particular, I would like to think about how 
Foucault considers racism as a structure underpinning the discourse of a society at war in order 
to identify a parallel between Mill’s focus in On Liberty and the “relations of domination” (45) 
                                               
30 John Stuart Mill. The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, Volume XVIII - Essays on Politics 
and Society Part I. Edited by John M. Robson. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977, p. 217. Subsequent page references in text. 
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that Foucault sets out to explain in the lectures composing Society Must Be Defended.31 In the 
third lecture, Foucault identifies a link between relations of force and relations of truth. With the 
emergence in the seventeenth century of a binarized conception of society – what Foucault calls 
politics as the continuation of war by other means – truth is no longer a universal or neutral 
position, but becomes “always a perspectival discourse. It is interested in the totality only to the 
extent that it can see it in one-sided terms, distort it and see it from its own point of view” (52). 
In On Liberty, what Mill proposes as a universal or neutral position is, as truth is for Foucault, 
always perspectival. Though not ostensibly concerned with racial difference, the concept leaves 
its trace everywhere throughout On Liberty. Difference, and specifically difference as a 
racialized concept, can be framed as a constitutive problem for Mill, or what John Frow calls a 
paralogic: that which enables something impossible to exist.32 
Primarily, the social conflict in On Liberty is framed as a conflict between the individual 
and the mass: the individual’s autonomy must be maintained in spite of a social totality whose 
power always threatens to impinge on liberty. In the first few sentences of On Liberty, Mill 
frames this as a struggle that has long plagued humanity: “It is so far from being new, that, in a 
certain sense, it has divided mankind almost from the remotest ages; but in the stage of progress 
into which the more civilized portions of the species have now entered, it presents itself under 
new conditions, and requires a different and more fundamental treatment” (217). And yet for 
Mill, the relationship between the individual and the society is not entirely antagonistic: while 
his understanding of liberty requires that individuality flourish above all else, throughout On 
Liberty the individual can only be understood in the context of, and must identify with, the social 
                                               
31 Michel Foucault. “Society Must Be Defended”: Lectures at the College de France, 1975-76. 
Translated by David Macey, New York: Allen Lane, 2003, p. 45. Subsequent page references in 
text.  
32 John Frow. “Cultural Studies and the Neoliberal Imagination.” Yale Journal of Criticism 12:2 
(Fall 1999): 423-30, p. 428. 
 
 54 
whole. There is thus a deep ambivalence about the collective in On Liberty, an ambivalence that 
is, as we shall see, tied up in the problem of difference. The problem is not, as it was for 
Habermas, a difficulty aligning the individual in all one’s particularities with the abstract 
individual who has a stake in the state; rather, the issue is preserving valued difference (as not all 
difference is equally valued) when faced with an overwhelming mass of sameness. Drawing on 
the Tocquevillean notion of “tyranny of the majority,” Mill exhibits a distrust that echoes 
Tocqueville’s own anxiety about the mass public and public opinion. It is intriguing to note how 
closely Mill’s framing of Tocqueville’s concept echoes Foucault’s notion of the social body 
constituted by the racially-based antagonism of race wars, a state whose existence depends on 
expelling the “race that is permanently, ceaselessly infiltrating the social body” (61). In Mill’s 
words:  
 
Like other tyrannies, the tyranny of the majority was at first, and is still, vulgarly, held in 
dread, chiefly as operating through the acts of the public authorities. But reflecting 
persons perceived that when society is itself the tyrant—society collectively, over the 
separate individuals who compose it—its means of tyrannizing are not restricted to the 
acts which it may do by the hands of its political functionaries… it practices a social 
tyranny more formidable than many kinds of political oppression, since, though not 
usually upheld by such extreme penalties, it leaves fewer means of escape, penetrating 
much more deeply into the details of life, and enslaving the soul itself (219). 
 
Both Foucault’s “racism that society will direct against itself” (62) and Mill’s image of a society 
at war with itself figure a social whole defined and shaped by systemic struggle. If we take 
Foucault’s point that the “war that is going on beneath order and peace, the war that undermines 
our society and divides it in a binary mode” is inherently a race war (59-60), it is difficult to read 
Mill’s description of society fighting itself without thinking about the way in which the discourse 
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of race struggle is encoded in the discourse of individual rights.33 That is, the model of society 
Mill presents us with is a binarized depiction of the struggle between the individual and the 
social totality that occurs most particularly at the site of putatively peaceful or non-political 
moments, threatening the freedom and sanctity of the individual (“enslaving the soul”).  
In “The Negro Question,” we saw that “noble feelings” functioned to both open up 
Carlyle’s restricted, ethnocentric version of the good to encompass class and racial difference, 
and retain a centralized notion of good based on Mill’s own version of aristocratic, ethnocentric 
liberalism. We have thus already seen the way in which feelings operate alongside gentility as a 
seemingly universal category, yet one that is very much particularized in raced and class terms. 
That the most dangerous form of tyranny of the majority is “the tyranny of the prevailing opinion 
and feeling” (9) should suggest that at issue in Mill’s protection of individual independence is 
precisely the kind of Eurocentric individual we have already seen function as the universal 
standard in Mill’s writing. The capacity to withhold imposing one’s feelings on others is a signal 
of what we might call the absorptive individual, or the extraordinary man who is capable of 
making capacious his own interests to absorb the coexistence of those of others, even when they 
                                               
33 Indeed, Foucault writes of the emergence of rights discourse as an inextricable part of the 
emergence of this discourse of struggle: “In the general struggle he is talking about, the person 
who is speaking, telling the truth, recounting the story, rediscovering memories and trying not to 
forget anything, well, that person is inevitably on one side or the other: he is involved in the 
battle, has adversaries, and is working toward a particular victory. Of course, he speaks the 
discourse of rights, asserts a right and demands a right. But what he is demanding and asserting 
is ‘his’ rights – he says: ‘We have a right.’ These are singular rights, and they are strongly 
marked by a relationship of property, conquest, victory, or nature. It might be the right of his 
family or race, the right of superiority or seniority, the right of triumphal invasions, or the right 
of recent or ancient occupations. In all cases, it is a right that is both grounded in history and 
decentered from a juridical universality” (52). 
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conflict.34 Witness the disregard Mill has for the mass of ordinary men making up the public who 
are incapable of so doing:  
 
when does the public trouble itself about universal experience? In its interferences with 
personal conduct, it is seldom thinking of anything but the enormity of acting or feeling 
differently from itself… moralists … tell us to search in our own minds and hearts for 
laws of conduct binding on ourselves and on all others. What can the poor public do but 
apply these instructions, and make their own personal feelings of good and evil, if they 
are tolerably unanimous in them, obligatory on all the world? (284) 
 
After what has been called the “affective turn” in critical theory, it is worth considering just what 
Mill means when he uses the term feelings to describe one’s orientation toward good and evil.35 
Do feelings stand for a specific category for Mill, or would another term – opinion or beliefs, for 
instance – work equally well? The passage uses feelings to capture the part of life that is distinct 
from action, as this is where the idea of freedom or autonomy is most crucial for Mill throughout 
On Liberty. As far as one’s actions are concerned, the harm principle lays out the extent of 
appropriate moral or physical compulsion; however, compulsion or harm is harder to define in 
the realm of thought and opinion, where what Mill figures as a colonizing “disposition of 
mankind” makes one want “to impose their own opinions and inclinations as a rule of conduct on 
others” (227). To take just one of the religious examples Mill is fond of using: if you feel that 
eating pork is a sin, you cannot legitimately compel someone not to eat it; nonetheless, is it still 
wrong to feel that not just you but everyone should abstain from its consumption?  
                                               
34 Consider the example of Stoic Marcus Aurelius: his sense of “unblemished justice” in 
combination with “the tenderest heart”; all his failings are “on the side of indulgence,” and his 
writings are “the highest ethical product of the ancient mind” that “differ scarcely perceptibly, if 
they differ at all, from the most characteristic teachings of Christ” (236). 
35 See Patricia Ticineto Clough and Jean Halley, editors. The Affective Turn: Theorizing the 
Social. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2007. 
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Considered in this way, it may seem that feelings are commensurate with beliefs: one 
feels or believes that eating pork is sinful. However, a closer examination of Mill’s deployment 
of the language of affect suggests that feelings do, indeed, function in a way that is distinct from 
other terms like ideas, opinions, or beliefs. Immediately before the chapter cited above, Mill 
explains that  
 
a religious bigot, when charged with disregarding the religious feelings of others, has 
been known to retort that they disregard his feelings, by persisting in their abominable 
worship or creed. But there is no parity between the feeling of a person for his own 
opinion, and the feeling of another who is offended at his holding it; no more than 
between the desire of a thief to take a purse, and the desire of the right owner to keep it 
(283).  
 
Here, there is quite an obvious distinction between having a feeling and an opinion; feelings are 
something you can have about an explicitly political position, a separate affective layer that is in 
addition to, and lies behind, the opinion. Hence, feelings are what steer people to form opinions 
in the first place: “The practical principle which guides them to their opinions on the regulation 
of human conduct, is the feeling in each person’s mind that everybody should be required to act 
as he, and those with whom he sympathizes, would like them to act” (220-221). What follows is 
an account rather like Raymond William’s structure of feelings, which “exert palpable pressures 
and set effective limits on experience and on action” before they are solidified as ideology.36 In 
Mill’s words: 
 
Wherever there is an ascendant class, a large portion of the morality of the country 
emanates from its class interests, and its feelings of class superiority. The morality 
between Spartans and Helots, between planters and negroes, between princes and 
subjects, between nobles and roturiers, between men and women, has been for the most 
part the creation of these class interests and feelings: and the sentiments thus generated, 
                                               
36 Raymond Williams. Marxism and Literature. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988, p. 132. 
Subsequent page references in text. 
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react in turn upon the moral feelings of the members of the ascendant class, in their 
relations among themselves (221). 
 
Moral sentiments are often shaped by class or social interests, not “as a matter of reason, and on 
their own account,” but as a “consequence of the sympathies and antipathies which grew out of 
them” – and in fact at times those sympathies or antipathies occur of what seems like their own 
accord, as they may equally have “little or nothing to do with the interests of society” (221). 
Clearly, then, feelings are distinct from opinion, though perhaps not from what Williams 
describes as “thought as felt and feeling as thought: practical consciousness of a present kind, in 
a living and interrelating continuity” (132); yet, feelings are not necessarily aligned with either 
personal or social interests, nor are they necessarily informed by reason. What we see, then, in 
Mill’s affective language is the creation of a space behind reason, thought and opinion, a space 
that is in a certain sense inaccessible to those things. Feelings are beyond reason, in fact often 
negates it; people “are accustomed to believe… that their feelings… are better than reasons, and 
render reasons unnecessary” (220). And whereas you might be able to think like or even as 
someone else might – that may be the only way to reach informed opinion – you cannot feel 
exactly as another might feel. Though we may be able to reason along the lines of thought of 
another person, the “enormity” of feeling differently represents a core space of inaccessible 
difference.37  
We see another instance of Mill’s use of feeling as a category distinct from thought or 
opinion in his description of Continental liberalism’s ideal of representative government. A 
mode of government that exists only in fantasy, this form of representation consists of a ruling 
                                               
37 See a similar characterization of feelings as something that signals the radical difference of the 
other person by Adam Smith: “As we have no immediate experience of what other men feel, we 
can form no idea of the manner in which they are affected, but by conceiving what we ourselves 
should feel in the like situation.” The Theory of Moral Sentiments. 1759. Edited by Knud 
Haakonssen. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002, p. 11. 
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power that is “identified with the people… their interest and will should be the interest and will 
of the nation.” Thus, the people could not be thought of as tyrannizing over itself: “This mode of 
thought, or rather perhaps of feeling, was common among the last generation of European 
liberalism, in the Continental chapter of which it still apparently predominates” (218). What does 
it mean to call a political position a feeling, rather than a mode of thought? Conceived of as 
something removed from reasoning and inaccessible to the empirical method, feeling signals a 
way of thinking about representative government that is only possible when popular government 
is something “only dreamed about” or read about in the distant past, a way of feeling that exists 
only in the present among those Continental political thinkers who represent the “brilliant 
exceptions” we have encountered before (219).38 When Mill describes a political idea based on 
an impossible conception of government as a feeling, he harnesses something like what Sara 
Ahmed describes as affective stickiness to indicate a kind of bodily experience that precedes (or 
stands in place of) rational political thought.39 Describing Bentham’s idea of pleasure, Ahmed 
notes that affect functions as “a bodily orientation that reveals a social orientation, a tendency to 
have a certain tendency” (232).40 Following Ahmed, I want to suggest something similar is at 
work in Mill’s rendering of feeling: to call what would otherwise be a purely social orientation, 
                                               
38 The progressiveness of the form of government also recalls the temporal dimension of a 
nation’s advancement in the discussion, above, of the West Indies. 
39 “Affect is what sticks, or what sustains or preserves the connection between ideas, values, and 
object”; it deals with “how things cohere in a certain way.” In the relationship between the 
affective response and the emotion that evokes it (the bodily feelings of fear, and what we call 
fear, for instance), the social has a role: “Before we are affected, before something happens that 
creates an impression on the skin, things are already in place that incline us to be affected in 
some ways more than others... To read affect we need better understandings of this ‘in place,’ 
and how the ‘in place’ involves psychic and social dimension” Sara Ahmed. The Promise of 
Happiness. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010, p. 230-1 fn. 1. Subsequent page 
references in text. 
40 Ahmed continues: “The importance of thinking about happiness as contiguous with pleasure 
sensations is that it allows us to keep our attention on the bodily dimensions of happiness. I do 
not want to take the body out of happiness” (232 fn. 2). 
 
 60 
which operates and has purchase in only the public political realm, a feeling is to call up a bodily 
orientation too. Mill thus introduces an idea about public life that is not thought or rationally 
tested through public debate, but felt, a kind of knowing that brings the body into a place where 
it would otherwise have no business.41 When politics is affective rather than rational, when we 
have feelings about it rather than just think about it, our bodies become strangely relevant to the 
way we know politics; it is thus a very strange language for Mill to use when he ostensibly 
argues for the irrelevance of bodily difference in the public sphere. 
Why are feelings so important to Mill’s conception of freedom? And what does it mean 
to conceive of freedom as the freedom to have a feeling unhampered by the feelings of others? 
Following queer theorists like Judith Butler, David Halperin, and Sara Ahmed, can we 
understand Mill’s use of affect as a category that mediates between the personal and the public? 
If feelings function as the limit case of empiricism, much like racial difference in “The Negro 
Question,” in opening up a space for difference beyond the limits of what we can know or 
observe, they thus allow for an amount of inequality that we need not explain away through 
rational means. Take, for instance, the example of the rightful owner who wants to keep his 
purse, and the thief who wants to steal it. The “parity” Mill refers to is not simply about who gets 
to possess the purse, but also about whose desire for it is the right one. The tangibility of the 
object makes the disparity of such competing desires fairly evident, and, in making a connection 
between affect and object, Mill suggests that such inequality spills over into the affective realm 
too. Like taste, which is intriguingly interchangeable with feelings in the example of the purse, 
                                               
41 This is a way of knowing and thinking often encountered in the classroom, where language 
like “I feel that” instead of “I think that,” or “I have feelings about” instead of “I have an opinion 
about,” is used to present an opinion subjectively, thus making space for one form of knowledge 
without excluding others. That is, in those spaces it functions as a self-consciously subjective 
way of knowing in order to circumvent the power relations of knowledge. Mill uses the same 
technique to the exact opposite purpose. 
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feelings always connote subjectivity: “a person’s taste is as much his own peculiar concern as his 
opinion or his purse” (284).42 Some feelings (the connotation is, therefore, some people) are 
simply less valid than others. Indeed, feelings function metonymically throughout On Liberty. A 
world of equal feelings stands in for the notion of equality itself, and the equality of feelings is as 
much a fantasy as an idealized (non-tyrannical) popular government. Though it is “easy for 
anyone to imagine an ideal public” (283), in which each member is free from the imposition of 
others’ thoughts and feelings and only required to “abstain from modes of conduct which 
universal experience has condemned” (284, my emphasis), such a public has never materialized: 
“where has there been seen a public which set any such limit to its censorship?” Rather, the 
public never thinks “of anything but the enormity of acting or feeling differently from itself” and 
thus makes “their own personal feelings of good and evil, if they are tolerably unanimous in 
them, obligatory on all the world” (284).43 In anticipating Ahmed’s observation that there is “a 
political struggle about how we attribute good and bad feelings” (69), Mill lays out the conflict 
between the individual and the totality as a conflict of feelings – the individual’s right to feel as 
he or she wants about good and bad, versus the social imperative to feel as everyone feels. 
Moreover, in the affective realm, just as there are some feelings that are more powerful (the 
feelings of the majority), and some that are less valid (the feelings of the thief or religious bigot), 
there are also some feelings that are simply better than others. 
                                               
42 On inequality of taste, see Pierre Bourdieu. Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of 
Taste. Translated by Richard Nice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1984. For a 
consideration of feelings when they are not merely personal, see Sianne Ngai’s reading of tone as 
affective bearing or “set toward” the world. Ugly Feelings. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 2007, p. 29. 
43 On the social nature of thought in Mill, see Adela Pinch: “along that line where mental 
freedom and the harm principle meet there opens, in Mill’s work, a space for taking a moral 
stance on thinking as part of social life with others.” Adela Pinch. Thinking About Other People 
in Nineteenth-Century British Writing. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010, p. 12. 
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Mill’s sense of hierarchy is always indexed to progress, and it is no different in his 
account of feelings. A full account of “those who have been in advance of society in thought and 
feeling” (222) is given in the chapter “On the Liberty of Thought and Discussion.” Whereas the 
ordinary man, we have seen, imposes “his own liking” as a standard of judgement on others, and 
cannot think beyond his own preference, the progressive individual is someone whose feelings 
are capacious enough to make space for the feelings of others. This appears to be a universal 
perspective, but one which only certain kinds of individuals can access. The “wise man” attains 
wisdom and good judgement because “he has kept his mind open” and listened to criticism from 
others, because he has tested his opinion against the fallacies of others, and because “he has felt, 
that the only way in which a human being can make some approach to knowing the whole of a 
subject, is by hearing what can be said about it by persons of every variety of opinion, and 
studying all modes in which it can be looked at by every character of mind” (232). We might 
think about this individual as the aristocrat (or, since it is a gendered individual, the gentleman) 
of Mill’s democratic society; unlike the “world” or the mass of people from which he must stand 
out, this individual represents the perfectibility of culture and social progress rests on his 
shoulders. Importantly, as Mill defines it here, wisdom comes not simply from actions, which 
can be learned – such as listening and thinking – but also from feeling: before he can listen, he 
needs to feel that he needs to listen. Feeling the value of an open mind is here characterized as an 
inherent form of knowing that precedes rationality.  
When Mill distinguishes between this kind of individual, whose status and worth as a 
single person is defined by his distinctiveness, and the mass of ordinary people who, by virtue of 





He who lets the world, or his own portion of it, choose his plan of life for him, has no 
need of any other faculty than the ape-like one of imitation. He who chooses his plan for 
himself, employs all his faculties. He must use observation to see, reasoning and 
judgement to foresee, activity to gather materials for decision, discrimination to decide, 
and when he has decided, firmness and self-control to hold to his deliberate decision. And 
these qualities he requires and exercises exactly in proportion as the part of his conduct 
which he determines according to his own judgement and feelings is a large one. It is 
possible that he might be guided in some good path, and kept out of harm’s way, without 
any of these things. But what will be his comparative worth as a human being? (262) 
 
By Mill’s reasoning, worth may seem attainable depending on the use of faculties. But that leads 
us right back to judgement and feelings: it is the having of feeling and judgement in the first 
place that determines whether one is able to choose his own plan of life. What is more, Mill 
relies on highly racialized language in distinguishing the worthy humans from the “ape-like” 
mass. The de-individuating effect of public opinion is very clearly articulated as a racialized one. 
Writing about the morality of the time, and in particular the “philanthropic spirit” which tends to 
produce general moral prescriptions, Mill describes the repressive standard set by contemporary 
society: “Its ideal of character is to be without any marked character; to maim by compression, 
like a Chinese lady’s foot, every part of human nature which stands out prominently, and tends to 
make the person markedly dissimilar in outline to commonplace humanity” (271-272). There are 
two salient points here. The first is the construction of the mass as something dangerous that 
works at the site of character to produce “weak feelings and weak energies” (272). The second is 
the metaphor works to make racial difference a non-difference: that is, racial difference (coded 
as feminine, no less) is marked as a rigid and violent sameness. Commonplace, indistinguishable 
humanity is thus charged with the weight of racial difference whereas the ideal character/citizen 
is thus inherently white/English and masculine. 
Progress for Mill hinges not simply on individuality, but on individuality expressed in 
ethnic terms. Often it is China that represents stasis, sameness, and the stultifying effect of mass 
 
 64 
culture opposed to the “remarkable diversity of character and culture” of Europe (274).44 And if 
Mill views the mass everywhere with suspicion, regarding democracy as a political form that 
discourages nonconformity and tends to the “despotism of custom” (272), it is nevertheless clear 
that China’s stasis is the inevitable result of a lack of worth or wisdom in those “sages and 
philosophers” who are “remarkable” for the “excellence of their apparatus for impressing, as far 
as possible, the best wisdom they possess upon every mind in the community” (273). Those 
passive minds who cannot act, but who must have knowledge impressed upon them, are not 
responsible for China’s stasis; that responsibility lies with the “intelligent part of the public” who 
allow, indeed encourage, such sameness to spread (275). Put differently, China is stultifying and 
static not because of its methods, but simply because it is China: even the remarkable cannot 
recognize the value of individuality when they see it.45  
The limits of autonomy are marked, in the end, by both feelings and by nature defined by 
ethnicity: liberty is possible only for those who prove themselves to be worthy, but worthiness 
depends on possessing the capacity for it and on feeling a certain way. If not exactly inherent, the 
origins and workings of that capacity are nonetheless inaccessible to the empirical eye, and 
therefore cannot be satisfactorily proved. Such ambiguity at the heart of the notion of capacity 
leads to Mill vacillating over the course of On Liberty on the subject of despotism. Consider 
                                               
44 “A people, it appears, may be progressive for a certain length of time, and then stop: when 
does it stop? When it ceases to possess individuality” (273). Mill was of course not the only 
nineteenth-century thinker to use China as the representation of stasis. For instance, see 
Tocqueville’s reference to “the unusually static quality of mind of this nation.” Democracy in 
America and Two Essays on America (1835-1840). Translated by Gerald E. Bevan. London: 
Penguin, 2003, p. 536. 
45 Mill continues: “to see that it is good there should be differences, even though not for the 
better… If resistance waits till life is reduced nearly to one uniform type, all deviations from that 
type will come to be considered impious, immoral, even monstrous and contrary to nature. 
Mankind speedily become unable to conceive diversity, when they have been for some time 
unaccustomed to see it” (275). See also his definition of utility as the “permanent interests of 
man as a progressive being” (225). 
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three moments that express slightly different positions on whether liberty applies to those who 
are not worthy. First, at the beginning of the text, Mill maintains despotism is a “legitimate mode 
of government” when dealing with “barbarians,” if it is a means of effecting their improvement 
(225). “Liberty, as a principle,” Mill continues, “has no application to any state of things anterior 
to the time when mankind have become capable of being improved by free and equal discussion” 
(224). Second, Mill denies that “any community has a right to force another to be civilized… I 
cannot admit that persons entirely unconnected with them ought to step in and require that a 
condition of things with which all who are directly interested appear to be satisfied, should be 
put an end to because it is a scandal to persons some thousands of miles distant” (292). A 
civilization that considers itself under threat of barbarism must have become “so degenerate, that 
neither its appointed priests and teachers, nor anybody else, has the capacity, or will take the 
trouble, to stand up for it” (291). Thirdly, when discussing imposing limits on the sale of harmful 
commodities, Mill maintains that such measures are “suited only to a state of society in which 
the labouring classes are avowedly treated as children or savages, and placed under an education 
of restraint, to fit them for future admission to the privileges of freedom” (299). And, he also 
maintains, “no person who sets due value on freedom will give his adhesion to their being so 
governed, unless after all efforts have been exhausted to educate them for freedom and govern 
them as freemen, and it has been definitively proved that they can only be governed as children” 
(299). Though this might sound like a rejection of paternalism, there is a hint that the problem is 
that England is not in fact paternalistic enough:  
 
It is only because the institutions of this country are a mass of inconsistencies, that things 
find admittance into our practice which belong to the system of despotic, or what is called 
paternal, government, while the general freedom of our institutions precludes the exercise 
of the amount of control necessary to render the restraint of any real efficacy as a moral 




Considered together, what emerges from these moments is a complex position on the working 
classes and other “barbarians.” Mill advocates a paternalistic approach until a sufficient capacity 
for freedom can be proved, but this begs the question: if that capacity is not provable, then are 
certain people, by virtue of their class, race or gender, permanently outside the principle of 
liberty? 
 
Love and empiricism: Private feelings of a mass public 
I have been arguing that freedom in On Liberty is a seemingly expansive though 
ultimately limited concept for Mill: a right reserved for the worthy, rather one which all people 
deserve equally. I now want to extend this argument through detailed analysis of The Subjection 
of Women (1869), which is putatively considered to fall within the tradition of liberal feminism 
on the basis of its argument for the equality of women, but which is difficult to reconcile with the 
conception of freedom that emerges over the course of Mill’s work—from which women are 
ultimately excluded on the basis of gender.46 As freedom is a concept that can only apply to the 
individual qua individual, and as Mill consistently thinks about the individual in a way that 
excludes all but gentlemen of a particular kind, freedom is not ultimately attainable for women in 
this scheme. 
Scholars have contrasted Mill’s feminism with his paternalistic attitude towards British 
subjects in the colonies and his support for empire, valorizing the former while trying to wrestle 
with the contradiction between an upholder of equality and an apologist for imperialism. Take, 
for instance, Jennifer Pitts’ discussion of Mill’s problematic support for empire, in which she 
                                               
46 John Stuart Mill. The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, Volume XXI - Essays on Equality, 
Law, and Education. Edited by John M. Robson. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1984. Subsequent page references in text.  
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contrasts his paternalistic attitude towards Indians with what she describes as a forward-thinking 
position on gender:  
 
John Stuart Mill was attuned to a degree remarkable for a man of his day to the ways in 
which European society and laws infantilized women, treating them as wards incapable 
of bearing adult responsibility. At the same time, he accepted with little question the view 
that Indians were similarly immature and incapable of self-government.47 
 
Pitts’ portrayal of Mill as a “remarkable” visionary on women’s rights despite his “blind spot” 
concerning empire is a reading of Mill that depends on viewing his position as anachronistic: at 
once ahead of his time and behind the times.48 Yet neither charge – Mill as backward and racist, 
or forward-thinking and feminist – gives a complete, or a properly historicized, account of Mill’s 
position. In the rest of this chapter, I argue that a similar structure of thought underlies Mill’s 
position on both race and gender, and that both are informed by nineteenth-century ideas about 
rights and responsibilities. In advocating for gender equality in a fashion that rejects separate 
sphere ideology as oppressive and tyrannical, but nonetheless naturalizes its logic, Mill connects 
the concept of responsibility with the very whiggish notion of capability or capacity. No one is 
excluded from equality on the evidence of race or gender alone, but one must prove oneself 
capable of rights before one can be granted the responsibilities that rights entail. 
                                               
47 Jennifer Pitts. A Turn to Empire: The Rise of Imperial Liberalism in Britain and France. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005, p. 5. 
48 Mill’s position on women is frequently framed as “remarkable.” See also Jennifer Ring. 
“Mill’s The Subjection of Women: The Methodological Limits of Liberal Feminism.” The Review 
of Politics 47.1 (January 1985): 27-44. Ring opens with the claim that “John Stuart Mill’s The 
Subjection of Women is a remarkable document for its time” (27). See also Hollie Mann and Jeff 
Spinner-Halev: “What is so remarkable about Mill’s analysis of gender, where he compares 
being a wife to being a slave, is that it is strikingly similar to contemporary radical feminist 
arguments made by Adrienne Rich, Catharine MacKinnon, Andrea Dworkin, and others about 
the institution of marriage and the practice of compulsory heterosexuality.” “John Stuart Mill’s 
Feminism: On Progress, the State, and the Path to Justice.” Polity 42.2 (2010): 244-70, p. 253. 
Subsequent page references in text. 
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In Subjection, Mill clearly imagines a world in which some men are not fit for the 
responsibilities of married, and perhaps civic, life. Behavior at home is indexed to a great chain 
of being, in which “angels” and “absolute fiends” are rare. Everyone else has their place in a 
progressive chain, at the bottom of which are “ferocious savages, with occasional touches of 
humanity… and in the wide interval which separates these from any worthy representatives of 
the human species, how many are the forms and gradations of animalism and selfishness, often 
under an outward varnish of civilization and even cultivation, living at peace with the law”; yet 
despite breaking no laws, these savages make the lives of the women they live with “a torment 
and a burden” (288). The progressiveness of this chain maps onto gender, inasmuch as we saw 
that it mapped onto race in “The Negro Question,” whereby worthiness and cultivation are 
concepts that are notionally not specific, but in the end are limited to a very particular sense of 
fitness.  
There is, then, a structural similarity in the way that Mill treats both racial and gender 
differences, but there are also crucial distinctions in the way Mill handles difference in 
Subjection compared to his debate with Carlyle on the “Negro Question.” I am not suggesting a 
progression in Mill’s conception of difference over time; rather, I want to suggest these 
distinctions hinge less on temporality than on the particular orientation of gender to public and 
private life. Given that, as I have suggested, feelings signify for Mill a subjective space of 
inaccessible difference, the relationship between men and women – and men’s and women’s 
feelings – is significant. The relationship between the black Jamaican and the white Englishman 
is structured by differences of race as well as nation and thus suggests that difference is 
unbreachable based on geographical distance and therefore the impossibility of thinking or 
feeling together. By contrast, gender introduces a space of difference inside the home. When 
Hollie Mann and Jeff Spinner-Halev maintain that Mill “challenged the traditional liberal idea 
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that there is an impermeable boundary between the public and the private” (255), what is effaced 
is precisely the importance of the private sphere for Mill. Private relations, to put it baldly, are 
qualitatively different than public ones because they are based not simply on feelings of 
obligation, but (at least ideally) on affective bonds of love. The marital relationship thus serves a 
very specific purpose for Mill, one which is more complex than the framework of liberal 
feminism often grants it.  
One way to think about the significance of marriage in Mill’s thought is through Lauren 
Berlant’s concept of “enabling disavowals,” which allow us to maintain the disposition she calls 
cruel optimism: namely, attachment to what is bad for us.49 Berlant notes the way love has been 
seen to function as a “bargaining tool for convincing others to join in making a life that also 
provides a loophole through which people can view themselves nonetheless as fundamentally 
noninstrumental” (181). Arguing against Butler, who looks at how the subject chooses or refuses 
to reproduce the attachment to subordination, Berlant argues that the hegemonic is “not merely 
domination dressed more becomingly” but “a metastructure of consent.” As such, “dependable 
life relies on the sheerly optimistic formalism of attachment,” which is why we consent to tell a 
story about the good life even as it hurts us, even as we are not “the hegemons” (185). “What 
would happen,” Berlant asks, “if we saw subjectivization as happening historically, as training in 
affective sense perception and intuition?” (186). Elsewhere, Berlant poses several questions 
about subjectivization, including the following, which is most useful for my purposes: “how are 
the infrastructural activities of capital expressed in practice, experience, and subjectivity?”50 It is 
this relationship – between the “infrastructural activities” of capital, figured as empire and the 
nation-state – that I want to scrutinize through gender in this chapter. How do gender relations 
                                               
49 Lauren Berlant. Cruel Optimism. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2011, p. 215. 
50 McCabe, Earl. “Depressive Realism: An Interview with Lauren Berlant.” The Hypocrite 
Reader. 5 (2011). 
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provide Mill with another way to structure freedom to exclude certain people? How does the 
intimate sphere perform a unique role in the training in affective sense perception? And how can 
we link the structure of the family and its affective model to Mill’s establishment of a rather 
Darwinian circuit of cultivation: the only people who are worth cultivating are the people who 
are already in some sense cultivatable? And how does this circuit hinge on the idea of gender 
difference, as something that is both empirically thinkable and also beyond all possible reach of 
empirical thought? 
Subjection can be understood as Mill’s attempt to shift the terms of marriage from 
domination to consent. Difference is, as I have shown, central to the way Mill thinks about 
power: biological determinism may justify a degree of domination, or at the very least trouble the 
notion of consent, and consequently we see Mill grapple with the origin of gender difference 
much as he did, in “The Negro Question,” with the origin of racial difference. However, Mill’s 
ambivalence about whether, under conditions of equality, gender differences would persist – 
what Mann and Spinner-Halev call his “agnostic” position (254) – has often been confused with 
a complete refusal of natural gender differences. Mill’s argument has frequently been understood 
to hinge on contradiction. On the one hand, he argues that, given systemic inequality, we cannot 
know the limitations of women based on observable behavior; and on the other hand, his claim 
for female equality rests on capacity proven through observable behavior.51 In asking whether 
Mill’s argument is consistent with feminism, and if so how to reconcile the apparent 
“contradictions” in his work, we fail to appreciate that Mill’s construction of empiricism and its 
                                               
51 See Elizabeth A. Smith. “John Stuart Mill’s ‘The Subjection of Women’: A Re-Examination.” 




limits is not a contradiction at all.52 For Mill, empirical methods clearly show that the “feeling” 
of naturalness about women’s subjection to men is “dependent on custom” rather than on 
inherent difference: “everything which is usual appears natural” (270). That premise, that the 
best form of gender relations is the current form based on inequality and on women’s subjection, 
“rests upon theory only; for there never has been a trial made of any other: so that experience, in 
the sense in which it is vulgarly opposed to theory, cannot be pretended to have pronounced any 
verdict” (264). It is precisely not the point that Mill “did not believe that any intellectual or 
affective differences between men and women would hold once equality and liberty were 
widespread,” as Mann and Spinner-Halev argue (254-5). In fact, Mill takes pains to stress that 
we cannot know whether the gender differences we can see are natural or whether they are the 
product of inequality:  
 
Standing on the ground of common sense and the constitution of the human mind, I deny 
that any one knows, or can know, the nature of the two sexes, as long as they have only 
been seen in their present relation to one another… What is now called the nature of 
women is an eminently artificial thing—the result of forced repression in some 
directions, unnatural stimulation in others (276; my emphasis).  
 
Thus, when Mill asserts that “no one can safely pronounce that if women’s nature were left to 
choose its directions as freely as men’s… there would be any material difference, or perhaps any 
difference at all, in the character and capacities which would unfold themselves” (305), the 
important point, which is so often obscured, is not that we can say with any certainty that 
differences would not hold under conditions of equality, but that we cannot “safely pronounce” 
one way or the other. 
                                               
52 After summarizing the position of feminist critics, Smith proceeds to attempt to reclaim Mill 
for feminism, and attribute the perceived contradictions as evidence of Mill’s (remarkable, 
forward-thinking) concession to the (repressive) times. 
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Retaining the full sense of indeterminacy about Mill’s understanding of the origin of 
gender difference is necessary to understand the way his empiricism works to shape a notion of 
freedom that is neither as remarkable nor as “limited” as some critics have characterized it. 
Mill’s project in Subjection is ultimately both radical and conservative, a curious mix of 
feminism and benign paternalism: what would happen if we grant freedom to women, and in that 
event how could we direct them? When he does evoke the specter of natural difference, he does 
so only to question whether that difference is natural in the sense of biological, or natural in the 
sense of a logical consequence of repressive circumstances: “I shall presently show, that even the 
least contestable of the differences which now exist, are such as may very well have been 
produced merely by circumstances” (305). Consider his discussion of brain size. Mill rejects the 
idea that men’s brains are always larger than women’s, on the evidence of “a man who had 
weighed many human brains, [and] said that the heaviest he knew of, heavier even than Cuvier’s 
… was that of a woman” (311). What Mill rejects here is not the connection between gender, 
brain size and intelligence, but certainty about the degree of the connection. By “making 
abstraction of the great unsettled controversy respecting the appropriation of different parts of 
the brain to different mental faculties,” Mill asserts that all we do know about the brain is that 
there is some connection between magnitude and capacity, and that the magnitude of the brain is 
not the only factor determining the capacity of the instrument (311). In effect, all the empirical 
method can do here is prove uncertainty: by abstracting from what we do know, all we can 
establish as a general principle is the fact of uncertainty regarding brain size and its relationship 
to mental capacity. As a result, all that remains to us is to hypothesize: it would therefore “not be 
surprising” to Mill “if men on the average should have the advantage in the size of the brain, and 
women in activity of cerebral circulation” (311). As this hypothesis accords with what we can 
observe in general behavior – that a woman’s brain is quicker to fatigue, but also quicker to 
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recover; that women are quick, whereas men excel at the kind of thinking that requires “most 
plodding and long hammering at a single thought” – it is likely to be a difference that is 
biological in origin (312). However, even when these differences seem to be entirely observable, 
they still remain a kind of thought experiment, notionally provable but nonetheless unproven: 
“this speculation is entirely hypothetical; it pretends to no more than to suggest a line of enquiry” 
(312). Mill is quite emphatically not rejecting the notion of natural difference as such; what he 
repudiates is “the notion of its being yet certainly known that there is any natural difference at 
all” (312). The effect of this repudiation is to force the empirical gaze on what is knowable or 
“most accessible to speculation” (313): the “different relations of human beings to society and 
life” (312) or “the origin of the differences actually observed” (313).  
This focus on the oppressive social relations that shape most difference is what has by 
turns excited and frustrated feminist readers of Mill’s work, as he seems to be making an 
argument that gender is constructed and difference results from “a differing socialization,”53 or, 
as one critic puts it, he “foreshadows later ‘radical feminist’ views of sexist socialization.”54 Yet 
his empiricism can just as easily turn to reinforcing innate gender differences; as Ring contends, 
“he is forced to present contradictory arguments from a single store of empirical evidence” (40). 
The explanatory framework for Mill’s consideration of gender difference is thus a peculiar kind 
of empiricism. It is not a search for “inductive certainty,” resting on the question of “how can we 
get a ‘universal law’ out of isolated and unrelated particulars,”55 but in fact the opposite: a search 
for inductive uncertainty through which an isolated and unrelated particular can refute perceived 
universal laws without establishing competing universals to replace them. His understanding of 
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gender requires that we dispense with generalizations about women’s unsuitability for public life 
based on the evidence of a single exception. The circular logic of his pronouncement that “any 
woman, who succeeds in an open profession, proves by that very fact that she is qualified for it” 
does establish a kind of empirical certainty, but it is based on a crucial inductive uncertainty 
about what else women can do (301).56 When Mill posits that “what they have done, that at least, 
if nothing else, it is proved that they can do,” the qualifications – the “at least” and “if nothing 
else” – reinforce unknowability. While we know what women have done, we do not know the 
form and extent of natural difference and therefore the “else” remains in radical uncertainty 
(302). The argument is based on potential, which takes exceptional examples and uses them to 
refute generalizations about gender difference based on what women typically do, as follows: 
 
Let us at first make entire abstraction of all psychological considerations tending to show, 
that any of the mental differences supposed to exist between women and men are but the 
natural effect of the differences in their education and circumstances, and indicate no 
radical difference, far less radical inferiority, of nature. Let us consider women only as 
they already are, or as they are known to have been; and the capacities which they have 
already practically shown (302). 
 
Herein, Mill takes an experienced fact and makes from it an “entire abstraction.” What is 
interesting to note is the kind of empirical generalization Mill is asking us to make, based upon 
the exceptional fact that surpasses the common experienced fact. In making abstractions of what 
is unprovable – the origin of gender difference, and consequently innate inferiority – Mill 
establishes that only a certain kind of evidence counts as empirical evidence: “negative evidence 
is worth little, while any positive evidence is conclusive” (302). What results is an empiricism 
which focuses not on the everyday or common experience, or the effect of subordination on the 
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vast majority of women, but on the unique case. It is those unique cases – those extraordinary 
women who are the “fit” ones, to use the Darwinian language Mill frequently adopts – whose 
subordination matters more than blocking the undeserved progress of the unfit: “If only once in a 
dozen years the conditions of eligibility exclude a fit person, there is a real loss, while the 
exclusion of thousands of unfit persons is no gain” (274). As the idea of fitness indicates, the 
question of what evidence counts, and which particulars are generalizable, is intimately linked to 
the question of who can experience freedom. 
It is important to note that the “loss” Mill describes as resulting from excluding the 
exceptional women, it is clearly just as much a loss to the social whole as it is a loss to that 
particular individual who is excluded. The reason for that broader social loss is the nature of the 
power that results in women’s subordination to men. It is, as the opening page of Subjection 
makes clear, not simply the subordination, but the “legal subordination of one sex to the other” 
that is at issue (261). The problem of excluding “even a few women” who may be fit for certain 
duties is that “the laws which shut the door on those exceptions cannot be justified by any 
opinion which can be held respecting the capacities of women in general” (301): it is not the fact 
of exclusion that troubles Mill here, but the fact that the mechanism which shuts doors to 
exceptional women is a legal one. The implication is that the exceptional women who suffer by 
being limited are less significant than the cost to the larger social whole (and the exceptional 
people who steer its direction) of being the form that blocks potential. This way of thinking 
about inequality, as equally if not primarily a problem for those who benefit from unjust laws, is 
consistent with Mill’s conception of liberty and his understanding of the problem of racial 
difference in “The Negro Question.” Difference, whether it is gender or racial difference or even 
difference in intellect, does not trouble Mill if it is the result of natural capacity, but is intolerable 
when it is created through external circumstances. What those who seek to claim Mill as a proto-
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radical feminist fail to grasp is that, according to the logic of Subjection, the idea of inherent 
gender difference or different gender roles pose no conceptual difficulty, but the legal ascription 
of these different roles is both intolerable and unacceptable.  
In one of the clearer articulations of his elitism, Mill maintains that, “in the more 
improved countries,” women are the only case besides royalty “in which laws and institutions 
take persons at their birth, and ordain that they shall never in all their lives be allowed to 
compete for certain things” (274). All “dignities and social advantages are open to the whole 
male sex,” even those attainable only through wealth, as “wealth may be striven for by any one, 
and is actually obtained by many men of the very humblest origin” (274). Mill’s indifference to 
the “insuperable” difficulties “to the majority” of acquiring wealth or status “without the aid of 
fortunate accidents” is a clear expression of both his whiggishness and what is for him the 
sticking point of nineteenth-century gender relations: that “no male human being is under any 
legal ban” and therefore “neither law nor opinion superadd artificial obstacles to the natural 
ones” (275). If we consider Mill’s notion of freedom as the ability to develop according to one’s 
natural capacity, and autonomy as the ability to follow one’s inclinations within the bounds set 
by natural capacity not artificial regulation, it is easy to see why gender relations in nineteenth-
century Britain posed such a problem for Mill, and why he focused in particular on the 
institutional relation of marriage. Marriage is a particularly problematic relation for Mill, 
primarily because it undermines the logic of inherently different capacities and responsibilities 
by suggesting that women must be coerced into gender roles, and secondarily because it is a 
relation that must structure life both for those whose natural capacities are great and exceptional, 
and those whose natural capacities incline them to barbarism. It is particularly important to note 
that Mill distinguishes between two sources of “artificial obstacles”: the law and opinion. This 
would seem to refer to the idea of the “received opinion” which, in On Liberty, is grasped by the 
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unthinking, unempirical majority and which threatens the cognitive freedom of the extraordinary 
individual. Opinion serves a slightly different function in Subjection than it does in On Liberty, 
for women are both controlled by opinion, but also strangely aligned with it. The tension has 
implications for the question of whether it is possible to consider women as fully a part of Mill’s 
conception of the universal idea of the individual.  
Capacity must be allowed to develop freely, and because legal obstacles prevent this free 
development, they are a problem for Mill. When Uday Mehta describes the attitude of British 
paternalism about India as “an odd mix of maturity, familial concern, and an underlying 
awareness of the capacity to direct, and if need be, coerce,”57 it is the phrase “if need be, coerce” 
that draws a line between a liberal paternalistic frame of mind in the British Empire, and the 
problem of paternalism for Mill at home – both at home in the national sense, and literally in the 
domestic sphere. As a legal relation, enforced on women by “foul rather than fair means,” the 
problem with marriage is that it defines the woman and the man as one legal unit (283). The 
inadequate protection afforded to a few by settlements notwithstanding, the legal consequence of 
marriage for women thus entails the complete “absorption of all rights, all property, as well as all 
freedom of action” (284). The usurpation of the rights of married women precludes the 
possibility that women would or even could enter into marriage willingly, as Mill’s comparison 
of it to a business relationship makes clear: “No one would enter into partnership on terms which 
would subject him to the responsibilities of a principal, with only the powers and privileges of a 
clerk or agent” (291). Unlike a business partnership, marriage cannot be dissolved easily, and 
tyranny in the relationship should be prevented not through the codified designation of rights and 
responsibilities, but through vague and ultimately unenforceable factors like the personal 
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affection “which is the growth of time” (289). Influence comes through building a common life: 
the having and raising children; cultivating a “community of interests as concerns third persons”; 
the importance of the wife to her husband’s comforts and “the value he consequently attaches to 
her on his personal account, which, in a man capable of feeling for others, lays the foundation of 
caring for her on her own” (290). Through the intertwining of lives, a married couple develops 
the “influence naturally acquired over almost all human beings by those near to their persons” 
and thus “both by their direct entreaties, and by the insensible contagion of their feelings and 
dispositions,” they are able “unless counteracted by some equally strong personal influence, to 
obtain a degree of command over the conduct of the superior, altogether excessive and 
unreasonable” (289-290).  
The idea of contagious feelings alerts us to Mill’s interest in the marriage question, 
specifically, what makes gender difference a problem that is structurally similar to, though in 
certain ways more fraught than, the question of racial difference. Mehta’s identification of the 
risks of cosmopolitanism elucidates one reason why this is the case. For Mehta, the risk of 
encountering difference is always a risk of “the possibility of being confronted with utter opacity 
– an intransigent strangeness, an unfamiliarity that remains so, an experience that cannot be 
shared, prejudices that do not readily fuse with a cosmopolitan horizon, a difference that cannot 
be assimilated” (22). Confronting opacity in the home is a more fraught interaction than 
encountering it in the public sphere, because of the closeness of the encounter. In the home, 
difference is assimilated bodily. In the domestic space, unlike in the public sphere in which 
cosmopolitan encounters take place, influence happens not through rational discussion or the 
struggle between the potentially tyrannous opinions of the majority and those of the minority, but 
through the “insensible contagion” of “feelings and dispositions,” as though a mood could 
percolate through the domestic space and infect even the strongest of inhabitants. This form of 
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influence bestows upon women an excessive form of power to which the wife has no right, and 
which does nothing to address her lack of freedom: “neither in the affairs of families nor in those 
of states is power a compensation for the loss of freedom” (290). Mill’s easy slippage between 
the family and the state indicates his tendency throughout Subjection to think about the state and 
the family as aligned if not exactly analogous. Yet it is by no means clear that he consistently 
sees the role of the family as equivalent to the role of the state. Though at times Mill’s argument 
rests on the family’s crucial distinction from the state and the public sphere, here its corporate 
function – as a unit composed of individuals, though not in the uneven sense that coverture 
implies – establishes the family as a form analogous to a business partnership or the state. As a 
corporation, then, the family becomes a site for thinking about the principles pertaining to the 
body politic in the sentimental or affective register the marital relationship necessitates. The 
transmission of affect thus cannot be considered purely a private matter, merely at play in the 
private space of the home; invoking the state suggests a political aspect of the transmission of 
feeling, and invoking notions of liberty, rights, responsibility, governance, and consent in the 
idea of feeling with or as someone else.58 
Politicizing feelings in this way suggests the political function of the private realm, and 
indeed domesticity and the family, play important roles in Mill’s conception of the state. Yet the 
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distinction between the public and the private remains an important one for Mill. Before 
returning to the politics of private space, and the way Subjection considers the risks inherent in 
the encounter with radical difference in the home, I want to explore Mill’s configuration of the 
private as a separate space. What purpose does its distinctiveness serve? Habermas points to one 
model for thinking about the separation of the public and private in Marx’s counter-model of the 
bourgeois public sphere. In Habermas’s account of the bourgeois public sphere, autonomy is 
rooted in “the sphere of commodity exchange.”59 In Marx’s dialectical counter-model, after the 
extension of the franchise to include the propertyless, the public would have no interest in 
maintaining the privateness of society; the public sphere would “be able to realize in earnest 
what it had promised” (127). According to this “socialist formulation” of the liberal idea of the 
political public sphere, the relationship between the public and the private was reversed (128). 
Private autonomy is the result of publicness: “Private persons came to be the private persons of a 
public rather than a public of private persons” (128-9). The public “secured for itself (as 
composed of private persons) a sphere of personal freedom, leisure, and freedom of movement” 
(129). For Engels and Marx, this is the emancipation of personal, private interaction from the 
economic function, removing the basis for the family and its relevance to the state; no longer 
“saddled with any legal regulations” the family would be privatized, and the relations between 
the sexes would become a purely private and not a social affair (129). The liberal model 
conceived of the extension of the franchise in an alternative way, seeing not the emancipation of 
the private realm from its economic function or the democratization of the public sphere, but 
conciliation: that is to say, the contradiction of an extended franchise within the context of an 
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unequal class society could be solved through “conserving a relativized form of the bourgeois 
public sphere” through representativeness (131). 
By Habermas’s account, the dialectical counter-model was to have exposed the Kantian 
model of publicity as ideological (130). The earlier, Kantian model of publicity relies on not on 
the “distributive sameness of all wills,” that is, the will of individuals together, but on the 
“collective oneness of the combined will” (108). This model made “political domination rational 
within the framework of a philosophy of history” (130), viewing the “social preconditions of a 
public sphere as an element in the political realm” as a natural order (130). Where the socialist 
model demonstrated that the bourgeois public sphere could not satisfy its supposed 
preconditions, the liberals, according to Habermas, cast doubt on the “presuppositions of a 
natural basis upon which the idea of a political public sphere rested” (131). But what Habermas 
fails to account for are the ways in which Mill continued to maintain a belief in the “natural basis 
for the public sphere that would in principle guarantee an autonomous and basically harmonious 
course of social reproduction” (130). To put this another way, progress, for Mill, is immanent in 
the natural order, and in consequence familial relations must be privatized, the organization of 
gender relations stemming from natural capacity and not the law. However, the privatization of 
the family does not point to the emancipation of the private sphere from social labor as for Marx. 
Instead, the liberal privatization of the family functions to resolve for Mill the contradiction of 
public sphere ideology: the freedom of the private sphere can be harnessed to make thinkable 
and indeed make natural the unfreedoms occurring elsewhere. It is only as a space of freedom 
that the private realm can enable the forms of power that take place in the public sphere.  
We can see this quite clearly in Mill’s use of slavery as a metaphor for marriage. Though 
the comparison may seem like a stock nineteenth-century argument against the institution, and an 
anticipation of what has since become a feminist trope, the key point about the example is that 
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for Mill it is a metaphor and not a literal comparison. That is to say, slavery and marriage are 
analogous, but they are not precisely the same. Slavery may well be a form of tyranny and 
domination, but it nonetheless preserves the privatization of domesticity even for slaves, in a way 
that marriage, a form of legal restriction that operates in what should be the sphere of freedom 
and leisure, cannot do. As an institutional relation that makes freedom unattainable for women, 
the unfreedom of marriage penetrates the space of the private sphere, thereby upsetting the 
distinction between the public and the private: 
 
no slave is a slave to the same lengths, and in so full a sense of the word, as a wife is. 
Hardly any slave, except one immediately attached to the master’s person, is a slave at all 
hours and all minutes; in general he has, like a soldier, his fixed task, and when it is done, 
or when he is off duty, he disposes, within certain limits, of his own time, and has a 
family life into which the master rarely intrudes. ‘Uncle Tom’ under his first master had 
his own life in his ‘cabin’, almost as much as any man whose work takes him away from 
home, is able to have in his own family. But it cannot be so with the wife (284-285). 
 
Mill’s introduction here of Harriet Beecher Stowe’s Uncle Tom’s Cabin is curious, not least 
because it is, at best, a careless reading of the novel, which makes the insistent point that the 
slave’s cabin and the lives that unfold in it are contingent and, lacking legal protection, allowable 
only at the whim of the slaveowner. George, a slave married to another slave, makes this point 
quite explicitly in the opening chapters of the novel, when he says to his wife: “Don’t you know 
a slave can’t be married? There is no law in this country for that; I can’t hold you for my wife, if 
he chooses to part us.”60 As Tess Chakkalakal writes, the slave’s inability to marry legally made 
slavery in America “not only an economic problem of labor but also an affective problem of 
intimacy.”61 Chakkalakal cites William Wells Brown, whose Clotel makes the point that, in 
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denying slaves the right to marry, “the slaveholder denies to his victim even that slight 
alleviation of his misery, which would result from his marriage being protected by law and 
public opinion” (2). Taken together, these points indicate why Mill’s bad reading of Uncle Tom’s 
Cabin does important work for his conception of what marriage ought to do. Precisely because it 
is not regulated by law, slave marriage takes place entirely in the affective, familial space of the 
private sphere, and is defined in contrast to the economic sphere and the problem of labor rather 
than the legal regulation of the state. In Mill’s reading, Uncle Tom’s position in the private realm 
has an equivalence in the position of any soldier or any other worker whose labor is controlled 
by his employer; the metaphor establishes a kind of social equality not vis-a-vis the state but 
certainly in the private space of the home. 
What slavery does, therefore, is preserve family life as a sphere free from domination, 
which is precisely what nineteenth-century marriage is unable to do. Whereas to an Uncle Tom, 
marriage represents the only place that slavery cannot touch, a site of freedom and self-
determination in a life that is otherwise circumscribed, for a wife there can be no such freedom: 
for her, slavery operates at the level of family life itself. It is precisely because slave marriage is 
not regulated by law – and is thus a question of affect, intimacy, labor, and the public but not the 
state – that it can function in such a way for Mill. Chakkalakal characterizes Brown’s as an 
argument for legal marriage and consequently for abolition: recognizing affective bonds as legal 
ones thus renders the slave capable of bearing rights. Mill’s argument relies on making the same 
connection, but in reverse: making legal obligations out of affective ones enslaves women in 
relation to the state, and that enslavement carries over into the affective realm. Private relations 
become structured by political subjugation, as “every one of the subjects lives under the very 
eye, and almost, it may be said, in the hands, of one of the masters… each individual of the 
subject-class is in a chronic state of bribery and intimidation combined” (268). This form of 
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enslavement is harder to resist than political disenfranchisement, as it restricts solidarity among 
the subjected: unlike Uncle Tom, living happily with his family in his own cabin, each subjected 
woman lives with her master, “in closer intimacy with him than with any of her fellow 
subjects… If ever any system of privilege and enforced subjection had its yoke tightly riveted on 
the necks of those who are kept down by it, this has” (268). It is quite clear that marriage is a 
distinct form of captivity because it is an affective one: “men do not want solely the obedience of 
women, they want their sentiments. All men, except the most brutish, desire to have, in the 
woman most nearly connected with them, not a forced slave but a willing one, not a slave 
merely, but a favourite. They have therefore put everything in practice to enslave their minds” 
(271). Mill imagines the slavery of marriage – unaccountably, unlike actual slavery – penetrating 
directly to the seat of liberal individuality itself, to a woman's character: “no other class of 
dependents have had their character so entirely distorted from its natural proportions by their 
relation with their masters,” as “conquered and slave races” may have been “more forcibly 
repressed,” but “whatever in them has not been crushed down by an iron heel has generally been 
let alone” (276). Unlike slavery and because of the intimacy of the relationship, marriage shapes 
women’s “capabilities” (276); the comparison suggests that even slaves have a capacity for 
individuality that women are denied. 
That Mill sees slavery and marriage as crucially unlike implies that his conception of 
freedom is ultimately framed in gendered terms (notwithstanding that his objections to marriage 
seem to be based in ideas of universal or human rights and thus not especially marked by 
gender). For example, Mill’s argument depends on a rhetoric of choice, rights, and desire: a 
woman can never be said to choose marriage, as she is always presented with the “Hobson’s 
choice” to take it or leave it (281). Marriage involves the loss of all property rights, including the 
rights over her own person including the right to follow her own “inclinations,” the “legal rights” 
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to her children, or the right to live apart from her husband without being compelled to return “by 
law, or by physical force” (285). Arguments like these suggest that Mill is arguing for women as 
the subject-bearers of equal rights, equal choice, and equal freedom. That marriage impinges 
upon the kind of choices and freedoms that are available to women is clearly an issue, however 
that should not lead us to assume that, for Mill, marriage as an ideal relation rejects gendered 
rights entirely, or that, as Nadia Urbinati has proposed, “androgyny forms the philosophical 
foundation for Mill’s vision of civil and political equality between men and women and of his 
belief in the free development of individuality.”62 Reading Mill in a trajectory of liberal 
feminism, or even radical feminism, does not grant the crucial point that in Mill’s conception 
rights and obligations are and should be gendered; the legal restrictions imposed on women in 
marriage are intolerable because they obstruct the free operation of those gendered rights. The 
slavery metaphor highlights the fact that women ought to bear certain rights and do not, but it 
also highlights the fact that those rights are always already gendered ones. For instance, the right 
of refusing what Mill calls “the last familiarity” is not only an “admitted right” but a “moral 
obligation” for the female slave “in Christian countries,” but, as Mill says, “not so the wife: 
however brutal a tyrant she may unfortunately be chained to… he can claim from her and 
enforce the lowest degradation of a human being, that of being made the instrument of an animal 
function contrary to her inclinations” (285). Though the word “inclinations” might suggest a 
more universal concept of bodily determination, the context makes clear that this is a right of 
refusal only, and hence a gendered right. The effectiveness of slavery as a point of comparison 
for marriage works on the notion that there are natural and separate gender roles, and it is those 
which the contemporary form of marriage obstructs.  
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Urbinati maintains that Mill saw sexual equality as “a precondition of individual free 
choice and self-determination,” which liberates men and women from “rigid distinctions 
imposed by sex roles” (631). This may be the most literal way to understand Mill’s analogous 
discussion of marriage and slavery, but, as I have argued, Mill’s problem with marriage as a 
form of control is not that it enchains us within the restrictions of gender roles. Rather, marriage 
as a legal form of subjugation imposes artificial regulation that prevents the development of 
natural gender roles. The “anxiety” that causes men to compel women into marriage and 
motherhood “for fear lest nature should not succeed in effecting its purpose” is “an altogether 
unnecessary solicitude”: “One thing we may be certain of – that what is contrary to women’s 
nature to do, they never will be made to do by simply giving their nature free play” (280). If 
Mill’s language sounds Kantian here, evoking the free play of imagination and understanding of 
the third critique, it is perhaps because the logic also is. Requiring marriage as a free choice so 
that what women do, absent legal obstacles, becomes proof of what they can do follows a similar 
kind of paradoxical thinking that is familiar to us in Kant’s notion of free play. As a “mental 
state or activity in which the imagination stands in relation to understanding, but without being 
governed by concepts,” imagination manifests the lawfulness of understanding in a way that is 
free or without a law.63 There is a symmetrical form aligning the Kantian paradox of lawfulness 
without a law and Mill’s paradoxical conception of marriage. In other words, what Mill seems to 
be advocating in Subjection is marriage as a relationship based in “freedom and accordance with 
rules.”64 Marriage cannot be thought about as a natural relation until it is a choice made freely 
and on “equal conditions” (281): “freedom of individual choice is … the only thing which 
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procures the adoption of the best processes, and throws each operation into the hands of those 
who are best qualified for it” (273). But once it is so chosen, marriage provides a system of 
governance which is no less gendered despite being extra-legal. Freedom is, to make the obvious 
point, not compatible with tyranny, but nor is it incompatible with a lawfulness based on a form 
of gender difference that is perceived as natural. So, in Mill’s conception, marriage ought to be a 
state of freedom, and in accordance with rules, not a state of tyranny and despotism. This 
emphasis on marriage as a relation entered into freely is not the first step towards an undoing of 
gender roles, as feminist readings of Mill often proclaim. It is, in fact, what establishes the 
principles of freedom that are a necessary condition before it is possible to reify gender roles as 
natural or resulting organically from natural difference, and not the product of social 
organization or enforced domination. Freeing the marriage relationship from despotism, 
regulation and the sphere of governance and the state to anchor it in the affective realm means 
that continued subordination must be the result of inclination and is thus sufficient proof of 
natural difference. It is women’s inclination and natural capacity to be subordinate, and it is 
necessary that women are equal in marriage in relation to the state, so that their social inequality 
is made possible and thinkable within Mill’s definition of liberal freedom.65  
If Mill’s conception of ideal marriage can be thought of as a lawfulness without a law, 
the ambivalence he displays about the origins and evolution of law makes a certain kind of sense. 
Like the origin of gender difference itself, Mill cannot or will not determine whether laws 
evolved to perpetuate an arrangement of gender relations that developed organically, or they 
enforced an artificial dependence on women that is not the product of a natural inequality. 
Because “laws and systems of polity always begin by recognising the relations they find already 
                                               
65 In other words, removing the legal injustices marriage perpetrates allows Mill to redeem the 
family as a site of slavery, so that it can become the site of subjectivization, hence enabling what 
Berlant calls “training in affective sense perception and intuition” (Cruel Optimism 186). 
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existing between individuals,” the present legal subjection of women to men arose out of what 
Mill implies is a natural difference, based on reproductive capacity and physical strength: “from 
the very earliest twilight of human society, every woman (owing to the value attached to her by 
men, combined with her inferiority in muscular strength) was found in a state of bondage to 
some man” (264). What follows is a long and whiggish history of social relations, in which Mill 
characterizes force as a barbaric and primitive mode of organizing governance, and in all 
respects, except for gender relations, one that has been superseded by “institutions grounded on 
equal justice” (265). In this account, gender difference existed in the form of a relationship 
between men and women, based on men’s strength and women’s value to men presumably 
regarding childbearing, and this naturally occurring form of difference was exacerbated and 
codified by subsequent legal relations. The principle that the natural determines the legal would 
make sense if Mill wants to reject marriage as a form of relation governed by laws and the state, 
because it suggests that there is no need to codify something that is naturally occurring in any 
case.  
Though in many ways this is indeed the argument Mill makes, he does not make it 
without qualification. Instead, and interestingly, he complicates his position by also arguing that 
the difference in law is what creates inequality, by perverting the character and morals of those 
who live under its unfairness. In Hegelian fashion, it is the oppressor and not the oppressed who 
is most damaged by this relationship: “servitude, except when it actually brutalizes, though 
corrupting to both, is less so to the slaves than to the slave-masters. It is wholesomer for the 
moral nature to be restrained, even by arbitrary power, than to be allowed to exercise arbitrary 
power without restraint” (321). At stake in this remarkable statement is not simply the morality 
of men, though that is clearly a concern: relations of force and men’s assumption of arbitrary 
power prevents the development of what Mill calls “genuine moral sentiment,” which can only 
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be cultivated in “daily life” in the context of the “equality of married persons before the law” 
(293). But, as Mill’s argument unfolds, it becomes clear that legal equality depends on both 
cultivating morality and the moral legitimacy of superiority. Consider, he asks his reader, “what 
it is to a boy, to grow up to manhood in the belief that without any merit or any exertion of his 
own …by the mere fact of being born a male he is by right the superior of all and every one of an 
entire half of the human race” (324, my emphasis). This belief leads to the perversion of 
“character”: it is not simply man as a “social being” that is so affected, but man as an 
“individual” (325). Such an unwarranted power of domination cultivates in the boy a “sublime 
and sultan-like sense of superiority,” which saturates not just social and private life, but also the 
interior space of the mind: “men of the cultivated classes are often not aware how deeply it sinks 
into the immense majority of male minds” (324).  
The problem of domination as a legal practice is that it thwarts the free play of capacity, 
and as such, it has consequences for the definition of freedom itself. As Mill’s characterization of 
arbitrary power as most harmful to the slave-master might suggest, it is what freedom means for 
men, rather than for the subjugated women:  
 
Any sentiment of freedom which can exist in a man whose nearest and dearest intimacies 
are with those of whom he is absolute master, is not the genuine or Christian love of 
freedom, but, what the love of freedom generally was in the ancients and in the Middle 
Ages – an intense feeling of the dignity and importance of his own personality (295).  
 
Real freedom, then, is incompatible with a social order shaped around “the right of the strong to 
power over the weak,” as justice will therefore “never get possession of men’s inmost 
sentiments; they will be working against it, even when bending to it” (326). Freedom cannot be 
merely the ability to command the labor of others; this is a form of rule that undermines the 
principle of independence that is at the heart of freedom, indeed the very notion of the sovereign 
subject. Thus, Mill’s objection to the doctrine of coverture is not to shared ownership as such or 
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even the treatment of a married couple as one unit under the law, but to the fact that the man’s 
ownership of common goods is compelled by law and is therefore a form of intolerable 
dependence. The ownership of goods in common, as a concept, is perfectly acceptable “when 
resulting from an entire unity of feeling in the owners,” but as the enforced acquisition of goods 
it is of no real benefit: “I have no relish for a community of goods resting on the doctrine, that 
what is mine is yours but what is yours is not mine; and I should prefer to decline entering into 
such a compact with any one, though I were myself the person to profit by it” (297). Justifiable 
superiority, the kind that leads to progress and that warrants elevation and legitimates 
governance, must be the result of character, not the law: “conduct, and conduct alone, entitles to 
respect… not what men are, but what they do, constitutes their claim to deference” (325). 
Profiting, therefore, through the law and not through merit enchains both parties. 
Mill’s argumentation works to produce the possibility of dominance rendered as a kind of 
reciprocity, a relation that is nevertheless the product of force but which does not involve a 
feeling of control.66 The distribution of rights should “follow the division of duties and 
functions” as determined by “individual capacities and suitabilities” and not a pre-determined 
law (291). While this by no means suggests a perfect equality, it does avoid the association of 
conquest to instead describe a relation of dominance in terms that imply two free, sovereign 
subjects negotiating their rights on equal grounds or on the basis of best fit. Thus, the “natural 
arrangement” of a marriage is “a division of powers between the two; each being absolute in the 
executive branch of their own department, and any change of system and principle requiring the 
                                               
66 We might think of it as the opposite of the dynamic of shameless that Berlant posits here: “The 
structure of shamelessness doesn’t necessarily involve in-your-faceness. It can involve any frank 
refusal to produce the affect for you that you need someone to have in order for you to feel in 
control of the situation of exchange. It is to take control over the making and breaking of the 
terms in which reciprocity will proceed, if at all” (Lauren Berlant, Sina Najafi and David Serlin. 




consent of both” (291). The language Mill uses here is not, significantly, the language of love but 
the language of governance: division of power, consent, executive branch. This is an important 
transition in language from Mill’s consideration of marriage as a (worse) form of slavery in the 
sense that the affective realm is replaced by the realm of governance, that is, from marriage as a 
relation of love to marriage as a relation within or like the state. The language therefore effects a 
shift away from mutuality (the idea of a community of goods merging naturally through shared 
feelings) and the idea of equality under the law to the concept of liberty rendered as an atomized 
and separate independence. The family becomes quite literally analogous with the nation, as no 
adult member can be happy while excluded from the “deciding authority”: “It is the same with 
nations. What citizen of a free country would listen to any offers of good and skillful 
administration, in return for the abdication of freedom?” (337). The family imagined like or as a 
nation suggests a very different kind of family than the one the slave metaphor proffers. Here the 
family does not seem to be a part of the private sphere, or what Habermas calls the “conjugal 
family’s internal space” (30), and in fact the language Mill uses strips the family of its intimacy. 
While the family may still fit two of the three aspects – voluntariness and a community of love – 
of the Habermasian private sphere, Mill’s family in this instance troubles the third aspect of 
cultivation, whereby the private sphere permits the “non-instrumental development of all 
faculties that marks the cultivated personality” (46-7). 
Mill uses the comparison between slavery and marriage to sever the connection between 
marriage and the law, suggesting that the affective bonds of the family are what allows one to 
confront unfreedom or tyranny in the slave economy or capitalist labor market. That he then 
yokes the family together with the state serves as an interesting modification of the role of the 
intimate sphere. Whereas in comparison to slavery, the intimacy of the family is paramount, in 
this curious doubling of the family and the state intimacy is precisely what gets drained through 
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the use of contractual, non-affective language. In part, the result is to make clear something that 
the slavery comparison only implies: the family, even as an utterly privatized realm, is always 
instrumental. Making the family analogous with the state however, suggests a different kind of 
instrumentality than in Habermas’s account of the bourgeois private sphere. For Habermas, the 
family is instrumental in that it gives the illusion of freedom as a boundless state of being, all the 
while conscripting the family and its privacy as what reproduces the capitalist economy. The 
freedom of the private sphere is thus a kind of false consciousness, “a private autonomy denying 
its economic origins” (46). For Mill, however, the private sphere is not a seemingly emancipated 
inner realm that in reality is constrained by its social function to mediate and ensure the 
reproduction of capital; instead, figuring the family as a state in miniature suggests instead that it 
is purposive and directed towards the state, even in its privatization. That is to say, there is no 
illusion about the non-instrumentality of the family: the cultivation it enables is always a 
cultivation relative to the state. This is less an audience-oriented privacy than an always already 
civic one.67  
When Mill proposes that “personal independence” is necessary to happiness (336), we 
might think that this is a form of privacy and individuality whereby the illusion of independence 
is perpetuated by “the intimate relationships between human beings who, under the aegis of the 
                                               
67 Audience-oriented in the Habermasian sense: “Subjectivity, as the innermost core of the 
private, was always already oriented to an audience (Publikum) …the directly or indirectly 
audience-oriented subjectivity of the letter exchange or diary explained the origin of the typical 
genre and authentic literary achievement of that century: the domestic novel, the psychological 
description in autobiographical form” (49). This form of subjectivity, transported into the realm 
of the public, becomes the “fictitious identity of the two roles assumed by the privatized 
individuals who came together to form a public: the role of property owners and the role of 
human beings pure and simple” that enables the bourgeois public sphere (56). This is a different 
form of relationship than Mill’s rendering of the family as a kind of condensed state. In the 
intimate sphere of the family, individuals occupy roles that are political roles or can be expressed 




family, were nothing more than human” (Habermas 48). But it is as citizens, not as humans, that 
Mill’s family members confront each other. Having been emancipated from the restrictions that 
legality places on both wives and husbands, freedom need not mean the entire privatization of 
subjectivity; as citizens in the private sphere, freedom can be made thinkable within limits not in 
spite but because of its emancipation from legal regulation: this is what Mill calls “rational” 
rather than “lawless” freedom (336). The idea of rational freedom is thus built on the discursive 
construction of marriage, unfettered by an artificial hierarchy imposed through legal regulations, 
as the coming together of two sovereign subjects, between whom power is divided according to 
capacity. The equality of those subjects is necessary in the first instance to establish the 
conditions of possibility for marriage, but it is also in principle impossible given the limitations 
women’s “disabilities” impose on the development of their capacity. As a result of this double 
bind, the pertinent question for Mill is how it is possible to limit individual freedom, without that 
individual being “fettered and restricted” (338)? How is it possible to take a paternalistic attitude 
towards certain groups, without being explicitly paternalistic or ascribing that paternalism to the 
category of difference? Mill’s answer is to think about freedom as a feeling, which is universally 
felt in particular ways depending on capacity. The intrinsic good is a principle of self-
governance, such that no one should feel managed even if that management is in their best 
interests.  
Take the boy for whom the “administration of his interests by a tutor” fails to “satisfy his 
feelings,” or the “citizen of a free country” who desires freedom and not skillful administration: 
“the consciousness of working out their own destiny under their own moral responsibility” is a 
compensation “to his feelings for great rudeness and imperfection in the details of public affairs” 
(337). Individual happiness lies not in the best arrangement of public affairs – as impossible as it 
is to imagine Mill advocating for imperfect administration of anything – but in the raising of the 
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individual “as a moral, spiritual, and social being.” At this point we come up against a double 
constitution once more: the “ennobling influence of free government” cultivates the individual, 
and the cultivated individual with an “unselfish public spirit, and calmer and broader views of 
duty” is the only individual who can perfect government as a good and ennobling force (337). 
But the freedom – or the feeling of freedom – has to be extended to all people, regardless of 
gender or ability. The taking up of responsibilities is imagined as the release from painful 
bondage, and it is, Mill admonishes, universally felt as such by “any” man and therefore any 
“human being” including women: “Let any man call to mind what he himself felt on emerging 
from boyhood… and entering upon the responsibilities of manhood. Was it not like the physical 
effect of taking off a heavy weight, or releasing him from instructive, even if not otherwise 
painful, bonds? Did he not feel twice as much alive, twice as much a human being, as before? 
And does he imagine that women have none of these feelings?” (337). Once he establishes the 
desire for freedom as a universal feeling, however, Mill introduces capacity as a concept that 
regulates it, so that it becomes at once possible to understand freedom as a universal good that 
means different things to different people. If happiness is the result of feeling free, unhappiness 
is the result of feeling one’s capacities are wasted, the “feeling of a wasted life” (340). It is, of 
course, important that it is the feeling of a wasted life, rather than a wasted life in and of itself. 
Scaling happiness and unhappiness to feelings (rather than the things in themselves) anchors 
them to the notion of capacity: it is not the “restraint on the freedom of conduct” merely which 
wastes a life, but enforcing a “disproportion” between capacity and the allowable field of action 
(340). Happiness and unhappiness are the universal consequence of freedom and waste. But what 
defines freedom and waste are feelings stemming from capacity, which is entirely subjective, and 
hence Mill establishes room for radical relativity within the context of putative universality. 
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In so thinking about the family and the state as analogous forms, and forcing the partners 
in a marriage to confront each other as citizens desiring happiness and freedom, Mill posits 
freedom itself as a quality that is notionally universal, but actually specific and therefore can be 
gendered. Women can be recognized as sovereign subjects worthy of freedom in theory, 
however the question remains as to whether that translates into a recognition of women’s 
sovereignty in practice. Certainly it did for some, like the women he cites as examples of those 
with the “capacity for originality” who have been able to undertake the “long process of 
climbing” the “edifice” of distinction (315). But given he cites perhaps half a dozen of such 
women throughout Subjection, it seem apropos to wonder about the rest. Women in general, 
inasmuch as Mill maintains they have rights and responsibilities vis-a-vis the state and indeed the 
family, are governed by opinion. Unlike their husbands who are genuinely thinkable as 
individuals even when they have not particularly distinguished themselves, the capacity of 
women for sovereignty is undermined by being so tyrannized by public opinion. The Mary 
Somervilles of the nineteenth-century world clearly have the capacity for originality, though 
even then, it is an “originality of its own,” a “conception of the mind itself” rather than “those 
great and luminous new ideas which form an era in thought” (314). Yet the counterpoint to these 
rare individuals is, according to Mill, the figure with whom most women are aligned: Mrs. 
Grundy – the eminent Victorian representation of groupthink. As the very pattern of 
conventionality, Mrs. Grundies might have the ability to exert their homogenizing will on others, 
but this form of power, Mill constantly reminds us, pales in comparison to freedom as well as the 
autonomy and self-control that are the corollaries of sovereign subjectivity.  
Throughout Subjection, the critical distance between social restraint and conscience is a 
necessary property of the cultivated individual and is figured as something entirely out of reach 
for all but the most exceptional women. When Mill notes that “the communities in which the 
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reason has been most cultivated, and in which the social duty has been most powerful, are those 
which have most strongly asserted the freedom of action of the individual – the liberty of each to 
govern his conduct by his own feelings of duty, and by such laws and social restraints as his own 
conscience can subscribe to,” the language is the least interesting way in which this kind of 
liberty is gendered, even (or especially) as Mill argues that it should be accessible to women 
(336). If liberty is defined as the ability to choose which forms of social restraint are worth 
consenting to, then liberty is entirely out of reach for most women who are so aligned with social 
restraint that they are imagined as embodying it. Indeed, one of the arguments Mill makes to 
reassure his readers that legal regulation is unnecessary to ensure women will not take up 
professions en masse, and thereby abandon marriage and household management, is that public 
opinion can so easily regulate their conduct: “these things, if once opinion were rightly directed 
on the subject, might with perfect safety be left to be regulated by opinion, without any 
interference of law” (298). In light of Mill’s concern with the tyranny of public opinion in On 
Liberty, this may seem like a bizarre claim to make; it is also puzzling, to say the least, in light of 
the way he vaunts self-government as an intrinsic good. The suggestion that opinion will govern 
women’s behavior if the law can be restrained from so doing thus undermines the entire concept 
of women’s self-governance, or at least ensures that the form of women’s self-governance is 
contingent on opinion in a way that might be concerning for the individual. Though there is 
“latitude” for the adaptation of “general rules to individual suitabilities,” for the “greater number 
of married women” – those for whom it will “in general be understood” that she manages the 
house and does not seek to govern her conduct outside the usual private realm of the home – 
regulation by opinion sounds much more like “skillful administration” (298) than it sounds like 
women “working out their own destiny” (337). 
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What can at best be considered Mill’s apathy, but is perhaps more like endorsement, 
about the regulating effect of public opinion where women are concerned places women in his 
thought in the mass, rather than as the individual who is threatened by it: “The wife’s influence 
tends, as far as it goes, to prevent the husband from falling below the common standard to 
approbation of the country. It tends quite as strongly to hinder him from rising above it. The wife 
is the auxiliary of the common public opinion” (331). Although when men are “weak,” a wife is 
or can be an improving force, once “we ascend higher in the scale, we come among a totally 
different set of moving forces,” which is to say the wife is a flattening, homogenizing, degrading 
influence. If the husband “differs in his opinion from the mass,” or if, “feeling in his heart truths 
which [the mass] nominally recognize,” he wants to act differently and better, then the wife acts 
as a stultifying force: “Whoever has a wife and children has given hostages to Mrs. Grundy” 
(331-332). As suggested, wives of the Mrs. Grundy type are not just the “auxiliary” of public 
opinion; they embody it. In fact, Mrs. Grundy functions mimetically as well as metaphorically: at 
once a particular figure and the universal shape of every woman, Mrs. Grundy reinforces the fact 
that Mill, even as he wants to assert women’s ability to bear rights, cannot quite make the leap to 
seeing women as individuals rather than individuality’s antitheses. Women squash all signs of 
individuality whether or not they intend to do so: “with such an influence in every house, either 
exerted actively, or operating all the more powerfully for not being asserted, is it any wonder that 
people in general are kept down in that mediocrity of respectability which is becoming a marked 
characteristic of modern times?” (333). As the force that prevents the development of 
individuality, women are exactly what the individual needs to struggle against in order to be free: 
holding respectability as a good over cultivation or even duty and aspiring to mediocrity rather 
than exceptionalism, women exemplify the mass which threatens to engulf individuality.  
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Mill’s despair at the mediocrity of modern times suggests that, if feelings are dangerous 
because the proximity of family life allows them to bypass reason to influence others through a 
process of “insensible contagion,” perhaps the most dangerous thing about this contagion is that 
it seems to work most powerfully in the wrong direction (290). That is, in a family that feels 
differently as a result of “the broad line of difference which those disabilities [of women] create 
between the education and character of a women and that of a man,” women cannot live up to 
Jane Eyre’s famous declaration that women feel just as men feel (333). There is a certain quality 
of selfishness and inability to think with the public interest – despite being so aligned with public 
opinion – that prevents women from feeling interested in the same way as men can. Thus, when 
a man wants to sacrifice personal interest for public good, he “always hopes that his sons will 
feel as he feels himself,” but his wife and daughters “can participate in none of the enthusiasm or 
the self-approbation he himself may feel, while the things which he is disposed to sacrifice are 
all in all to her” (331-332). Mill parses two different kinds of sacrifice here: the wife whose 
“whole life” has been made a “continued self-sacrifice” for her family and position, and the 
husband whose sacrifice is simultaneously less personal and conceived of in terms so large the 
wife cannot comprehend it. Whereas he sees the social as the broader good for which things are 
sacrificed, for her the family is the larger good: “She has sacrificed her whole life to it, and her 
husband will not sacrifice to it a whim, a freak, an eccentricity,” threatening the loss of the 
family life “for no reason of which she can feel the cogency” (332). The wife cannot feel the 
cogency, that is to say, of reasons which put the social whole first, as the people she immediately 
knows define the social and she is unable to see beyond this vision of the private or small-scale 
public good. Simply put, women have what we may think of as a local, rather than properly 
social, conception of the public. This narrowing of the field of the social, “the feeling that the 
individuals connected with them are the only ones to whom they owe any duty,” is both 
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inculcated in women by “all the education which women receive from society” and a quality that 
is inherent to women’s nature (321). This capacity is both learned and a natural “gravitation of 
women’s minds” (306), a “capacity” for intuitive perception lends them to attend to the local 
better than the general: “their intuitive sagacity makes them peculiarly apt in gathering such 
general truths as can be collected from their individual means of observation” (305). Harnessing 
this characteristic ambiguity establishes a kind of division of labor whereby Mill aligns women 
with intuition, practice, experiential fact, “dealing with things as individuals rather than in 
groups,” a “more lively interest in the present feelings of persons,” and the ability to take action, 
and men with speculation, theory, general principles, and the reflective mode of deep constant 
thought. This achieves several things. First, it reconciles gender differences as part of a 
necessarily complementary whole, whereby each corrects the other’s errors, and a man can do no 
better than go over his thoughts in the presence of a “superior” woman (306). Second, it once 
more highlights the Darwinian notion of fitness, so that anyone, regardless of gender, should 
fulfill the role for which they are best fit; and though these are likely to fall along gendered lines, 
they need not. Finally, it establishes that the only solution to inequality is paternalism. As women 
think in particulars rather than generalities, they are less able to connect their circumstances to 
broader issues of social inequity: each woman “complains of her own husband” but does not 
“complain of the power of husbands” in general (322). Because, then, women “cannot be 
expected to devote themselves to the emancipation of women, until men in considerable number 
are prepared to join with them in the undertaking,” it falls to men like Mill himself first to make 
women aware of the general system of oppression under which they suffer, and then to steward 
them into whatever kind of freedom for which they prove themselves fit (322). 
There is, of course, a definite sense of hierarchy attached to Mill's conception of fitness; 
it maps onto the “ladder” that spans the distinctions between barbarism and civilization (254). 
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Although Mill characterizes this ladder as a chain of individuals, “where every individual is 
either above or below his nearest neighbour,” elsewhere it seems quite clear that not all of the 
rungs represent individuals (294); there is a distinction between the “worthy representatives of 
the human species” and the unworthy rest, who are not distinguishable as representatives of 
anything, but are clumped together as a big mass of “forms and gradations of animalism and 
selfishness” (288). Despite existing largely as an assemblage of baseness and barely 
distinguishable as individuals, those on the lower rungs are unable to think beyond the limits of 
their own feelings to consider the social good. Thus even though a “stupid person’s notions and 
feelings” are not really his own, but can “confidently be inferred from those which prevail in the 
circle by which the person is surrounded,” such a person is less able to conceive of society duty, 
unlike those who are truly individuals and “whose opinions and feelings are an emanation from 
their own nature and faculties” (278). Women’s alignment with the mass is as much a class 
matter as it is anything else, as individuality is clearly counterposed to the “common” in both the 
sense of mass or general and the sense of lower class. Hence the woman who drags her husband 
down into mediocrity strips away that very solidly middle-class virtue, “aspirations,” so that 
“after a few years he differs in no material respect from those who have never had wishes for 
anything but the common vanities and the common pecuniary objects” (336). Though what Mill 
calls the “selfish propensities” like “self-worship” and “unjust self-preference” seem to be 
largely a matter of gender difference – that is, he asserts they “have their source and root in, and 
derive their principal nourishment from, the present constitution of the relation between men and 
women” (324) – in many ways class is a more intractable problem than gender, as women of a 
high class can easily rise above the limitations of their gender to feel interested in the social 
whole, as with Mill’s princesses, who, “being more raised above the generality of men by their 
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rank than placed below them by their sex,” have “been allowed to feel the liberal interest natural 
to any cultivated human being” (304).68  
Against the stultifying effects of the mass and its selfish propensities, what is needed for 
progress is the social feeling of Mill’s intellectual elite, the exceptional group who can feel ahead 
of the law, steering society towards progress. It is this “intellectual elite” who sees “the futurity 
of the species,” and the “still rarer elite” who has “the feelings of that futurity” (518). If Mill sees 
the oppressive laws governing marriage as having arisen organically out of pre-existing 
relationships based on gender difference, humanity would become stalled in those oppressive 
circumstances without these future-feeling elites who can live beyond existing laws and drive 
progress forward: “laws never would be improved, if there were not numerous persons whose 
moral sentiments are better than the existing laws” (295). In removing the legal obstructions to 
possible equality, and extending the “mass of mental faculties available for the higher service of 
humanity,” we should not make the mistake of assuming that Mill intends to upset the balance 
between the “mass” and the “elite” (326). Rather, in freeing all who are distinguished by their 
capacity of feeling the future, the family will be turned to account as a “school of sympathy in 
equality” (295), with all the need for training and character development that a school connotes. 
Where citizenship “does not come near the daily habits or inmost sentiments,” the family “justly 
constituted, would be the real school of the virtues of freedom,” allowing those with the capacity 
to fulfill their destiny as individuals (295). 
Freedom and equality in the civic realm alone are insufficient to cultivate a nation’s 
citizenry. The “true virtue of human beings is fitness to live together as equals”: individuals 
                                               
68 Indeed, the problem of marriage is in a way a problem of class distinction as well as gender 
difference. That is, it is largely a problem because, as Mill asserts, it is a mass relation, not “an 
institution designed for a select few” – it is the “bad” men who cannot be trusted to live in the 
spirit rather than the law of marriage (287). 
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needs to be fit for equality before they exercise its benefits in relation to the state (294). 
Subjection, in arguing for the family as the necessary site of cultivation, amounts to a doctrine of 
self-help in which self-improvement is both a personal and a civic duty: “self-respect, self-help, 
and self-control which are the essential conditions both of individual prosperity and of social 
virtue” (330). Subjection conforms to the paternalistic mode of the self-help genre. Because it is 
first necessary to be “fit” for living in equality, the relation between Mill’s elite and the mass can 
only ever be a relation of a compassionate but nonetheless coercive paternalism. The family is an 
important site for Mill given women’s inherent qualities, both their innate ability to cultivate 
their family and their natural cultivability. Uniquely positioned as “diffusers of moral 
influences,” women possess a heritable “nervous temperament” – which is also transmitted to 
sons, though it is “possible, and probable,” that it is more often inherited by women (308). Thus, 
women’s characters are of the kind that is shaped by “what is meant by spirit” (308). This 
excitability is a powerful social force if channeled correctly: “Strong feeling is the instrument 
and element of strong self-control: but it requires to be cultivated in that direction” (309). If not 
correctly cultivated and let loose undirected on the public realm, women’s “share of influence” 
will only ever be a perverted and damaging one, giving a “tone to public moralities” that reflects 
the “disinterestedness in the general conduct of life” resulting from women’s limited sphere 
(329). The narrow thinking that is the “habit inculcated by their whole life” hampers women’s 
natural strong feeling and its consequent inwardness; women thus myopically look to 
“immediate effects on persons, and not to remote effects on classes of persons,” and thus the 
“increasing mass of unenlightened and short-sighted benevolence” blocks progress because it 
takes “the care of people’s lives out of their own hands,” when what is needed is to “induce 
people to take care of themselves” (330-331). We can see in this example how hard Mill’s 
ambivalence about natural difference works to shore up his intellectual elitism, establishing 
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leadership as the civic duty of the already-fit, while simultaneously rendering inferiority as the 
natural state of the unfit – as the “disagreeable consequences of their own acts” from which we 
should not relieve them (330). Restraining freedom is an undisputed evil, one which “leaves the 
species less rich, to an inappreciable degree, in all that makes life valuable to the individual 
human being” (340). But Mill’s point is not that freedom will result in the erasure of hierarchy or 
of difference. Towards the end of Subjection, he explains we must not “suppose that these 
differences of feeling and inclination only exist because women are brought up differently from 
men, and that there would not be differences of taste under any imaginable circumstances. But 
there is nothing beyond the mark in saying that the distinction in bringing-up immensely 
aggravates those differences, and renders them wholly inevitable” (334). Happiness, we learn by 
the end of Mill’s text, is not about eliminating evil or smoothing out all the “inevitable 
imperfections” of life; it is submitting to a world in which we do not “add to the evils which 
nature inflicts” (340). This is a Darwinian world indeed, where the happy survive and multiply, 
and the unhappy are left to be happy that there are no laws preventing them from attaining the 
inferior position for which they are fit.  
I am suggesting that Mill’s “fountain of human happiness” establishes difference as a 
necessary condition for sociality (340). But it is a form of difference that is remade through its 
empirical ambivalence, so that it can be made compatible with the form of freedom liberalism 
values, as a political ideal based on an individuality that becomes inherently possible in all who 
inhabit the social world. In a defense of liberalism’s complexity and ethical commitment, 
Amanda Anderson contrasts liberalism as a “body of thought and a lived political commitment” 
with the position of liberalism’s critics, who deem it a “structural illusion” that “disavows its 
own interests and violence and serves to perpetuate forms of subjectivity and thought that 
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entrench established interests and mask operations of power.”69 The critique of liberalism 
flattens what Anderson wants to draw out as liberalism’s “complex history,” in order to refute 
the critique from radical theory that “liberalism, insofar as it disavows its own ideological 
complicity with the status quo, is a bankrupt mode of critical political thought, because it does 
not seriously confront the question of violence and the fact of its own interests” (227). What I 
have suggested in examining the operation of difference in Mill’s thought is that understanding 
Mill’s political commitment in its full thickness and historical specificity requires also a 
consideration of how it masks the violence of its interests. In other words, if the critique of 
liberalism Anderson dismisses is indeed a reductive mode of reading realism, so too is a 
recuperative reading of liberalism’s history, which in turn disavows how deeply liberalism as a 
lived political commitment is – even or especially when it makes least sense for it to be so – 
intertwined with subjectivization. Reading Mill’s work as a discursive form of “training in 
affective sense perception and intuition,” to borrow Berlant’s phrase again, exposes the way it 
masks its own labor, which is to say the “operations of power,” not because it is “morally 
bankrupt,” but as the necessary condition of living its political commitment (186).70  
There is some of the nuance Anderson wants to see, an appreciation of the constitutive 
tensions of liberalism, in Mill’s determination to strip difference of its inherent inferiority, to 
open up the categories of freedom and justice to a form of universality, while simultaneously 
resting intensely hierarchical ideas about character and fitness on a sense of innate difference. 
                                               
69 Amanda Anderson. “Character and Ideology: The Case of Cold War Liberalism.” New 
Literary History 42 (2011): 209-229, pp. 211-12. Subsequent page references in text. 
70 See E. P. Thompson on commitment in politics: Commitment “entails the assumption of the 
fullest human responsibility available to men in class society – a responsibility entailed by the 
tissue of human relationships into which we are committed by the very fact of birth – the 
purposive and sustained action, in association with others, to bring class society itself to an end.” 
E. P. Thompson and the Making of the New Left. Edited by Cal Winslow. New York: Monthly 
Review Press, 2014, p. 114. 
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Perhaps the refractory nature of difference indicates what Anderson refers to as “a pessimism or 
bleakness that derives from an awareness of those forces and conditions that threaten the 
realization of liberal ambitions” (213). In any case, Mill’s occasionally perverse attachment to 
the natural as an explanatory framework for differences of gender as well as race makes 
difference productive, exalting as the necessary condition for progress the capacity to think 
beyond oneself. This expansive interest is the property of the forward-thinking elite, represented 
for instance by the “judge who gives a just decision in a case where his feelings are intensely 
interested on the other side, derives from that same strength of feeling the determined sense of 
the obligation of justice, which enables him to achieve this victory over himself” (309). The 
judge’s strong feelings are what make him an individual and what allow him to adopt the best 
interests of the social whole as his own; thus, his strong feelings are both what spur him to 
justice, and what are sacrificed in the name of justice – that is to say the social whole. Marriage 
in its best form enables this, because of the way it allows difference, for good or ill, to change its 
practitioners. In many ways, the very intractability of difference in the private sphere is what 
functions to resolve the question of how to live with difference: “When each emulates, and 
desires and endeavours to acquire, the other’s peculiar qualities, the difference does not produce 
diversity of interest, but increased identity of it, and makes each still more valuable to the other” 
(335). Between equal spouses, difference expands one’s empathetic capacities. You can acquire 
the other person’s peculiarities, and they yours; the result is not less difference, but an alignment 
with the other person or a form of assemblage based on the “increased identity” of interest. Love 
enables difference to remain different, while also rendering it assimilable, but only when no one 
is “much the inferior of the two” (335). It is not clear what exactly comprises a marriage of 
people “between whom there exists that best kind of equality” (336), because Mill says he “will 
not attempt to describe” it: “To those who can conceive it, there is no need; to those who cannot, 
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it would appear the dream of an enthusiast” (336). The judge’s mode of identification, and its 
underlying premise of thinking and feeling beyond the self, may be enabled by Mill’s ideal form 
of companionate marriage among equals. But this kind of equality can, after all, tolerate an 
indeterminate amount of inequality. Perhaps, then, the problem of difference for Mill is 
ultimately a problem of recognition: a confrontation with difference demands that, in order to 
adopt the judge’s social feeling and sense of justice, we do the work of making the people who 
are not honestly equal into people we can nonetheless recognize as equals.71 
  
                                               
71 Recognition in this mode requires conscripting difference to enable the continued operation of 
power. See Berlant: “Self-transforming compassionate recognition and its cognate forms of 
solidarity are necessary for making political movements thrive contentiously against all sorts of 
privilege, but they have also provided a means for making minor structural adjustments seem 
like major events, because the theater of compassion is emotionally intense. Recognition all too 
often becomes an experiential end in itself, an emotional event that protects what is unconscious, 
impersonal, and unrelated to anyone’s intentions about maintaining political privilege (Cruel 
Optimism 182). Another way of putting this is to suggest that what Charles Taylor sees as a 
particularly modern problem has its antecedents in the nineteenth century: “What has come about 
with the modern age is not the need for recognition but the conditions in which the attempt to be 
recognized can fail.” “The Politics of Recognition.” Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of 









In 1859, Lady Theodosia Monson took the lease of premises at 19 Langham Place to 
establish a kind of ladies’ club.1 It was billed primarily as a social space, for the “convenience” 
of women shopping in the West End, as “attached to the Reading Room is a Luncheon Room, 
and a room also for the reception of parcels, for the use of subscribers only.”2 As Barbara Caine 
points out, though the premises at Langham Place were modelled on the idea of the gentlemen’s 
club, they were crucially different, located not amongst those clubs in Pall Mall or Mayfair, but 
in the shopping district of the West End.3 The Saturday Review excoriated the reading room as a 
modern-day enactment of Ecclesiazusa or Lysistrata: sexual depravity was clearly the only 
possible result of any public gathering of women as a group, the necessary consequence of 
“ladies imitating a masculine institution.”4 As such resistance suggests, the rooms had a function 
beyond providing respite for middle-class women from the toils of West End commerce. The 
                                               
1 “Lease for 21 Years 1. James Fergusson Esq. of Langham Place, Regent Street. 2. Theodosia, 
Lady Monson, WID. Of 29 King Street, St. James’s.” London Metropolitan Archives. London 
ACC/0086/009. 
2 Cited in Pam Hirsch. Barbara Leigh Smith Bodichon: Feminist, Artist and Rebel. London: 
Pimlico, 1999, p. 197. 
3 Barbara Caine. “Feminism in London Circa 1850-1914.” Journal of Urban History 27 
(September 2001): 765-778. 
4 Cited in Hirsch. Barbara Leigh Smith Bodichon, p. 197. Subsequent page references in text. 
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lease provided a name and a geographical center for the group of organizers and activists that 
came to be known as the Langham Place group. 
The previous year, Bessie Rayner Parkes (1829–1925) and Barbara Leigh Smith 
Bodichon (1827–1891) had founded a joint-stock company in order to publish the English 
Woman’s Journal, a feminist journal designed, as Teja Varma Pusapati claims, “to bring various 
strands of the women’s movement together.”5 Although members had already been engaged in 
activist work, establishing a site at Langham Place organized the women as a collective political 
force in an unprecedented way. From those offices, the Langham Place group worked to shift 
public opinion and effect change on a wide range of issues affecting women. Its members 
founded the first degree-granting college for women in Britain, advanced the accreditation of 
women professionals, pioneered female entrepreneurship, founded the first women-owned and 
operated press, organized women’s labor, and were instrumental in the franchise debate. Yet the 
Langham Place group was not, itself, an organized movement. 
The Langham Place group (hereafter LPG) was an informal gathering of women based on 
personal relationships in a specific locale. As such, it was distinct from other committees 
working to promote the position of women, even though many were affiliated with Langham 
Place and were also staffed by some of the same people. The Society for Promoting Employment 
for Women (SPEW), established by Adelaide Procter and Jessie Boucherett in 1859, kept 
meeting minutes and attendance records, and listed its fifteen-person membership in its early 
promotional materials; it also relied on the involvement of prominent men such as Lord 
                                               
5 Teja Varma Pusapati, “Novel Networks: The ‘Specialite’ of the English Woman’s Journal,” 
Victorian Periodicals Review 47.4 (2014): 597-613, p. 607. Subsequent page references in text. 
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Shaftesbury, Monckton Milnes, Arthur Kinnaid and Sir Francis Goldsmid.6 The LPG did not 
formally organize its meetings in that way and, although men were shareholders of the joint-
stock company in order to comply with British law, the group itself was run by women. As 
Jordan and Bridger note, the “informal organisational style” of Langham Place was based on 
“personal ties of friendship and loyalty” rather than the SPEW model of decision-making by a 
formal (and mixed-gender) committee (398).7 If Mill’s task was to render different people 
recognizable as equals, this chapter will explore how the LPG effected this in practical terms: 
how did they forge a concrete form of association that could absorb differences without erasing 
them, in order to reshape the public sphere to include women? 
Most accounts of the LPG’s history trace its origin to one personal relationship in 
particular: the 1848 meeting, and ensuing friendship, of Parkes and Bodichon.8 Their friendship, 
made possible by the similarities of their progressive, Unitarian backgrounds, established a 
precedent for the way in which personal connections could, as Lynne Walker writes, supply a 
“private, social matrix for public, political action.”9 Both women came from Unitarian families, 
steeped in a culture of dissent and radical politics.10 They shared a commitment to art – Leigh 
                                               
6 Ellen Jordan and Anne Bridger. “‘An Unexpected Recruit to Feminism’: Jessie Boucherett’s 
‘Feminist Life’ and the importance of being wealthy.” Women’s History Review 15:3 (1996): 
385-412, p. 392. Subsequent page references in text. Although men, including Samuel Cortauld 
and Peter Alfred Taylor, were shareholders of the limited liability company that owned the 
English Woman’s Journal, the Langham Place group was comprised of women, who were, as 
Jane Rendall notes in her Oxford Dictionary of National Biography entry on the group, mainly 
single. 
7 However, the shareholders of the English Woman’s Journal did include male sympathizers like 
Samuel Courtauld and Peter Alfred Taylor. 
8 For an account of the friendship, see Hirsch, and Jane Rendall. “Friendship and Politics: 
Barbara Leigh Smith Bodichon (1827–91) and Bessie Rayner Parkes (1829–1925).” Sexuality 
and subordination: Interdisciplinary studies of gender in the nineteenth century. Edited by Susan 
Mendus and Jane Rendall. London: Routledge, 2002: 136-170. 
9 Lynne Walker. “Locating the Global/Rethinking the Local: Suffrage Politics, Architecture, and 
Space.” Women’s Studies Quarterly. 34.1/2 (Spring 2006): 174-196: 182. 
10 Though Parkes converted to Roman Catholicism in 1864, possibly as a result of her friendship 
with Adelaide Procter. 
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Smith to painting, and Parkes to poetry – and read books together which they discussed in their 
letters to one another. Their friendship was in many ways a typical one for women of their class 
background, though they took pleasure in pushing the boundaries of Victorian conventions. 
Bodichon’s biographer Pam Hirsch recounts the letters they wrote while on an unchaperoned trip 
they took in 1850 through Belgium, Germany, Austria and Switzerland, joking gleefully about 
the way their appearance repelled would-be suitors; Bodichon wore her famous dark-tinted 
glasses to deal with an eye problem, and they both wore “short black boots with coloured laces 
and skirts lopped off four inches above the ankle for ease of walking” (44). Their differences 
stemmed largely from what Hirsch describes as Bodichon’s “rather ambiguous social position”: 
her parents had not married, and part of her father’s side of the family refused to acknowledge 
her and her siblings – which “allowed her an unusual social mobility” (viii). The friendship 
between Parkes and Bodichon therefore made space for unconventionality that was not possible 
in Parkes’s very conventional family life. This space afforded the pair a glimpse of what could be 
possible for women given different social arrangements. As Jane Rendall notes, it was the 
realization through their friendship of “a world of experience, of sexuality and politics, from 
which they were themselves excluded” that politicized their activities.11 
The friendship between Parkes and Bodichon modeled a way of bridging social 
difference, and managing the operations of the broader group to which it gave rise. It was not 
just that Parkes and Bodichon had an extensive and varied social network, which counted among 
its numbers prestigious Victorian thinkers, activists, and artists, but that those social ties formed 
the basis of the political work both women accomplished. They were strongly influenced, for 
instance, by their friendship with the art historian and writer Anna Jameson, who styled herself 
as a kind of aunt to the two younger women. Elizabeth Blackwell, the first woman to receive a 
                                               
11 Jane Rendall. “Friendship and Politics,” pp. 136-7. 
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medical degree in America, was Parkes’s cousin and a good friend to Bodichon, who pressed her 
to give lectures in Britain; it was those lectures that inspired Elizabeth Garrett, the first British 
woman to qualify as a physician (Hirsch 352). Bodichon introduced Garrett and Blackwell at a 
party at Blandford Square on March 2, 1859, and this social introduction was the “founding 
moment” of Garrett’s medical career (Hirsch 55). The social connection had a clear political 
effect that demonstrates how much of the change originated by the group was driven by social 
ties rather an explicitly political agenda. In addition, the group’s social reach amplified its 
audience, with Parkes’ and Bodichon’s social circle extended to the arts, including such 
luminaries as George Eliot and the Pre-Raphaelite painters. This influential network of 
connections is partly why critics can plausibly claim that the LPG had an influence that extended 
beyond the circulation of the group’s mouthpiece, the English Woman’s Journal, the 
subscriptions to which numbered initially only in the hundreds.12 If, following Teja Varma 
Pusapati, the English Woman’s Journal’s “discursive framework” is seen to accommodate 
“contradictions and inconsistencies” in order to shape a itself as a “collective, developing 
endeavor” (605) it is reasonable to ask whether the same can be said of the LPG as a whole. To 
what extent was it possible to make claims in the general interest of all women, without 
compromising the ability of women to make claims as liberal individuals? Did the group sustain 
individual differences in light of the supposed universality of the liberal individual? 
In Chapter One, I gave Mill as an example of the way in which the liberal relationship to 
difference in the Victorian period was profoundly ambiguous. As something extraordinary that 
differentiates the few from the many, difference was seductive, providing the spark of 
                                               
12 Pauline Nestor. “A New Departure in Women’s Publishing: The English Woman’s Journal 
and the Victoria Magazine.” Victorian Periodicals Review 15.3 (1982): 93-106, p. 95. 
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uniqueness that is a necessary condition of liberal subjectivity.13 Yet the fact of difference in 
Victorian society often functioned to obstruct the liberal supposition of equality, and its 
persistence challenged the eternal progressiveness of the liberal individual. The elision of 
difference – in other words, the liberal abstraction of universality – was thus always an 
expression of the fundamental challenge that difference posed. One of liberalism’s constitutive 
conundrums is that difference is simultaneously the cornerstone of the liberal individual and 
what must be abstracted in order to transform the private individual into the rights-bearing 
subject. In Elaine Hadley’s superb account of this process, she notes the importance of 
transcending difference to achieve a position of liberal disinterest. The manifestation of 
disinterest through the process of devil’s advocacy (Mill’s dialogic practice necessary to achieve 
an opinion that is individual rather than the received opinion of the masses) “fosters a cognitive 
expression of social alterity, and, as an internal form, it organizes the otherwise 
incommensurable contents of social difference, renders their cacophony… into a privately 
beautiful concordance.”14 In Hadley’s account, the discordant noise of so many differences 
requires proper organization to attain the beauty of liberal individuality.15  
This, and the next, chapter of this dissertation explore various attempts to undertake that 
beautiful organization, to achieve a form of collectivity or collective thinking that resolved 
difference into Hadley’s privately beautiful concordance. Herein, I offer an analysis of LPG’s 
politics, seeking to illuminate how they asserted their ability to assume political and civic rights 
                                               
13 See Angelique Richardson. “‘The Difference Between Human Beings’: Biology in the 
Victorian Novel.” A Concise Companion to the Victorian Novel. Edited by Francis O’Gorman. 
Malden: Blackwell, 2005: 202-231. 
14 Elaine Hadley. Living Liberalism: Practical Citizenship in Mid-Victorian Britain. Chicago and 
London: University of Chicago Press, 2010, p. 81. Subsequent page references in text. 
15 See Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe: difference as antagonism, defined as the point that 
constitutes the limits of the social; “mutually contradictory belief systems” and the formal means 
of managing contradictory belief systems into one within which we can live. Hegemony and 
Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics. 1985. London: Verso, 2001, p. 124. 
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not merely as individuals but specifically as women. The gist of my argument is as follows. The 
LPG represented a bid to think about how the democratic public sphere might be sustained 
through the production of difference as the basis for forging collective bonds. That requires a 
mode of alignment  based not on identification but on disidentification, a concept used by queer 
theorists to describe the experience of situating oneself within and against the identifications to 
which we are interpellated.16 As such, the LPG functions as an important test case to think 
through the questions John Frow asks in “Cultural Studies and the Neoliberal Imagination”: 
“What remains of the liberal vision of a common public culture in a world of asserted 
differences? What mechanisms of consenting or dissenting identification sustain a democratic 
public sphere when politics becomes spectacular” – that is, where representation replaces 
rational debate as the primary political mode?17 
 
Of members and mobilization 
The emergence and the historical significance of the LPG has received a fair amount of 
critical attention, usually in relation to particular women and their roles in shaping liberal 
feminism. As Jane Rendall observes with reference to the friendship between Parkes and 
Bodichon, the “awakening of self-consciousness” and “different kinds of feminist activity” 
cannot be understood merely as a public or political fact, but must be related to “personal 
histories and networks of friendship which underlay the slow growth” of the nineteenth-century 
women’s movement.18 This is an important point, because the nature of the group depended on 
                                               
16 See Judith Butler:“What are the possibilities of politicizing disidentification, this experience 
of misrecognition, this uneasy sense of standing under a sign to which one does and does not 
belong?” Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of ‘Sex.’ New York: Routledge, 1993, p. 
219.  
17 John Frow. “Cultural Studies and the Neoliberal Imagination.” Yale Journal of Criticism 12:2 
(Fall 1999): 423-30, p. 423. 
18 Rendall. “Friendship and Politics.” p. 163. 
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an informal organizational structure, lack of focus on a single issue or even consensus on where 
to direct efforts, and reliance on personal connections. Margaret Forster, in her account of 
grassroots feminism, points to the tendency to keep issues separate so that public opinion on one 
matter would not affect how another was perceived, resulting in a “cult of personality” among 
feminist leaders. One of Forster’s examples is Langham Place member Emily Davies (1830–
1921), who abstained from much of the group’s active suffrage work in order to focus on 
education initiatives.19 Forster suggests that this need to keep issues “clean” was largely 
strategic. I wish to enlarge on this point by suggesting that the diversity of focus and emphasis on 
personalities was also symptomatic of the way in which the early feminist movement thought 
about collectivity and solidarity, and how those concepts could crystalize around the question of 
what it meant to identify as a group of women. Collectivity, for the LPG, did not require 
resolving differences into a unified aim or position in order to achieve gains; diversity of focus 
and character was, as I shall argue, a necessary corollary of the way the LPG organized based on 
a politics of friendship. 
The LPG did not compose its membership by recruiting for a specific political purpose. 
Rather, the group evolved by bringing together women who shared an unspecified dissatisfaction 
with their position and the desire to do something to address it. Its members thus came from very 
different backgrounds and had a diverse set of experiences, including various levels of exposure 
to any form of activism. Some of the first members included the poet Isa Craig (1831-1903), the 
daughter of a Scottish hosier. Craig became involved in the group through her friendship with 
Parkes, as did Matilda Hays (1820?–1897), one of the group’s more radical members. Hays, who 
went by the name of Max and wore men’s clothes above the waist, was the daughter of a corn 
                                               
19 Margaret Forster. Significant Sisters: The Grassroots of Active Feminism 1839-1939. London: 
Random House, 2004, p. 3. 
 
 115 
merchant, and sacrificed a literary career to act beside the American actress Charlotte Cushman, 
with whom she was romantically involved. Emily Davies, one of the group’s most unlikely 
activists, was the daughter of an evangelical Anglican clergyman who met Bodichon in Algeria 
in 1858 while she was nursing her brother as he recovered from tuberculosis. Unlike Bodichon, 
Davies had little exposure to political ideas, but developed her own convictions through 
friendship with Bodichon, who was quick to lend Davies the works of Mary Wollstonecraft and 
reassure her of the existence of a network of women who shared Davies’ sense of dissatisfaction 
with restrictions of domestic life.20  
As the group grew, women were brought in by the group’s activities rather than personal 
friendship. Even so, the broad range of opinions and investments of the members allowed for a 
wide range of ideological positions. For instance, Jessie Boucherett (1825–1905), who sought 
out the women after reading an issue of the English Woman’s Journal, was a staunch 
Conservative. With Helen Blackburn, she formed the Freedom of Labour Defence League in the 
1890s to oppose the introduction of the Factory Acts, on the basis that it would restrict women’s 
freedom in the marketplace and therefore their earning potential. In so doing, she clashed with 
other members of the LPG who advocated association and cooperation rather than liberal 
individualism as the answer to women’s disadvantaged position in the labor market. My point in 
tracing these connections is that the group’s informal structure meant that it grew from general 
social principles rather than specific political goals, and that this, in consequence, enabled the 
membership to remain one characterized by difference: ideological, religious, and political 
differences, differences in marital status, and class differences. The LPG was a collective 
comprised of people who might not otherwise associate with one another, and who often 
profoundly disagreed on moral or ideological grounds; as such, the broad commitment to general 
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principles was a crucial aspect of the group’s formation and a necessary condition of its function. 
Of necessity, the group did not cohere around commitment to a particular cause but came 
together around the general principle of furthering the position of women in society.  
The group’s initiatives were varied. Along with the English Woman’s Journal, SPEW 
was headquartered in the Langham Place premises. Inspired by an anonymously-published 
article by Harriet Martineau, “Female Industry,” which appeared in the April issue of the 
Edinburgh Review, the founders of SPEW wanted to address the problem of so-called 
“superfluous” women, the half-a-million unmarried women Martineau estimated were eking out 
a living as governesses or seamstresses in the absence of familial support. At 19 Langham Place, 
SPEW held classes in arithmetic, bookkeeping and shorthand to equip women with the skills 
they needed to join the workforce in the way the society advocated: as professionals and valuable 
participants in public life, not as poorly trained, ineffectual and barely genteel governesses.21 The 
organization also functioned as a kind of employment agency, maintaining a register of women 
seeking work and helping women in other industrial efforts, for instance by lending money to a 
group of women china-painters to start their own business after the company that employed them 
elected not to rebuild their business following a fire.22 
One of the points of tension in Langham Place was how to approach the question of 
married women. Married women’s status was a major point of tension in feminist and liberal 
                                               
21 See Rendall. “Langham Place group (act. 1857–1866).” Oxford Dictionary of National 
Biography. Oxford University Press, Oct 2005. 
22 Michelle Elizabeth Tusan. “‘Not the Ordinary Victorian Charity’: The Society for Promoting 
the Employment of Women Archive.” History Workshop Journal 49 (2000): 221-230, pp. 225-6. 
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circles in the decades-long agitation for female suffrage.23 Parkes initially wanted to avoid 
discussing the issue in the pages of the English Woman’s Journal. It could not, however, be 
permanently avoided, and in 1864 the periodical published extracts of Harriet Taylor’s “The 
Enfranchisement of Women.” The risks of including married women in other bids for 
opportunities for women, including enfranchisement, would have been clear following the failure 
of the Married Women’s Property Bill of 1857. As Ben Griffin has documented, the debates 
about married women’s property acts – not only in the 1850s but in the second attempt to pass a 
bill over a decade later – tended to focus on the effect on the home, rather than the principle of 
sexual equality (62). The disagreements were largely of a practical, rather than a theoretical, 
nature: would the immediate inclusion of married women in the push for suffrage doom the fate 
of single women? Emily Davies was of this opinion. She was, says Andrew Rosen, optimistic 
about the efficacy of a petition signed by 1,499 women that she and Elizabeth Garrett presented 
to John Stuart Mill in 1866, and wanted to limit the initial demand for the vote without 
specifically excluding married women.24 As she wrote to Helen Taylor, “I do not see that in 
limiting our claim, we necessarily pronounce any opinion upon the rights of other people, outside 
that claim… When the wedge is inserted, we can go on for more, including liberty for married 
women in other directions.”25 Taylor, on the other hand, felt very strongly that any case for 
female suffrage must be put forward on behalf of all women; any less would be capitulation to 
                                               
23 See Rendall. “John Stuart Mill, Liberal Politics, and the Movements for Women’s Suffrage, 
1865-1873.” Women, Privilege, and Power: British Politics, 1750 to the Present. Edited by 
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Property Acts.” The Historical Journal. 46.1 (2003): 59-87. Subsequent page references in text. 
24 Andrew Rosen. “Emily Davies and the Women’s Movement, 1862-1867.” Journal of British 
Studies. 19.1 (Autumn 1979): 101-121, p. 112. Subsequent page references in text. 
25 Ann B. Murphy and Deirdre Raftery, editors. Emily Davies: Collected Letters, 1861-1875. 
Virginia: University of Virginia Press, 2004, p. 188. 
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the forces of inequality that introducing a bill to Parliament was designed to fight.26 These 
negotiations indicate the way in which the LPG defined what it meant to have a collective 
category of “women” in and through these strategic discussions about which forms of differences 
among women were to count in the political context, and which would not.27 
The status of married women was the source of disagreements of policy and approach, at 
times having a relatively small effect on the workings of the LPG, and at other times the source 
of major divisions, indicative of vastly different philosophical approaches to social questions. It 
was, in part, Emily Davies’ disinclination to include married women in petitions for electoral 
reform that saw her turn away from the push for female suffrage and focus on what was another 
major issue for the LPG: education.28 Davies was instrumental in the founding of Girton College, 
which later became part of Cambridge University; she and other members of Langham Place 
were also actively involved in many different campaigns to increase educational opportunities 
for women throughout the 1850s and 1860s.29 Inadequate education, and especially the social ills 
                                               
26 Andrea L. Broomfield asserts that this was less an ideological difference than a matter of 
Taylor’s idiosyncrasy and self-importance (“Walking a Narrow Line: Helen Taylor’s Literary 
Contribution to the British Women’s Rights Movement.” Women’s Studies 26 (1997): 259-83). 
27 See Barbara Caine. English Feminism, 1780-1980. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997, p. 
546 and Forster. Significant Sisters, p. 2. Both the issue of suffrage and the issue of married 
women’s rights more broadly were, of course, also deeply affected by class. As Griffin notes, 
“by preserving the system of trusts the wealthy classes were able to opt out of a reformed 
common law which gave married women considerably more freedom than they had hitherto 
enjoyed. In this way rich and poor continued to be governed by different legal systems, yet MPs 
were able to present the Married Women’s Property Bills as removing class differences” (82). 
28 For an account of Davies’ disagreements with Helen Taylor, see Rosen. His account focuses 
on reclaiming Davies’ legacy in the suffrage movement, and thus he makes some remarkable 
comments about Taylor; for instance, that she was “too uncompromising and too eccentric” to be 
“merely an additional member” of a suffrage committee headed by Davies (115), though the 
letter he cites, in which Taylor declines to subscribe to the committee given its exclusion of 
married women was a major philosophical sticking point, is in fact quite generous and 
diplomatic in tone. 
29 Barbara Bodichon was also an advocate of women’s education, having used some of the 
money her father settled on her at the age of 21 to found the Portman Hall School, an 
experimental school that was co-educational, non-denominational, and attended by children of 
different class backgrounds. See Hirsch (76). 
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caused by the problem of governessing, was an issue for the LPG from the beginning, but 
became an especially important issue for Davies as the decades progressed. Motivated by 
Elizabeth Garrett’s inability to matriculate at London University in the early 1860s, Davies 
began her work on education reform. The attempt to open up the Cambridge Local Examination 
for girls was one of the first campaigns spearheaded by Davies, a “means to an end” of opening 
up higher education for women.30  
In the debates about the exams there was more at stake than the question of whether the 
exams could or should be administered to women. The discussions about increasing educational 
opportunities for women turned on the very nature of gender difference. Detractors were quick to 
point to the perceived inherent gender differences, questioning whether girls’ brains were 
capable of attempting such examinations without causing great harm to their physical and mental 
health. Even among the supporters there was dissent about whether girls should take the same 
exam as it was administered to boys attending school, or whether they should sit a specialized 
exam tailored to female strengths such as art and needlepoint. According to Margaret Forster, 
Davies insisted on maintaining exactly the same curriculum for her female students as male 
students took, even at the expense of innovation (153). There was also conflict about the goal of 
such education: was it simply to prepare girls for their domestic duties as wives and mothers – by 
taking arithmetic they could better balance the household budget, for instance – or was it to 
extend the opportunities for employment outside the home?  
Education reform, as historians have amply document, reflected broad shifts in the 
cultural values of nineteenth-century Britain. The shift from small-scale, private schools to 
public institutions was also a shift from a patron-based, individualized system of education 
                                               
30 Josephine Kamm. Hope Deferred: Girls’ Education in English History. London: Taylor & 
Francis, 2010, p. 126. 
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towards a much more egalitarian, meritocratic system. In a study based on the Taunton 
Commission’s investigation into the state of education in 1864-8, Joyce Senders Pederson 
explains that the larger schools establish towards the end of the nineteenth century were 
structured around a form of universalism, as they applied a common standard to all pupils, rather 
than tailoring educative goals to the specific personalities of each student, as earlier private 
institutions had. In cultivating broad skills that were applicable beyond the domestic sphere, the 
girls’ public schools and women’s colleges established in the later part of the nineteenth century 
broadened their focus beyond the structure of the family, organizing their pupils into peer groups 
rather than perpetuating a hierarchical arrangement based on the social position of the girls’ 
families. The universalism that resulted from the imposition of such common standards to all 
pupils – with which Davies’s project of extending the university local exams to women had a 
great deal to do – also functioned to create an environment of competition, where individual 
achievement, rather than family background, was the measure of success.31 In this light, the 
LPG’s work on education reform can be understood as contributing to the shift away from older 
models of social difference that prioritized group identity in order to create new forms of 
difference on an individual basis. This shift contributed to the form of collectivity which 
Langham Place made possible, one which relied on the language of individual achievement to 
promote a universalism that could absorb certain differences at the expense of others. 
That being said, the sprawling commitments of the group and the different, often 
conflicting, viewpoints of its members are often viewed by scholars as liabilities, factors central 
to the group’s eventual dissolution. As the 1860s progressed, the collectivity at Langham Place 
was put under increasing pressure both external and from within. The internal tensions 
                                               
31 Joyce Senders Pederson. “The Reform of Women’s Secondary and Higher Education: 
Institutional Change and Social Values in Mid and Late Victorian England.” History of 
Education Quarterly 19.1 (Spring 1979): 61-91, particularly p. 81. 
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(“bickering,” as one critic calls it), such as personality clashes and arguments about religious 
differences, made it difficult to set long-term goals.32 The disagreement about legislation to 
protect women as a special class of workers is another example of a frequently recurring 
question over the direction of the group: should it continue as an organization focused on and led 
exclusively by women (Parkes’ position) or did it require a mixed membership and an 
involvement in broader campaigns and voluntary associations (Emily Davies’ position)?33 
External pressure came in the form of financial difficulties that had plagued the group since its 
inception, as well as resistance from the public and the families of the women who were 
involved.34 It was a largely independent organization of women and naturally, there were 
concerns about exceeding the bounds of sexual morality. Parents were concerned about the 
intimacy of women’s friendships, and those concerns were not quietened by several well-
publicized scandals involving some of the group’s members, such as the divorce case in which 
Emily Faithfull was named, or the rumored romantic relationship between Max Hays and 
Adelaide Procter.35 By the mid 1860s, the LPG had dissolved, though its members continued in 
their activist work, and the literary endeavors of the English Woman’s Journal were carried on 
by Emily Faithfull’s Victoria Press, Parkes’ Alexandra Magazine, and Boucherett’s 
Englishwoman’s Review.  
                                               
32 Sheila Herstein. “The Langham Place Circle and the Feminist Periodicals of the 1860s.” 
Victorian Periodicals Review 26.1 (1993): 24-7, p. 25. 
33 See Rendall. “Langham Place group (act. 1857–1866).” 
34 The English Woman’s Journal folded in late 1863, after a lengthy correspondence between 
Parkes and Bodichon over its financial troubles. See Herstein p. 25. See also Bessie Rayner 
Parkes’ “A Review of the Last Six Years,” in which her description of “the humble but ceaseless 
struggle of all these years” is an oblique reference to the fact that the journal did not succeed as a 
money-making publication comparable with the “rest of the periodical press.” The English 
Woman’s Journal 12.72 (1 February 1864): 361-368, p. 364-365. 
35 For the Faithfull case, see Martha Vicinus. “Lesbian Perversity and Victorian Marriage: The 
1864 Codrington Divorce Trial.” The Journal of British Studies 36.1 (1997): 70-98. On the 
relationship between Max Hays and Adelaide Procter, see Caine. “Feminism in London.” p. 769. 
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It is primarily because of these simultaneously generative and destructive differences that 
the LPG is relevant, indeed central, to the project of this dissertation. I attempt to explain the 
significance and the legacy of the LPG through a sustained focus not on the arguments they 
made to advance the cause of women’s rights, but the way they encountered the liberal public 
sphere through making competing demands on the basis of the specificity of individualism and 
the generality of universalism.36 My claim is that the form of the group, the way in which the 
women organized themselves into a collective and represented that collectivity in the English 
Woman’s Journal which they produced from 1858, can be considered as an attempt to create 
sustainable difference: a form which made difference plausible in conjunction with coalition, the 
idea of equality, and the supposition of universality. Simply put, I wish to propose that one of the 
LPG’s significant achievements was formal. For the LPG’s liberal feminism, individual 
differences were to be nurtured, not simply effaced or transcended; they were also a threat to the 
liberal ideal of equality. To maintain the belief (or what some theorists call the fiction) in an 
equality despite difference, it was necessary to create a form that could make difference 
productive and compelling: privately beautiful concordance. Even when its arguments were 
neither entirely original nor entirely satisfactory – neither to their activist contemporaries, nor 
subsequent generations of feminist scholars – the group nonetheless effected change through its 
attempts to mediate between the specific and the general and harmonize discord as beautiful 
agreement. The women of Langham Place sought, in other words, to create a space in which 
                                               
36 Nancy Fraser’s careful definition of the Habermasian public sphere is a useful point of 
reference throughout this chapter. As she defines it, the public sphere “designates a theater in 
modern societies in which political participation is enacted through the medium of talk. It is the 
space in which citizens deliberate about their common affairs, hence, an institutionalized arena 
of discursive production.” The Langham Place group was formed to function along precisely 
these lines, creating a discursive space for political participation on behalf of a category of 
people whose contribution to the body politic was, at least ideologically, expected to take place 
in the private life of the home. See Nancy Fraser. “Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution 
to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy.” Social Text 25/26 (1990): 56-80, p. 57. 
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difference was sustainable in the context of a collective politics based on transcending but not 
erasing those differences – and for a time they succeeded. They also succeeded in embracing the 
importance of gender difference by claiming rights specifically as women, and in asserting that 
women’s capacity to think and feel as the liberal individual made the fact of gender entirely 
inconsequential. In short, gender was simultaneously politically irrelevant and politically 
necessary. 
 
The place of women in public 
According to the rhetoric of Victorian domestic ideology, women’s contribution to the 
social and moral fabric of the British empire was based on purported innate and absolute 
difference between men and women. Women shaped public life not by participating in it, but by 
cultivating what Sarah Stickney Ellis called “the domestic character of England—the home 
comforts, and fireside virtues for which she is so justly celebrated.”37 Of course, scholars have 
significantly complicated the ideal of separate spheres in accounts like Ellis’s, or Ruskin’s 
rhapsodies about the “queenly power of women.”38 Scholars have highlighted women’s agency 
in the public sphere and undermined the simple equation of domesticity and oppression; others 
have complicated the very framework of separate spheres, particularly through the lens of an 
                                               
37 Sarah Stickney Ellis. Women of England, Their Social Duties, and Domestic Habits. London: 
Fisher Son & Co, 1839, p. 10. 
38 John Ruskin. Sesame and Lilies. 1865. Edited by Deborah Epstein Nord. New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2002, p. 69. 
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analysis of social class that decentered the middle class and its domestic ideology.39 That 
women’s particular difference defined their social place was therefore an assumption against 
which the LPG struggled; yet, in claiming rights as women, to be able to mobilize around gender 
difference was also a foundational organizing tactic. For instance, in an article called “The Use 
of a Special Periodical,” Bessie Parkes reflects on the “motives for amalgamation” in working 
for the rights of women; it is with no sense of irony that she begins the article by defining 
women as a “special” group, and concludes it by maintaining that “it must not be forgotten that 
women are not a class, a set, a specialité in whose service we are setting up an organ, but just 
half the race.”40 The paradox of this position – or rather, Parkes’s willingness to embrace two 
contradictory positions at once – reflects the awareness of the Langham Place activists that 
asserting women’s existence as a class or generality challenges their capacity to bear the rights of 
the liberal individual with particular differences, preferences, and capacities. To claim 
recognition as a “class” was both necessary and problematic: it formed the basis of the claims for 
the inclusion of women into the public sphere and political life of the nation, but it threatened 
both the attempt to carve out a space for women’s individuality and the underlying premise of 
liberal universality according to which differences had no purchase in political and public life.  
The physical location of the LPG was a crucial factor in its ability to enable women’s 
association despite social difference. As I have mentioned, the women advertised the premises as 
                                               
39 On the first point, see Nancy F. Cott. The Bonds of Womanhood: “Woman’s Sphere” in New 
England, 1780-1835. 1977. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997; Anna Clark. The Struggle 
for the Breeches: Gender and the Making of the British Working Class. 1995. Berkeley: The 
University of California Press, 1997; Mary Poovey. The Proper Lady and the Woman Writer: 
Ideology as Style in the Works of Mary Wollstonecraft, Mary Shelley, and Jane Austen. 1984. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985. On the second point, see Leonore Davidoff and 
Catherine Hall. Family Fortunes: Men and Women of the English Middle Class, 1750-1850. 
London: Routledge, 2002; Mary P. Ryan. Women in Public: Between Banners and Ballots, 1825-
1880. 1990. Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1992. 
40 Bessie Raynor Parkes, “The Use of a Special Periodical,” The Alexandra Magazine & English 
Woman’s Journal, 4.1 (September 1864): 257-63, p. 262. Subsequent page references in text. 
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primarily a social space with a reading room, luncheon room, and parcel room for subscribers 
coming in from shopping. Framing the premises in this way made explicit women’s use of public 
space, naming and politicizing what would otherwise be the private, domestic affairs of 
individual women shopping and conducting household business. In hailing individual women 
shoppers as part of a new collectively-identified group, the advertisement both pointed to what 
already existed, and what the group aspired towards, namely a new way of using public space, or 
more specifically, making available that space for women in the same manner as it was used by 
men. The reading room served as a potent symbol of the possibility of claiming participation in 
public life as a woman – simultaneously creating a separate class based on gender difference, 
and maintaining that there was no gendered difference in the use of space.41 In formalizing the 
space in this way, the group established its premises as a space where women would enter not 
merely as consumers or in relation to normal social life as a kind of public spin on the house call, 
but specifically as part of a collective of women.42 
In carving out a physical space for women in this way, the group gave a new relevance to 
the category of women in civic life. They also had to make certain choices about what kind of 
publicity would count: was this a moment in which cross-class identifications would take hold, 
or would “woman” be synonymous with “lady”?43 It might seem at first blush that 19 Langham 
Place served merely to replicate the exclusions of the public sphere, in marketing itself towards 
                                               
41 For an analysis of how a different space afforded “‘possibilities’ across class and gender 
hierarchies as well as across literary forms,” see Susan Bernstein. Roomscape: Women Writers in 
the British Museum from George Eliot to Virginia Woolf. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press, 2013, p. 2. 
42 See John Frow: “Consumption, that is to say, offers something like an alternative (and 
“neoliberal”) form of citizenship, one that can recognize and valorize difference in a way that an 
abstract belonging to a commonwealth cannot do” (428). 
43 For a brilliant account of the afterlife of this conundrum, see Ruth Livesey’s account of the 
women factory inspectors in the late 1890s in “The Politics of Work: Feminism, 
Professionalisation and Women Inspectors of Factories and Workshops.” Women's History 
Review 13:2 (2004): 233-262. 
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the members of the middle class: the women who shopped, and who could afford the guinea a 
year a subscription cost (or two guineas, if one wished to bring non-subscriber guests). By 
claiming a space in public life for women, and yet by limiting access to that space based on very 
specifically classed categories, the group seemed to be limiting the universality of its claims to a 
gendered collectivity. Yet in practice, it was not so simple: alongside the reading room, the space 
hosted a register of employment, which was imagined as a kind of public noticeboard to be 
printed in the English Woman’s Journal, “that Mrs A. might recommend an excellent matron or 
school teacher, and Mrs B. hear of her through our simple plan.”44 It quickly expanded, and the 
register was overwhelmed with applications from women, “all of them with some claim to the 
title of a lady,” as Bessie Parkes wrote (114). What becomes clear, as Parkes elucidates the types 
of women who applied, is that “lady” was a more inclusive category than it might seem: “young 
girls of seventeen finding it necessary to start in life;” “single women who found teaching 
unendurable as life advanced;” “married ladies whose husbands were invalided or not forth-
coming;” “widows who had children to support;” “tradesmen’s daughters, and … people of 
condition fallen into low estate” (114).  
The employment register, and Parkes’ later discussion of it at the National Association for 
the Promotion of Social Science (NAPSS), clearly represents the contradiction that characterizes 
the group as a whole. It is true that the group’s ethos was typically middle class, and its concern 
for working women was often based in charity rather than solidarity, displaying an ethnographic 
interest in the poor and a middle-class concern for social amelioration rather than the sense of a 
shared position and struggle. Even so, the group’s physical location brought together people 
whose social backgrounds were more different than the two-guinea fee for the reading room 
                                               
44 Paper read at the National Association for the Promotion of Social Science, August 1860. 
Reprinted as and reprinted as “A Year’s Experience in Woman’s Work.” The English Woman’s 
Journal 6.32 (1 October 1860): 112-21, p. 113. Subsequent page references in text.  
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would otherwise suggest, demonstrating a more expanded sense of who the collective could 
accommodate than the group’s representations of itself indicate. Although the tension persists 
between the idea of women in its most common sense, and the mission of the group as a 
philanthropic organization, the group’s physical space accomplished what it did not always do 
discursively: it brought together difference women to create an expanded sense of a women’s 
public. The group’s philanthropic agenda might have relied on absolute differences of class and 
character in theory, yet the associations the group enabled defied that sense of absoluteness in 
practice. The LPG supported the Ladies Sanitary Association, founded by NAPSS, whose goal 
was to carry out “a social and sanitary crusade” into the homes of the poor.45 Both NAPSS, or 
the Social Science Association as it was also often called, and the Langham Place circle were 
part of a broader shift in the late 1850s and 1860s from older models of philanthropy to the 
professionalization and bureaucratization of the management of social problems.46 The space 
afforded by the LPG provided a moment of transition, in which it was if only briefly possible for 
working-class women and educated women to imagine themselves on, and indeed to occupy, the 
same employment noticeboard. 
This is not to say that the LPG successfully resolved the liberal tension about difference. 
As the English Woman’s Journal makes clear, the members’ engagement with the concept shifts 
not only throughout the journal’s publication, but within each piece. Parkes’s “A Year’s 
Experience in Woman’s Work” is an example of this. It makes the case for a solution to the 
surplus women problem that crudely reshapes the feminine caretaking role to fit new ideas about 
women’s professionalism. Her answer is to train highly-educated women to be able to carry out 
                                               
45 Parkes cited in Rendall 2005.  
46 Ellen Jordan usefully details this shift in her Women’s Movement and Women’s Employment in 
Nineteenth-Century Britain. London: Routledge, 1999. Tusan deftly documents the way in which 




“moral superintendence over women” (117) – a typical example of philanthropic paternalism and 
very much of a piece with the NAPSS philosophy. Yet her use of the term “highly-educated 
women” is significant, relying on training rather than birth to provide moral authority. The 
phrase suggests, or at least leaves room for the possibility, that this is a scheme in which 
definitions – what it means to work, what it means to be a lady – are less rigid than Parkes 
herself maintains. Parkes writes: “I am in this paper considering the needs of educated women; 
— of women who have been born and bred ladies — it is a real distinction from which, even in 
America, the most earnest democrats cannot escape, and which in England, however much the 
strict edges of the lines of demarcation between class and class may be rubbing off, still exists in 
full force” (115). For all Parkes’ insistence on the “real distinction” separating a lady from the 
women who were not, her article cannot keep the categories straight: in one moment, 
“tradesmen’s daughters” have definitely “some claim to the title of a lady,” but in the next 
moment they are “not what we mean by ladies; they belong to tradesmen’s families” (116). 
Parkes’ struggle with the category of lady in this piece is characteristic of the way in which the 
LPG negotiated the idea of difference by implicitly asking how far it was possible to imagine 
commonness with people who lived differently. For Parkes, the line of identification seems to 
cease at fifty or seventy-five pounds a year, and only then if the subject is “perfectly 
unencumbered” and can not only “look like a lady” but also “live like one” (116). 
My claim is not that the LPG sought or managed to forge a sense of sisterhood that 
transcended all differences, particularly those of class, but a much more modest claim: to the 
extent that the group successfully expanded the sense of what it meant to assert solidarity as 
women (or as ladies), its success was in large part due to the forms of association the group, 
particularly in its use of physical space, enabled. As Emily Davies wrote to Barbara Bodichon, 
one of the clear achievements of the group was that Parkes, because of her role as editor but not 
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necessarily in that capacity, became a focal point for all kinds of women from all over the city: 
“it is no doubt something to have somebody sitting in a certain chair in a certain room at fixed 
hours every day & it might possibly be turned to some account by & by.”47 The LPG functioned 
as a space where associational ties were able to accommodate difference, where a common 
purpose could be imagined, even across those lines, like the rigid distinctions of class, that seem 
to forbid ties of allegiance and recognition. Often in spite of its own rhetoric, as we have seen in 
Parkes’ discussion of the employment register, the group was the physical manifestation of a 
space where difference met. The premises thus functioned as a formalization of liberalism’s 
potential to embrace difference, even as its rhetoric is also a symptom of liberalism’s fear of 
difference’s disintegrating effects. 
 
The English Women’s Journal in the literary public sphere 
In “Rethinking Recognition” (2000), Nancy Fraser identifies a shift in the way in which 
social movements have made – and are making – their claims. Feminism, for instance, 
“previously foregrounded the redistribution of resources,” but now makes claims on the basis of 
recognition. For Fraser, the question of why “so many movements couch their claims in the 
idiom of recognition” is a profoundly contemporary one, a product of neoliberalism and 
globalization.48 The resulting rise in mass communication and migration have the effect of 
“hybridizing and pluralizing cultural forms” (108); this reifies group identities, “hypostatizing 
culture,” and so serves merely to address the “freestanding cultural harm” caused by 
misrecognition, while obscuring and neglecting its economic injustices (110). The paradigm 
Fraser advocates – a consideration of both the cultural politics of recognition, and a focus on 
                                               
47 “Letter from Emily Davies to Barbara Bodichon.” 14 January 1863. GCPP Bodichon 2/10. 
Girton College Archive, Cambridge. 
48 Nancy Fraser. “Rethinking Recognition.” New Left Review 3 (2000): 107-120, p. 107. 
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redistribution to address economic inequality – has come under question by other philosophers, 
including Judith Butler and Iris Marion Young.49 However, it is not the specificity of her 
argument that is relevant to my discussion, but the terms in which she lays out the gulf between 
the politics of recognition and the politics of redistribution. What I am trying to show in my 
discussion of Langham Place is that recognition has a longer history in the feminist framing of 
rights, identity, and politics than Fraser’s article acknowledges. Recognition is, in other words, as 
central to understanding the relationship of feminism to liberalism as to neoliberalism. 
Mass cultural forms and increasing global mobility were two factors that profoundly 
shaped the way the Langham Place women considered the problem of difference, and the ways 
in which they challenged the practical politics as well as the ideological organization of mid-
Victorian society. The tension between recognition and redistribution, albeit in markedly 
different terms, is everywhere evident in the attempts to form the LPG as a site from which to 
challenge the social, legal, political, and economic injustices facing women in the mid-nineteenth 
century. It is not merely that cultural forms drive the shift to recognition Fraser identifies, but 
that bids for recognition and subjectivity grounded in and through cultural forms are central to 
the way the women of Langham Place organized themselves as a collective, and, further, that 
they laid claim to the universalism of the liberal position and the individualism of liberal 
subjectivity on the basis of collective identification; in short, how they lived with the democratic 
ideal and its contradictions. My focus on the forms of their claims, rather than simply the claims 
themselves, avoids attempts to categorize the group as either liberal or feminist, driven by 
recognition or redistribution, as radical or progressive (if not reactionary).  
                                               
49 See Jacinda Swanson. “Recognition and Redistribution: Rethinking Culture and the 
Economic.” Theory Culture Society 22 (2005): 87-118, p. 87. 
 
 131 
One of the persistent tendencies in criticism of the LPG is the desire to frame the group as 
the originary point of British feminism, often stressing its organization as a way of accounting 
for the breadth and extent of the group’s achievements. We see this, for instance, in Sheila 
Herstein’s claim that “the origins of organized British feminism can be traced to the Langham 
Place offices of the English Woman’s Journal,” or Ellen R. Jordan’s point that the LPG was an 
“institute [that] was the closest the Women’s Movement as a whole came to a formal 
organization.”50 These attempts to establish the organization of the LPG obscures what I will 
claim are its most interesting aspects: its informal and in many ways disorganized mode of 
organizing its work, and its dedication to the process of argumentation rather than the 
development of a cohesive, unified political platform. In large part, this informal formalism can 
be attributed to the locatedness of the group: the centrality of the Langham Place premises as a 
focal point to bring together women with disparate goals and commitments. But, while the 
group’s physical space was important, it was also a limitation the group needed to transcend, as 
the LPG’s vision of its work was always as a mass movement, and not one confined to London’s 
West End. The periodicals the group produced were crucial means by which the women sought 
to influence the nation. In a period in which the “general” reader was understood to be male, and 
only “family” publications or “class” journalism (that is, publications directed at a special 
interest group) were produced for a female audience, the attempts by members of the LPG to 
normalize publications produced for and by women is another significant way in which the group 
worked to reshape the public sphere.51  
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The English Woman’s Journal reflects some of the tension that characterizes the group as 
a whole: between the desire to be a mass movement and the fact that some of the possibilities the 
group afforded depended on its particular, small-scale physical space; between individual 
assertion and collective identity; and between what Jürgen Habermas calls the “literary public 
sphere” of the eighteenth century and the “mass public of culture consumers” of the twentieth.52 
There were several other periodicals associated with LPG. Members were responsible for the 
Alexandra Magazine, Victoria Magazine, and, after 1866, the Englishwoman’s Review (the 
merged product of the English Woman’s Journal and Alexandra Magazine).53 The English 
Woman’s Journal came about through the partnership of Barbara Bodichon and Bessie Parkes. In 
1858, after dabbling in editorial work with the Glasgow periodical, the Waverley Journal, they 
formed a limited liability company, of which Bodichon was the majority shareholder by virtue of 
her unmarried sister, who could hold shares in her own right – something which Bodichon, who 
had married in 1857, could not legally do given the status of married women’s property rights.54 
The company functioned both as a source of employment for women and to bring together a 
community of women activists. Many of the women who would make up the LPG, including 
Max Hays, Emily Faithfull, Maria Rye, Jessie Boucherett and Adelaide Procter, were initially 
attracted by the work of the journal (Rendall 2005). Shortly after the periodical’s first issue ran in 
March of 1858, Monson had established the premises at 19 Langham Place, and Emily Faithfull 
had launched the Victoria Press, which was entirely staffed by women – the only press in the 
                                               
52 Jürgen Habermas. The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a 
Category of Bourgeois Society. Translated by Thomas Burger. (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991), 
pp. 167-8. Subsequent page references in text.  
53 For details of these publications, see Laurel Brake and Marysa Demoor, editors. Dictionary of 
Nineteenth-Century Journalism. Gent: Academia Press, 2009. 
54 On the status of women shareholders in nineteenth-century Britain, see Mark Freeman, Robin 
Pearson, and James Taylor. “‘A Doe in the City’: Women Shareholders in Eighteenth- and Early 
Nineteenth-Century Britain.” Accounting, Business & Financial History 16.2 (2006): 265-291. 
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country to be so staffed.55 Thereafter, the English Woman’s Journal was printed by Faithfull’s 
Press, making it a journal that was run by women, and largely owned by them (unlike the 
Waverley). The English Woman’s Journal therefore differed from many other special-interest 
journals of the period because it created, in the words of Pauline Nestor, “a wide and varied 
community of women” with influence that reached far beyond the pages of the journal itself.56 
While it was influential in providing a voice for the women of Langham Place in print, it was 
equally important as an example of a female-initiated corporate venture.57 Ironically, thought, the 
journal was never a financially successful project. In 1859, Parkes wrote to Bodichon that she 
had come into an inheritance providing an extra 150 pounds a year, the interest of which she 
could use to pay for the journal.58 The journal’s financial viability, or lack thereof, was an 
ongoing theme in the letters between the women. Yet, despite its financial problems, the journal 
was an important part of the burgeoning women’s movement as a space that was both discursive 
and physical. 
In a case study of SPEW drawing from the organization’s archive housed at Girton 
College, Michelle Elizabeth Tusan contends that the “urban-based groups” like SPEW and the 
Langham Place circle “attracted like-minded participants who went on to promote the 
                                               
55 Brake and Demoor, editors. Dictionary of Nineteenth Century Journalism, p. 204. 
56 Nestor. “New Departure,” p. 95. 
57 It is also worth noting that the material published in the English Woman’s Journal was 
discussed in other periodicals and newspapers. Bodichon’s pamphlet, Women and Work, for 
example, was initially published in the Waverley (Hirsch ch. 9 fn. 2) and republished in the 
English Woman’s Journal. Subsequently, an article discussing the tract and echoing many of its 
sentiments was published in The Leader, a radical periodical that billed itself as a publication for 
“All classes, all people.” (Laurel Brake. “The Leader.” Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition. 
Kings College London. www.ncse.ac.uk/index.html.) These cases, though insufficient to map the 
spread of ideas published in EWJ, nonetheless speak to Nestor’s point that the influence of the 
journal cannot be judged by circulation figures alone. 
58 “Letter from Bessie Rayner Parkes to Barbara Bodichon.” 30 January 1859. GCPP Parkes 
5/88. Girton College Archive, Cambridge.  
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‘advancement of women’ through the establishment of a female-centred associational life.”59 The 
heavily philanthropic bent of the work done by organizations or collectivities like SPEW and the 
LPG suggests that difference was just as often understood to form the basis of what Dinah Birch 
and Mark Llewellyn term “mutual interests and destinies” as it was considered to be a force that 
fractured the collective potential of such associations.60 Indeed, the LPG resists an understanding 
of their associational life as one based on like-mindedness, and the discussions about the purpose 
and direction of English Woman’s Journal, preserved in the group’s letters, reveal the limits of 
reading the periodical as a reflection of the group’s common goals. The journal’s importance lies 
precisely in the way it serves to question whether it was possible to think about common goals, 
and how much the interests of individual women could be reconciled with the interests of women 
in general. The use of the singular term in title of the journal (the English Woman’s Journal) 
raises two questions lying at the heart of the LPG’s work: to what extent can collectivity be 
imagined as a unity? When is difference too different to be thought together? That Bodichon, as a 
married women who could not legally enter into contracts on her own behalf, could not therefore 
under the law own the journal she helped found indicates how these questions took on a 
particular urgency for women in the 1850s and 1860s.61 In the context of the debates about the 
Married Women’s Property Acts, the journal’s statement of unity on its title page offers a 
different model of incorporation than the institution of marriage offered, one in which women’s 
individuality is explicitly named and also forms the basis for solidarity. The journal, in 
                                               
59 Tusan. “Not the Ordinary Victorian Charity,” p. 221. 
60 Dinah Birch and Mark Llewellyn, editors. Conflict and Difference in Nineteenth-Century 
Literature. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, p. 2. 
61 See Griffin on the way the debates about the Married Women’s Property Acts in the 1850s and 
1860s were not merely about the principle of equal rights, but also about the problem of 
redefining a woman as an individual rather than an incorporated part of her husband. Griffin cites 
Philip Muntz, the Radical MP for Birmingham: The Act “would certainly cause great difficulties 
in all the domestic arrangements of life. It would cause antagonism between those who we were 
taught to believe were one” (62). 
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addressing itself to the singular “woman,” hailed each of its readers simultaneously as 
individuals and as members of the collective pool of its readership.  
The articles to which I now turn are significant for both the Journal and the “woman” it 
recognizes and redistributes in the sense that they provide a form capable of negotiating between 
a kind of exemplary individuality and a collective understanding of womanhood.62 The first 
article in the journal’s first issue, “The Profession of the Teacher” (the annual reports of the 
Governess’ Benevolent Institution from 1843-1856), is characteristic in its uncertainty about the 
parameters of its audience, reflecting the English Woman’s Journal’s competing impulses 
towards inclusivity for all women and the narrower focus of middle-class paternalism.63 The 
argument is not particularly remarkable in its recommendation of a doctrine of liberal self-help 
mitigated by the compassion of Christian charity. Yet the manner in which it seeks to transcend 
individual differences is illustrative, both of the form of representative individuality the article 
ultimately endorses, and in the way it struggles to define the collective voice in which it speaks. 
Does the author speak on behalf of all women, or only the middle- and upper-class women who 
are the subjects, rather than the objects, of the philanthropic mission? Teaching, the author 
maintains, is of importance, not merely because it was a gendered occupation, but because it was 
an occupation of general, rather than specifically classed, interest: unlike domestic and factory 
work, “the teaching profession touches everyone as either they had a governess or have a relative 
or friend in the business” (1). The teaching profession may register class differences, as the 
                                               
62 See also Pusapati’s mention of the July and August 1859 publication of two articles called 
“Things in General” signed by “Nobody in Particular” (606). 
63 “The Profession of the Teacher.” English Woman’s Journal 1.1 (1 March 1858): 1-13. 
Subsequent page references in text. The article is unsigned; Kathryn Hughes attributes it to 
Bessie Parkes; Mary Poovey attributes it to Jessie Boucherett. I will refer to the author, rather 
than attempting attribution; the ambiguity of the author’s identity is, in many ways, my point. 
Kathryn Hughes. The Victorian Governess, 1993. London: Hambledon and London, 2001, p. 
213. Mary Poovey. Uneven Developments: The Ideological Work of Gender in Mid-Victorian 
England. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988, p. 232. 
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“platform on which middle and upper classes, meet, the one struggling up, the other drifting 
down” (1), but, in its general relevance, can transcend the particularities of those differences.  
The figure of the governess has often been read as a sort of projection-screen for anxiety about 
the fluidity of class identities that this statement suggests.64 Yet, the tone of this article betrays 
little anxiety about the fluid class location of governesses. The ability of the universal dilemma 
of the governess to transcend the specificity of problems peculiar to one class is crucial, because 
it is on that basis the issue could use a particular case as a wedge issue to make space for a 
discussion about the training and employment of women more broadly. Because the governess’s 
problems transcend the particular problems of rank, using the governess as a test case functions 
to shape women’s employment as a national issue rather than the particular problem of a certain 
class or sector. 
Like many articles in the journal, “The Profession of the Teacher” depends on certain 
exclusions to create solidarity among women. In particular, it draws on an understanding of race 
and nation in which a progressive potential defines the English in comparison to inferior races. 
The article is prevented from becoming an entirely typical example of liberal feminism’s worst 
tendencies, defining collectivity based on the image of its white, middle-class proponents, only 
because the supremacy of the English is proven by the working classes of England rather than 
the middle-class producers of the journal. It is the hardworking nature of English men and 
women that elevates the nation above other, indolent races: the “Hindoo” who “pecks rice, 
sleeps, bathes, fights, and embroiders coats of many colours,” or the “Mohammedan Arab” who 
“sits cross-legged in the sun and plays endless games of backgammon” (10). Against this 
background of casual racism, the English or Anglo-Saxon man is notable for his industry because 
                                               
64 See Poovey’s chapter on the governess in Uneven Developments, in which she in fact cites this 
sentence from the report. 
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his “spécialité of function” is labor: he “digs and ploughs, spins and weaves, buys and sells” 
(10). As the “feminine counterpart to these fine sterling qualities,” Mrs. Bull possesses “good 
common sense” and “a motherly body”; she “not only looks after the children, but after the 
storeroom too,” as she “weighs the cheese and bacon, and metes out the flannel” (10). The 
provincial Mrs. Bull, a working woman from the “country districts,” is made to stand for a 
generalized form of Englishwoman upon whom the hopes of progress are pinned.65 As such, she 
registers precisely the ways in which the journal’s idea of common womanhood both embraces 
and refuses difference. Compared to the genteel reader whose fear of not being a gentlewoman 
keeps her from the hard work necessary to “clear the path to new occupations,” Mrs. Bull’s 
difference is the basis of her exemplarity; yet her exceptionality as “intelligent female labour” is 
only legible against the endlessness of the Arab’s backgammon-playing (9-10).   
In the article, then, feared difference scorned to promote a narrative of English 
exceptionalism, and celebrated difference is embraced in the figure of Mrs. Bull. This establishes 
a general form of womanhood whose distinctiveness and progressive potential stems from her 
proven ability to work. The figure of Mrs. Bull represents an individual who works in a specific 
location and at specific tasks, but also represents the entire nation of English women who share 
her capacities. In this way, the figure does what the article as a whole aspires to do: mediate 
between the particularity of the (English) individual woman, and the collectivity of all the 
nation’s women to which she belongs. This occurs at the level of the article’s language, for the 
writer creates a sense of inclusiveness at certain times and distance at others. For instance, the 
writer advocates that the reader ought to go out and “try how far society would support her if she 
entered a telegraph office, or opened a stationer’s shop, or took a place as a show-woman in any 
                                               
65 Recall Mill’s representative married woman, Mrs. Grundy: “Whoever has a wife and children 
has given hostages to Mrs. Grundy” (331-332). Mrs. Bull also, of course, evokes Punch 
magazine’s John Bull cartoons.  
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of our enormous clothing establishments” (11). In considering the possible results of this 
experiment, the author writes that if “one” tries and is shunned, one could “stay at home by the 
fire of one’s own earning… holding comfortable converse with Dickens and Thackeray, 
Tennyson and Mrs. Browning… as a compensation for living people whom we have not met 
because they would not meet us, — because we kept a shop!” (11-12). The slip between the 
singular “one” and the plural “we” weaves together the single individuals, sitting alone and 
rejected but buoyed by the fires they have provided for themselves, into an imagined community 
of working women, whose individual efforts combine to shift social opinion, and whose 
solidarity is crafted through those efforts and in the consequences of potential social failure. 
Moreover, it seems to me not incidental that reading plays a visible role in this imagined 
collectivity: like the role the LPG imagined for the journal itself, the novels and poetry hail their 
readers not merely as individuals, but as a community. 
What is clear in the “The Profession of the Teacher” is how hard the author needs to work 
in order to achieve any kind of a balance between the one and the many. This reflects the 
difficulties in reconciling an insistence on women as liberal individuals capable and deserving of 
work that is “healthy” and “exciting” and that pays a living wage (10), with the still 
unrecognized fact that the problem of women’s work was a problem of scale: a social problem 
affecting “tens of thousands” of women (9), rather than an individual problem.66 Social change 
“on the required scale” is effected by the accretion of individual efforts: “every young woman 
who must ‘go out’ from the domestic hearth asking herself, ‘Is there nothing else which I can, for 
better pay than that of a governess, undertake at the cost of a little courage?’” (12). These 
                                               
66 The author refers to an article in February’s Blackwoods, written by a man of “much sense and 
kindliness” but a “strongly conservative tendency” who argues that the problem of women’s 
unemployment is exaggerated (12); the author thus clearly feels it is still necessary to convince 
the reader of the view that unemployment was in fact a general social problem. 
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individual examples of “the intelligent female labour of the Anglo-Saxon race” are to be fed into 
what the author calls “the general stream of business, … whose tributary rivulets are of different 
complexion in different localities” (12). As a metaphor, the general stream of business works to 
characterize the approach to difference in the journal. Made up of “tributary rivulets,” which are 
characterized by their specificity and “different complexion,” the general stream absorbs but 
does not negate those differences. In particular, in the general stream of business, intelligent 
female labor becomes merely another kind of intelligent Anglo-Saxon labor. Unlike race, gender 
becomes something that is not a significantly or qualitatively different difference.  
The women who, as representative individuals, are to go out and seek their livings as 
businesswomen have their precedents in the pages of the journal. Specifically, the first issue also 
saw the publication of an article called “Miss Bosanquet,” an article which was to function as “a 
legitimate preface to a series of biographies which we hope to publish in this journal.”67 These 
biographies indeed appeared throughout the journal’s run; other subjects included Florence 
Nightingale, Elizabeth and Emily Blackwell, Rachel Felix, and Rosa Bonheur.68 The series both 
assumes, and works to convince, that the lives of the subjects are significant “for public and for 
private interest,” as the author of the Bosanquet piece writes (35). The subjects of the biographies 
are women committed to a purpose, who excel in their fields, and for the most part exhibit an 
“unwavering conviction of duty, and an earnest desire to be useful to her sex and to her kind,” as 
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Anna Blackwell wrote of her sister.69 Cumulatively, the series offers its subjects as representative 
individuals, empirical proof of women’s subjectivity and capability. Her sister achieved so much, 
Anna Blackwell writes, not out of a craving for notoriety but with a drive that grew “naturally 
out of the experiences of her life” (80). This characterization of the subject as fulfilling her 
unique and innate capacities at once establishes her specialness and individuality and, as it is 
assumed if not explicitly stated in similar biographies, also stands as evidence of the universality 
of her potential and by implication the potential of all women. Miss Bosanquet, for instance, is 
significant because of the strength of her religious convictions, which the biography maintains 
she discovered on her own, and which isolated her from her parents. The extremity of her 
Methodism might have been as distasteful to the journal’s readers as it was to her parents; thus 
the author is at great pains to point out that Bosanquet (later Mrs Fletcher) was “democratic,” 
that “the spirit” of Mr. and Mrs. Fletcher’s “exertions was immeasurably wider than their creed, 
and that was not bigoted, though devoutly orthodox” (35). To stress her individuality, the author 
needed to draw out Bosanquet’s piety and the extremity of her religious devotion, but retain a 
catholic spirit in order to appeal to all of the journal’s readership. 
As a series, the biographical pieces must function to present the subjects in all their 
particularities while simultaneously suggesting that these figures represent not just themselves 
but in some sense the capacities of all women. Because of these contradictory purposes, the 
biographies often establish the particularities of each women’s attitudes or behaviors – the 
extremes of their commitments – only to neutralize them with qualifications. As we have seen, 
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Miss Bosanquet is simultaneously the picture both of extreme religious devotion, choosing to 
leave the family home rather than compromise her religious commitments and sense of Christian 
charity, and of liberal toleration at its finest:  
 
For those who differed from her in controversy she had sweet courtesy and clear 
statements of her own views; for those who were of one faith with herself she had 
sympathy and tenderness unbounded; for those who agreed with her neither in belief nor 
in practice she cherished hope and charity up to the farthest limits possible to one of her 
decided creed (36).  
 
The portrait of Rachel Felix is similarly conflicted. Much is made of her prima donna qualities: 
her fondness of gambling and anger at losing, her love of excess and grand display, and her 
“economical predilections,” which the author attributes, in barely veiled anti-Semitism, to her 
Jewishness. However, the author seeks to balance these aspects of her character with more 
savory characteristics.70 For instance, Rachel’s “reputation for economy almost amounted to the 
accusation of avarice, yet she could be generous and liberal to those whom she loved or wished 
to serve and encourage” (159). Particularly at the moments when the subjects of the biographies 
appear at their most particular, the series takes pains to modify the extremities of the women’s 
characters, instead stressing their goodness and their “liberal” nature. While these pieces do 
celebrate the individuality and unique quirks of their subjects, when read together over the 
course of the journal, they begin to seem like variations on a single theme. The women depicted 
lived remarkably different lives, yet their portraits are rendered in similar ways. Devotees of the 
anecdote long before new historicism, the portrait authors sought to highlight the originality and 
particularity of each subject. But collectively, the particular quirks of these women – whether it 
is Miss Bosanquet’s lifelong devotion to a Methodist faith she discovered in spite of her parents, 
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or Elizabeth Blackwell marching around the room carrying a man who had just declared it 
impossible that a woman could lift him – begin to seem less like unique characteristics than the 
formulaic and predictable proof that women are capable of individuality. 
The series thus has two effects. First, these biographical articles suggest that the 
differences among women – the particular foibles of liberal individuals – render collectivity 
possible; they establish the personality of their subjects as specific enough to highlight their 
uniqueness, and also general enough to establish the fact of difference as what all women have in 
common. In so doing, the second effect of the series is made clear: the articles bring to light the 
complexities of the LPG’s engagement with difference. If difference is the basis of commonness, 
how is it possible to preserve difference without smoothing its edges away in sameness? Are 
there limits to difference rendered in this way? Miss Bosanquet’s biography articulates this point. 
In the way that she cherished Christian charity and liberal hope for progress “up to the farthest 
limits possible to one of her decided creed,” her toleration of difference was largely a wish for 
sameness. The claim invites the charitable reading that the article’s author undoubtedly intended: 
to prove the capacities of a gentle, devout woman, who transcends her own boundaries every 
time she encounters someone with differing views. Yet it also invites a more skeptical reading, 
one which points to the limits of the journal’s construction of a subjectivity that could only 
embrace the working class by caricaturing Hindus and Arabs: just how far, the reader might be 
moved to question, are the farthest limits of a creed which is so decided? What is the purpose of 
charity when undertaken in the hopes that the differing one will to see the light and come into the 
proper fold? 
If the journal reveals the limitations of engaging with difference as much as it represented 
its possibilities, how did the LPG cultivate associational ties founded on difference? The answer, 
I suggest, is in the form of the group itself, and the ways it sought to craft a collective identity of 
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its members that was, in practice, genuinely democratic: a unity forged through the coming 
together, but not the merging, of individual voices.  
 
Incorporated aesthetics 
The artistic work of the group’s members in this period constantly rehearses different 
forms of this kind of togetherness, resulting in what I want to describe as an incorporated form of 
art. Parkes’s 1858 poem, “Two Graves,” provides one such example. It gives an account of 
visiting the graves of Mary Wollstonecraft Shelley and Percy Bysshe Shelley within the span of a 
year. The poem’s first two stanzas focus on the distance between the graves, “a thousand miles 
apart,” and the difference of the surroundings: his grave “beneath the Roman rose,” and hers 
“where the tenderest snowdrop blows.”71 The final two stanzas depict the spiritual merging of the 
two figures, among the “heavenly lilies,” where the “long-dissever’d lives entwine.” As literary 
endeavor, “Two Graves” is remarkable only for its mediocrity, indicating the reason why, as 
Kathleen McCormack notes, Parkes’s verses “never achieved for her much fame as a poet.”72 As 
thought-experiment, however, the poem plays a role among other attempts in the journal to 
negotiate between separateness and togetherness, and to think through what it means to have a 
collective identity. The poem insists that the “living law” of the Shelleys was “to know one soul, 
one heart,” yet insistently reminds us of the separateness of the two lives: the focus on the 
physical separation of the graves; the note preceding the poem of the date of each writer’s death, 
reminding the reader of the thirty years Mary Shelley outlived her husband; and finally, the very 
title, which gives precedence to the two individual deaths, rather than the poem’s romantic image 
of the everlasting life in heaven of the couple’s merged heart and soul. 
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I do not mean to suggest that Parkes chose the grave as a deliberate metaphor for the 
project of imagining a feminist collectivity, but that the poem reflects a tension between the 
integrity of the individual and the possibility of collective identification.73 A sketch, “Ye newe 
generation” (c. 1854), is another example of the way in which the group’s members used art to 
explore the relationship between the one and the many. The sketch (see below) is attributed to 
Barbara Bodichon, and is included in the collection of her personal papers at Girton College.74  
 
Figure 1: [Barbara Bodichon?]. “Ye newe generation” (c. 1854). 
However, the sketch is both unsigned and undated, and Deborah Cherry notes that it was one of a 
“handful of drawings for private circulation,” and perhaps made by “one of her circle of family 
and friends.”75 Lacking clear attribution, the sketch has the effect of playing with the expectation 
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of art as the unique product of an individual artist.76 It also evades our attempts to assign 
individuality to the figures it depicts. There are six figures in the crude sketch: four women in the 
foreground, wearing the loose, practical clothing associated with feminist activists, and wielding 
an artist palette, paper, an umbrella (which was to become “one of the most circulated signs of 
the feminist campaigner, according to Cherry),77 and what Alexandra Wettlaufer identifies as a 
maulstick;78 a woman in the background, covering her face with her hand; and the unfinished 
figure of a bull, at whom the umbrella and art paraphernalia are being brandished. The four 
women in the foreground are identified by Cherry and Wettlaufer as Bodichon, Anna Mary 
Howitt, Eliza Fox, and Parkes.79 Meritxell Simon-Martin, however, notes that Hirsch identifies 
Jane Benham in Fox’s place,80 and therefore claims that “as neither Bodichon nor her friends are 
easily recognisable, the drawing could be interpreted as Bodichon having in mind a collective 
understanding of the new generation of professional women.”81 
For Wettlaufer, the sketch represents “an image of solidarity and forward movement,” as 
the clothes of the women “merge together” to present an admittedly “comic” united front, four 
women artists against the bull’s “symbol of aggressive masculinity and stubborn stupidity” 
(132). Simon-Martin agrees that the sketch symbolizes a “collective understanding of the new 
generation of professional women,” but notes that Bodichon’s “feminist outlook” was tainted by 
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in text. 
79 Wettlaufer. “Politics and Poetics of Sisterhood,” p. 132. Deborah Cherry. Painting Women: 
Victorian Women Artists. London: Routledge, 1995, pp. 47-8. 
80 Hirsch. Barbara Leigh Smith Bodichon, p. 118. 
81 Meritxell Simon-Martin. “More Beautiful Than Words & Pencil Can Express: Barbara 
Bodichon’s Artistic Career at the Interface of her Epistolatory and Visual Self Projections.” 
Gender & History 24.3 (November 2012): 581-99, p. 589. Subsequent page references in text.  
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a “problematic bourgeois standpoint,” excluding members of the working class and especially 
women of color from its liberal individualist ethic (589-90). Both critics are right to focus on the 
sketch’s representation of collectivity, though when read in light of the group’s other work, it 
become more than simply a comic representation of feminist artists taking on John Bull. Like the 
series of biographies published in the English Woman’s Journal, the attempt to depict women as 
representative individuals – a unique person, who also stands for the potential of all women to be 
so unique – functions to erase the particularities it attempts to represent. That we no longer know 
the historical figure for whom each of the figures is a representative makes the risks of this form 
particularly evident. The journal’s, and the group’s, desire to make the womanhood it represented 
representative – always to stand for someone more than herself – risked losing individuality in 
the desire for collective identification. The LPG’s form of imagined solidarity was not perfect, 
and Simon-Martin’s reminder of its exclusions is fair. But to see those exclusions as the same 
kind of exclusions we look for in contemporary, post-identity-politics media representations fails 
to grasp the power of the form. A reminder comes from the contemporary critical response to 
women’s art such as, by example, Anna Mary Howitt’s Boadicea Brooding over her Wrongs 
(1856). The painting, since destroyed, took Bodichon as a model, with Howitt no doubt intending 
to draw a parallel between Boadicea’s wrongs and those of women in the mid-nineteenth-
century. The Athenaeum published a review in which the author asked, “What is this but an 
angry woman, whose wrongs we only know by the Catalogue?”82 In seeking resentfully to 
reduce Boadicea/Bodichon to merely “an angry woman,” instead of a figure representing the 
wrongs of a community of women, the reviewer implicitly acknowledges how powerful it was to 
depict women as representative individuals in the 1850s. Focusing on the exclusions of specific 
representation thus misses the point. The importance of the artistic representations of the LPG 
                                               
82 Cited in Wettlaufer. “Politics and Poetics of Sisterhood,” p. 141. 
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was not because they represented a specific collectivity in which named groups were either 
included or excluded, but because they rendered artistically the form of collectivity as such.  
In her chapter on the Fortnightly Review, Elaine Hadley describes the way in which the 
journal’s use of signatures formalized a liberalism in which the content of one’s opinion mattered 
less than the liberal process of mind that led to one’s having an opinion in the first place. This 
formalism, Hadley argues, ultimately “reveals the extent to which eclecticism becomes liberal 
eclecticism” – that is, it reflects not the “diversity of society” but rather “the diversity displayed 
through the liberal form of thought and opinion” (172). Although theoretically anyone can form 
an opinion regardless of social position, this is an exclusionary formalism, which disenfranchises 
and effectively dehumanizes those whose commitments or resources prevent their adherence to 
these formal rules of liberal cognition. One of the remarkable achievements of the LPG was to 
challenge this exclusionary formalism: to live and work as a collective that attempted to bend the 
formal abstraction of liberal opinion to address the question of social diversity. The group 
formalized a way of addressing the exclusions of the liberal public sphere and the political form 
of liberal subjectivity. We can perhaps most fully appreciate the achievement of the LPG only if 
we consider the embodied aspect of liberal universality. The supposed abstraction of the public 
sphere allows the liberal individual to suspend the particularities of the self, and especially the 
body with its physical signs of difference, to participate in a true meeting of the minds.83 Of 
course, critics have long pointed to the ways in which this rhetoric functions to magnify 
                                               
83 See John Frow: “The public is thus a space of the suspension of the self such that real 
differences can be treated as virtualities. It is this suspension that makes possible what I would 
call the generous indifference that is the hallmark of democratic civility” (427). 
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differences, even as it purports to make them most inscrutable.84 In Hadley’s account of liberal 
embodiment, the reason this construction perpetuates the exclusions of marginalized groups is 
evident. As she notes, the signature on articles in the Fortnightly embodied “not the actual person 
in his entirety or even his personality” but the abstract category of his singularity: “the signature 
functions as a public manifestation of liberal individuality as embodiment, extracting the 
character of the life of the mind without exposing the man of character” (160). Behind the 
putatively unmarked category of character stood the very distinctly marked man. In making their 
claims upon the liberal public sphere, the LPG was challenged by this abstracted embodiment: 
how could they lay claim to an unmarked universality, when to point out the fact of their 
difference was also to point out their distance from the liberal embodiment of individuality? 
If the “weighted body must only be implied” because the liberal individual is constituted 
not by the body but by a person’s capacity to “abstract himself into disinterestedness” (160-1), 
the women of Langham Place were in a bind. So much depended on the body, or more 
specifically on proving that women’s bodies were no less physically capable of the challenges of 
work and especially of thought.85 Take, for instance, the anecdote of Elizabeth Blackwell 
marching around the room with a man over her shoulders to prove women’s physical capacity.86 
On the one hand, both the act and the subsequent recounting of it in the pages of the journal 
serve as bids for equality, as evidence that a woman’s physical capacity is equal to any man’s. On 
                                               
84 For just one of a vast string of examples, see James B. Salazar, “The rhetoric of character thus 
promoted a democratic vision of self governance and upward mobility that legitimated and 
secured existing social hierarchies through the very gesture of overcoming them.”  Bodies of 
Reform: The Rhetoric of Character in Gilded Age America, New York: New York University 
Press, 2010, p. 19. 
85 One could look to any number of articles in the English Woman’s Journal on the issue of 
schooling for girls. See, for instance, “The Society of Arts Examinations.” English Woman’s 
Journal 1.5 (1 July 1858): 326-332. 
86 Blackwell is an interesting figure to think about this through, given not only her gender but her 
subsequent blindness: how much does disability disrupt Hadley’s narrative of embodiment? 
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the other hand, because it highlights the woman, and not merely her character — her body, and 
not merely the abstract imprint of it in the form of the signature — the anecdote risks 
reinscribing women’s alignment with what Hadley calls concrete embodiment rather than the 
abstractness of the liberal individual. Consequently, the LPG needed to challenge the form of 
abstract liberal embodiment, to break the string of associations that composed abstract liberal 
subjectivity: the implication of a handshake in the signature, “that the handshake is ‘evoked’ by 
the hand,” and that the hand “‘stands in for’ the private individual” (Hadley 160). That is 
precisely the function the group’s art performed. Through pieces like “Ye Newe Generation,” the 
group troubled the easy flow of liberal association. The signs of individuality in the significantly 
unsigned sketch – the artist’s palette or writer’s notebook – have an excess of meaning beyond 
standing in for the particular private individuals the figures represent. They stand in also for all 
the other private individuals that could be represented, and ultimately even for the principle of 
abstraction itself: that women can be represented in this metonymic fashion. The sketch effects 
what the form of the LPG also does: its artistic practice makes liberal individuality a collective 
prospect without thoroughly undermining the entire sense of liberal individualism, and it does so 
by crafting gender as a form of difference that was simultaneously politically salient and 
politically irrelevant.  
 
Democratic letters 
The members of the LPG disagreed with each other. The facile nature of this statement 
belies the potential magnitude of these disagreements. The debate over whether to include 
married women in the push for the vote, for instance, had at stake no less than the political voice, 
indeed identity, of many of the group’s members. What Hadley refers to as a “dutiful respect for 
differing opinions” (172) might understandably falter in such circumstances. However, the 
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group’s letters reveal that, although there were clashes that led to irrevocable fractures, for the 
most part conflicting opinions were respected. The women who detailed those conflicts were 
often the very members supporting the dissenting member; and those conflicts were allowed to 
exist without needing to be reconciled in some higher liberal version of truth. The democratic 
form evident in the group’s letters is important not because it necessarily does what it promises, 
but because it gives form to a way of embodying the liberal individual whose relationship to the 
public sphere need not involve a disinterestedness that requires us to divest ourselves of our 
particularities. The letters show how the group developed a politics of friendship, which 
modelled a way of relating to otherness by investing of one’s particularities while simultaneously 
occupying them most intensely. 
The challenge was to extend this model beyond the circle of friends, especially given the 
high stakes of disagreement. The issues that the LPG debated had material and practical 
consequences for the lives of its members, and for women in general: the franchise, the extent to 
which it was right or expedient to include married women in the push for the vote and work, and 
educational and employment opportunities open to women. The group never achieved consensus 
on these issues.87 Discord encompassed major disagreements about policy as well as personal 
disagreements, and though the latter were as crucial to the group’s significance as the former, 
little has been written about them. Like the reviewer who refused to see Anna Mary Howitt’s 
Boadicea as anything other than the representation of a lone angry woman, most critics have 
seen the disagreements of the LPG as merely squabbles among women: less a significant aspect 
of their politics than petty and destructive infighting. This was a risk of which the group itself 
was well aware. In a letter about working to establish a women’s college, Fanny Metcalfe wrote 
                                               
87 The role of married women, for instance, was never agreed upon: Parkes could never advocate 
for the explicit inclusion of wives in the category of the worker, whereas Boucherett and 
Faithfull did. See Rendall. “Langham Place group (act. 1857–1866).” 
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to Barbara Bodichon of her fears that “the whole thing threatens to merge into what the scoffers 
of the other sex will call a woman’s squabble.”88 Parkes, too, felt that the success of the journal 
was necessary to prevent the group being “talked of” in London, “America & Paris,” as “one 
more failure in women’s attempts at working together.”89 Relatively little has been written about 
the tensions and disagreements of the group, in part because of the tendency to view them, as 
Metcalfe worried that they would be viewed, as feminine “bickering.”90 Given the importance 
granted to the LPG in the historiography of the emergence of an organized feminist movement in 
Britain, the reluctance to engage with the potentially unproductive and disintegrating effects of 
such personal and political disagreements is understandable; even (or perhaps especially) 
feminist scholars of the group tend see the failure of solidarity in such disagreement.   
The disagreements are nevertheless important in understanding the group’s operations 
and significance, particularly if we consider, as I am proposing, that the group primarily 
functioned as a structure to hold together dissenting voices, disparate politics, and conflicting 
visions. The letters that passed between the group operated, like the physical space at Langham 
Place, as what Birch and Llewellyn call “a holding ground for dialectical positions” – of personal 
difference, political differences, and different priorities and strategies (4). The space of the letters 
worked to balance what Regenia Gagnier argues “constituted the anxiety of liberalism after a 
                                               
88 “Letter from Fanny Metcalfe to Barbara Bodichon.” 28 March 1875. GCPP Bodichon 3/22. 
Girton College Archive, Cambridge. 
89 Parkes’ view presented by Davies. “Letter from Emily Davies to Barbara Bodichon.” 3 
January 1863. GCPP Bodichon 2/5. Girton College Archive, Cambridge. Davies disagreed: “In 
everything Bessie says, I am struck with her amazing ignorance of what other people think & 
feel about things in general. If she had been brought up among either Church people or orthodox 
dissenters, who between them, constitute the great mass of English society, she would know 
there is nothing at all new in women’s working together. ... The new and difficult thing is, for 
men & women to work together on equal terms, & the existence of the EWJ is no testimony with 
regard to that.” 
90 Herstein attributes the group’s dissolution to “Bickering among the Langham Place feminists” 
as well as financial difficulties (25). 
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century of its development”: the “tension of independence versus interdependence, specifically 
of individual development threatening the functioning of the whole.”91 If, as Jacques Ranciere 
writes, politics is “the sphere of activity of a common that can only ever be contentious,” we can 
perhaps understand the group’s disagreements not as mere squabbles but as the working out of a 
politics.92 It recalls, too, Mill’s insistence on the importance of conflict and discussion in the 
formation of collective decisions. As Bruce Baum points out, talking is crucial for Mill in order 
to foster “deliberation regarding ‘every interest and shade of opinion’ so that collective decisions 
will involve all parts of the political community.”93 In crafting the group as a space where 
disagreement and conflict, rather than merely a uniform voice, shaped the group’s activism, the 
LPG enabled a form of democratic association in which all voices have equal power and 
collectively contribute to make up the whole. Derrida reminds us that there “is no democracy 
without respect for irreducible singularity or alterity, but there is no democracy without the 
‘community of friends’, without the calculation of majorities, without identifiable, stabilizable, 
representable subjects, all equal.”94 Such a politics of friendship was central to the LPG’s attempt 
to forge a community based not on liberal forms of abstraction and disinterest but on the 
affective ties of friendship and also difference; the challenge was to attempt to extend this form 
of association on a mass scale. 
                                               
91 Regenia Gagnier. Individualism, Decadence and Globalization: On the Relationship of Part to 
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In her account of meeting the Leigh Smith sisters, Emily Davies describes the revelation 
that came from feeling connected to others who shared her discontent with the place of women in 
society:  
 
After making acquaintance in Algiers with Annie Leigh Smith (Madame Bodichon’s 
sister)—the first person I had ever met who sympathized with my feeling of resentment at 
the subjection of women—I corresponded with her and she introduced me to others of the 
same circle and kept me up to what was going on. In 1858 the first organized movement 
on behalf of women was set on foot.95  
 
These common sympathies drove much of the work of the group, rather than a definite program 
or concrete set of goals. What many historians describe as the instrumental or pragmatic 
approach of the burgeoning women’s movement might thus better be described as a growing 
sense of cohesion: the bringing together of a movement based on shared feelings.96  
The importance of shared feelings is the space they allow for disparate opinions. We can 
see this in the way the group wrote about each other. In January of 1863, for instance, Emily 
Davies wrote to Barbara Bodichon of Bessie Parkes’ “amazing ignorance of what other people 
think & feel about things in general,” and yet reports in the same letter that in the management of 
                                               
95 The editors of Davies’ Collected Letters note that this is cited by Barbara Stephen in Emily 
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the journal, “Bessie is quite willing for me to take any line of thought I like, so long as Miss 
Cobbe, whom she considers most dangerous, is well looked after!”97 It might seem that this letter 
is evidence of the group’s tendency to suppress, rather than embrace, dissenting opinions, and 
other letters do give a similar impression. Discussing Emily Faithfull, Davies writes: “I could get 
on with Miss Faithfull. Her views, so far as she has any, are the same as mine, I don’t think there 
is any fear now, of her working out badly.”98 Despite these avowed preferences for those with 
similar opinions, in practice it seems that the group tended to accommodate more than it 
suppressed divergent opinions. Affection overcomes disagreement when Parkes writes that “I 
like Miss Cobbe exceedingly, but I don’t agree with her as she very well knows”; moreover, 
according to Sally Mitchell, Parkes was the editor who booked Cobbe to write for the journal 
despite their disagreements, which were mostly about religion and therefore not insignificant, 
especially given that for Parkes the integrity of religious belief was the sure ground that made 
individual opinion possible.99 Davies was herself a famously “formidable” and obstinate woman, 
yet the letters show that she could dissent, and still advise following the path of her opponent 
(Forster 159-60). As she wrote: “I have quite come to the conclusion that Bessie’s ideas and mine 
are different, tho’ not antagonistic, & that they cannot be worked together. … Bessie offers all 
sorts of concessions, which however, I feel unwilling to accept. I don’t think the Journal can be 
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vigorously worked on a system of mutual concessions, and as my idea would know no chance, 
except under a variety of unattainable conditions, I believe it is best to adopt Bessie’s.”100  
Different though not antagonistic is a fairly good description of the way in which the 
group organized itself around dissenting opinions. There were, however, limits to how far this 
kind of balancing could go, for instance in the group’s ability to accommodate Max Hays, whose 
romantic relationships with other women caused problems given the group’s desire to change 
minds on a mass scale, and therefore their need to distance themselves from what would 
compromise their respectability. Davies wrote of the “revulsion” of some of the other women, 
noting that Hays’ connection with the journal “did a great deal of harm,” and in December of 
1862 reported that Hays “has entirely left, & taken away all her things.”101 Parkes, who was fond 
of Hays, nonetheless noted the improvement after her departure, writing to Bodichon that with 
Hays’ resignation, “All well at Langham place.”102 Davies subsequently noted the need to set and 
maintain the boundaries within which productive disagreement could take place, and when she 
took up the editorship of Victoria Magazine, wrote about the agreement she and Emily Faithfull 
put together: “I have no notion of friendly vagueness in matters of business, & I believe a great 
deal of the trouble at L. P. has been caused by the want of distinct, definite arrangements.”103  
The expulsion of Hays reveals the limits of the expansiveness of which the group was 
capable, which I will explore further below. Nonetheless, the records of the group show their 
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commitment to seeking a form that was simultaneously broad enough to accommodate 
disagreement and specific enough to reflect a position; one not necessarily characterized by the 
vagueness against which Davies protested, but certainly by the friendliness. Besides Hays, the 
varied personal commitments that might have obstructed the cohesiveness of a more formal 
organization, such as Bessie Parkes’ Catholicism, were not the forces of disintegration that they 
could have been, due to the associational ties of friendship on which the group was based.104 In 
fact, it was religion around which many discussions and negotiations of the group’s platform 
centered: not merely because the group attracted women of different backgrounds, but also 
because of the extent to which religion is linked to ideas about freedom, the tyranny of the 
majority, and the formation of opinion. For Parkes, religion was more or less synonymous with 
individuality itself, or at least to the authenticity of the individual; as she wrote, it was the one 
subject which “each individual… will feel to be sure.”105 Yet, through a non-denominational but 
clearly religious perspective, religion was also the means through which the group sought to 
overcome the divisions among its readers and bring them together in one coherent group.  
Religion is at once pure difference, indicative of the deeply personal and subjective, and a 
necessary mechanism preventing difference fracturing into complete isolation. Too much of any 
religion was potentially divisive, but a lack of religious commitment could similarly hamper the 
group’s attempts to build a readership and to function democratically, bearing out Adam Phillips’ 
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point that “too much consensus, just like too little, is the enemy of democracy.”106 As Davies 
wrote: 
 
Lizzie Garrett finds the tone of the Journal ‘atheistic.’ I think this is too strong an 
emphasis, but at the same time the careful elimination of all distinctive religion must I 
think lower the tone, & destroy the heartiness of even the best writers. At the same time I 
don’t see how a Company, composed of persons of very different opinions, can leave its 
Editors & other contributors free.107  
 
Frances Power Cobbe, Davies reports, maintained “that to be interesting we must leave off 
balancing between parties & take up one decided line of religious thought. That as a matter of 
policy, the most effective line at this time would be what she calls Broad Church. That to get 
good writing, we must pay high.”108 Taking a broad church position reflects the desire to be 
broadly marketable, but the insistence on good writing was of course a question of class, a desire 
to separate the English Woman’s Journal from the cheaper periodicals designed for mass 
publication.109 It is no coincidence that in both Cobbe’s and Garrett’s arguments the question of a 
religious policy is entangled with the quality of writing; underlying both these issues were 
questions of scale and balance. The group’s concern about the quality of the writing reflects both 
a desire to craft the journal as a mass publication, and a very liberal reluctance to be associated 
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with the mass. The penny press was characterized by its depoliticized and entertaining nature as 
much as it was characterized by accessibility – and those were qualities with which the LPG’s 
journal could not, by definition, afford to be associated.110 The group’s discomfort with too much 
religious difference is not, or not only, what some critics term the failure of liberal toleration as 
theoretically boundless, but practically limited.111 Rather, religion was an obvious testing ground 
on which to work out the extent to which difference could be accommodated, and how much 
individuality could be embraced while still maintaining a group identity and collective 
consciousness. Without religious guidelines, the group would disintegrate into potentially free 
but entirely atomized individuals; too firm a group position, and the space religion makes for 
individual conviction, interiority, and authenticity would be entirely eroded.  
The group’s discussion about both these issues, the journal’s quality and the journal’s 
religious platform, suggests that the form of the journal, as an aspiring mass publication that 
could still function as an organ of critical debate, was at least as important as the individual 
pieces it published. The question was how best to frame the different and conflicting views it 
represented: how could the journal achieve a form that could bring so many different people 
together while not just preserving but creating space for women’s differences and individuality? 
The group’s ability to weave together the thoughts of people “of very different opinions” 
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depended on a politics of friendship based on intimate, personal relationships such that Parkes 
was able to disagree with Cobb, yet still like her exceedingly. To preserve this form while 
extending its reach on a mass scale in order to meet its goals, an intellectual commitment to 
critical debate and always, obviously, social change, was a task which gave rise to a fundamental 
question: if it was friendship that gave form to a collective that could accommodate difference, 
how would that model sustain itself on the wider scale of a community of women or, more 
broadly, the liberal public sphere? 
This question is a particular version of the liberal ambivalence about difference, the 
problem of perceiving as equal an expanded sense of the body politic. If a democratic way of 
thinking is, as Adam Phillips implies by way of Winnicott, entering “imaginatively and 
accurately” into another’s “thoughts and feelings and hopes and fears” (30), then the journal 
itself provides a hint of how this might be possible beyond the intimate sphere of friendship in 
“Chance Encounters,” an article published in November of 1860.112 The article’s author, A., 
records the glimpses of human life she perceives when bored and looking around her. In 
particular, she reads the faces of women as a record of the misery shaping their lives; the misery 
she sees on one woman’s face becomes an accretion of the misery of all women, and in that 
capacity the particulars of each woman’s misery become legible. The author vacillates between 
what she imagines is true of the women she encounters (one “must be” the wife of a shopkeeper), 
and what she knows is true (the shopkeeper’s wife has no ownership over her own labor or 
money). What we get in the article is not quite the democratic psychoanalytic mode of Winnicott 
and Phillips, as there is no way of knowing how accurate the author’s assumptions are. Yet the 
article is also not what it initially seems to be: namely, the unwarranted imposition of a history or 
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a tragedy on the lives of others in a very liberal form of colonizing directed particularly at the 
poor who, the author maintains, live their emotions openly, unlike the “educated classes” who 
“conceal their feelings better” (182). The author acknowledges the limitations of her imagining, 
granting that she “may sometimes have guessed wrongly, and given more sympathy perhaps than 
was needed” (185). This is a tolerable risk in the creation of a world in which the important thing 
is to try to rend the “thick conventional cloud” which conceals emotions and isolates sufferers, 
making the suffering shopkeeper’s wife a lone picture of misery rather than a link in a great 
chain of suffering women.  
Sympathy in this account is of limited use, as liberal sympathy so often is, but not 
because it fosters, as D. Rae Greiner writes, an “approximate and virtual” rather than 
“identificatory and fusional” form of thinking with the other.113 This is a closer form of 
sympathy, which recognizes the limits of its fusional aspirations, but nonetheless tries to catch 
the “pathetic glimpses of inner life, hear many an unspoken world, and give to many 
unconscious hearts a thought of loving sympathy and compassion” (185), in order to build a 
world in which miseries are common and not isolating, and the intimacies that enabled the 
coming together of the LPG could be imagined to extend to strangers. A more obviously political 
way of putting this is through the language of representation. In 1863, Davies wrote to Bodichon 
that “it would be a great presumption for a few women, up in London, to pretend to represent 
anybody but themselves. Let us adopt some distinct, unwavering line of policy, & then, if a good 
many people feel themselves represented by us, why so much the better.”114 Like the author of 
“Chance Encounters,” Davies here recognizes the limitations of the group in her claim that they 
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could not speak for those beyond the circle of the “few women.” Yet this way of thinking about 
representation is intriguing: by occupying a position, other people who do not occupy that 
position could nonetheless somehow feel represented by it. By this account, the special interests 
of the journal could become general interests only by remaining firmly special interest. As 
Davies writes in the same letter, it would do no good to abandon the journal to try to publish 
more broadly in the mainstream papers: “I think there are some things we want to say, that we 
could not get said in Magazines over which we have no control, & that if we really knew what 
we were about & people knew where they had us, so to speak, we might experience some 
influence over public opinion.” By taking a particular line of thought, the group can hope that the 
feelings of others will match; without speaking for all, the group can effect change on “public 
opinion” and, by implication, the composition of the public itself through these feelings of being 
represented. What Davies is expressing here is a desire for a collective movement of women that 
is not premised on sameness, hence preserves the differences of those women who are not the 
few women up in London. 
This kind of collective identity, which preserves difference and the nuances of individual 
interest but does not atomize its constituent parts, achieved formal realization in the letters the 
group wrote to each other. We can understand the letters themselves as a democratic form, as 
they are composed of different voices and viewpoints without necessarily requiring that any one 
voice emerges as the sole decision-maker or winner, even in letters that are arguing for a certain 
course that the journal or the group should take. What the letters also do is strategize about the 
role of the individual voice; a particularly apt example of this is evident in a series of letters 
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exchanged about the issue of including married women in the vote.115 In this series of letters, 
members of the group position themselves in relation to Mill, as a proponent of female suffrage 
and the person who would deliver petitions organized by the group to Parliament; these letters 
reflect a shift in terms of the group’s assessment of Mill’s value and ultimately reveal a changing 
sense about the potential of the manly liberal individual. 
The letters were part of a series exchanged by the group on the fraught question of 
whether married women would be included in the bid for the vote. As the prospect of female 
citizenship challenged the legal justification of married couples as a single unit, it was not hard 
to see why there were concerns that this could also extend to the spiritual and religious 
conception of marriage. Given the liberal ambivalence about the language of rights,116 the 
decision about how to frame the push for the vote was a difficult one: should it be made in the 
name of universal human rights, which would align the cause of female suffrage with working-
class reform measures, or was it to endorse implicitly the logic that equated citizenship rights 
with property rights?117 As the 1860s progressed, the group’s work on suffrage was conducted 
with an eye to the risks and benefits of aligning with Helen Taylor, whose firm position on 
including married women in all bids for the vote has been well documented.118 For instance, in 
August of 1866, Emily Davies wrote to Barbara Bodichon about the possibility of establishing a 
formal committee to agitate for the vote. Davies is quite clear both about the necessity for such a 
                                               
115 Andrew Rosen. “Emily Davies and the Women’s Movement, 1862-1867.” Journal of British 
Studies. 19.1 (Autumn 1979): 101-121, p. 112. His account focuses on reclaiming Davies’ legacy 
in the suffrage movement, and thus he makes some remarkable comments about Taylor; for 
instance, that she was “too uncompromising and too eccentric” to be “merely an additional 
member” of a suffrage committee headed by Davies (115), though the letter he cites, in which 
Taylor declines to subscribe to the committee given its exclusion of married women was a major 
philosophical sticking point, is in fact quite generous and diplomatic in tone. 
116 See Kahan. Liberalism in Nineteenth-Century Europe, pp. 6-7. 
117 See Jane Rendall. “John Stuart Mill, Liberal Politics, and the Movements for Women’s 
Suffrage” and Griffin. “Class, Gender and Liberalism in Parliament.” 
118 See, for instance, Broomfield. “Walking a Narrow Line.” 
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committee, and the need for careful, strategic thought about how it should be composed. She 
reports having seen Mrs Taylor – Clementia Doughty Taylor, who, together with her husband, 
Peter Alfred Taylor, supported many radical causes – who volunteered as Treasurer for the new 
committee. Though Davies remarks that “Personally, I feel sure that Mrs. Taylor will be good to 
work with,” and that she would “always ‘take’ the reasonable side,” she is nonetheless aware of 
the risks of Taylor’s involvement: “I told her frankly the one objection to her (the Reform 
League &c.) & she said she would of course leave it to us.”119 The letter is but one example of 
the way in which members of the LPG thought carefully about how they aligned themselves, and 
the consequences that formalizing certain relationships would have on the strapped finances of 
the group’s activities, and the public image of the immediate issue of votes for women, as well as 
the broader cause of women’s rights.  
The group’s letters reveal a strong focus on the expediency of formalizing relationships, 
especially given the parliamentary support Mill could offer, as well as a consciousness of the 
impact those relationships would have on the public perception of the group’s activities. The 
August letter from Davies to Bodichon brings up two issues: connection with reform, as we see 
in her reported conversation with Clementia Taylor; and the issue of how to deal with married 
women and the vote. The connection with Helen Taylor was particularly fraught, as, unlike 
Clementia whose name “need not be prominent,” Helen’s name along with that of her 
stepfather’s would inevitably and publicly be associated with the work of the committee. The 
political disagreement between Davies and Taylor was seemingly a pragmatic one, over the 
strategy that would most likely result in extending the franchise – to push immediately for total 
inclusion, or to begin with a limited claim that could be challenged through attacking the status 
                                               
119 Letter to Barbara Bodichon. August 10, 1866. Murphy and Raftery, editors. Emily Davies: 
Collected Letters, 1861-1875, p. 190. 
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of married women’s property rights. Yet the disagreement between Helen Taylor and Davies 
went beyond merely the strategic. It was also the negotiation of a position that dictated the 
ideological basis of the push for votes for women. The question of whether married women 
would be explicitly included in the bid for the vote (and to what extent) was the question that 
revealed on what grounds the claim for female citizenship could be made: whether it was made 
in the name of universal human rights, or whether it was to endorse implicitly the logic that 
equated citizenship rights with property rights. In the discussion around the petition presented to 
Parliament, Davies’ position was “to leave it open”; to “limit,” as she wrote in a letter to Helen 
Taylor, “our demand definitely to unmarried women & widows,” as so doing would “strengthen 
our position so very much with most people, that one feels tempted to adopt it, if it could be done 
honestly & without embarrassing future action.”120 If we take seriously Davies’ seemingly 
incongruent position that to limit a claim could be synonymous with leaving it open, her position 
begins to look less like the accommodationist politics it is frequently read as, and more like a 
particular way of formalizing interest and inclusion. Davies saw Taylor’s staunch insistence on 
principle as not only uncompromising but risky: “She does not seem to understand the case as to 
limiting our claim. If there is a loophole for wives, as to which the law is not indefinite, (& that 
seems to be agreed.) the only way to keep them out of the discussion is to limit our claim, 
without expressing any opinion as to the rights of other Claimants.”121 If no difference was to be 
recognized between married and unmarried women in the push for the vote, the legal status of 
wives would undermine all women’s claim to the vote. Davies’ argument was to lead with the 
pragmatic position, and then follow with the principle — once unmarried women had the vote, 
                                               
120 “Letter to Helen Taylor.” July 18, 1866. Murphy and Raftery, editors. Emily Davies: 
Collected Letters, 1861-1875, p. 183. 
121 “Letter to Barbara Bodichon.” August 10, 1866. Murphy and Raftery, editors. Emily Davies: 
Collected Letters, 1861-1875, p. 190. 
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the argument to exclude married women would have less force. The petition that Mill had 
presented to Parliament in June excluded any overt reference to married women, instead making 
a claim to extend the franchise “without distinction of sex” to women whose possession of 
property would have entitled them to vote if they were men. 122  
While Taylor’s concern was principle, Davies was focused on what later theorists would 
call building a public, and a mass one at that. Her aim was to cover, as she wrote, “a wide field & 
bring the matter before everybody who may possibly be interested.”123 As Michael Warner notes, 
a public is constituted through address to both onlookers and interlocutors: “The known element 
in the addressee enables a scene of practical possibility; the unknown, a hope of transformation. 
Writing to a public helps to make a world insofar as the object of address is brought into being 
partly by postulating and characterizing it.”124 Davies was quite aware that the LPG was not 
merely collecting signatures of existing supporters, but attempting to shape the public which it 
addressed.125 It was, as she recorded, an expensive endeavor that would “necessarily involve a 
great waste of printing & postage. If we knew beforehand what sort of people would be likely to 
respond, we might confine our appeals to them, but we have not the materials even for a 
                                               
122 The petition was presented to Parliament by Mill in June, and excluded any overt mention of 
married women, instead claiming rights on the basis of sameness. The wording of the petition 
ultimately read: “For extension of the electoral franchise to all householders, without distinction 
of sex, who possess such property or rental qualification as may be appointed for male voters.” 
from Barbara L.S. Bodichon and others. (No. 8501, 1521 signatures, printed in App. 747, p. 305; 
The Times, 8 June, p. 5.) John Stuart Mill. The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, Volume 
XXIX - Public and Parliamentary Speeches Part II July 1869 - March 1873. Edited by John M. 
Robson and Bruce L. Kinzer. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, London: Routledge and 
Kegan Paul, 1988, p. 575. 
123 Andrea L. Broomfield asserts that this was less an ideological difference than a matter of 
Taylor’s idiosyncrasy and self-importance (“Walking a Narrow Line”). 
124 Michael Warner. Publics and Counterpublics. New York: Zone Books, 2002, p. 91. 
Subsequent page references in text.  
125 See Warner: “all discourse or performance addressed to a public must characterize the world 
in which it attempts to circulate and it must attempt to realize that world through address” (114). 
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guess.”126 The likelihood of achieving any success in a bid for the franchise was dependent on 
the kind of support that could be garnered within Parliament, and consequently also on the 
support of members of the press who might influence Members of the House of Commons.127 
The debate about how best to achieve any gains rested on competing ways of rethinking the 
liberal process of abstracting from one’s particular interest in order to include women in the 
conception of liberal citizenship. This also involved a negotiation of the conception of 
collectivity, and how best to think about a collective understanding in relation to the 
representative voice of the individual. The moments in the letters track the decreasing 
importance of the representative voice of individual men, and the increasing importance of the 
democratic and collective form of the women’s letters. These letters show the development of a 
different way of representing liberal individuality than the one-to-one chain of equivalence of 
liberal signification of a vote or a signature or an opinion standing for one man. 
The first moment I want to examine is a letter of December 28, 1862, written by Davies 
to Bodichon.128 Davies begins the letter by updating Bodichon on the news from Langham Place, 
then turns her attention to the journal itself, presenting a range of opinions about the role and 
future of the journal. Davies transcribes the opinions of various members of the group on the 
utility of the journal as a means of affecting public opinion of what Ellen Drewry calls “our 
especial social question.” The form of this letter, in bringing together so many voices, represents 
the form of the group itself, as a collection of individual voices, which, though they express 
                                               
126 “Letter to Helen Taylor.” August 4, 1866. Murphy and Raftery, editors. Emily Davies: 
Collected Letters, 1861-1875, p. 186.  
127 In a later letter, written just two days before the petition was presented in the House of 
Commons, Davies writes about the usefulness of having a list of Members of the House, as well 
as newspaper writers, “as we can mark the names that are most likely to influence them.” “Letter 
to Helen Taylor.” June 5, 1866. Murphy and Raftery, editors. Emily Davies: Collected Letters, 
1861-1875, p. 173. 
128 “Letter to Barbara Bodichon.” December 28, 1862. Murphy and Raftery, editors. Emily 
Davies: Collected Letters, 1861-1875, pp. 11-18. Subsequent page references in text.  
 
 167 
some points of dissent about the role of the journal in the formation of a feminist public, 
nonetheless come together to make up a coherent whole. Drewry’s passage makes specific 
reference of Mill’s support, as she notes: “Even when a great minded man like Mill takes up the 
subject, it is not so much the masterly treatment that is useful, as the moral support that the 
question gains from such a name” (16). There is a tension here between Drewry’s point, that it is 
Mill’s name rather than the content of his contributions, that can draw people, and the democratic 
form of the letter, which gives space to many voices and absorbs their conflicting views.  
Davies’ letter, in reporting to Bodichon a variety of different views about the future of the 
English Woman’s Journal, shows that the group was highly conscious of the need to “spread our 
ideas” and change opinions, as Davies wrote, and to “work on the public mind,” and cultivate its 
public (17). In pointing to the use that could be made of Mill’s name, Drewry argues that the 
ideas of Langham Place would best be propagated by mainstream media – “the best daily 
papers” – rather than through the limited capacities of a special-purpose periodical. She writes: 
“Vexatious as it seems that an enterprise which has dragged on a tedious & insipid existence for 
so long, should die as it were on the very eve of a promised improvement, I can conscientiously 
see no sufficient basis for a Journal.” Davies, writing that it “would be very difficult to point out 
any definite conversion effected by the instrumentality of the Journal alone,” imagined that the 
journal would primarily reach those already convinced of its necessity (16). However, other 
opinions offered in the same letter expressed a sense that the existence of the journal, by the 
mere fact of its repeating its claims, could do real social and political work. This is the view 
presented by Lizzie Garrett, for instance:  
 
I feel extremely incapable of judging how far such an organ will really advance the 
principles we contend for, however good it may be, but I should think the experience of 
past reforms & how they have been gradually won by drumming facts & arguments 
(which must have seemed superfluous enough to the drummers) upon the public ear, may 
be taken as tolerably conclusive that a well-worked organ does promote the advance of 
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reforms in time… I should fancy most of the people actively interested in the principle, 
are taking it in now, as I was, not so much for its own sake, as for the principle. If it gets 
decidedly better, every one will rejoice, & will at least lend it about & recommend it more 
heartily, so that perhaps in this way new people will be brought in thro’ it. But as long as 
it is decidedly special in character, I fancy we must not look for a very large circulation 
(13-14).  
 
In pointing to those who buy the journal for its “principle” rather than its own sake, Garrett 
identifies the public of the journal as a group defined by its political motivations. Suggesting that 
the public would expand to encompass a “new,” general audience if it were “better,” Garrett 
joined her voice to the many members of Langham Place (and friends of the group, including 
George Eliot) who advocated for the publication of good serial literature to transcend the narrow 
interest of the journal: “A good tale would take off its ‘special’ character, so perhaps it would be 
as well to compromise on this ground, by giving a novel to attract the public,” she wrote (14).  
The question of the journal’s aesthetic practices, tied as it was to its orientation to a 
special or general interest, was intimately bound up in the question of its political alignment. In 
the same letter, Davies presents the views of Miss Gimingham, who maintained that a 
“respectable circulation” for something “of real & vital importance” ought to be possible, given 
that “the trash now published under petticoat patronage (real or supposed) finds a market… 
Social questions command attention.” The journal could reach a wide audience, and appeal even 
to “old-fashioned folks,” if they could “identify it with some steady-going moderate party … a 
nucleus once formed, a thousand different channels would open & extend the circulation. But it 
must have a business & not a charity foundation. By this I mean, people must subscribe for it to 
please themselves, not for friendship; & the trade must be got to promote its circulation” (16). If 
in this letter Mill represents a single, authoritative voice with the power to command the 
attention of the public, in contrast to the many voices of Langham Place whose interests were too 
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narrow and closely-aligned with the issue to hail a public, there is a slight shift in the second 
letter I want to examine in which Mill’s name is evoked.  
Writing to Anna Richardson in July of 1865, Davies comments on Mill’s political 
campaign: “Some people, including Mrs. Lewes, don’t care about his getting into Parliament, 
thinking that he will gain no more influence by it, but I cannot help wishing to have all the best 
men in the governing body, even tho’ there seems to be not much for them to do at present.”129 
Like Drewry in the earlier letter, Davies here suggests that the transmission of influence depends 
not on the specificity of what he says or the political platform in which he says it, but on his 
exemplarity. Intriguingly, however, Mill’s greatness is only a representative example of a 
collective form of greatness; he is but one example of “all” the best men who should hold office. 
Mill, in this example, stands for a form of collectivity that, as I will argue, is extremely important 
to the LPG, which still grants individuality to each (exceptional individual) voice composing it. 
Interestingly, Davies’ use of Eliot functions here in much the same way. “Mrs. Lewes” represents 
her own opinion that, as Eliot herself wrote in a letter to Clementia Doughty Taylor, “I am not 
anxious that he [Mill] should be in Parliament: thinkers can do more outside than inside the 
House.”130 She also, in Davies’ letter, stands for the other people whose opinions hers represents: 
the group of “some people” that includes her.  
The final moment I want to highlight is from the letter Davies wrote to Bodichon in 
August of 1866. “I hope the mischief of the riots is dying away. I fancy the Reform League has 
had a lesson,” she writes of the recent Hyde Park riots, arguing that “it clearly will not do to 
identify ourselves too closely with Mill. The Guardian (Liberal Church) remarks that the weight 
                                               
129 “Letter to Anna Richardson.” July 5, 1865. Murphy and Raftery, editors. Emily Davies: 
Collected Letters, 1861-1875, p. 157. 
130 George Eliot’s 1865 letter to Mrs. Peter A. Taylor, Letters IV 196 cited in Avrom Fleischman. 
George Eliot’s Intellectual Life. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010, p. 142. 
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of his support has much diminished since he has shown that he can be as often & as vehemently 
wrong as other people.” Mill’s involvement with the Reform League was controversial, in 
particular his association with what many perceived to be the violent excesses of a mass 
gathering and a symbol of the “threatening power of the working men’s movement.”131 This 
marks a distinct shift in perception, both the public perception of Mill and the LPG’s perception 
of Mill’s utility. His support for female suffrage has become something of a liability, not only 
because of the taint of mass uprising his support of the Reform League carried, but also because 
his support risked being construed as a personal pet project rather than a collective movement. 
As Davies wrote in another letter about ten days later, on August 21, 1866: “In anything that we 
do now, I shall be inclined to omit Mr. Mill’s name. The newspapers have got into a way of 
treating the question as an individual crotchet of Mr. Mill’s. That secures to us all the support 
that his name can bring. What we must show is that it is not a personal crotchet of anybody’s… 
we get mixed up in the public mind with Jamaica & the Reform League, which does us no 
good.”132 Mill’s association with the Reform League began to represent to the LPG the 
unattractive extremes of both the single voice and the crowd: the extreme individualism that 
                                               
131 See Hall, McClelland, and Rendall. Defining the Victorian Nation, p. 4. 
132 “Letter to Barbara Bodichon.” August 21, 1866. Murphy and Raftery, editors. Emily Davies: 
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and Jack Stillinger. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
1981, pp. 278-279. 
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comes from exalting one voice or personality above all others, and the equally extreme form of 
violent mass movement that drowns out the representative individual voices. Moreover, Mill’s 
involvement with the Reform League and the Jamaica Affair compromised the distinctiveness of 
the cause of votes for women, threatening to engulf it in a wave of disenfranchised people.  
Although these moments in the letters reflect an increasing suspicion with the form of 
liberal individuality associated with the authoritative voice of the best men, they also reflect an 
ambivalent relationship to the idea of the common, as the unhappy circumstance of being as 
“vehemently wrong as other people.” In a sense, the group anticipates Hannah Arendt’s point that 
the mass society, particularly mass hysteria, can threaten a sense of commonness as much as total 
isolation can. When people “suddenly behave as though they were members of one family,” 
Arendt writes, the difference of each person can no longer be seen or appreciated. Everyone is 
“imprisoned in the subjectivity of their own singular experience” (58). Between the two extremes 
of isolated individualism and Arendt’s familial model where differences are completely erased, 
the LPG sought to find a middle ground: a politics of friendship, which would allow for the 
possibility of difference and disagreement, but which could nonetheless provide a form in which 
those differences could be thought together.  
 
Incorporated form of the LPG 
I have already referred to “The Use of a Special Periodical,” the article Bessie Parkes 
published in the first joint issue of the English Woman’s Journal and Alexandra Magazine. The 
article was a stocktaking of sorts, an account of the goals of each journal and Parkes’ editorial 
practices at the English Woman’s Journal. It is a clear articulation of the need both to establish 
the “special” needs of women as a group, namely, the goals of the journals could not be trusted to 
the “diffusion of ideas through the general press” (258); and to establish the generality of 
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women, that they are “just half the race” rather than a separate “class” (262). It is also an 
acknowledgement of the dissension among the group: that Parkes “tried, as far as possible, to 
admit both sides of the controversy” (258) on the various topics it discussed, and that the people 
who put out the journal had views which “differed in detail, but who were united in a desire to 
investigate the great mass of female misery and indigence existing in England” (257). The 
journal is figured as an “embodiment” that draws together “a great amount of scattered energy,” 
incorporating these separate parts even in spite of themselves: its value is not less, she writes, 
“because the separate parts of the working body are sometimes convinced that they would get on 
as well, or even better without it” (258). 
As an incorporation that “threaded the separate parts of the movements” together, the 
journals are both a part of the masses of women and a tool to speak to them. If, for Matthew 
Arnold, the business of criticism was to “know the best that is known and thought in the world,” 
Parkes’ vision in “Use” is more democratic, seeking “the best thoughts of the best people; if 
expressed with genius or with force, so much the better; but if expressed somewhat loosely and 
colloquially — better so than not at all” (259).133 This in part reflects the target audience of 
Alexandra, “women who are actually working for their livelihood” (259), but there is also a 
sense that the “thinkers and the workers” (257) who are brought together by the form of the 
journals have things to learn from each other. Unlike Arnold’s suspicion of a mass audience 
satisfied by inadequate ideas, Parkes’ piece emphasizes the vital role of a broad audience in 
spreading ideas. The merging of the two journals was designed, Parkes wrote, to garner the 
energies of the LPG into a mass movement, to “secure the diffusion of practical principles over a 
larger class of society, and in a cheaper form” (257). The cheapness of the Alexandra would 
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receive “an accession of thought” (258) from the contributors of the English Woman’s Journal, 
but without a mass audience there is no spread of ideas, as reiteration is more important than 
even the most brilliant productions of a lone pen. The journal functions as a “living link between 
human intelligence,” not a machine but an “organic” mechanism to bring together the mass into a 
unified form: “worked out not by one but by many, under a certain supervision by one” (259). 
Yet this article, which spends so much time trying to create this unified world and 
asserting that women are not special or separate, ends with a claim for the special skills of 
women in “organising, ruling, adapting, supervising” and that these skills are what fit women for 
“responsible social usefulness” (263); that is, it is women’s distinctness which is the basis for 
their claim for social rights. It is in response to claims like this that Barbara Caine asserts that the 
philosophical framework of liberalism provided the foundation for the demands of the women’s 
movement, with its “essential individualism, … notion of men as rational and self-interested 
beings and its belief in the importance of men following their own perceived self-interests” 
(1982 540). The application of liberal ideas to women, according to Caine, led to a set of 
demands based not on “rights in any abstract way,” but the assertion of “full adult status” for 
women: not “the equality of men and women in any substantive way but rather the entitlement of 
women to equality before the law and the freedom of women to develop themselves – often 
along lines which were seen to be quite distinct from those of men.”134 To Caine, the claim or set 
of claims that resulted from feminists’ engagement with liberal ideas was based on a 
“combination” of two notionally separate beliefs: “belief in the particular nature of women” and 
the inherently masculine form of “liberal individualism” (540). Departing from Caine, I wish to 
challenge the notion that these ideas (women’s distinctiveness and women’s sameness) were in 
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fact separate. By my account, their alignment formed the constitutive tension of the LPG and the 
basis of the group’s incorporation of difference. At stake was how to demand the recognition of 
women as individuals and potential citizens, and thereby assert the irrelevance of gender in the 
political realm, while also forging a common politics based on the importance of gender as a 
political force. At stake, too, was how to position themselves as individuals unmarked by 
difference and a distinct collective of women, as political actors with particular experiences as 
women and citizens with common experience of public and political life. 
The tendency to understand the relationship between Langham Place and liberalism as 
one based primarily on conflict is a prevalent one, even when the relationship is conceived of in 
other terms than the broadly philosophical, as in Caine’s account. For instance, Jane Rendall’s 
carefully wrought historical account of the relationship between liberalism and women’s suffrage 
highlights the interpersonal tensions that fractured the relationship between liberalism and the 
nascent feminist movement. According to Rendall’s account, liberal circles were not the only 
influence on the women of Langham Place – she notes, for instance, the importance of the 
radical unitarian set among which Parkes and Bodichon travelled135 – but it was an important 
relationship, one based on philosophy, the parliamentary politics of the Liberal party, and the 
social connections between prominent liberals like Mill and Harriet Taylor and the Langham 
Place set. Like Caine, Rendall stresses both the confluence and the conflict of liberalism and 
nascent liberal feminism: as she says, Mill’s “ideal of citizenship” shaped the way the women 
imagined female citizenship could be, as it was based on the key liberal ideals of progress, 
“education and cultivation,” as well as the notion that one needed to be fit to be a citizen (176-8). 
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Despite the philosophical importance of liberalism, however, the alliances between the members 
of Langham Place and key liberal figures was more often fraught than friendly, and by the mid-
1860s Rendall perceives an evident split on practical and ideological grounds due to the “sharp 
differences among the women and men involved, and more especially between the Mill-Taylor 
axis and the Langham Place women… both in terms of organizational strategy and in principle” 
(175).  
The critical accounts that highlight the tension between two opposing camps of liberalism 
and feminism result in an understanding of mid-nineteenth-century liberal feminism as 
fundamentally compromised: the goal of equality was sacrificed in order to embrace a masculine 
liberal ideal.136 Although recent work has aimed to restore complexity to our understanding of 
liberal feminism, the implication of it as an inherently compromised movement persists. As 
recently as 2012, Barbara Korte makes precisely this point in an article about the travel writing 
of the English Woman’s Journal, arguing that a piece by Barbara Bodichon on travel in Algiers 
demonstrated how the journal “oscillated between confident displays of female agency and 
tendencies to downplay the traveller’s sex, thus responding to cultural anxieties about the threat 
to domestic values suggested by female travel.”137 Korte points to Bodichon’s piece as making a 
                                               
136 For typical examples, see Sarah Dredge. “Opportunism and Accommodation: The English 
Woman’s Journal and the British Mid-Nineteenth-Century Women’s Movement.” Women’s 
Studies: An Inter-disciplinary Journal 34:2 (2005): 133-157; and Janet Rendall’s summing up of 
the legacy of the LPG in her Oxford Dictionary of National Biography entry, which stresses the 
“complexities” – which can more or less be read as a euphemism for limitations – of liberal 
feminism: “Although some individuals led unconventional lives, there was no public 
confrontation of the sexual double standard or codes of propriety. … Their analyses and their 
solutions were derived from the perspectives of the reforming middle classes, as was the concept 
of female citizenship with which, as individuals, they mostly continued to work.” Recent critics 
who have challenged the perception of liberal feminism as inherently limited include Livesey, 
whose excellent work sees the class-based problems as a concerted political position rather than 
the result of ideological blindness. 
137 Barbara Korte. “Travel Writing in The English Woman’s Journal (1858–1864): An Area of 
Leisure in the Context of Women’s Work.” The Research Society for Victorian Periodicals. 45.2 
(Summer 2012), p. 166. Subsequent page references in text. 
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radical claim for gender equity (both men and women could travel to Algiers) before lapsing into 
the use of the generic male pronoun to soften the impact of gender difference. The line Korte 
points to as marking gender difference, apparently the lone spot of vocal radicalism, reads:  
 
If any enterprising English lady or gentleman wishes to see another quarter of the globe 
in addition to their own Europe before they die; if they wish to get out of Christendom; if 
they wish to see strange beasts, strange plants, and new races; if they wish to ride on 
camels, to eat porcupine and wild boar; in fact, to put down without much trouble and no 
danger in a perfectly new world, there is only one place within seventy-eight hours of 
travelling from London which will answer this purpose.”138  
 
For Korte, marking gender, as an explicit assertion that women could travel, is a display of 
female agency; failing to do so is an attempt to defuse the threat posed by female travelers, and is 
therefore an attempt to pander to mainstream values. I want to propose a different reading of 
Bodichon’s slippage between gender-neutral language (by which in this context I mean either the 
singular “they” or the use of masculine pronouns as generic ones) and language that clearly 
insists on women’s capacity as potential travelers. To characterize Bodichon’s piece as by turns 
brashly assertive and meekly dissembling is a misreading of her tone, and Korte’s proposal that 
readers “to whom the author was truly anonymous” might have assumed male authorship and 
consequently a male traveler is both irrelevant and unlikely, given the mode and values of the 
English Woman’s Journal’s production as well as the composition of its readership. Bodichon’s 
language, both when it is gendered and when it is not, is less an attempt to conceal the author’s 
gender or make a polemical point about women’s agency than it is an insistence of the 
irrelevance of gender to travel: both men and women can occupy the perspective of the traveler. 
The significance of Bodichon’s piece is not, as Korte claims, that she argues that women could 
                                               
138 Barbara Bodichon. “Algiers: First Impressions.” English Woman’s Journal 6.31 (1 September 
1860): 21-31, p. 21. 
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travel or attempts to mitigate any perceived threats to domesticity posed by the figure of the 
female traveler. Rather, it is the concerted statement the article makes about what kinds of 
differences matter, and when gender registers as a meaningful difference and when it does not.  
Bodichon’s piece barely registers gender difference, as Korte notes. What it does instead 
is catalogue in minute detail the differences of race and nation that an English traveler will 
encounter in Algeria. Among the fascinations Algeria offers for Bodichon is the presence of so 
many different people, and what that mix can tell us about national characteristics and how they 
compare; as Bodichon writes, “[h]ere they are altogether, and can be compared with ease” 
(25).The significant opposition in Bodichon’s piece is not the difference between the male and 
female traveler, but the difference between the universal voice of the traveler and the 
particularities of the “striking and amusing… motley crowd which he will see from his window.” 
The traveler possesses both an individual voice in a specific position – the view is what he can 
see when “fairly and comfortably installed in his hotel on the Place” – and a perspective as an 
observer that removes him from, and elevates him above, the ethnographic details of the scene. 
The people encountered by the traveler in Algeria, on the other hand, lose all distinguishing 
characteristics as they signify the group of which they are a part: a “mass of Arabs,” for instance, 
or a long figure like the “Kabyle, who has taken kindly to French civilization,” whose singularity 
indicates not individuality so much as it does representativeness. Instead of understanding the 
masculine language the piece uses as an attempt to mute the radical potential of women travelers, 
the language functions to isolate gender as a kind of difference that, in the imperial context, does 
not matter: the lady traveler could also occupy the judging voice of the cultivated Englishman. In 
the face of racial difference, the English lady can occupy the universal perspective of the liberal 
subject just as well as the English gentleman would; rather than softening the impact of gender 
difference, Bodichon’s piece shapes it as a special form of difference. If her article diminishes 
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the significance of gender, it does so not to make concessions or weaken its claims for gender 
equality, but as a bid to expand the capacity of the cultivated liberal subject. The article 
establishes that the universal perspective of the liberal subject, often structured precisely to 
exclude women, is in fact able to encompass differences of gender; and it does so by ascribing 
the otherness of difference to the object of the traveler’s gaze, the racial others one encounters in 
Algeria. 
The ability to shape gender as both inherently political and a form of difference that did 
not matter in the political and public spheres thus comes at the expense of other kinds of 
difference. Alan Kahan argues that liberals used the discourse of capacity to mediate between the 
hierarchy of aristocracy and the universal rights of democracy (4-6). The LPG used the 
connection that we see in Chapter One between Mill’s empiricism and the language of capacity 
in order to make their case about the particularity of gender as a form of difference. An article by 
Bessie Rayner Parkes, appearing in two parts in 1860 in the September and November issues of 
the English Woman’s Journal provides an example of this.139 The piece deploys Mill’s empirical 
indeterminacy about difference in order to make a case for the rights of women as a group, and 
for the removal of legal and social obstacles preventing women’s progress as students, 
employees, and citizens. If difference read as inferiority is inherently unprovable given 
conditions of inequality, then any measure of achievement or progress is proof of women’s 
capacity for citizenship. Parkes’ piece begins by establishing Mill as a representative individual, 
and uses the logic of his argument to create a space in his construction of liberal subjectivity for 
an individual who might look like the reader of the English Woman’s Journal. Parkes’ article 
functions to make gender a productive form of difference, reshaping the form of the liberal 
                                               
139 Bessie Rayner Parkes. “The Opinions of John Stuart Mill.” English Woman’s Journal. 6.31 
(September 1, 1860): 1-10. Subsequent page references in text. 
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individual so that its defining quality is what Bourdieu calls “cultural competence” rather than 
gender (2). 
Parkes begins her article with a claim for Mill’s importance – “There is no name in 
England which carries with it so much weight” – to Oxford and Cambridge, as well as in “the 
two Houses of Legislature.” Positioning Mill in the context of scholarship and politics, Parkes 
invokes the authority of “all classes of thinking men all over the country”; but, in claiming the 
Irish Encumbered Land Act as the proof of his “high principles, his unbiased judgement, and his 
practical good sense,” also aligns him with the disenfranchised (1).140 As such, Parkes constructs 
Mill as a figure who mobilizes people based on capacity – “all classes of thinking men” – rather 
than inherent social position. He is an elite thinker, addressing the “most educated minds of our 
time,” and yet the effect of his thought is deeply democratic, reaching “indirectly every 
individual, however ignorant.” He at once guides public opinion, shaping the minds of journalists 
and determining the rightness or wrongness of any “political measure” in the minds of the 
thinking public; and yet his writing is above the fray of the ignorance of the mass, as “what he 
has written is founded on reason, and stands like a solid rock amidst the shifting sands of public 
opinion.” Parkes’ representation of Mill cultivates a kind of exclusivity, encouraging her 
audience to identify with the “educated minds” of the time, and suggesting – though those minds 
are clearly gendered male throughout the first passage – that not only are women capable of so 
identifying, but also that it is vital for the activist readers of the English Woman’s Journal to do 
so: “It is not a little important that women engaged in the present movement for extending the 
                                               
140 Though the Act had unanticipated effects, Mill spoke of it as an act of “statesmanlike 
measure,” which “to a great extent liberated Ireland from the great evil of needy landlords.” “The 
State of Ireland” Parliamentary speech. March 12, 1868. The Collected Works of John Stuart 
Mill, Volume XXVIII - Public and Parliamentary Speeches Part I November 1850 - November 
1868. Edited by John M. Robson and Bruce L. Kinzer. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1988, p. 253. 
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right to work to their sex should know exactly what the opinions of such a man as Mr. Mill upon 
this question and all connected with it” (1). 
In large part, the first half of Parkes’ article in the September issue is directed at 
undercutting the notion of women’s incapacity, that women “cannot understand such books, that 
they have not logical intellects, that they cannot follow consecutive reasoning, and that such 
studies are altogether unfeminine.” Drawing on Mill’s empiricist logic, Parkes argues that to 
counter such claims, women ought simply to read Mill, and thereby prove it a feminine 
endeavor: “To read it properly, and thoroughly to understand it, is quite an education to the 
logical faculties of the student” (2). If one acquires this education, one proves implicitly that one 
is capable of it.141 Parkes states that “We picture to ourselves” a female reader – specifically, “a 
well-educated girl of eighteen or twenty” (4) – who sits down to read Mill’s work, “having 
perused carefully and with great interest… rather anxiously looking out to see if any method will 
prove her logically incapable of understanding what she is about” (2). Parkes makes a case for 
this educated, and educable, girl as a potential subject and citizen of the nation as much as part of 
the household, highlighting the similarities rather than the distinctions between the private and 
political spheres: “Political Economy is to the nation what domestic economy is to the family” 
(4). This imagined female reader, who would “enjoy mastering” Mill’s work (with the “exception 
of the chapters on currency and the calculation of chances”), is evoked by Parkes on behalf of a 
collective “we” who “believe any woman who chooses to apply herself to the study can 
understand everything which Mr. Mill has written” (2). The imagined reader “anxiously” scans 
                                               
141 Indeed, the logic of those who call learning unfeminine is given by Parkes as the perfect 
example of the logical flaw petitio principii, or begging the question: “Can there be a better 
example [of it] … than the constant assertion which puts down so much young effort by asserting 
it to be unfeminine, and insisting that a woman must not be unfeminine, and all the common 
verbiage to that effect. Best to be answered by doing the right thing bravely, and proving it, 
therefore, feminine” (3). 
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the pages of Mill’s work, “looking out to see if any method will prove her logically incapable of 
understanding what she is about, or any paragraph insinuate that the great master himself holds 
such an opinion” (2). Not finding any such proof of incapacity, her capacity to understand Mill’s 
reasoning is proved; and this proof – which is both imagined, in the figure of the girl, and 
demonstrated by Parkes herself, and the women readers of the journal who are presumably 
following Parkes’ gloss on Mill – allows Parkes to generalize about the potential capacity of all 
women as a class, using the evidence of one to make a claim for inclusion: “She feels she 
understands perfectly; and she reasons logically enough from this instance of her own 
consciousness, that other women also can understand it” (2).  
Much of the proof that Parkes finds in Mill’s work is either assumed proof such as the 
above, or proof she extrapolates to apply to women from general principles. For instance, a 
passage from Mill’s Logic on the flawed thinking of those who posit inherent difference of 
intellect on the basis of race or sex: as such propositions are unable to be substantiated except by 
removing from the differences that we can see those difference which “have existed in the 
outward circumstances” of the subjects, “residual” or “ulterior original distinction” cannot be 
proved (3). Parkes cites this passage as showing, “distinctly enough – if we rightly understand it, 
and think it out in all its bearings – what are the opinions of John Stuart Mill upon the education 
of women, and our female student ought to feel a bound of joy, and will go on with her studies 
with renewed courage and spirits” (3). In her parenthetical attempt to think Mill’s statement out 
in all its bearings, Parkes makes a fairly large conceptual leap from refuting the idea of an innate 
difference in intellect based on social factors to education policy. In assembling Mill’s 
indeterminacy about proof into an assertion that the denial of rights is only appropriate where 
incapacity can be proven, Parkes puts difference in the service of politics in order to claim 
education as an inherent right, and to infer a support from Mill’s words that is not particularly 
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implied. Therefore, Parkes does not merely use Mill’s text here in order to prove theoretical 
equality (or, more precisely, the absence of proof for originary or biological inequality, which is 
not quite the same thing) but, rather, she turns to it to prove there is a distinct necessity for action 
in the field of concrete rights. As such, it is a good example of the way in which the LPG used 
the logic of liberalism to make room for gender difference in the construction of the individual 
and his or her rights. When turning to Mill’s explicit focus on women in the labor force, Parkes 
initially claims that the science of political economy is a necessity for women as it “bears 
directly on all philanthropic efforts,” in which women, of course, take “so large a share” (4). At 
the very least, this is an argument for women’s involvement in the public sphere based on the 
domestic virtues that define their philanthropic role; it is because of women’s “philanthropic 
efforts” that it is their “duty” to educate themselves and “study scientifically all the laws of 
national wellbeing” (4). Women’s participation in the public sphere seems to be in the form of a 
gendered contribution to the national good. Yet as the article progresses, Parkes complicates this 
view significantly. 
Parkes builds on Mill’s argument that the submission of working women to working men 
is one of reasons “of the misery and poverty of the lower classes,” and that the lower wage 
women’s work attracts is about the social role of women’s labor rather than the nature or quality 
of the work itself (4). Observing that “we would draw particular attention to the line which we 
have marked in italics,” Parkes uses Mill’s words to make the case that there is no argument to be 
made for the exclusion of women from the liberty of competing in the labor market. Yet it is in 
her commentary on this point that Parkes makes the most interesting claim: 
 
referring to the preceding sentence about the effect of custom in determining the wages of 
certain classes of women, we must not forget that custom is simply the aggregate of 
individual opinion for which we are each of us responsible.  It is literally the self-respect 
of workers which in the long run keeps up their price in the labour market… And this 
self-respect, being intimately connected with the standard of public opinion among 
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women, should be a matter of moment to each one – each should remember that on this 
point she contributes a quota to the influences which bear on the female working 
population (6). 
 
In one sense, it is quite easy to see how arguments like this would become the elitist form of 
liberalism and liberal feminism, charged with making oppressed classes responsible for their own 
oppression under the guise of a discourse of self-help individualism. However, this paragraph is 
doing complex work with liberal ideas about individuality and the mass. In On Liberty, for 
instance, Mill writes of the way in which “public opinion now rules the world… The only power 
deserving the name is that of masses, and of governments while they make themselves the organ 
of the tendencies and instincts of masses.” Against this stultifying, mediocre tyranny of opinion, 
the individual is the only hope of salvation: “The initiation of all wise or noble things, comes and 
must come from individuals.”142 Parkes’ definition of the public sphere is significantly more 
democratic, imagining a public opinion in which every woman has the capacity of the individual, 
and which women, as a mass composed of individuals, therefore have the power to shape.  
The power women have to change the social organization thus stems both from their 
domestic life as well as their place in the public sphere. To negotiate this position, Parkes argues 
for the importance of introducing the morality of religion, which she equates with the domestic, 
into the logic of the market. She gives the example of the daily governess, to whom a family may 
give an extra 10 pounds a year out of Christian charity and a knowledge of her personal 
circumstances, though the same principle is not applied to the man, to whom there exist no 
personal ties, who sells material for the family’s clothes:  
 
                                               
142 Mill. The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, Volume XVIII - Essays on Politics and Society 
Part I. Edited by John M. Robson. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, London: Routledge and 
Kegan Paul, 1977, p. 268. 
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We have thus two truths to consider;—the truth which holds good in regard to the action 
of masses of people on one another, and the other truth, that individuals must and do act 
on Christian principles towards those with whom they come in separate contact. In the 
market we must buy and sell at market price, because our finite natures cannot possibly 
take in the moral condition and physical necessities of those who have produced the 
goods we want to acquire; but in the domestic relation of employers and employed, a 
certain margin is cut off from the rule of political economy, and embraced within that of 
religion (7). 
 
Underlying Parkes’ two truths, in light of the fact that it is “hopeless to imagine that individual 
efforts could ever raise the market price of needlewomen’s work” (7), is the acknowledgement of 
the structure of capitalism that circumscribes the conditions of labor, especially for the working 
women who have the least say over their own conditions of employment. Yet, as it is “the 
bounden duty of every mistress of a family not to beat down those she comes in contact with 
below the point where their labor gains a wholesome maintenance” (7), Parkes argues that a 
strategic alliance of female householders and female laborers is possible; that is, she asserts that 
the bonds of gender have some stronger form of interest than are apparent in other forms of 
everyday action in the capitalist marketplace.  
In building on the familiar supposition that we have the most sympathy with those to 
whom we are closest, Parkes also carves out a space between the interactions which guide the 
“masses of people” and those that govern individual actions based on Christian principles. That 
mediating space is based on the gendered and religious principles of domestic space, and in so 
doing makes a political claim for that space. Though political economy is “the rule of true self-
interest; it is in itself neither moral nor immoral; it represents the laws by which we are swayed 
in dealing for ourselves and for our families with the outward world of strangers, of whom we 
know nothing.” Parkes argues for enlarging the capacity of “our circle of interest and affection” 
so that the “boundary beyond which we treat other human beings scientifically without any self 
denial” recedes (7). For Parkes, to imagine the collectivity of women as an enlarged one based 
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on the feelings of the home is also to imagine a body politic of an “ideal nation” which mitigates 
the harshness of the capitalist “principle of getting everything as cheap as possible” (7). What 
would result as “the more completely society is infused with those ideas which modify the action 
of purely scientific laws” is the realization of a bourgeois public sphere that includes women. 
Moderating the rationality of economics with the affective values of the domestic sphere will 
make it “easier” for women to work without being “crushed” by the machinery of society: “the 
more human creatures cast behind them the savage theory that might makes right, which may be 
termed the political economy of wild beasts, the more possible become the independent labours 
of the gentler sex” (7). This does not entirely challenge the assumption of the public sphere that 
private interests should be bracketed in favor of the common good, but it figures gender as a 
special case, less as a form of difference that has to be encountered than a structuring relation 
that enables a better form of commonness. Parkes asserts a vision of the public sphere that, when 
structured by these gendered principles, better realizes its own ideals.143 
If we saw in the debates about the journal a model of cooperation that embraced 
difference and disagreement, it should come as no surprise that cooperation is in these articles an 
important concept for Parkes, one that forms the crucial basis of her assent to Mill’s ideas about 
social progress. She notes Mill’s mention, in Principles of Political Economy, of the necessity for 
insurance to mitigate the effects of “vicissitudes of fortune which arise from inevitable natural 
calamities,” and which thus afford the individual some degree of protection and stability (9).144 
                                               
143 If we consider that liberal feminism is typically criticized for being a form of feminism that, 
in prioritizing individual equality, neglects to think about structures, my objection to such 
criticism of the Langham Place group should become clearer in my argument that something 
more complicated is occurring in Parkes’ article: an acknowledgement of the complex structures 
of power that govern an individual’s access to the public sphere, or the opportunities afforded to 
the privileged liberal individual — and a belief in gender difference as a competing structure that 
can ameliorate the exclusions of the public sphere. 
144 Parkes is citing, as she tends to do, long passages from Mill himself. 
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Drawing a parallel between Mill’s remarks on insurance, and remarks on “the principle of co-
operation to women” made by Elizabeth Blackwell in her lectures in England, Parkes notes that 
it is “interesting” that these “two long-sighted seers look forward to the extension of the same 
principle; the one desirable for the sake of professional women; the other as necessary for the 
progress of society” (9). The version of cooperation Parkes considers, based on Blackwell and 
Mill, is not an endorsement for the combined labor power of a women’s trade union, but rather 
the application of Mill’s argument for the progressive potential of the “more extensive and more 
skillful employment of the joint-stock principle” to women (10). Through cooperation, Parkes 
asserts, the “small means and more delicate physical powers of women” may be utilized even 
where “each by herself would have failed” (11).145 This physical capacity of women causes 
Parkes to part ways with Mill in advocating protective legislation in the form of Factory Acts, as 
the “very nature of the work” is so taxing as “fairly to claim legislative consideration” (10). This 
is an important point of divergence for Parkes, as Mill’s position, which she cites, was that for 
“improving the condition of women, it should, on the contrary, be an object to give them the 
readiest access to independent industrial employment, instead of closing, either entirely or 
partially, that which is already open to them” (11). 
Quite apart from the substance of their disagreement, Parkes’ departure from Mill is 
rhetorically interesting, given that she grants him the final word in this first part of the article. In 
so doing, Parkes allows the opinion of a man whose opinion of right and wrong, she had begun 
by observing, sways the opinion of thinking men, to stand until the second part of the article was 
published two months later. Yet in ending with Mill’s words, she also highlights the role of voice 
                                               
145 Here Parkes alludes to the issue of factory legislation, that is, the amount of government 
regulation of unmarried women conducting unsafe labor in factories and mines that could be 
consistent with a liberal model of a free labor market. The introduction of Factory Acts would 
become increasingly an issue throughout the 1870s and into the 1890s, and would in many ways 
fundamentally reshape the structure of the feminist movement. 
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throughout the article, underscoring her own among the authoritative voices she cites in this rare 
moment of disagreement with Mill. Moreover, although the topic of the debate is work, Parkes’ 
rhetorical strategy highlights the importance of voice rather than the actual activity of labor. As 
labor, the issue of work is an issue of class merely; as a question of voice – whose voices 
determine how labor is discussed and legislated about – gender supplants class as a framework 
for thinking about the issue.  
This point, implicit in Parkes’ position in “The Opinions of John Stuart Mill,” is made 
quite clearly in SPEW report presented at the Annual Meeting of the National Association of 
Social Science on October 24, 1860, and later published in the English Woman’s Journal. In 
attempting to ameliorate the condition of working women, SPEW notes that it would target the 
“lower ranks of the middle class” – the “very independent” class, as the English Woman’s 
Journal states elsewhere, who “willingly accept help,” but “cannot endure patronage”146 – as 
“we could for a time do nothing” for highly educated women, and “women of no education could 
do nothing for us.” However, by inserting a “wedge” into the issue in this most productive sector, 
progress would result for all.147 By elevating the most productive subjects of this self-help 
scheme, competition would be reduced in the starvation industries, and the lives of working-class 
women would also improve. It is not in the labor market where gender equality is possible, but in 
the meetings to discuss the state of the labor market: “The sexes here find their right place, side 
by side with each other, and we hail this as the commencement of the breaking down of that 
                                               
146 Barbara Bodichon. “Middle Class Schools for Girls.” English Woman’s Journal 6.33 (1 
November 1860): 168-177, p. 173. A paper presented at the meeting of the National Association 
for the Promotion of Social Science, Glasgow, 1860. 
147 “Special Meetings at Glasgow and Edinburgh, With Reference to the Industrial Employment 
of Women.” English Woman’s Journal 6.33 (1 November 1860): 146-159, p. 147. Subsequent 
page references in text. 
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unnatural barrier between them which, separating the interests of men and women, acts in a 
thousand pernicious ways on the moral health and well-being of the community” (145). 
Another of Parkes’ English Woman’s Journal articles, “A Year’s Experience,” presents in 
many ways a fairly predictable argument about the problem of female unemployment: the 
overstaffing of certain fields like governessing; the fact that the normal wages for women’s work 
are not generally sufficient if a woman is encumbered with dependents; and the fact that much 
work is impossible given the limitations of a womanly frame. The solution the piece ends by 
presenting is, again, the unsurprising solution of better-assisted migration schemes, to aid in the 
placement of women in the colonies where they “are wanted in every social capacity,” and where 
women might be trained in the “functions of administrative benevolence,” which, though 
employment, are actually only the “development of household qualities,” and the “larger, the 
more generous, and equally distinctive part of woman’s work in the world” (121). What is 
interesting about Parkes’ argument here is not that she makes her case for the employment of 
women as merely an extension of her domestic function in the home, but the way in which she 
lays out the problem of female underemployment as not a gender problem, but a class one: 
though “lines of demarcation” between the classes still exist, the problem is they are increasingly 
becoming blurred (115). In the case of governessing, for instance, the primary concern is a 
problem of indistinction, that ladies occupy the title along with tradesmen’s daughters; the 
profession brings together in one class those “who are very unequal” in qualifications and salary 
(116). 
The article advocates encouraging the entry of women into “hitherto unaccustomed 
businesses and trades” (116). For young and single women, “it is highly desirable to extend and 
encourage” occupations in the semi-mechanical arts such as law-copying “in every way, taking 
great care in the formation of model classes, or new businesses, to harmonize them as much as 
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possible with the physical and moral conditions of female workers” (116). For the highly 
educated women “to whom the keeping up of a social position has become a moral necessity” 
(116), the answer to their employment is a moral one: “moral superintendence over women” 
(117). Their locatedness in the class system of their proper place allows women-as-workers to 
transcend their status as mere translators of the domestic realm into the world of work. This is 
not as simple as saying that Parkes ignores the dynamics of class in favor of thinking about 
gender, as a typical critique of liberal feminism would have it; rather, it is that she uses ideas 
about fitness and right place in a classed society in order to smooth the transition between 
women as domestic carers (even if that care takes place in the public realm) and women as 
political actors and participants in the public sphere of critical debate.  
The second part of Parkes’ article on Mill, which appeared in the English Woman’s 
Journal two issues after the first, continues her focus on work, but takes up and makes central 
the issue of cooperation. Cooperation, by the November issue, had become a kind of mantra to 
the LPG. It was mentioned and advocated in Parkes’ earlier piece on Mill, and was frequently 
argued for elsewhere in the pages of the journal – in Bodichon’s piece on “Middle Class Schools 
for Girls,” for instance, in which she advocates that ladies pool their skills in order to develop 
more effective schools on a cooperative basis. Mill, Parkes writes, is the “apostle of co-
operation” – an intriguing reading of Mill given his recent publication of On Liberty, his paean to 
individuality.148 Parkes’s point highlights the centrality of cooperation, not so much to Mill’s 
ideas of individuality, but to those of the LPG; the key question is not whether cooperation is 
useful – it is a concept “peculiarly useful to women” – but whether it is achievable: “the extent to 
which it can be carried out by the actual men of this work-a-day world” (193).  
                                               
148 Bessie Rayner Parkes. “The Opinions of John Stuart Mill.” English Woman’s Journal 6.33 (1 
November 1860): 193-202, p. 193. Subsequent page references in text. 
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For Parkes, the concept of cooperation is what distinguishes the capacity of white, 
Christian women: cooperation is “peculiarly useful” to women, because women are peculiarly 
suited to it. Their inherent ability to cooperate, and thus to progress, renders gender a special 
form of difference in comparison to the uncivilized non-Christian others. Unlike what Parkes 
refers to as Eastern “hordes,” a cooperation acts as a body with common interests, but does not 
subsume the distinguishing characteristics and individuals within it: “The savage cannot co-
operate in a sphere higher than that of the yelling war-dance. The submissive hordes of Eastern 
despotisms were ranged in ranks under one master, but they did not co-here in mutual activity” 
(194). Self-government is the crux of cooperation: without it, cooperation would not be possible, 
as the mass would swallow the individual, as in the uncivilized “war dance,” in which the 
participants merge so completely as to become one. This Eastern, non-cooperative merging exists 
as a totally asymmetrical power relation, as the despot rules over a horde incapable of thinking 
individually, able only to act in concert as a buzzing mass. What cooperation allows, given the 
importance of self-government, is a peculiarly liberal form of power. It conforms quite neatly to 
the definition of the bourgeois public sphere by merging interest, without necessarily granting 
everyone an equal stake. Thus, in the commercial cooperative endeavor of the joint stock 
principle: 
 
this common fund may be used or divided in various ways; the shares may be equal or 
unequal, the government of the different parts of the concern may be federal or strictly 
democratic; and so on. Only it is necessary that there shall be shares, and proportionate 
profits, and that in some way the concern shall be self-governed. Self-government is the 
root of the idea, for which reason Mr. Mill says, ‘the peculiar characteristic, in short, of 
civilized beings is the capacity of co-operation.’ And this refers to all moral as well as to 
all commercial co-operation (194). 
 
The problem of cooperation, then, is to ensure it can fulfill its ideal function in an increasing 
mass society, that is, one in which production occurs on an increasingly larger scale, and thus 
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risks segmenting into what Mill identifies as “two parties with hostile interests, employers and 
employed, the many who do the work being mere servants under the command of the one who 
supplies the funds, and having no interest of their own in the enterprise, except to fulfill their 
contract and earn their wages” (196). Parkes proposes the joint stock principle as “capable of 
solving this problem” though “its battles have been most severe, partly on account of its 
apparently democratic tendency, partly because it early became mixed up with moral and social 
questions with which it has properly no necessary concern” (196). 
Despite its association with socialist ideas (the moral and social questions with which, 
Parkes lamented, it had unfortunately become associated), Parkes asserts that it is possible to 
reconcile cooperation with the moral framework laid out in the first part of article. Cooperation is 
“moral” and “religious” as much as it is a matter of commerce. In fact the moral meaning “lies at 
the basis of the commercial meaning” as trust is required: those who practice cooperation need to 
“agree on principles” and “keep their tempers one towards the other,” and “civil peace” is 
necessary to conduct transactions in “peace and quietness,” in order to apply the “principle of 
united action to greater profit” (194). Though Parkes insists that the moral meaning contributes 
to the commercial, her clarification of the principles of cooperation suggests that the commercial 
principle also feeds into its moral meaning. That is, the values of agreement, civility, peace, and 
trust that seem to be involved in the moral idea of cooperation highlight that the concept involves 
a group of individuals who consent to act in a single entity. Contractual ideas and moral ones are 
therefore mutually constitutive, further reinforcing cooperation as an exclusively Christian 
principle. Moreover, the progress it both is a sign of and contributes to is likewise out of reach 
for non-Christians: “Even in Pagan nations these combined secular and religious influences have 
sufficed to create vigorous social life. But the triumph of co-operation in its more extended moral 
sense was reserved for Christianity to declare” (194). Cooperation is both evidence of a capacity 
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for progress and what brings it about. Parkes cites Mill’s assertion that “there is no more certain 
incident of the progressive change taking place in society, than the continual growth of the 
principle and practice of co-operation” (194). In typically circular Millean logic, cooperation has 
the potential to mitigate the miseries of capitalist production “as soon as civilization and 
improvement have so far advanced that what is a benefit to the whole shall be a benefit to each 
individual composing it” (196). Progress is possible when progress has been achieved; thus, 
despite experiments tried in Paris, it is in “England, conservative England, that the great 
triumphs have been achieved” (197). The attractiveness of the principle of cooperation for Parkes 
is that it models a kind of collectivity based on balancing the individual and the mass, and 
perhaps even more importantly, that it does so in a way that addresses systemic inequality 
without advocating revolutionary politics.149 Cooperation provides not equality of opportunity, 
but an opportunity for all to progress: “It may be said that in a free country all men are free to 
save and take an even chance of becoming capitalists. It is true that they are so far on an equality; 
yet would it not be far better if, instead of having, as now, an equal chance of standing on a 
summit, all honest and industrious men could calculate on a more even remuneration, and be 
raised to a higher level?” (196). By making progressive potential a peculiarly English quality, 
Parkes locates all subjects with potential for equality (here, honest and industrious men, and only 
by implication women) quite specifically in the national body politic. 
                                               
149 It is a diagnosis of how capitalist power works that trusts in the reason of the powerful, but 
still requires a countermeasure: “the man with capital is not merely a double man, but a tenfold 
man: he is not merely a man and money, but a moneyed man. His power has increased in a 
geometrical ratio” (195). His advantage is “perfectly fair” and it is “unlikely that he will do 
anything very unreasonable. He has his interests and also his character to consult… All I wish to 
point out is, that he actually does possess an enormous power; that thousands of his fellow-




Parkes includes a lengthy excerpt from a paper on “Co-operative Societies,” written by 
Owenite Dr. John Watts, which advocates the application of principles of cooperation in ventures 
such as the Rochdale Co-operative Association, a cooperative endeavor comprising three shops, 
offices, and a library and reading room devoted to “educational purposes.” As the “solid and 
practicable remnant of the teaching of Robert Owen,” such cooperative endeavors “are proof of 
the wisdom of attempting only such improvement at any time as society is fit for and can 
appreciate” (199). Watts promoted only what was “practicable” about Owen’s society theory, 
attributing the ultimate failure of Owen’s endeavors to the fact that his “proposed economical 
arrangements did not fit in” (199) with the progressive, Darwinist account of social organization 
he outlines. Watts’ is quite clearly a liberal vision of progress, in which the success of the 
cooperation must be simultaneously held up as an improving force, and as the proof that its 
members are capable of the responsibilities of citizenship. Thus, he commends that “men who 
were formerly of dissipated habits, women who were extravagant and troublesome to their 
husbands, have all been wonderfully improved” while also lamenting the fact that out of 3,100 
houses in the Rochdale community, less than 200 confer the vote. Consequently, the 
disenfranchised majority are “shut out from any part in the business of the nation” despite being 
“intelligent and moral enough to appreciate, adopt, and manage large trading concerns” (200). 
The principle of cooperation, to Watts, is thus both the mechanism for the development of the 
“well-being” and “independence of character” of the working-classes (201), and the proof that 
they are capable of such improvement. 
For Parkes, Watts’ paper “strongly impressed” her with the applicability of its “principle 
to female labor” (201). In a mere paragraph of conclusion following Watts’ several pages, Parkes 
sums up “in a most practical manner”: “If twenty ladies in any town would club together £5 a-
piece, they might open a stationery shop, to which, if they gave all their own custom, they might 
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secure a profit after employing a female manager, and if the business increased, female clerks 
also” (202). The proof Parkes uses to bolster her argument is the proof that cooperation has been 
an effective strategy for men; it is only by analogy that she can propose it as a uniquely female 
solution. That the article has functioned as a lengthy analogy should remind us, too, that as an 
example of a woman’s public voice, it is a curious object. Composed almost entirely by cobbling 
together the voices of influential men, giving most space to men’s cooperation in order to prove 
its applicability to women, Parkes’ article suggests that gender difference can ultimately be 
understood by models of sameness, and thus what it offers is a form of incorporation that 
structures more equal relations in the public sphere.  
Forty years after the Combahee River Collective published its famous statement of Black 
feminism pointing out the interlocking nature of oppression, it is impossible not to acknowledge 
the great cost to subjectivities marked by other forms of difference in the claims made by the 
LPG that, in Margaret Forster’s words, “[n]either class nor money made the kind of difference it 
might be expected to make: being a woman transcended other differences” (4). This has led to a 
fundamental misapprehension of the significance of the LPG’s project, such that in 2014, it was 
still possible to publish articles in which the main stakes of argument is that the group was 
“unabashedly feminist” (Pusapati 609). This is the familiar and problematic legacy of second 
wave feminism: the unsustainability of relying on a set of universalizing claims grounded in the 
premise that women have inherent similarities as women, and the resulting implication that their 
status as political beings depends upon those qualities and shared struggles. The legacy of the 
LPG has tended to be weighed against this received understanding of liberal feminism. In the 
1990s, feminist critics were frustrated by what they saw as the group’s moderate position (not 
claiming as many rights for women as they could have); more recently, scholars have been 
frustrated by the way the group was primarily a middle- and upper-class endeavor, and tended to 
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perpetuate, rather than challenge, the injustices of the imperial project in replicating assumptions 
about the liberal individual’s whiteness and Britishness.150 The presentism that inheres in this 
way of thinking about the group’s work – its claims, as well as its organization – tends to flatten 
the historical specificity of the group, and risks overstating or minimizing, or vastly 
mischaracterizing, its significance. Moreover, it imposes a telos on the group’s social 
contribution by assuming a kind of inevitability about the development of feminism: liberal 
feminism began in either naive or malevolent disregard of difference, which we then learned to 
think about correctly in the more enlightened twentieth century.  
Underlying much of this work is an assumption that the fit between liberal ideas and 
feminist ones is somehow an imperfect one.151 Insofar as liberal feminism can be said to have a 
coherent ideology or platform, which is precisely not what I have argued of the LPG in this 
chapter, the received critical narrative holds it to be a philosophy based on the struggle of 
competing parts: the insistence on seeing the structuring force of gender (feminism) against the 
faith in the universality of the unmarked, individual, rational rights-bearing subject (liberalism). 
This chapter has reassessed this story about liberal feminism, though not in the service of a 
vindication of their politics or a redemption of the liberatory potentials of their claim to 
                                               
150 Margaret Forster is an example of the first tendency, Meritxell Simon-Martin and Lynne 
Walker of the second. 
151 This is an assumption that runs deeper than work on mid-nineteenth-century British feminism. 
See, for instance, Anne Phillips’ “Feminism and Liberalism Revisited: Has Martha Nussbaum 
Got It Right?” Constellations 8.2 (2001): 249-266: “The relationship between feminism and 
liberalism has always been an uneasy one. In the first instance, this was because liberals were so 
hesitant about recognizing that their new understanding of politics had implications for women’s 
equality” (p. 249). See also Joan W. Scott: “‘Women’ came into being as political outsiders 
through the discourse of sexual difference” (Joan Wallach Scott. Only Paradoxes to Offer: 
French Feminists and the Rights of Man. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996, p. 3). Yet, 
in writing about this paradox as constitutive of feminism, Scott is still subordinating the struggle 
of the feminist paradox to the republican one; that feminists were “marked by the paradox” of 
difference was because they “carried” the “ambiguities of the republican notion of the 
individual” into “feminist arguments” (11). 
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universality. The exclusions and inconsistencies of the LPG are often as surprising as they are 
distasteful to a contemporary feminist analysis. Whose feminist sensibilities would not be 
affronted by encountering the glowing review of Coventry Patmore’s The Angel in the House, 
now synonymous with the oppressions of Victorian middle-class domestic ideology, in an early 
issue of the English Woman’s Journal?152 Rather than seeking to champion the arguments or 
strategies of the group, my intention has been to show that the development of liberal feminism 
was the contingent product, rather than inevitable result, of the way the LPG oriented itself 
towards and thought about difference.  
  
                                               
152 The way in which many of the arguments for female emigration anticipated the claims of 
W.S. Greg, whose journalism has also been taken to task by feminist critics. These strange 





Aesthetic Liberalism: Election Novels of the 1860s 
 
Introduction 
If liberal politics and activism in Victorian Britain in the wake of reform was always and 
deeply marked by the struggle of relating to difference, as I have been arguing, literature of the 
period was no less so marked. To some extent, the ways in which literary works dealt with the 
specter of reform mirrored liberalism’s general struggle with difference: after all, no less than 
politics, the arts “have traditionally excluded certain kinds of people as well as certain kinds of 
experience,” as John Carey succinctly points out.1 The rise of popular fiction in the nineteenth-
century challenged the view of literature as the production and appreciation of elusive works of 
individual genius. For example, Matthew Arnold’s definition of criticism as “a disinterested 
endeavour to learn and propagate the best that is known and thought in the world” set apart from 
the “mass – so much better disregarded – of current English literature” stands as an example of a 
view of culture that bears more than a passing resemblance to Mill’s understanding of political 
office as a special and rarefied sphere reserved for the individual genius, a notionally 
meritocratic but predictably exclusive sphere.2 Reform and its consequences had its effect on the 
                                               
1 John Carey. What Good Are the Arts? Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006, p. x. 
2 Matthew Arnold. “The Function of Criticism at the Present Time.” 1864. Culture and Anarchy 




literary sphere, resulting in rising literacy rates, lower publishing costs, and increasing numbers 
of people with the money to buy a book and the time to read it.3 
As the first two chapters of this dissertation have explored, the 1860s were a period in 
which political shifts in and involving the nation brought the fact of difference into close 
proximity, and as a result of which the body politic had to contend with reimagining citizenship 
on a broader scale. Beyond the political sphere, the question of difference manifested itself in the 
literary public in the period, as writers responded to what was taking shape as a mass readership 
on an unprecedented scale. The mid-nineteenth century saw the emergence of the blockbuster 
novel, with all its associated merchandise, and these commercially successful novels cultivated a 
large, varied, and unknown readership. This was, in a sense, an epiphenomenon of reform: 
namely, the increasing pressure of a public sphere that needed to contain a larger variety and 
multitude of people who previously had not needed to come together in any particular kind of 
relation.  
It was clear to contemporary writers and thinkers that this new, expanded sense of the 
public was changing the literary landscape in powerful and unpredictable ways. Perhaps the most 
well-known account is Wilkie Collins’s “The Unknown Public,” published in Dickens’ 
Household Words in 1858.4 In the essay, Collins investigated the hitherto unknown public of 
penny press readers, a group of people whose literary practices had been operating without the 
knowledge of the Victorian literary establishment, and presented his findings for the middle-
class reader of Dickens’ journal. Critics have tended to read Collins’ piece as a sign of anxiety 
                                               
3 For an account of this development and its effect on the structure of the novel from a narrative 
theory perspective, see Alex Woloch. The One vs. the Many makes the case that the “logic of 
inclusiveness” of the nineteenth century becomes “increasingly central to the novel’s form.” The 
One vs. the Many: Minor Characters and the Space of the Protagonist in the Novel. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2003, p. 25. 
4 Wilkie Collins. “The Unknown Public.” Household Words 18.439 (21 August 1858): 217-222. 
 
 199 
over the popularization of a middlebrow form of art, but this is hard to understand when one 
reads the piece itself closely.5 Despite Collins’ clear elitism, the tone is overwhelmingly one of 
excitement, and unmistakeable glee at the opening up of a new market – the “great, unparalleled 
prospect” that awaits the “coming generation of English novelists” (222). Part of Collins’ 
excitement in “Unknown Public” stems precisely from a dizzying sense of boundlessness, and 
the possibilities this afforded for the extension of his public. This is not the problem of scale 
conceived as a purely political question; culturally and commercially, the scale of the unknown 
public offered unprecedented potential.  
Margaret Oliphant wrote about this new public with a similar mix of snobbery and sense 
of potential for Blackwood’s in the same year. In her article, “The Byways of Literature: Reading 
for the Million,” Oliphant describes the purchase of six penny journals and discovery of the 
contents of those “unauthoritative, undignified, unlearned broadsheets, which represent literature 
to a great portion of our country people, despite of all the better provision made for their 
pleasure.”6 Unimpressed with what she reads, Oliphant initially frames the rise of this new public 
as a symptom of the improved mechanics of printing and the degradation of thought: the “flimsy 
pages” prove that “good sense, good thought, truth, excellence, or refinement of any kind, are by 
no means included in what is called the spread of literature” (202). Rejecting the idea that the 
                                               
5 For instance, Kyriaki Hadjiafxendi and John Plunkett claim the piece “exemplifies the anxiety 
created by the realization that the fiction market was becoming divided between the ‘popular’ 
and the ‘literary’.” “The Pre-History of the ‘Little Magazine.” The Oxford Critical and Cultural 
History of Modernist Magazines Volume 1. Edited by Peter Brooker and Andrew Thacker. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009: 33-51, p. 40. Such a position belongs to the tendency to 
read sensation fiction purely in terms of its transgressive impulses or lack thereof. Critics like 
Patrick Brantlinger, D. H. Miller, Lynn Pykett, and Jenny Bourne Taylor, writing in the 1980s 
and 1990s, set the terms in which sensation novels would be discussed, largely unchanging, for 
the next twenty years. 
6 [Margaret Oliphant.] “The Byways of Literature: Reading for the Million.” Blackwood 




newly literate masses should be applauded for mere literacy, Oliphant argues that the “spread of 
education,” the “diffusion of knowledge,” and the “constantly increasing extent of ‘reading for 
the million’” necessitate a “stricter standard” (202); as such, it was necessary to examine what is 
being read before we move to “give the masses all credit for their gift of reading” and “glorify 
ourselves over the march of intelligence” (202-3). Oliphant characterizes the literary realm in 
terms that strongly evoke its role in comprising the public sphere, and which also underscore its 
political nature. The “oligarchies and democracies of that Republic of Letters” function, for 
Oliphant, to claim “throughout its ranks a noisy equality, pleasantly varied by the arrogance of 
individual despotisms. Let us not delude ourselves with the idea that literature is fully 
represented by that small central body of its forces of whom everybody knows every individual 
name” (203). This is liberal elitism at its finest: an ambivalence for both the noisy democratic 
equality of the masses and the tyranny of famous individuals is ultimately weighted in favour of 
the “heroes” against the “undiscriminated multitude” (204). The “everybody, who is nobody” 
generating “deep-rolling subterraneous universal applause” for the unknown penny journalists is 
notionally excluded from the “we” who “never knew of it” (211). 
Of course, for Oliphant as much as for Collins the beauty of the noise is how receptive 
the indiscriminate masses are to the right message; the “multitudinous public” is a blank, 
conquerable public that “opens its own mind to us, all unawares and unconsciously, by means of 
those penny papers” (204). The mass, curiously in possession of a single mind among them, 
passively waits for interpolation by the right authors; Oliphant advocates for authors like 
Dickens and Thackeray to hold direct court with these readers, lifting them up by virtue of their 
ability to craft appealing and improving narratives. Yet “Byways” also functions to undo the 
distinctions it makes between the indistinct mass and the individuated middle-class readers; there 
are moments in which Oliphant transcends, or comes close to transcending, her elitism. In her 
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claim that “people whose understanding of poverty does not mean a smaller house, or fewer 
servants, or a difficulty about one’s butcher’s bill, but means real hunger, cold, and nakedness 
are not people to be amused with abstractions” (205), she demonstrates a hint of empathy for 
readers looking for distraction from real, immediate suffering. Such distraction requires a 
different form of identification than the concerns of the wealthy; what penny journal readers seek 
is not a literature in which “their own trials are shadowed—their own sentiments expressed—
their own life illustrated by the fictitious representation before them (207), but one in which they 
can imagine themselves elsewhere. Oliphant briefly abandons the ethnological language typical 
of the genre to which her article and Collins’ belong, and imagines a universal feeling in 
response to the real stress of living in poverty: “In our nobler and loftier sorrows, it comforts us 
to hear of others who have borne the like affliction; but in our more sordid and petty pangs do we 
prefer to escape rather into regions where such things are impossible, to forget our mean 
surroundings in imaginary splendour” (207). Ultimately, Oliphant never strays too far from 
conventional platitudes about improving the masses through literature, but in her understanding 
of the desire for distraction from real care the mass readership is humanized in a way that 
Collins’s unknown public is not. The readers of penny journals may display no taste for the 
abstractions of philosophy, but everyone can identify with their desires: “We suppose, though it 
is rather contrary to the theory which brings poetry—and fiction as a development of poetry—
most close to the heart when it expounds what that heart itself feels without being able to 
express—that this too is a natural sentiment” (207). 
For Oliphant, the desire to read is a natural one, and it renders the noisy, indiscriminate 
mob legible as individuals and members of the wider “we” that encompasses not just bourgeois 
but all readers. That being the case, can literature uniquely effect a certain kind of identification 
where politics and practical reform fail? Oliphant’s article suggests that it can, serving as a kind 
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of object lesson for the way in which literary form possesses the unique ability to address the 
challenge of imagining oneself in the position of someone with whom one otherwise has little in 
common – a persisting problem for liberalism as a politics and reform as a practice. This is 
somewhat like, but not precisely the same as, D. Rae Greiner’s definition of sympathy as “a set 
of formal protocols for feeling ourselves thinking with real people and fictional ones.”7 But 
where “fellow-feeling” is, for Greiner, a vicarious sense, this chapter explores how fiction 
cultivates practices of identification that are at once more identified and more removed than 
sympathy; that is to say, not just thinking with but thinking as, as we see Oliphant doing for a 
brief moment in “Byways.” Despite an obvious aloofness, “Byways” cannot help but imagine a 
collectivity that includes all readers when it comes to the reasons we turn to fiction. In the 
context of a political and cultural moment in which we do not know exactly who the people are 
with whom we must learn to think, the novel negotiates identificatory practices that make this 
form of identifying possible.  
As we saw in “Byways,” and as the very terms “unknown public” and “reading for the 
million” suggest, the democratization of politics and culture in the period of reform gives rise to 
a troubling lack of differentiation. If an enlarged readership presents an opportunity, by 
removing the distinction between its various classes of readers, literature’s mass circulation also 
threatened to bring into being a mass culture that was atomized and meaningless and, above all, 
uncultured. Yet by explicitly addressing its audience as a mass public, and modeling the 
abstraction of differences not as an atomizing but as a productive force, the novel could also 
offer its public what David Halperin describes in another context as “ways of being, feeling, and 
relating” that transcend differences, giving form to the possibility of living as equals although 
                                               
7 D. Rae Greiner. “Thinking of Me Thinking of You: Sympathy Versus Empathy in the Realist 
Novel.” Victorian Studies, 53.3 (Spring 2011): 417-26, p. 419. 
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one’s differences are not equal.8 Although the working-class readers consume the inferior 
narratives published by the penny press, that they are drawn towards stories that distract them 
from their real-world cares is entirely understandable. If the desire for narrative is a “natural 
sentiment,” working-class feelings become momentarily legible within the framework of “our 
sorrows,” without threatening to subsume the individual reader within the chaos of “noisy 
equality.”  
In this chapter, I will explore three novels that not only exemplify this dynamic, but 
which also explicitly thematize ideas about difference, commonness, and publicity in an age of 
reform. George Eliot’s Felix Holt, The Radical (1866), Margaret Oliphant’s Miss Marjoribanks 
(1866), and Anthony Trollope’s Phineas Finn (1869) deal with the landscape of Victorian 
politics and the legacy and possibility of the Reform Acts.9 Trollope’s novel, published in 
volume form after the 1867 Reform Act, handles the question of reform in the 1860s most 
directly through an account of Phineas Finn’s political rise and fall, which hinges on his 
occupation of redistributed seats and his impossible position on Irish tenant rights. Oliphant’s 
Miss Marjoribanks, which, like Phineas Finn, is part of a series on English social and political 
life, was published in fifteen parts in Blackwood’s Magazine and then in three volumes in the 
year before the Second Reform Act. Unlike Trollope’s novel, Oliphant’s novel handles politics 
only obliquely: electioneering is a matter of the man, and not the politics, as Oliphant’s 
eponymous heroine often maintains. Eliot’s novel, published in 1866, returns to the first moment 
of parliamentary reform: it is an historical novel set in the months following the passage of the 
first Reform Bill in 1832. Felix Holt has been called Eliot’s political novel, but as the opening of 
                                               
8 David Halperin. How to Be Gay. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2012, p. 66. 
9 George Eliot. Felix Holt, the Radical. 1866. Edited by Fred C. Thomson. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1998. Margaret Oliphant. Miss Marjoribanks. 1866. Edited by Elisabeth Jay. 
London: Penguin, 1998. Anthony Trollope. Phineas Finn. 1869. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1991.  
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the novel makes clear, it is also fundamentally, and perhaps primarily, concerned with the way in 
which previously inchoate political and social differences became solidified through the agitation 
around the Reform Act, and the way in which “private life” is “determined by a wider public 
life.”10 
How, and the extent to which, private life determines and is determined by public life are 
central questions for all three of these novels. In a sense, the novels do the work of mapping the 
broader political struggles and effects of reform on the individual lives they depict through the 
marriage plots on which each novel also hinges. For example, the process of becoming humbled 
and submitting herself to Felix’s “purer and stronger” vision and nature that Esther Lyon must 
undergo (148); the gradually unfolding realization that Lucilla Marjoribanks must allow her heart 
to go “off from its mistress altogether” in the matter of her marriage,11 rather than allow itself to 
be engineered as Carlingford and its electorate can be engineered through Lucilla’s schemes; and 
Phineas’ decision to give up politics to marry his Irish sweetheart Mary, rather than marry for 
money to maintain his independence in the British parliament.  
It is not merely the effect of the political or the public sphere that these novels address, 
however. As I argue in this chapter, the novels provide a form for negotiating between political 
or public and private differences. When Hannah Arendt diagnoses the problem of mass culture, 
the issue is not volume, or merely volume, but one of synthesis: “What makes mass society so 
difficult to bear is not the number of people involved, or at least not primarily, but the fact that 
the world between them has lost its power to gather them together, to relate and to separate 
them.”12 These novels aestheticize precisely this problem, as both the personal and the political 
                                               
10 Eliot. Felix Holt, p. 43. Subsequent page references in text. 
11 Oliphant. Miss Marjoribanks, p. 467. Subsequent page references in text. 
12 Hannah Arendt. The Human Condition. 1958. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
1958,  pp. 52-3. 
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plot lines in each novel are characterized by too much isolation (a lack of relation) or a form of 
community that is also too much (a lack of separation). We see this in the disorganized landscape 
of Carlingford politicking, for instance, or in Eliot’s riots in which instigator and pacifist are 
indistinguishable. In narrating the chaos of the mass and its shift into the soothing clarity of the 
very personal marriage plot, these novels could be read as a retreat from the visibility of politics 
into the privacy and intimacy of the domestic sphere. Yet, I propose an alternative reading: as 
aesthetic objects packaged for consumption and ideally for mass circulation, these novels offer 
us not a retreat into the individual narrative but the rendering of a form of privacy in which we 
can all participate.  
As mass products, these novels organize difference in a way that responds to the 
pressures of nineteenth-century reform. Consider Walter Bagehot’s point that difference required 
the form of institutions: if the subjects of a government thought about what was useful, and if 
they all thought the same thing useful and could be attained in the same way, the formal elements 
of a constitution would not be needed. But, as Bagehot went on to note, “the world in which we 
live is organized far otherwise.”13 In this otherwise-organized world, these novels represent a 
crucial part of the political process around nineteenth century reform, providing – like the 
constitution in Bagehot’s analysis – a form for thinking together that makes communal life 
possible among people who think and feel differently. To use the terms laid out by Michael 
Warner, as “strangers who become, by virtue of their reflexively circulating discourse, a social 
entity,” the readers of these popular novels become not merely an audience but a public.14 Hailed 
by popular novels as mass subjects, I will argue, readers learn to read through a framework of 
                                               
13 Walter Bagehot. The English Constitution. 1867. Edited by Miles Taylor. Oxford: OUP, 2009, 
p. 7. 
14 Michael Warner. Publics and Counterpublics. New York: Zone Books, 2002, p. 12. 
Subsequent page references in text. 
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both recognition (recognizing that you are being addressed by the novel) and difference (needing 
to acknowledge that the text does not address you, or indeed anyone, in particular). These novels 
formalize difference and hail the reader as a mass subject, operating through what Raymond 
Williams has described as practical consciousness, and what Halperin has more recently 
described as practices of being: a way of feeling that is collective, premised on a shared and 
general affective form, rather than specific affective content (66).15 Oliphant’s middle class 
readers may define poverty as a “smaller house, or fewer servants, or a difficulty about one’s 
butcher bill” and the cheap periodical readers may define it as “real hunger, cold, and nakedness” 
(205), but the general form of feeling want enables a shared identification across the boundaries 
of those specific differences. This is a form within which it is possible to feel with through 
disidentifying. You need not be hailed by specific content to feel addressed by it. 
Imagining citizenship on a broader scale entailed an expansion of not only the political 
sphere but also the constitution of the public sphere. The question of reform was not simply 
about voting, but also crucially about relating, as Felix Holt makes clear. Contestation about who 
counted as an equal in the public sphere, which played out in political form in the issues 
discussed in the first two chapters of this dissertation, will here be considered in relation to the 
novels of the period. In modelling an affective structure based on general rather than individual 
feelings, the Victorian novel taught its readers to live with difference by learning to feel with 
characters, even or especially when they could not identify with them. These novels are, in other 
words, both theorists and symptoms of reform. In responding to the exigencies of reform, the 
novels provide an aesthetic form to the problems posed by a public sphere increasingly 
fragmented and threatened by its own expansion. As such, what they offer us is not, or not only, 
a moral answer to the problem of sympathy, but a practical response to the problem of liberal 
                                               
15 Raymond Williams. Marxism and Literature. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988, p. 132.  
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politics. In short, how to conceive of a frame of mind that could encompass the different lives, 
standpoints, and politics invoked by reform? 
 
Felix Holt, The Radical 
Written between March 1865 and May 1866, as agitation in the lead up to the passage of 
the Second Reform Act heightened, and set more than thirty years earlier in the year of First 
Reform Act’s passage, Felix Holt, The Radical has been considered Eliot’s most contemporary 
novel, and as a novel whose historicity is markedly out of step with current politics.16 Whatever 
relation the novel is understood to have to the pressing political matters of reform in the 1860s, 
critics tend to agree that the political strand of the plot is less compelling or “resonant,” as 
Pauline Nestor puts it, than the Transome plot. Underlying such interpretations of Felix Holt is 
an interpretation of the novel’s form that will also be familiar to critics of Daniel Deronda: a 
novel based on separate strands, which are weaved together with more or less success. Nestor 
rejects the charges that the novel “lacks structural cohesion,” but to her the novel is political in a 
general sense, showing the interrelation between public and private life, rather than a specific 
engagement with political questions given rise to by reform (113). Catherine Gallagher contends 
the novel’s “imbalances and contradictions” include “Dickensian intricacies of plot” required to 
intertwine “individual and family destinies.”17 In contrast, I argue that the novel’s depiction of 
                                               
16 For example, Pauline Nestor cites Blackwood claiming: “Her politics are excellent and will 
attract all parties. Her sayings would be invaluable in the present debate.” George Eliot. 
Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002, p. 106. Subsequent page references in text. In contrast, David 
Kurnick maintains that Felix’s reappearance in the “Address to Working Men” is a “stark 
admission that there was always something amiss in this character’s conception.” “Felix Holt: 
Love in the Time of Politics.” A Companion to George Eliot. Edited by Amanda Anderson and 
Harry E. Shaw. West Sussex: John Wiley & Sons, 2013: 141-152, p. 149. Subsequent page 
references in text. 
17 Catherine Gallagher. “The Failure of Realism: Felix Holt.” Nineteenth-Century Fiction 35.3 
(1980): 372-384, p. 379. Subsequent page references in text. 
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individual destinies resolves questions that are at heart political, having to do with the 
relationship between public and private, the extent to which identification is possible across 
difference, and the changing social landscape as a result of reform. This reading of Felix Holt is 
thus an argument for the significance of its politics beyond the “privatization of potentially 
political meaning.”18  
In what follows, I will read several key moments in Felix Holt in order to demonstrate 
how the novel dramatizes a particular mode of identifying that sustains a fantasy of liberal 
sociality: that it is possible to live as equals with those who are different. This is not, it should be 
said, an argument about George Eliot’s relationship to liberal thought.19 Nor is it a complete 
analysis of how Eliot deals with reform; I do not, for instance, address Middlemarch, which 
Gallagher has argued is the climax of the movement in Eliot’s thought for which Felix Holt is 
but a stepping stone, and in which, she claims, “reform and the 1832 Reform Bill become 
themselves metaphors” (384). My reading of Felix Holt is indebted to Raymond Williams’ 
proposition that, evident in the history of the novel, is the “problem of knowing a community—
of finding a stand-point from which community can be known.”20 In the development of the 
novel from Jane Austen to George Eliot, what happens is “a recognition of other kinds of people, 
other kinds of country, other kinds of action on which a moral emphasis must be brought to bear” 
(256). This is precisely the line of thinking that my argument takes up, seeing an attempt to 
resolve the problem of knowing an unknowable community in the way the novel figures reform, 
                                               
18 Kurnick. “Love in the Time of Politics,” p. 146 
19 For that, see Daniel S. Malachuk. “George Eliot’s Liberalism.” A Companion to George Eliot. 
Edited by Amanda Anderson and Harry E. Shaw. West Sussex: John Wiley & Sons, 2013: 370-
384. For an account of Eliot’s thought in relation to ideas about democracy and culture in 
Arnold, Schiller, and Mill, see Colene Bentley. “Democratic Citizenship in Felix 
Holt.” Nineteenth-Century Contexts 24.3 (2002): 271-89. 
20 Raymond Williams. “The Knowable Community in George Eliot’s Novels.” NOVEL: A 
Forum on Fiction 2.3 (1969): 255-268, p. 255. Subsequent page references in text. 
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and in the intertwining of what critics – including Williams, it must be said – typically have read 
as distinct political and personal plots. Williams argues that the “emphasis of want” is 
“specialized to Felix Holt,” and that the knowable community “comes to be known primarily as a 
problem of relationship: of how the separated individual, with a divided consciousness of 
belonging and not belonging, makes his own moral history” (262). In what follows, I want to 
push the boundaries of Williams’ argument. It is not only that in Eliot’s novel the problem of the 
community becomes the problem of the relationship; rather, the relationship poses a solution to 
the politics of the novel, such that Treby Magna can fail to return a Radical candidate and 
nonetheless be reformed through the way in which the novel solves the relationship.  
David Kurnick revises Williams’ reading of the coach scene that opens the novel, in 
which the reader should imagine themselves on a coach thirty-five years ago wending its way 
through the countryside. For Williams, the coach-journey allegorizes Eliot’s style that can 
“register the causes of political turmoil” and then contain it “in a detached vision of rural 
tranquility” (143). Kurnick maintains that Williams’ point is inherent to Eliot’s text, in that part 
of “the interest of Felix Holt is the way its narrative awkwardness serves to render explicit the 
deeply ambivalent political and representational demands Eliot attempts to reconcile throughout 
her work” (144). Kurnick pays attention to what I agree is a strangely suggestive sentence 
closing the introduction: “These things are a parable” (11). For Kurnick, the point of the parable 
is about art and the excesses of the realist novel:  
 
the sentence’s very mysteriousness highlights Eliot’s half-despairing sense of a realistic 
art’s potential impossibility. The gothic image of a blood-infested landscape is a 
parable—but of what? Behind that question we may hear lurking a larger doubt about the 
social relevance of creative art more generally. To what concrete reality does aesthetic 




Kurnick’s is one of the most interesting readings of Felix Holt, but I am inclined to disagree with 
the conclusions he draws here, perhaps because I do not see the same narrative awkwardness that 
he does (and other critics do) in the novel. Instead, I see the introduction as a parable of different 
kinds of publicity, a slippage between the known and local, where “everybody in North 
Loamshire knew Sampson’s coach” (10), and the wide, unknowable kind, where individual 
stories are “unknown to the world,” there is “much pain that is quite noiseless,” and the 
“vibrations that make human agonies are often a mere whisper in the roar of hurrying existence” 
(11). This is a broader world of unimaginable feelings, and the scale of the parabolic blood is so 
broad that no one, and no one novel, can grasp the whole of it: “the red warm blood is darkly 
feeding the quivering nerves of a sleepless memory that watches through all dreams” (11).  
Of course, to say that Eliot’s fictional project depends on representing both the specificity 
of private life and the generality of human existence is to render in banal terms the point she 
herself makes in Middlemarch, as the newly married Dorothea Casaubon sits sobbing: “If we had 
a keen vision and feeling of all ordinary human life, it would be like hearing the grass grow and 
the squirrel’s heart beat, and we should die of that roar which lies on the other side of silence.”21 
What is interesting about Felix Holt is the way in which reform problematizes mediation 
between the two – the coachman everyone knows, and the noiseless pains and vibrations of the 
general human agony that we can never know, or bear to know. Reform marks the landscape of 
the introduction from the beginning of the novel’s second paragraph. The undeparted glory of the 
old coach-roads and the cozy social interactions, personified in the “smiling glances of pretty 
barmaids, and the repartees of jocose ostlers” go hand-in-hand with the political injustices and 
corruptions that reform movements intended to address: “In those days there were pocket 
boroughs, a Birmingham unrepresented in Parliament and compelled to make strong 
                                               
21 George Eliot. Middlemarch. 1871-1872. New York: Penguin, 2015, p. 186. 
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representations out of it, unrepealed corn-laws, three-and-sixpenny letters, a brawny and many-
breeding pauperism, and other departed evils; but there were some pleasant things too, which 
have also departed” (5). The shepherd can imagine his life untouched by the “mysterious distant 
system of things called ‘Gover’ment,’ which, whatever it might be, was no business of his,” and 
he can “cut his bread and bacon with his pocket-knife, and [feel] no bitterness” (6), but the 
reader cannot help seeing how the pressures of politics underlie and even enable this bucolic 
existence, creating the conditions for the very coach in which we are to imagine ourselves a 
passenger. The introduction enacts the difficulties of a reforming world, as we see so many 
different landscapes but cannot know them in their specificities. The coach takes us from the 
Protestant tramps, “saved from the excesses of Protestantism by not knowing how to read, and 
by the absence of handlooms and mines to be the pioneers of Dissent” (6) to the “trim cheerful 
villages” of homesteads of rich farmers, who thought of the coach as being for those “who, 
wanting to travel to London and such distant places, belonged to the trading and less solid part of 
the nation” (7); and from the coal mines, with the “pale eager faces of handloom weavers, men 
and women, haggard from sitting up late at night to finish the week’s work” (7) and the “pious 
Dissenting women” who “thought that salvation depended chiefly on predestination, and not at 
all on cleanliness” (7) to the manufacturing town, with its “population not convinced that old 
England was as good as possible” (8). Linked by the coach as it traverses these different worlds, 
the lack of cohesion is nonetheless palpable.  
The problem of this social world is that it is “easy for the traveler to conceive that town 
and country had no pulse in common” and that rural Englishmen’s “notion of Reform” was a 
“confused combination of rick-burners, trades-unions, Nottingham riots, and in general whatever 
required the calling-out of the yeomanry” (8). And though we are positioned with this traveler – 
or imagined as this traveler – the novel makes it impossible for us to replicate his 
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misconceptions. Government dictates the conditions of the shepherd’s life, and town and country 
alike are shaped by reform even if the riots seem to happen elsewhere. The novel itself, in 
imagining a coach journey that connects the cheerful villages, the exhausting coal mines, and the 
town, and weaving a narrative that hangs on riots in the boroughs as well as the cities, is itself 
evidence for association it negates. As the novel famously tells us, “there is no private life which 
has not been determined by a wider public life” (43). 
Treby Magna is a throwback to country towns of an earlier literary period. Before the 
Reform Bill had thrust upon it “the new honour of being a polling-place,” the town had been 
“quite a typical old market-town” (39). It is as if, in her characterization of Treby Magna before 
reform, Eliot anticipates Williams’ point that, in Jane Austen’s novel, all the people disappear 
except for those worth socially visiting (265). In no other similarly sized country town “was 
there a larger proportion of families who had handsome sets of china without handles” (39). It is 
a close-knit, socially imbricated town: “Such people naturally took tea and supped together 
frequently; and as there was no professional man or tradesman in Treby who was not connected 
by business, if not by blood, with the farmers of the district, the richer sort of these were much 
invited, and gave invitations in their turn” (39-40). What changes Treby Magna is not reform in 
the first instance, but the material conditions of labor: “there befell new conditions, complicating 
its relation with the rest of the world, and gradually awaking in it that higher consciousness 
which is known to bring higher pains” (40). As such, the town “gradually passed from being 
simply a respectable market-town,” in which the commercial relationships were based on social 
ones – “where the trade was only such as had close relations with the local landed interest” – and 
transformed into the “more complex life brought by mines and manufactures, which belong more 
directly to the great circulating system of the nation than to the local system to which they have 
been superadded” (41). As the novel makes clear, the changed economic conditions, resulting in 
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a changed social landscape divorced from the social ties of an older, more feudal model of 
society, become solidified as political division: “when political agitation swept in a great current 
through the country, Treby Magna was prepared to vibrate” (41).22  
In turn, these political divisions create further social divisions where there were none, 
reshaping the religious landscape of the town from a small community of Dissenters “as little 
moved by doctrinal zeal as their church-going neighbours, and [who] did not feel themselves 
deficient in religious liberty” (41) into a group of “eager men and women, to whom the 
exceptional possession of religious truth was the condition which reconciled them to a meagre 
existence (41). The Catholic Emancipation Bill “opened the eyes of neighbours, and made them 
aware how very injurious they were to each other and to the welfare of mankind generally” (41). 
These “higher pains of a dim political consciousness,” helped along by the “recent agitation 
about the Reform Bill,” ensure that ordinary neighborly disputes become marked by the divisions 
of political discord (42):  
 
It so happened in that particular town that the Reformers were not all of them large-
hearted patriots or ardent lovers of justice; indeed, one of them, in the very midst of the 
agitation, was detected in using unequal scales… and it was undeniable that the inspector 
at the tape manufactory, who spoke with much eloquence on the extension of the 
suffrage, was a more tyrannical personage than open-handed Mr Wace, whose chief 
political tenet was, that it was all nonsense giving men votes when they had no stake in 
the country (42-3). 
 
                                               
22 Eliot’s use of the word recalls associationism. As Shelley Trower describes, “associationism 
began to theorize that the external world vibrates the nerves; vibrations in the nerves transmit 
sensations to the brain; vibration-sensations generate ideas, feelings, memories, thought, 
imagination” (22). The image of Treby Magna vibrating at the beginning of Felix Holt is a 
political rendering of the kind of associationism that Trower sees in nineteenth-century 
physicists, physiologists, psychophysicists and spiritualists, “whereby external vibrations seem to 
set the matter of the body into a kind of sympathetic vibration; vibrations in the body then radiate 
outwards into the world beyond, in turn potentially vibrating another sensitive person” (11). 
Sense of Vibration: A History of the Pain and Pleasure of Sound. New York: Continuum, 2012. 
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The novel thus shows us the way in which the “private lot of a few men and women” are 
determined by the “wider public life” (43), and the particular influence of the Reform Bill is the 
way in which it hardens previously barely existing differences into codified and meaningful 
divisions. A petty dispute with the shopkeeper over the weighting of scales becomes political 
because reform creates positions that social actors occupy, thereby transforming them into 
political actors. What the Reform Bill does, in other words, is create not only a common world in 
which the “mutual influence of dissimilar destinies” unfolds, but also the conditions of 
possibility for both private and political events: those conditions “essential to the ‘where,’ and 
the ‘what,’ without which, as the learned know, there can be no event whatever” (43).  
Reform thus creates the conditions for the events of the novel by creating social 
differences where there were none, as the Catholic Emancipation Bill gives rise to the feeling 
that religious liberty is wanting, instead of ensuring the civil and political rights of Roman 
Catholics. If the first volume enables the problem of the novel to take shape in this form, 
intertwining disparate social worlds through the mysteries of descent, and the third volume of the 
novel resolves the political questions through the private solution of the marriage plot, then the 
novel’s middle volume dramatizes the grounds of the struggle in its competing definitions of 
radicalism. George Levine figures the contest as Esther’s choice between “Harold Transome, the 
practical politician careless about the means to power, and Felix Holt, who, professing 
radicalism, is really only a radical moralist—that is, a conservative.”23 Felix is “declassed,” in 
Levine’s analysis, “without a constituency, and armed only with George Eliot’s morality”; as 
such, Esther must choose between “corruption and surrender to the broadest and basest common 
denominator of human nature” (which Levine defines as politics), and the “best and most 
                                               
23 George Levine. “Politics and the Form of Disenchantment.” College English 36.4 (1974): 422-
435, p. 431. Subsequent page references in text. 
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individual personal morality” (which Levine defines as anti-politics) (431). Though I disagree 
with Levine’s definition of what counts as politics, I take his point. The contest between Harold 
and Felix is a clash between two versions of radicalism, a corrupt materialism on the one hand, 
and Felix’s sentimental response to a material problem on the other. 
We can see an example of this in the exchange between Harold’s agent, Mr Johnson, and 
Felix at the Sugar Loaf pub. Johnson cuts a good figure, eliciting a “general satisfactory sense 
that the hitherto shadowy Reform had at length come to Sproxton in a good round shape, with 
broadcloth and pockets” (113-114), whereas Felix dresses like the “working man” he chooses to 
be (110), and is accepted by the men “as one of themselves, only much more knowing” (115). 
Their debate is about interest and solidarity, and the extent to which one working man’s win 
benefits all working men. Johnson poses what he thinks is a rhetorical question:  
 
“There are colliers up at Newcastle, and there are colliers down in Wales. Will it do any 
good to honest Tom, who is hungry in Sproxton, to hear that Jack at Newcastle has his 
bellyful of beef and pudding?” 
“It ought to do him good,” Felix burst in, with his loud abrupt voice, in odd contrast with 
glib Mr Johnson’s. “If he knows it’s a bad thing to be hungry and not have enough to eat, 
he ought to be glad that another fellow, who is not idle, is not suffering in the same way.” 
(115)  
 
In this exchange, Johnson offers a form of solidarity based on shared interest, a class-based form 
of identification that prioritizes traditional forms of non-voting politics like protest: “Let the 
working men … join together and give their hands and voices for the right man, and they’ll make 
the great people shake in their shoes a little; and when you shout for Transome, remember you 
shout for more wages, and more of your rights, and you shout to get rid of … the tools the rich 
make use of to squeeze the blood out of the poor man” (117). The form of identification Felix 
offers relies on the hungry man’s ability to transcend his own interest, to use his experience of 
hunger to imagine another man’s relief and be glad of it. At this point of the novel – we are still 
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in the first volume – this mode of identification has little purchase. Chubb, the pub’s proprietor, 
tells Felix that “love an’’armony’s the meaning of ‘The Sugar Loaf, William Chubb.’ Folks of a 
different mind had better seek another house of call” (116). Johnson’s solidarity succeeds in the 
form of the “half-crown” (117) he lays on the table, which ensures that Felix’s message does not 
strike home with the good people of Sproxton. As one of the drinkers, Dredge, remarks at the 
close of the chapter, “I shouldn’t know which end I stood on if it wasn’t for the tickets and the 
treatin’” (119). 
We see a similar dynamic at play throughout the novel. Later, Felix sees a man in the 
“ultra-Liberal quarter of the High Street” and is attracted by the way in which he embodies 
manly labor, with “powerfully muscular” bare arms and the look of living “chiefly amidst the 
heat of the furnaces” (244). This muscular speaker is perhaps the novel’s most truly radical 
voice, advocating for rights beyond the limited extension of the franchise offered by reform, 
which he figures as a “bribe” to split the allegiances of “the people” (245). He argues for both 
political equality – “universal suffrage, and annual Parliaments, and the vote by ballot, and 
electoral districts” (246) – and equality in the public sphere, claiming that “we want a freeman’s 
share, and that is to think and speak and act about what concerns us all, and see whether these 
fine gentlemen who undertake to govern us are doing the best they can for us” (245). The 
speaker’s version of the body politic is a complex one, in which the aristocrats are the self-
appointed “brains” and the workers are the “belly that feels the pinches”; but the knowledge 
workers are also laborers who “must be looked after, like other workmen” (245). Despite the 
radical nature of his politics, the novel suggests that this speaker, like Johnson, is speaking for 
pay: “Felix recognized the fluency and the method of a habitual preacher or lecturer” (244). 
Felix, in contrast, speaks out of passion; his volunteerism is highlighted when, asked to respond, 
the narrator tells us he “did at once what he would very likely have done without being asked” 
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(247). When he speaks, the effect he makes is premised on his difference, as he is both stronger 
physically and more abstract:  
 
The effect of his figure in relief against the stone background was unlike that of the 
previous speaker. He was considerably taller, his head and neck were more massive, and 
the expression of his mouth and eyes was something very different from the mere 
acuteness and rather hard-lipped antagonism of the trades-union man. Felix Holt’s face 
had the look of habitual meditative abstraction from objects of mere personal vanity or 
desire, which is the peculiar stamp of culture, and makes a very roughly-cut face worthy 
to be called ‘the human face divine.’ Even lions and dogs know a distinction between 
men’s glances; and doubtless those Duffield men, in the expectation with which they 
looked up at Felix, were unconsciously influenced by the grandeur of his full yet firm 
mouth, and the calm clearness of his grey eyes, which were somehow unlike what they 
were accustomed to see along with an old brown velveteen coat, and an absence of chin-
propping. When he began to speak, the contrast of voice was still stronger than that of 
appearance. The man in the flannel shirt had not been heard—had probably not cared to 
be heard—beyond the immediate group of listeners. But Felix at once drew the attention 
of persons comparatively at a distance (247).  
 
Gallagher reads this passage to argue that Felix “stands for culture, for a realm of values 
independent of facts but also a realm of values that are absolutely and eternally fixed, where 
appearances that are recognized are equated with essences” (381). What stands out more than his 
fixity, however, is his habitual “abstraction” and the fact of his difference – a distinction 
recognizable even by lions, dogs, and Duffield men. Moreover, the “contrast” he makes is 
figured as a difference that hails a broader public than the trades-union man, as he commands the 
attention of “persons comparatively at a distance.”  
If Felix stands for culture, then, it is not culture as a retreat from politics, but culture as a 
politics; abstraction and publicity replace enfranchisement as the salient site of change. The vote 
for all is, for Felix, merely “the power to do mischief” (247), and a form of politics that “would 
never give you political power worth having while things are as they are now” (248). What Felix 
would like to “convince” his listeners is that “if you go the right way to work you may get power 
sooner without votes” (248). In the locomotive metaphor that he imagines as the body politic, the 
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“force that is to work” the “engines” of Parliament is not something so pedestrian as the vote; 
rather, it is to “come out of human nature—out of men’s passions, feelings, desires. Whether the 
engines will do good work or bad depends on these feelings” (248). The “greatest power under 
heaven” is “public opinion”: 
 
the ruling belief in society about what is right and what is wrong, what is honourable and 
what is shameful. That’s the steam that is to work the engines. How can political freedom 
make us better, any more than a religion we don’t believe in, if people laugh and wink 
when they see men abuse and defile it? And while public opinion is what it is—while 
men have no better beliefs about public duty… while men are not ashamed in Parliament 
and out of it to make public questions which concern the welfare of millions a mere 
screen for their own petty private ends,—I say, no fresh scheme of voting will much 
mend our condition. (248) 
 
Reading this, it is hard to argue with Levine about Felix’s conservatism, but if we take Eliot’s 
designation of Felix as a liberal radical seriously, it is worth parsing precisely of what form that 
liberalism consists. Felix and Mr Lyon are “Liberals who had neither freehold nor copyhold nor 
leasehold”; they share “political sympathies” and, regarding the election, there was “still 
something to be said on the occasion, if not to be done” (101). This disenfranchised liberalism is 
a form of politics that looks more like “delightful friendships” between “public-spirited” people, 
characterized by “much agreement, much disputation, and yet more personal liking” (101). 
Felix’s culture is therefore not a retreat from politics as such, so much as it locates the site of 
political change elsewhere: not in Parliament but in the realm of public opinion. Change will not 
happen in the political sphere, where self-serving politicians deploy the general interest to their 
own “petty private ends” or buy votes with beer, but in the public sphere, where general feeling 
and beliefs in right and wrong can make genuine political change.  
The competing ways of thought that Harold and Felix represent is thus at least in part 
about the relation each offers to self-interest, which must be transcended in a particular kind of 
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way in order to allow for the kind of change Felix offers. The relationship between Jermyn and 
Johnson is a case in point. Jermyn is sure that Johnson’s interest is tied to his own, so much so 
that he cannot conceive of Johnson’s autonomy as a separate individual. Thus, when thinking 
about who knows about the existence of Thomas Transome, he acknowledges no other “soul 
except myself and Johnson, who is a limb of myself” (186). Of course, he is absolutely wrong 
about that, as Johnson plays both sides throughout the novel, and Jermyn’s downfall does not 
materially affect his circumstances; as the narrator wryly notes, “Jermyn’s star was certainly 
going down, and Johnson did not feel an unmitigated grief” (301). Public good is thus defined 
neither as ascribing your own interest to another nor as transcending self-interest entirely, but in 
usefully transcending one’s own interest to act in proper unity with others; to be hungry in 
Sproxton and yet feel glad that Jack is fed in Newcastle. There are plenty of metaphors the novel 
gives us for this ideal relationship of parts and the whole; one such example is Lyon’s sincerity, 
which might be laughable until the narrator takes it seriously as a petty heroism:  
 
For what we call illusions are often, in truth, a wider vision of past and present realities—
a willing movement of a man’s soul with the larger sweep of the world’s forces—a 
movement towards a more assured end than the chances of a single life. We see human 
heroism broken into units and say, this unit did little—might as well not have been. But 
in this way we might break up a great army into units; in this way we might break the 
sunlight into fragments, and think that this and the other might be cheaply parted with. 
(157)  
 
Heroism is the right alignment of “a single life” with the “wider… world’s forces.” It is the kind 
of unity that Mr Lyon imagines as salvation, “the shout of a nation as of one man, rounded and 
whole, like the voice of the archangel that bound together all the listeners of earth and heaven” 
(46). But this is a world in which one cannot send “eyes to all corners” asking “What does 
brother Y. think?” (46); in order to “shout of a nation as of one man,” one must know the other’s 
mind. The trouble with this form of harmonizing, or with shining together as sunbeams do, is 
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that, in the world of human passions and actions, interest is so unknowable. Consider the 
“imaginary chess game” that opens chapter twenty-nine, in which “all the chessmen had passions 
and intellects,” and you might be “not only uncertain about your adversary’s men, but a little 
uncertain also about your own” (236). This imaginary game is easy “compared with the game a 
man has to play against his fellow-men with other fellow-men for his instruments. He thinks 
himself sagacious, perhaps, because he trusts no bond except that of self-interest; but the only 
self-interest he can safely rely on is what seems to be such to the mind he would use or govern. 
Can he ever be sure of knowing this?” (236). 
The novel proves insistently how bad people are at knowing how the world appears in the 
minds of others. The first time we encounter Felix is in a moment of precisely such misreading. 
Mr Lyon is in any case a man who rarely thinks about how he might be read: “it had never 
occurred to him to reflect what sort of image his small person made on the retina of a light-
minded beholder” (45). Although he is sensitive to others, he cannot interpret what he sees, or 
rather feels. Accordingly, when he first meets Felix, he feels him staring unthinkingly at a wax 
candle: “the minister’s sensitiveness gave another interpretation to the gaze which he divined 
rather than saw,” and he justifies the expense of wax by saying that Esther cannot handle the 
smell of tallow (51). For Gallagher, this moment is a sign of Felix’s cultured distance from 
inductive reasoning, as readers “must make meaning out of the low facts that Felix is too 
cultivated and ‘abstracted’” to notice; we get to know Esther through the detail of the wax 
candle, and Felix through his “attack on conventional reading” (380). Felix is not cultivated, 
however, so much as he is rude, dismissing the question of the candle with “loud abrupt tones” 
that “made the old man vibrate a little” (51). We learn less from this moment about Felix’s 
cultivation than about his illegibility. 
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Re-inscribing legibility onto this world in which we cannot know what sort of image we 
make on others, or what our chess pieces are thinking, is one of Felix Holt’s major tasks. Yet, 
despite the encounter with the candle, it is not Felix but Harold who is shown to be the paradigm 
for how not to read. A poor reader of the highest order, Harold offers us an inferior form of 
identification as well as of radicalism. The passage in which Mrs Transome first sees her son 
highlights reading in several ways, beginning with the moment in which she is arrested by 
“another likeness” in Harold’s appearance (17). This is a foreshadowing that draws attention to 
the act of reading, as only the novel’s re-reader could appreciate Jermyn, Harold’s biological 
father, as the referent of this likeness. Mrs Transome takes care to dry her tears in an attempt to 
curate her impression on her son, but it is a useless gesture. While she is aware that “her 
knowledge of the youth of nineteen might help her little in interpreting the man of thirty-four,” it 
does not cross Harold’s mind to pay attention; he is not a “careful observer” (17). Although he 
“had no wish opposed to filial kindness,” he has not the ability or the interest to try to gauge 
what his mother is thinking: “his busy thoughts were imperiously determined by habits which 
had no reference to any woman’s feeling; and even if he could have conceived what his mother’s 
feeling was, his mind, after that momentary arrest, would have darted forward on its usual 
course” (19). Harold’s mind is a world unto itself, and the thoughts or feelings of others are 
powerless to arrest it on its predetermined path. That Mrs Transome’s feelings are “excluded 
from her son’s inward world” gestures to the violence that comprises Harold’s despotic 
radicalism (19). Despite being “good-natured enough to wish that every one about him should 
like his mastery,” his is a worldview in which other subjectivities are at best irrelevant; he was 
“not caring greatly to know other people’s thoughts, and ready to despise them as blockheads if 
their thoughts differed from his, and yet solicitous that they should have no colourable reason for 
slight thoughts about him” (31). Harold’s inability to enter into the thoughts and feeling of others 
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extends beyond his mother to encompass a general inability to accommodate difference of 
thought of any kind, and the connection of that inability to his desire for mastery indicates just 
how imperious his politics are. Politics are, of course, at the heart of Mrs Transome’s “vague but 
strong feeling that her son was a stranger to her” (18): his announcement that he means to stand 
as a Radical confirms the difference she has already registered. Political differences register first 
as visible ones, but underlying both forms of difference is Harold’s inability to read feelings, an 
autocratic form of feeling that the novel explicitly connects to the violence of imperialism. 
Harold has a “narrow imagination which make what is admiringly called the practical 
mind” (93). We are made to understand the full extent of the shocking brutality behind the 
seeming agreeableness of Harold’s practical mind in a moment that contrasts Esther’s attraction 
to difference with Harold’s casual violence. Esther has a mutual, “extraordinary fascination” 
with little Harry, “a human specimen such as Esther had never seen before” (316). Trying to 
convince Esther that, despite his son, he has never loved another woman, Harold tells Esther that 
Harry’s mother had been a slave, “was bought in fact” (352). As Kurnick notes, the “sentence’s 
grammatical abstraction is a chilling indicator of emotional distance,” making it unclear whether 
Harold himself was the one who did the buying (146). Kurnick sees the “condensation of affect” 
in Mrs Transome’s character, but it is evident in Esther here too (145). Before Harold reveals his 
violent participation in the slave trade – whether he bought Harry’s mother or not, Harry is 
evidence of slavery’s sexual violence – Esther “began to tremble a little” (352). Harold wildly 
misreads Esther: “It was impossible for Harold to preconceive the effect this had on Esther. His 
natural disqualification for judging of a girl’s feelings was heightened by the blinding effect of 
an exclusive object—which was to assure her that her own place was peculiar and supreme” 
(352). Esther’s excess of feelings here gestures to a violence the text cannot explicitly 
acknowledge in any way other than romantic. Rendered speechless by Harold’s revelation, she 
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knows only that flirtation has to stop, “shaken with feelings she had not yet defined for herself” 
(352).  
Harold misunderstands Esther because he persistently reads her in light of his general 
ideas about women. His form of thinking is one in which general principles eclipse his 
understanding of particularities. Thus, he continues to believe that Esther’s feelings for Felix are 
“moral enthusiasm” rather than love, as he sees the “effect he produced on Esther by the light of 
his opinions about women in general” (378). His impressions “saved him the trouble of distinct 
ideas” (379). Kurnick maintains that Mrs. Transome’s psychologism signifies the way in which 
the personal and the political mirror each other in Felix Holt. Mrs Transome “must feel so many 
terrible things because she has been consigned the unenviable burden of representing a properly 
political discontent that has very little to do with her” (145). I want to go one step further: Mrs 
Transome’s burden, and Esther’s excessive feelings that display horror at a political reality that 
cannot be articulated, are part of the system of political discontent the novel establishes. They are 
commensurate reactions to a mode of identifying that would seem to be personal, but is in fact 
always already political. Esther’s shaking may be an excessive response to Harold’s “love-talk” 
(352), but the feelings she cannot bring herself to define register the way in which the system of 
sexual violence, of which Harry is the result, is part of the same imperious (and imperial) way of 
thinking of which Harold’s inability to read her is a symptom. To read Mrs Transome as the 
example of excessive political discontent – rather than, for instance, Mrs Holt, whose affect is no 
less excessive, but who has more obvious material grounds – is to buy into the logic of the novel, 
whereby explicitly political forms of action are expressed in and as liberal forms of 
identification. 
If Harold represents a mode of identifying that is politically as well as personally 
oppressive – the kind of reform that destroys – then Esther and Mrs Transome stand for the two 
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possible responses. Mrs Transome’s love ossifies through relating with and like Harold. Though 
initially a mother’s love “enlarges the imagined range for self to move in,” what it becomes 
requires “much suppression of self, and power of living in the experience of another” (22). Her 
relationship with Harold, one-sided as it is, fails to demonstrate “activity of tenderness or any 
large sympathy,” and the result is that she “contracted small rigid habits of thinking and acting” 
(23). Harold’s distant response leaves Mrs Transome with a decayed form of identifying, and she 
becomes, like her knowledge and accomplishments, one of the “old-fashioned stucco ornaments, 
of which the substance was never worth anything, while the form is no longer to the taste of any 
living mortal” (27). Mrs Transome can say that Harold displays “[n]o likeness to me now” (25), 
but she hardens to adopt a mode of identifying that resembles his: “Mrs Transome, whose 
imperious will had availed little to ward off the great evils of her life, found the opiate for her 
discontent in the exertion of her will about smaller things” (28). She becomes a living example 
of the failure of Harold’s mode of radical representation.  
Esther’s trajectory is an opposite one, representing a shift from bounded to expansive 
ways of thinking. At the beginning of the novel, she has a contracted sphere of thought, her mind 
“not free from a sense of irreconcileableness between the objects of her taste and the conditions 
of her lot” (65). Esther’s taste expands as her way of thinking does, so that by the end of the 
novel she turns to the “largeness of the world to help her thought” (388). Contemplating such 
largeness, she is able to encounter others in the specificity of their needs. Thus, Mrs Transome 
“might have gone on pacing the corridor like an uneasy spirit without a goal, if Esther’s thought, 
leaping towards her, had not saved her from the need to ask admission” (391). Ruth Bernard 
Yeazell has argued in relation to Felix Holt, Sybil, and Mary Barton that “the courtship of the 
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heroine may cover a political story.”24 In Felix Holt, the courtship is a political story, as Esther 
evolves, through her courtship, from the possession of a mind “not free” into a capacity for a 
form of thought in which her mind can leap from her body to Mrs Transome’s as though it is an 
autonomous entity. It is a form of inductive feeling, where the specific modes of feeling that 
Felix primes her to feel when he “raised a presentiment of moral depths that were hidden from 
her” enable the general form of sympathy that allows her to feel with others, like Mrs Transome 
or her father. Hence, when she learns the truth about her birth, “her mind seemed suddenly 
enlarged by a vision of passion and struggle,” and “the odd, wayworn, unworldly man became 
the object of a new sympathy in which Esther felt herself exalted” (214). As with Mrs Transome, 
the encounter with the other enlarges the capacities of her own mind. 
Esther’s transformation is effected through the mode of relating that Felix represents. It 
would be remiss to ignore how violent that process is, as it begins with Felix’s wishing to “see if 
she could be made ashamed of herself” (63), and continues in Felix enacting a kind of affective 
mastery over Esther: the “tumult of feeling in Esther’s mind—mortification, anger, the sense of a 
terrible power over her that Felix seemed to have as his angry words vibrated through her—was 
getting almost too much for her self-control” (105). Ultimately, the solution the novel provides is 
to redress the balance of power, so that emotion flows both ways. We see the beginnings of this 
shift when Esther visits Felix to have him repair her watch, and the excess of feeling that her 
“mortification” occasions gives rise to a wave of tears that infect Felix (90). As a result of her 
tears, an “expression of sadness” appears in his eyes (90). When Felix learns to “set a high value 
on her feelings,” he learns to feel for others as well as think for himself, a mode of feeling 
rendered as fraternal: “Felix felt for Esther’s pain as the strong soldier, who can march on 
                                               
24 Ruth Bernard Yeazell. “Why Political Novels Have Heroines: Sybil, Mary Barton, and Felix 
Holt.” NOVEL: A Forum on Fiction 18.2 (1985): 126-144, p. 144. 
 
 226 
hungering without fear that he shall faint, feels for the young brother—the maiden-cheeked 
conscript whose load is too heavy for him” (261).  
As a result of this process, the courtship between Felix and Esther results in a more equal 
mode of relating as they each learn to abstract their own feelings and think with the other. When 
Felix asks Esther if she can imagine “choosing hardship as the better lot” and she says yes, their 
“words were charged with a meaning dependent entirely on the secret consciousness of each. 
Nothing had been said which was necessarily personal” (224). They need not talk about personal 
matters in order to know them; they have the ability to know each other’s secret consciousness. 
Unlike the “formulas of her father’s belief,” which, being without “feeling or understanding” had 
no “power to touch” her, Esther’s personal relationship with Felix offers her the “first religious 
experience of her life—the first self-questioning, the first voluntary subjection, the first longing 
to acquire the strength of greater motives and obey the more strenuous rule” (225). What the text 
figures as a religious experience that comes to her “through Felix Holt” could also be thought of 
as a political experience, couched as it is in the language of “subjection” and “rule”: “he had 
seemed to bring at once a law, and the love that gave strength to obey the law” (225). In this 
way, the novel renders private processes as political ones. The relationship between Esther and 
Felix may become one in which they can encounter each other on equal terms, as when she visits 
him in prison and they “looked straight into each other’s eyes, as angels do when they tell some 
truth” and Esther understands him “‘better than I used to do.’ The words of Felix at last seemed 
strangely to fit her own experience” (363). Their relationship models a kind of identifying where 
his words apply to the vastly different experiences of each of them; where, despite her willing 
subjection to him, they meet quite literally eye to eye with different experiences that can 
nonetheless be described by the same words.  
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The relationship between Esther and Felix poses a solution that extends beyond their own 
situation. Their dynamic has a public effect. What I mean is evident in the resolution of the court 
case in which, as Gallagher notes, Esther saves Felix not through proving the specific details of 
his innocence but the general fact of his goodness (383). Seeing him in court, “when he was the 
centre of a multitudinous gaze, which seemed to act on her own vision like a broad unmitigated 
daylight, she felt that there was something pre-eminent in him, notwithstanding the vicinity of 
numerous gentlemen” (366). Esther’s eyes are a kind of medium for the mass gaze; her vision 
refracts the “multitudinous gaze” and her feelings recognize Felix’s uniqueness. This movement 
from the general gaze to a specific one is echoed in the way Felix looks, “first at the audience 
generally,” and then more specifically with “a more observant expression” (366). As Esther 
looks, again, in his eyes, she feels “that he bore the outward stamp of a distinguished nature” 
(366). His narrowed focus distinguishes Felix in Esther’s eyes, and it is this sense of his pre-
eminence that allows her to abstract herself from her personal feelings and, “divested of all 
personal considerations whether of vanity or shyness,” testify to his goodness (374). In so doing, 
Esther has an elevating and unifying effect on the crowd; the “action of Esther’s” is so 
“beautiful” that it “conquered every low or petty suggestion even in the commonest minds” (374-
5). Its more “permanent effect” is, of course, the meeting of the “magistrates and other country 
gentlemen” at the White Hart (376). As Harold tells Esther, “You made all the men wish what 
you wished” (387). Together, Esther and Felix create a movement of minds that creates change 
in the world: “by the co-operation of similar movements in the minds of other men whose names 
were of weight,” Felix’s case transcends “political partisanship” and he is freed (378). 
This mode of identifying can make change in the world, but it is a particular kind of 
change based on liberal feeling. Accordingly, their wedding at the end of the novel has moved 
the feeling of the town, though not its politics: “the majority of honest Trebians were affected 
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somewhat in the same way as happy-looking Mr Wace was, who observed to his wife… ‘I feel 
somehow as if I believed more in everything that’s good’” (397). The broader social change is 
that Treby Magna “has since prospered as the rest of England has prospered,” but does not seem 
to have been altered in any other material sense:  
 
Doubtless there is more enlightenment now. Whether the farmers are all public-spirited, 
the shopkeepers nobly independent, the Sproxton men entirely sober and judicious, the 
Dissenters quite without narrowness or asperity in religion and politics, and the publicans 
all fit, like Gaius, to be the friends of an apostle—these things I have not heard, not 
having correspondence in those parts. Whether any presumption may be drawn from the 
fact that North Loamshire does not yet return a Radical candidate, I leave to the all-
wise—I mean the newspaper (398). 
 
Levine claims that Esther’s story shows that “individual moral growth can occur without the 
compromise of public action” (430). The “imagination of community dissolves” as, when “value 
centers in individual perception and action, we are introduced to a moral laissez-faire in which 
social change becomes possible only through a widespread change of heart” (432). What I have 
been suggesting is that the novel establishes changes of heart as a form of public action, albeit a 
form of action best suited to the public sphere rather than the political one. It is a triumph of 
newspapers and novels over electoral politics. Political freedom cannot make us better, but being 
better can give rise to a publicity that allows us, through the particular kinds of relating that 
liberalism offers, to feel “somehow” a stronger belief in the vague proposition of “everything 
that’s good.” Felix Holt offers us Esther’s willing slavery to overcome the inarticulable horrors 
that make us shake to contemplate Harold’s imperial violence. Nevertheless, honest Tom 






Margaret Oliphant began Miss Marjoribanks in late 1864, when she was living in Paris, 
distraught after the death of her ten-year-old daughter.25 The novel first appeared in Blackwood’s 
Edinburgh Magazine in fifteen parts published between February 1865 and May 1866, during 
which time Oliphant was also working on Agnes, Madonna Mary for Good Words, negotiating 
her contract to continue translating Les Moines d’Occident by Charles de Montalembert, and 
writing reviews as Blackwood’s “general utility woman.”26 The comparison between Oliphant 
and Eliot had already been made in the press in the early 1860s, an association about which Eliot 
was less than pleased, if her vehemence to assert that she was “NOT the author of ‘The 
Chronicles of Carlingford’” is any indication. 27 Despite not having read them, Eliot’s insistence 
is on how differently Oliphant’s novel represent the social landscape: “from what Mr Lewes tells 
me, they must represent the Dissenters in a very different spirit from anything that has appeared 
in my books.” Critics of the novel have tended to reproduce the assumption that the novelists 
were vastly different, if only in the tendency to position Miss Marjoribanks as a purely domestic 
                                               
25 Elisabeth Jay. “Introduction.” Margaret Oliphant. Miss Marjoribanks. Edited by Elisabeth Jay, 
London: Penguin, 1998, p. xi. 
26 Jay. “Introduction,” p. xii. 
27 George Eliot. The George Eliot Letters. Volume 4. Edited by Gordon S. Haight. New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1956, p. 25. 
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novel.28 Yet the novels are perhaps less dissimilar than they have been represented to be, 
especially given the centrality of reform to both.  
Oliphant’s work has been studied in the tradition of feminist criticism that seeks to 
address the devaluation of feminine or domestic plots. Deirdre D’Albertis’ work on the domestic 
drone is one such study. Following Nancy Armstrong and Elizabeth Langland, D’Albertis argues 
that Oliphant “invented the domestic drone from within a world of middle-class values, from 
within a domesticity we all too often characterize as unified and univocal.”29 What escapes such 
studies, in their important work of reclaiming novelists or novels from a literary critical tradition 
that sees little value in the feminine, is that in Miss Marjoribanks, Lucilla’s management is never 
purely domestic. Oliphant’s novel tells the story of Lucilla Marjoribanks, a girl of nineteen, who 
returns home from school after her mother’s death determined to conquer Carlingford society. 
Her desire to arrange Carlingford society is not about domestic management – or not domestic 
management merely, as Talia Schaffer acknowledges when she describes the novel as “a comic, 
unsentimental account of a woman’s desire for a career.”30 What Lucilla organizes is not merely 
a home, or the fabric of Carlingford polite society, but a public – the formation of which is the 
necessary precondition for the election the novel dramatizes. Prior to Lucilla’s return, Grange 
                                               
28 For instance, Amy Robinson’s interpretation of the novel as a rewriting of Emma, in that they 
are both stories about matchmakers (Amy J. Robinson. “Margaret Oliphant’s Miss Marjoribanks: 
A Victorian Emma.” Persuasions: The Jane Austen Journal 30 (2008): 67-75); Nicholas Rance’s 
interpretation that the novel “exposes the element of rationalism inherent in domestic moralism” 
(Nicholas Rance. Wilkie Collins and Other Sensation Novelists: Walking the Moral Hospital. 
Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 1991, p. 49); even Deirdre D’Albertis’s so-called “political 
history of the novel” reads the novel as a commentary of domesticity and middle-class values 
(Deirdre D’Albertis. “The Domestic Drone: Margaret Oliphant and a Political History of the 
Novel.” Studies in English Literature, 1500-1900. 37.4 (Autumn 1997): 805-29). See also David 
Kurnick on Felix Holt, as “baldly ideological” especially in the flatness of Felix’s 
characterization (147). 
29 Deirdre D’Albertis. “The Domestic Drone: Margaret Oliphant and a Political History of the 
Novel.” Studies in English Literature, 1500-1900. 37.4 (Autumn 1997): 805-29, p. 824. 
30 Talia Schaffer. Romances Rivals: Familiar Marriage in Victorian Fiction. New York: Oxford 
university Press, 2016, p. 220. 
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Lane is rich in “capital material,” but as a town or community, entirely atomized: “There is 
nothing which could be properly called a centre in the entire town… without organization, what 
good does it do to have a number of people together?” (20). Grange Lane before Lucilla is a set 
of discrete components that lack the ability to come together as a people and a public. As the 
remedy for “all that was wanting to Carlingford… a master-hand to blend these different 
elements” (21), Lucilla brings cohesion and meaning to the previously disparate residents of 
Grange Lane. In so bringing the community together as a community, and indeed, as a public, 
Lucilla serves as a model for a form of relating in politics by abstracting from her own difference 
in order to act for and as the good of the whole. 
Oliphant’s novel tells a story of growth and change: Lucilla’s growth as a politician and 
leader, and Carlingford’s change from an atomized collection of individuals to a political and 
social community. As a teenager, freshly returned from school to look after her father after the 
death of her mother, Lucilla is imperious in her determining to rule over her father’s house. Her 
resolution to “sacrifice her own feelings, and make a cheerful home for papa” is 
uncompromising and leaves little space for the feelings of others (4). Her practical father reacts 
to his wife’s death with mild regret rather than the grief Lucilla wants to assuage, and her mode 
of comforting him entirely fails to take into account his feelings; thus she determines to embrace 
him, “forgetting, with that singular facility for overlooking the peculiarities of others which 
belongs to such a character, that Dr Marjoribanks was very little given to embracing” (5). Hers is 
an imposing character in both senses of the word, and the narrator notes that she did not “learn 
by this defeat to take the characters of the other personae in her little drama into consideration” 
(11). The novel dramatizes Lucilla’s shift from this imperious girl of fifteen, to an accomplished 
household manager who sets out to “establish her kingdom” of Carlingford society “with a 
benevolence which was almost Utopian, not upon the ruin of other thrones, but with the goodwill 
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and co-operation of the lesser powers, who were, to be sure, too feeble to resist her advance, but 
whose rights she was quite ready to recognize, and even to promote, in her own way” (79-80). 
Melissa Schaub has argued that the novel is a story of Lucilla’s “growing ability” to 
consider others, and it may seem at first blush that this is so.31 Yet I would suggest that the shift 
in the novel does not particularly centralize Lucilla’s burgeoning sense of morality; in fact, very 
little changes about Lucilla, including her celebration at the end of the novel that, like Oliphant 
herself, she will not change her name upon marriage. The shift we do see in Lucilla’s orientation 
to others, then, is less about her own character development than it is about the cultivation of a 
particular way of relating, a shift from ruling to recognition. What really changes over the course 
of the novel is that Lucilla’s utopian benevolence shifts beyond the language of rights, where she 
can recognize and advocate for the rights of others, to a place where she can recognize and live 
with others’ difference. This becomes evident in her exchange with the drawing master’s 
daughter, Rose Lake. Rose analyzes her sister Barbara’s behavior and concludes: “Some are so 
different. Barbara ought to have been some rich person’s daughter, with nothing to do. She 
would not mind being of no use in the world. It is a kind of temperament I don’t understand” 
(146). Where Rose understands her sister’s difference, but struggles to account for what that 
difference means, Lucilla is content to see difference and leave it be: “Lucilla’s genius was broad 
and catholic, and did not insist upon comprehending everything” (146). In considering the sisters 
as they are, and making a social space for them based on their difference and how it fits in the 
social landscape (“She gave Rose a sudden scrutinising look, and measured her mentally against 
the gap she had to fill,” 146), Lucilla demonstrates a mode of relating that involves bringing 
                                               
31 Melissa Schaub. “Queen of the Air or Constitutional Monarch?: Idealism, Irony, and Narrative 
Power in Miss Marjoribanks.” Nineteenth-Century Literature 55.2 (2000): 195-225, p. 206. 
Subsequent page references in text. 
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people together based on a shared sociality, and which achieves the right balance between 
Lucilla’s private interests and the interests of the whole.  
That the novel establishes a distance between what Lucilla says and does, and how 
Lucilla is narrated to the audience, has been noted by critics. Schaub, for instance, reads this as 
an “ironic gap” between the narrator’s voice and Lucilla’s that displays that Lucilla “does not 
consciously understand narrative” in the same way as the reader and the narrator do (210). This 
is less about Lucilla’s naivety than it is about demonstrating the process of Lucilla growing into a 
kind of identificatory practice on which the form of the liberal novel relies. As Lucilla becomes 
more fully aligned with the gap between her voice and the novel’s narration of it, the “ironic 
gap” becomes a part of her characterization as she masters the art of politicking. When other 
characters in the novel debate about whether Lucilla is “full of feeling” – for example, at the 
unfaithfulness of a prospective suitor (134) – or speculate about the genuineness of Lucilla’s 
emotions, the narrator notes that they were “not doing Miss Marjoribanks justice – as indeed few 
people did – for that perfect truthfulness which it was Lucilla’s luck always to be able to 
maintain” (290). Lucilla’s “perfect truthfulness” in the face of conflicting emotions marks the 
difference between her private feelings and her public ones, and the narrator’s warning that both 
can simultaneously be perfectly truthful is a clear directive that we should read the distance 
between those feelings not as the failure of characterization or narratorial manipulation, but the 
successful attainment of the mode of identificatory practice for which Lucilla becomes the 
example. When a second suitor marries her widowed friend, Lucilla feels “a certain sense of 
surprised depression” (316). The “gentle sadness” she feels is dismissed by the narrator: “Not 
that she cared for the Archdeacon, who had thus disposed of himself; but still it was a curious 
fact that such a thing could be” (316). In the swift jump from Lucilla’s sadness to the statement 
of her disinterestedness, the narrative models the process of Lucilla disidentifying from her own 
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feelings: the shift, in other words, from her “natural womanly vexation to see a proposal nipped 
in the bud” to the “sentiment of general content and satisfaction” that comes from identifying 
with the public interest. These are conflicting feelings to be sure, but neither are inauthentic; the 
disjunction is the result of the process of abstracting oneself from one’s particular position to 
take up the general feelings of a public subject. In other words, the narrator warns the reader not 
to make the same mistake in judging Lucilla as the other characters do: the ironic gap we should 
be heeding is not between the narrator and Lucilla’s feelings, but the necessary doubling or 
distance in the structure and process of Lucilla’s feelings themselves, and the space that gives to 
occupy the same position with very different orientations in public and in private.  
Lucilla demonstrates a kind of abstraction of feeling, which is formalized in a more 
general sense throughout Oliphant’s novel as the narration persistently fails to articulate feelings 
– or, more properly, articulates the form of a feeling and not its content. Recall Lucilla’s 
“certain” feeling of surprised depression at the Archdeacon’s marriage. By describing it as a 
“certain” feeling, Oliphant manages to convey the specificity of a feeling while also evading its 
precise description. “To describe the feelings with which Mr Bury contemplated this little 
entr'acte, which was not in his programme, would be beyond our powers” (66); “As for Mr 
Beverley, his state of mind, as the newspapers say, could better be imagined than described” 
(223): the text is full of such moments, in which the emotion of the scene is in excess of what the 
text can convey. As such, Oliphant tasks the reader with imagining what it means to feel “a 
certain sense” of some imprecise feeling – in one notable example, all we are told is that Lucilla 
anticipates an event “with a certain emotion” (293). The identification it is possible to have with 
the character who feels such imprecise, or unapproachable, feelings can consequently only be 
formal; the specific content of the feeling remains inaccessible. 
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Miss Marjoribanks thus effects a distinction between the particularity of feeling in the 
private sphere, and the generality of public feeling, both within the text itself, and in the way it 
structures the relationship between text and reader. The third volume of the novel, which focuses 
on the campaign to elect the Member for Carlingford, extends this dynamic of abstraction to the 
realm of politics. The election is positioned as the next phase of Lucilla’s career, and the “second 
grand period of Lucilla’s life” (334). Her choice of Ashburton as the man for Carlingford is the 
product of a moment of intuition, based not on political but on social position: “Everybody knew 
everything about him, which was an ease to the public mind” (336). It is only fitting that the 
member for Carlingford, which exists as a public only through the exertions of Lucilla, should be 
selected by the same vague and imprecise, but also defined and strong, feelings that structure the 
rest of the novel. 
Lucilla’s selection of Ashburton is structured as a random moment: he “came into her 
mind in a moment, like a flash of lightning” (337-8), which is reinforced when the man himself 
manifests in front of her and “she did not know until she had almost done it, that she was 
walking straight into her hero’s arms” (338). Despite lacking “marked political opinions” and 
“perhaps” not being “quite aware what Mr Ashburton’s views were on the Irish Church question, 
or upon parliamentary reform,” Lucilla’s conviction that Ashburton is the man for Carlingford 
has the strength of the most deeply-held political platform: he springs “into her head by one of 
those intuitions which have such an effect on the mind that receives them” (337). Her manner of 
making this selection constructs the political field as a space in which the general feeling of the 
man, and the general feeling of the public, rather than the particularities and differences of 
opinion, is what drives the town’s political decisions. When Mr Ashburton objects initially to 




“Sir John takes exactly the other side in politics, and I am afraid the Doctor and the 
Colonel are not of the same way of thinking; and then my opinions –” 
“If they are not of the same way of thinking we must make them,” said Lucilla: “after 
having such an intimation, I am not going to be put off for a trifle; and besides, what does 
it matter about opinions? I am sure I have heard you all saying over and over that the 
thing was to have a good man. Don’t go and make speeches about opinions” (340). 
 
The novel’s publication date locates it in the midst of major pushes to restructure the political 
landscape of Britain, and the novel mentions them – the “freemen of Wharfside,” “parish-rates 
and Reform Bills and the Irish Church” – yet the specificity of those issues dissolves in 
Carlingford, where what is wanted is someone who would “attend to the town’s interests… and 
take the lead in a general way” (452). 
Lucilla’s decision to stand Ashburton is, therefore, stripped of every possible shade of 
political meaning, and yet the encounter between Lucilla and Ashburton is deeply imbued by the 
idea of political reform. Miss Marjoribanks is by no means a novel that advocates female 
suffrage, and yet the exchange between Lucilla and Ashburton dramatizes the clash of two 
entirely conflicting worldviews. Lucilla is delighted to have run into Ashburton, and “with a little 
scream” announces that her “mind was quite full of you” (338). She notes Ashburton’s “smile 
and a sudden look of interest,” and understands that his thoughts had turned immediately towards 
romance, which she immediately rejects: “‘I did not mean anything absurd,’ said Miss 
Marjoribanks. ‘Don’t talk any nonsense, please’” (338). As she walks Ashburton through her 
idea that he stand for Carlingford, he is overcome by emotion – “You are the only creature in 
Carlingford, man or woman, that has divined me,” he says, and presses her hand (339). Lucilla is 
“shy of such demonstrations,” understanding that the public tends to “keep a vivid recollection,” 
but calculates the moment and “accepted and returned in a womanly way the pressure of Mr 
Ashburton’s hand” (339). As they discuss the composition of Ashburton’s committee, and 
Lucilla scolds him not to “make speeches about opinions,” Lucilla is “inspired” and quite 
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convinced that “she was striking out a perfectly new and original line,” and Ashburton the 
candidate “smiled” and paid Lucilla “pretty little compliments,” thinking that “at the bottom she 
was only an ignorant woman after all” (340). 
There are two important things to note in this scene. The first is the way in which its 
comedy depends on our understanding of how vastly different Ashburton’s train of thought is 
from Lucilla’s. His understanding of social congress does not allow him to consider Lucilla as a 
political actor; his mode of discussion insists on casting a romantic frame over the conversation, 
even after Lucilla unceremoniously squashes that suggestion; and he receives a political 
nomination in the spirit of a romantic one, and his voices trembles with private feeling when he 
declares Lucilla as the only person in Carlingford to have truly seen him. Lucilla, on the other 
hand, is always speaking and acting in two registers: she understands Ashburton’s language and 
can respond to it strategically in a “womanly way” when necessary, but the interest in Ashburton 
that “touched his heart” (343) never touches hers. Her politics are always “quite in earnest,” as 
she maintains when she rejects the issue of Reform to focus on the candidate’s colors: 
 
As for Mr Ashburton, he did not begin to laugh until he had fixed upon her that gaze of 
utter amazement and doubt with which on many similar occasions ordinary people had 
regarded Lucilla – thinking she was joking, or acting, or doing something quite different 
from the severe sincerity which was her leading principle. She was so used to it, that she 
waited with perfect patience till her companion’s explosion of amusement was over. 
(342) 
 
Lucilla is a consummate politician, ever ready to adapt her approach to win over her audience. 
Thus, she fawns over her aunt’s imagined health problems, and appeals to her to define the 
Conservative platform, “though certainly she had a very much better notion of political matters 
than aunt Jemima had, to say the least” (350).  
The second important thing to note that emerges in the meeting between Lucilla and 
Ashburton is the emergence of her proposal of a politics absent a position – that her proposal for 
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her candidate is not driven by pure necessity but by principle. The refusal to take a position – to 
stand as a Tory, Whig, Radical, or Conservative, or to make claims based on the concrete 
political questions occupying the nation in the lead up to the Carlingford election – becomes a 
position in Lucilla’s mind. A “new and original line,” Lucilla’s position attends to the structuring 
of the public sphere, where command of public opinion rather than pure politics decides an 
election (344). As the novel makes clear, this understanding of politics does not alter the 
franchise as such, but it makes space for a great deal of people who do not qualify to vote: the 
“enthusiasts” she brings to her camp are “chiefly women, and in no cases had votes; but Miss 
Marjoribanks, with instinctive correctness of judgment, decided that there were more things to be 
thought of than the electors” (344).  
We could contemplate the symbolism of the colors Lucilla picks for her candidate, green 
and violet, and draw a connection to the chartist use of green, or the ahistorical connection to the 
suffragist colors, however that is precisely not the point. Political colors were local and largely 
random. As the report Jon Kelly notes, “the UK’s political map was a veritable kaleidoscope 
until fairly recently.”32 What is significant in Miss Marjoribanks is that green and violet are new. 
As Lucilla says, “I would not have anything to do with the old colours, for my part – they would 
be as bad as opinions, you know” (342). Lucilla effectively seduces Ashburton to select the 
colors by holding ribbons she happened to be carrying up to her face, knowing that “when a 
young woman who is not at all bad-looking puts up a rustling, gleaming knot of ribbons to her 
hair and asks a man’s opinion of the same, the man must be a philosopher or a wretch indeed 
who does not give a glance to see the effect” (343). That Lucilla happened to be carrying violet 
and green ribbons is either a coincidence, or suggests that she was carrying the ribbons around 
                                               
32 Jon Kelly. “The seats where Tories weren’t blue and Labour wasn’t red.” BBC News Magazine 
May 3, 2015, www.bbc.com/news/magazine-32510493. 
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for the purpose of choosing them for the new man for Carlingford, and Ashburton’s appearance 
at the right moment stamped his selection as that man. Either way, the process suggests a 
deductive, rather than an inductive, logic: the new and original line comes first, and is followed 
by the new colors, the candidate, and only then specific politics, if at all.  
The privileging of form over content is explicitly not political, in the sense that it 
evacuates the specifics of a position from the activity of politics. However, it serves an important 
political function, in that it smooths over difference in the public sphere so that people on vastly 
different sides can sit down at the same table. In a quite literal sense, we see this dynamic in play 
when Lucilla is entertaining the Rector’s sister, Miss Bury, as well as her cousin Tom and his 
“amusing” companion who discuss “all kinds of profane subjects” with the outraged Miss Bury 
(55). When Miss Bury objects tremulously at the suggestion that a hanged murdered has no soul, 
Lucilla attempts to smooth the waters with a local story: “I remember quite well there was a 
dreadful man once here in jail for something, and Mr Bury made him the most beautiful 
character! Every creature has a soul. I am sure we say so in the Creed every day of our lives, and 
especially in that long creed where so many people perish everlastingly… It is one of my 
principles never to laugh about anything that has to do with religion” (57). As Elisabeth Jay’s 
footnote to the text points out, the Creed to which Lucilla refers is the Athanasian Creed, which 
included an “especially damnatory clause” against those who don’t hold the “Catholic faith” 
(503). High Churchman did not want to change the service, however the Dissenting wing of the 
Evangelical party (the Burys’ faction) were campaigning to have it moved to the back of the 
Prayer Book, where it would become non-compulsory and less offensive to Noncomformists. Jay 
argues that in raising the debate “without declaring her own views on the matter, Lucilla is 
attempting both to prove her own religious credentials and discomfort her warring guests,” to 
smooth over the fact that Miss Bury the Evangelical is troubled “‘to sit down at table’ with 
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liberalizing Broad Churchmen who questioned the historical authenticity of the doctrinal claims 
advanced by the Athanasian Creed” (503). In referencing the argument without taking a side, 
Lucilla prioritizes the form of religious observance without making any claims as to content. 
This enables Lucilla to reframe the fact that Miss Bury was “constrained” to sit at a table with 
such irreligious men as a benefit. When Miss Bury worries about the “debasing effect” of the 
“depravity of the young men with whom circumstances had constrained her to sit down at table,” 
Lucilla replies: “I had you! … I felt it was such a blessing” (57). The “naturally mollified” Miss 
Bury leaves happily; the form of Lucilla’s feeling turns the constraint of sitting at a table with 
those of opposing viewpoints into a “blessing.”  
Lucilla’s speech in this episode is rather like Ashburton importing wine and putting it in 
Carlingford bottles. The wine is bought directly from the growers, as “naturally his own county 
could not supply the actual liquor,” but as it was “put in Carlingford bottles,” there is “no 
mystery” about him: “people knew the kinds he had, and how much, and a hundred agreeable 
details” (371). Lucilla is “perfectly orthodox” (55), and as such even her radical ideas are 
accepted as orthodoxy. Declaring that her principle is “never to laugh” at religion is, by 
implication, as ungodly a statement as Tom’s blushing reply to Miss Bury that he “can’t say” he 
does believe in “Jove” (56): her principle is not religion itself, but the fact that she takes it 
seriously. The “hundred agreeable details” in Lucilla’s speech conceal her radicalism, just as the 
Carlingford bottles conceal the imported wine. The bottles represent a form of sameness that 
abstracts differences into irrelevance, and a similar dynamic occurs in Lucilla’s speech, which 
takes a radical position in ways that make it sound like perfect conventionality. It conceals the 
particularities of her position in the orthodoxy of her language.  
The Marjoribanks’ Scottishness works in a similar way. Dr Marjoribanks is Scottish, and 
although little comment has been made of the fact of the family’s Scottishness, it fulfils an 
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important function in the novel.33 Scotland leaves its traces on Dr Marjoribanks, a “philosophical 
old Scotchman” (187) who speaks with a “remnant of Scotch” (357), and whose admiration for 
his “young revolutionary” daughter stems largely from his Scotch feelings, namely the “respect 
for ‘talent’ in every development, as is natural to his nation” (46-7). There are several other 
moments in which the Scottishness of the Marjoribanks family is mentioned: Dr Marjoribanks, 
“being Scotch,” has a “turn for genealogy” and thus is unimpressed by the pedigree of the 
Cavendish family (117); Mr Cavendish, defending Lucilla to General Travers, seems to use 
Scottishness as a shorthand for having a good family when he says, “I dare say her family is 
better than either yours or mine. Scotch, you know,” (278); and when Mr Cavendish wishes Dr 
Marjoribanks luck in the election, saying, “I thought you Scotchmen, Doctor, always liked to be 
on the winning side,” the doctor replies that “[w]e have a way of making our side the winning 
side” (386). My point in listing these mentions of Scottishness is that they pepper the pages of 
the novel in a way that gestures to the meaningfulness of Scotland (“Scotch, you know”), 
without seeming to signal anything specific other than a vague indication that the Marjoribanks 
family is a good one. Dr Marjoribanks is known to be “touchy where his nationality was 
concerned” (386), which Jay footnotes to indicate that Oliphant was similarly touchy, remaining 
“fiercely proud of her Scottish origins and accent” (516 n 2). Yet there is no pride evident in the 
passage, only a “grim” reply and touchiness; on what precise feelings that touchiness depends 
remains obscure to the reader. The doctor’s Scottishness matters, but in what way it matters the 
reader cannot know. Everyone in Carlingford knows about the Marjoribanks’ nationality, but the 
nature of its importance remains private. The Marjoribanks’ Scottishness is thus not the basis of 
                                               
33 Even in analyses of Oliphant’s relation to Scotland and Scottishness, Miss Marjoribanks and 
the Carlingford novels are considered English rather than counted among the Scottish novels. 
See Anne McManus Scriven. “The Muted Scotswoman and Oliphant’s Kirsteen.” Scotland in 
Theory. Edited by Eleanor Bell and Gavin Miller. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2004, pp. 167-182. 
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a specific kind of national politics, though it signifies an indeterminate difference that is 
inherently good, forming the basis of Lucilla’s ingenuity and ensuring whatever side the family 
takes is made the “winning side.” Scottishness represents a private form of nationalism that 
manifests not in politics but in a genealogical interest and in the providential resolution of the 
novel that restores Marchbank to the family and ensures the line’s endurance through Lucilla’s 
marriage to her cousin.  
Generalities form the basis of an apolitical politics throughout the novel in a wider sense. 
It is clear that Ashburton’s popularity stems not in spite but because of his lack of a clear 
platform: “The result of Miss Marjoribanks’s wise precaution and reticence was that Sir John 
Richmond and the Doctor and Colonel Chiley were all on Mr Ashburton’s committee. They 
might not agree with his principles, but when a man does not state any very distinct principles, it 
is difficult for any one, however well disposed, to disagree with him” (371). We see the process 
by which Ashburton’s mode of address – prioritizing general fitness and avoiding specific 
political views – is a more effective way to garner public opinion than Cavendish’s form of 
address that expresses “his views very freely” when Dr Marjoribanks reads them both, side by 
side, in the paper (353). As he sits in his easy-chair and reads both offerings, he finds that the 
“force of that simple statement” – that Ashburton is the right man for Carlingford – has a 
“wonderful effect” on his mind that amounts to a greater influence than the fact that 
Carlingford’s views “were precisely those of Dr Marjoribanks” (353). The doctor compares the 
candidate who is “right in politics” with the candidate who is “a more satisfactory sort of person” 
(353), and in the “ruddy and genial glow of firelight and lamplight and personal wellbeing,” the 
distinction between the two men becomes “confused” (354), which ends, as we have seen, with 
the doctor forming a part of Ashburton’s committee. The election itself suggests a personal 
resolution to the political question of the novel, as the “contest for the best man” ultimately 
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hangs on the “man most fit to represent Carlingford… not a man to be baited about parish-rates 
and Reform Bills and the Irish Church,” and “there were few so bigoted in their faith as to 
believe that the man who was capable of marrying Barbara Lake could ever be the man for 
Carlingford” (452). Despite Cavendish’s perfect politics, his “liberal principles and supposed 
Low-Church views” (447), in the town where politics does not “run very high,” the election is 
determined by his “injudicious sort of love-making” (452). Although Miss Marjoribanks, like 
Carlingford itself, would not seem to be a place where politics runs very high, the fact that 
Ashburton takes no position on the key issues of reform, and instead takes the lead in a general 
way, is precisely what makes him the ideal candidate in the age of reform. Ashburton’s general 
position of rightness brings the polity together, just as Lucilla reconciles competing Church 
interests into the only kind of harmony that could make sense at the lunch table – a harmony for 
which disagreement is a necessary condition, as Miss Bury’s presence was only able to be a 
blessing because of the godless men, but her presence could only have brought conflict. 
Specificity cannot bring together the freemen of Wharfside with George Street and Grange Lane, 
the Broad Church and the Low Church; the only man who can succeed in the context of reform is 
the man who does not take a specific position. In order to “attend to the town’s interests,” the 
right man must be able to “take the lead in a general way” (452). What wins the election is 
ultimately no man in particular but a fantasy of identification; by standing for the interests of the 
town in a general enough way, one can transcend the specificities of the particular.  
Miss Marjoribanks is thus a deeply political novel, especially and intrinsically because of 
the vagueness of the actual politics it portrays. Lucilla’s platform amounts to a politics of 
abstraction. It is not entirely unlike Mill’s vision of the perfect parliamentarian in its elevation of 
character, capacity, and principles in the general sense above personal interests narrowly defined, 
but while the man was central to Mill’s estimation of the right candidate, the man is almost 
 
 244 
incidental to Lucilla’s campaign, and so the most significant thing about Ashburton is his 
overwhelming insignificance. The right man for Carlingford can be anyone, so long as he is the 
right man for Carlingford. The form of abstraction that this politics represents has also a social 
face, which is evident in the triangulation between Lucilla and the two Lake sisters. The 
daughters of the drawing master, Barbara and Rose are marked by their difference, a tangential 
place in the social landscape of Carlingford. Barbara, who has ambitions beyond her station, is so 
mired in her differences that she appears at the election in her completely inappropriate, “best” 
dress which marks her irrevocably as “not precisely a lady” (455). The inescapability of her 
difference cements the failure of her candidate, and ensures that Lucilla’s difference is “proved” 
as “superiority” (110). Barbara’s sister Rose, however, is capable of garnering her particular 
identity as an artist into a form of equality in public space, “regarding the world” with an “air of 
frank recognition and acknowledgement.” As an artist, secure in that particular locatedness, and 
secure also in a “sense of confidence” in the friendliness of the public, Rose is possessed with the 
“confidence of her rank, which made her everybody’s equal” (144). That is, Rose has a feeling 
for equality where Barbara has both no feelings at all (for what is right, for her place, for social 
appropriateness) and far too many (for Cavendish, for social success, for recognition). The Lake 
sisters perfectly demonstrate the social effects of Lucilla’s politics. Both sisters are daughters of 
a drawing master, and just as peripheral to the real business of the Carlingford social scene. 
Whereas Barbara drowns in the specificity of her differences, Rose achieves precisely the form 
of abstraction that Lucilla advocates as a political platform.  
Rae Greiner argues that we understand the significance of sympathy in realism as a 
“process rather than a feeling” (418). Yet what if we consider the mode of identification that 
Miss Marjoribanks offers as neither a process or a feeling, but an affective structure that enables 
the reader to identify with and maintain distinction from simultaneously? Seen as such, the novel 
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dramatizes the dual perspective of what Michael Warner calls the subject of mass publicity. This 
mode of relating to ourselves and the collective is based on “a different affect, from that which 
we have in other contexts” (160). In the moment of apprehending ourselves as public subjects, 
Warner argues, we must imagine ourselves to be indifferent to our particularities even though we 
define ourselves by those particularities the rest of the time, and regardless of the fact that they 
shape our apprehension of public discourse (165). Miss Marjoribanks facilitates such 
abstractions, establishing a general form of feeling that enables the contradictory identification of 
the mass subject, thus making possible what John Frow calls “democracy’s imperfect benefits” 
by giving form to the fiction of democratic equality.34  
The problem with “fictions of generality” (429) is that they enable us to have a “common 
public culture in a world of asserted differences” (423) but they are “of necessity, empty 
fictions” (429). Is not the “representation of publicness,” Frow asks, “always the performance of 
a division, an exclusion, a minoritization?” (423). Whereas material exclusions are always the 
ugly reality of practical politics, the novel allows us to indulge in the fantasy of those empty 
fictions and forget about the exclusions. I will give an example of what I mean by describing, 
twice, the ending of Miss Marjoribanks: first to explain its events and then to explain how those 
events dramatize a form of relating based on abstracting oneself from one’s own interest and 
fully occupying it at the same time.  
After the election, it becomes clear that Mr Ashburton is going to propose. Aunt Jemima 
knows that Tom wants to marry her, and she wants her son to be happy, but she also wants more 
for him than marriage on two hundred a year. Waiting for Ashburton to arrive, we see the two 
women embroidering in the appearance of calm. In this quiet moment, Lucilla “temporarily lost 
                                               
34 John Frow. “Cultural Studies and the Neoliberal Imagination.” The Yale Journal of Criticism 
12.2 (1999): 424-430, p. 429. Subsequent page references in text. 
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the entire sway and control of herself and her feelings,” and for once “she not only did not know 
what she would do, but she did not know what she wanted to do” (462). Both women are literally 
panting with emotional exhaustion, and neither woman can see the other’s excitement or 
understand the other’s feelings: “While Miss Marjoribanks marveled that the emotion in her 
breast could be invisible, and at aunt Jemima’s insensibility, the bosom of that good woman was 
throbbing with equal excitement… so great was the preoccupation of both that neither observed 
how it was faring with the other” (463). Lucilla’s is a mind at odds with itself, “like a country 
held by two armies” (465); as she stands, talking to Ashburton, she hears the sound of a cab pull 
up, and her heart “went off from its mistress altogether, and rushed down-stairs bodily to see 
who was coming” (467). Although Ashburton is in front of her, she is entirely absent, busy with 
a “crowd of thoughts” following the sounds outside until she “heard neither words nor voice, but 
she heard something which had as great an effect on her as either could have had” – the crash of 
the bowl of cards that tells her clumsy Tom has arrived to claim her hand (469). Lucilla, who has 
always had her suitors firmly in hand, realizes that “her feelings had never been engaged,” but as 
Tom does engage them she “relinquished her superior position for the time being” (474), 
allowing him to take control of the scene for the short moment of time in which she is overcome 
by emotion, until “she felt that her involuntary abdication had lasted long enough, and that it was 
full time to take the management of affairs back into her own hands” (475). The housekeeper 
Nancy, described as Lucilla’s “prime minister,” is unwilling to welcome a husband for Lucilla 
and is concerned about the “changed state of affairs” that would result, but Lucilla reassures here 
that “it shall never make any difference between you and me” (476). Nonetheless, despite 
Lucilla’s reassurances, the language of the passage demotes Nancy from household prime 
minister to Lucilla’s “faithful servant” (476). After Tom settles the question, Lucilla goes out 
into the hall to the place where Tom and Mr Ashburton met each other: “Miss Marjoribanks 
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contemplated the spot with a certain tender sentimental interest, as any gentle moralist might 
look at a field of battle. What feelings must have been in the minds of the two as they met and 
looked at each other! What a dread sense of disappointment on the one side; what sharp 
stimulation on the other!” (477). Aunt Jemima is overjoyed to see her son happy, and when 
Lucilla is almost angry that she had not said anything about his imminent return, Aunt Jemima 
tells her that she “had to think for you both” and “did not know what your feelings were,” though 
she “always knew you were fond of each other, Lucilla; before you knew it yourselves” (478). 
The scene ends with “a vow of protection and guidance from the strong to the weak, though the 
last was only uttered in the protectress’s liberal heart” (479). 
The events begin with two women who are wholly occupied with their own positions, so 
much so that even when faced with her panting counterpart, the one cannot recognize that the 
other is feeling anything at all. When she hears the cab arriving, Lucilla is moved to abstract 
herself. Her warring mind splits off from her heart and she occupies two positions: she stands 
upstairs with Ashburton, and her heart trots off alone down the stairs to see who has arrived. It is 
the most graphic depiction of this dynamic in any of the three novels. Thereafter, we encounter 
the first exclusion: Nancy described as what she in fact is, the “faithful servant.” We have seen 
Nancy described in these terms, when she is so affected by Lucilla’s generous defense of Barbara 
Lake that she is moved “almost to tears” (125). Generally, Nancy is represented as an equal in 
the politicking of the household, as Lucilla’s prime minister or her father’s, as when Dr 
Marjoribanks looks forward to “Lucilla’s struggle with Nancy for the veritable reins of 
government” (26). In the moment that concerns us, however, the way in which Nancy slips from 
prime minister to faithful servant highlights her dependency. The reins of power were never hers 
to win.  
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The second exclusion is Mr Ashburton, who in his disappointment must be made to 
disappear unwillingly from the novel’s frame of action; thus he “went away from Lucilla’s side, 
thinking to come back again, and clear everything up; but he did not come back” (469). All we 
know of his pain is the exclamation that runs through Lucilla’s mind: “What feelings” must have 
been in his mind, what “a dread sense of disappointment.” Exactly: what feelings, what dread 
sense of disappointment? We can imagine the form of the feeling, but the content remains 
beyond description, an excess that cannot be represented in the public the novel imagines. 
Ashburton “never said anything about his disappointment,” and we never think of him again 
(495).  
Aunt Jemima is the third exclusion in the publicness the novel establishes with its 
resolution. Aunt Jemima, in a “very agitated state of mind,” worries about the power Lucilla has 
over her: “Tom had come too soon or Mr Ashburton too late, and all the fruits of her little bit of 
treachery were accordingly lost, and, at the same time, the treachery itself remained” (477). In an 
analysis of Eliot’s Adam Bede, Raymond Williams writes that when the Squire deals with his 
tenants, the description of his character reveals not simply himself, but the social and material 
relations of the countryside: “the old Squire’s way of looking is not now simply an aspect of 
character but of character in a precise and dominating social relationship.”35 This is precisely the 
function of what I have called moments of exclusion in this passage. We see Nancy’s 
subordinate social position, even as the language of the passage tries to conceal it through 
metaphors that suggest her equality or through highlighting the affective bonds that join her to 
the Marjoribanks. We register Ashburton’s pain, even though the nature of his feelings remain 
inaccessible if not unspeakable. And, evident in Aunt Jemima’s plaintive plea – “you will make 
                                               
35 Raymond Williams. “The Knowable Community in George Eliot's Novels.” NOVEL: A Forum 
on Fiction 2.3 (1969): 255-268, p. 256. 
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my boy happy, and never turn him against his mother” – is the fact that she stands to lose the 
only thing that matters to her if Lucilla should ever say what she knows. The only assurance we 
have that she will not is the pledge made in the secrecy of the “protectress’s liberal heart” (478). 
The passage thus dramatizes the process by which that “liberal heart” overcomes the exclusions 
that are the necessary corollary of “the liberal vision of a common public culture in a world of 
asserted differences.”36 Oliphant’s novel, in establishing a general, collective form of feeling 
while leaving space for its specific, individual content, achieves not the erasure of difference, but 
the feeling of equality. 
 
Phineas Finn 
In the general election of November 1868 – that same election in which Mill failed to win 
a seat for Westminster – Trollope spent four hundred pounds to stand for the borough of 
Beverley in the East Riding of Yorkshire.37 Like Mill, he failed to win one of the two seats 
Beverley returned to Parliament, and he never again stood for election. Little has been written 
about Trollope’s failed bid for Parliament, possibly because critics have agreed with journalist 
Lance O. Tingay that the attempt “cannot be taken very seriously” (23).38 Nonetheless, taking it 
seriously is precisely what I propose to do in this chapter, for in Trollope’s election addresses we 
can begin to see a framework detailing a view of statesmanship, in which the aspiring 
Parliamentarian models a certain kind of mediation between the individual and the public sphere 
– a mediation that the novels of reform I discuss in this chapter also dramatize.  
                                               
36 Frow. “Cultural Studies and the Neoliberal Imagination.” p. 424 
37 Lance O. Tingay. “Trollope and the Beverley Election.” Nineteenth-Century Fiction 5.1 
(1950): 23-37, p. 23. 
38 Exceptions do exist. See, for instance, David M. Craig. “Advanced Conservative Liberalism: 




In his election address, Trollope positions himself as an uncompromising party man: “I 
am of the opinion, – in which I cannot but think that you all will agree with me, –  that the chief 
duty of a Liberal member in the next House of Commons will be to give a firm and continued 
support to the Leader of the Liberal party.”39 The speech shows an affinity for party politics and 
procedure that will come as no surprise to a reader of the Palliser novels; he blames the Tory 
control of government on the Liberal members and the “deviations on their part from the straight 
line of Parliamentary tactics” (303). Trollope’s assumption of unity among the electors (“you all 
will agree with me”), naïve considering the widespread and commonly known bribery that 
decided the 1868 election in Beverley and ultimately ensured its disenfranchisement, is one 
example of the imagined forms of unity that Trollope invokes in the speech. Disraeli, under 
whose auspices the Reform Bill was carried out, is a man “in whom, certainly, the nation has no 
confidence,” whereas Gladstone is a man “on whom the whole Liberal party in England places 
an entire reliance” (303). What is interesting about these moments of campaign hyperbole is that 
the national lack of confidence in Disraeli is total, whereas the complete support of Gladstone is 
only partial: not the whole of England, but the whole Liberal party in England. Yet the relative 
positions seem equal if opposed, as though there is an equivalence between “the nation” and the 
“whole Liberal party in England.” The way Trollope slips between the two suggests a sort of 
synecdochal relation between parts and whole: in agreement, Trollope’s views are the electors’ 
views, which are the views of the Liberal party and also those of the whole of England. If 
anything, defining the nation’s confidence by its lack and the Liberal party’s reliance by its total 
strength suggests that the Liberal party is in a sense greater – a more powerful and unified force 
                                               
39 Anthony Trollope. “To the Freemen and Other Electors of the Borough of Beverley.” Beverley 
Recorder. 14 November 1868. Reprinted in Anthony Trollope. An Autobiography. 1875-1876. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 303. Subsequent page references in text. 
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– than the nation itself, gesturing to the imperial mindset that is, as Uday Singh Mehta has 
argued, shaped by liberal ideas.40 
The party thus becomes the vehicle for a certain kind of identificatory practice, a fantasy 
of unity in which sectarian interests can be transcended or abstracted in order to work as a 
coherent whole. In his first public speech, Trollope explicitly advocated for this model of party 
allegiance: “I do not think any man has a right to go into the House, and call himself what is 
popularly termed an ‘Independent’ member. A man going in the House is bound to make himself 
useful to the party to which he adheres. … You must work in bodies, in drilled regiments, to do 
any political good, or any other large work in the world. You must work shoulder to shoulder, 
and move step by step.”41 In part, the military-grade unity that this vision of party politics offers 
is a redress to the endless chaos of private opinion, where it is possible to hold an infinite number 
of positions on any issues; as Courtney C. Berger puts it, “politics cannot function along the lines 
of social differentiation.”42 One of the platforms on which Trollope ran in the 1868 Beverley 
election was state education, about which he claimed: “You are doubtless aware that the question 
divides and re-divides itself into so many points that it would be in vain for me to attempt to 
enlarge upon them within the limits of this short address. I trust, however, that my views will be 
found to be in accordance with those of the majority of the Electors of the Borough. There are of 
course various other matters connected with the programme of Liberal measures for the next 
Parliament, as to which it would be well that we should be in unison if you intend to do me the 
                                               
40 Uday Singh Mehta. Liberalism and Empire: A Study in Nineteenth-Century British Liberal 
Thought. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1999.  
41 Speech printed in Hull & Eastern Counties Herald November 3, 1868, reprinted in Tingay. 
“Trollope and the Beverley Election,” p. 26. 
42 Courtney C. Berger. “Partying with the Opposition: Social Politics in The Prime Minister.” 
Texas Studies in Language and Literature 45.3 (2003): 315-336, p. 320. Subsequent page 
references in text. 
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honour of voting for me at the coming Election.”43 If social questions are endlessly divisive, with 
as many points and opinions as there are people who could hold them, the redress to the chaos is 
party politics, where a general view may be “in accordance” with the majority of electors and 
therefore the party, which can run in perfect if fictional unity as in “drilled regiments.”  
The phrase “in accordance” does a great deal of work for Trollope here, eliding the slip 
between the endlessness of “deviations” and the unison of working in bodies. For Berger, politics 
in Trollope “formalizes conviction through the open endorsement of positions, thereby 
demonstrating its necessity to both social cohesion and individual identity” (320), a bureaucratic 
form of representation in which it “no longer matters what you think or who you are, only that 
you fill the appropriate space” (324). There is thus a certain kind of non-position in the 
positionality that Trollope imagines in his election speeches, where unity with the party 
supersedes the genuine commitment to individual opinion, and where the mere fact of having an 
individual opinion is sufficient to ensure agreement. Compatibility, rather than actual agreement, 
is sufficient basis to abstract to the lock-step form of unity that party politics requires to “do any 
political good.” 
The image of the committed statesman Trollope gives us in his speeches corresponds to 
Elaine Hadley’s identification of the shift away from the older aristocratic model of hand-picking 
candidates and the alignment of political interests across a “common cultural embedment in 
rituals and customs,” in place of which “the Liberal agenda substituted character and progress, 
liquidity and persuasion.”44 The irony of Trollope’s candidacy is that character and progress – 
not to mention his hopes of party unity – were ultimately less persuasive than the more 
                                               
43 Trollope. “To the Freemen and Other Electors of the Borough of Beverley.” Beverley 
Recorder, 14 November 1868, reprinted in Trollope. An Autobiography, p. 303. 
44 Elaine Hadley. Living Liberalism: Practical Citizenship in Mid-Victorian Britain. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2010, p. 5. Subsequent page references in text. 
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pedestrian pleasure of drinking Tory-bought beer. The Liberal electorate sold their votes to the 
Tories, returning Conservative candidates to both seats and sparking a corruption investigation 
that eventually led to the borough’s disenfranchisement. Though the “great majority” of the 
voters might indeed have been “at heart Liberals,” that Liberal spirit did not result in in Liberal 
action, as neither Liberal took office and Trollope received the fewest votes of all four 
candidates.45 Though Trollope euphemistically acknowledges the bribery when he writes that Sir 
Henry Edwards, the long-term Conservative member for Beverley, had “contracted a close 
intimacy with [the borough] for the sake of the seat,” for the most part, he attributes his loss to 
the strength of his commitments to a position (300). He notes his inability to “swallow such 
gnats” as the Ballot bill and the Permissive Bill, a bill enabling parishes to restrict the sale of 
alcohol, and declares that “I would swallow nothing, and was altogether the wrong man” (302). 
Berger’s claim in relation to The Prime Minister, that Parliament is imagined as a “form of 
bureaucracy” in which “it no longer matters what you think or who you are, only that you fill the 
appropriate space,”46 also applies to Trollope’s claim to be the “wrong man” – the reverse of 
Oliphant’s right man for Carlingford. Despite his insistence that his refusal to endorse the 
“unmanly restraints” of the ballot or alcohol sales restriction (302), Trollope maintained that his 
“strongest sense of discomfort arose from the conviction that my political ideas were all leather 
and prunella to the men whose votes I was soliciting. They cared nothing for my doctrines, and 
could not even be made to understand that I should have any” (301-2). What made him the 
wrong man for Beverley was not the failure of his opinions in particular, but the failure of 
opinion in general. 
                                               
45 “Beverley Borough Election.” The Beverley Recorder, November 21, 1868, reprinted in 
Trollope. An Autobiography, p. 304. Subsequent page references in text. 
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If, for Trollope as much as for Mill, the realities of electoral politics signaled the loss of 
the model of statesmanship to which he subscribed, Trollope found consolation in a more 
satisfying alternative: his novels. He makes clear the compensatory effects of literature in his 
Autobiography (1883), describing the publication of Phineas Finn in St. Paul’s Magazine as a 
work “in which I commenced a series of semi-political tales. As I was debarred from expressing 
my opinions in the House of Commons, I took this method of declaring myself” (317). Most 
critics pay no attention to Trollope’s framing of Phineas Finn in the autobiography, tending to 
follow John Halperin in reading Ralph the Heir (1871) as the result of Trollope’s experience in 
the Beverley election.47 Although Trollope is clearly referring to Phineas Finn as his 
compensatory political novel, one obvious reason the statement has not been taken seriously by 
critics is chronological:48 Trollope finished Phineas Finn in May 1867, so he could not have 
known that he would not take his seat on the benches where he “might possibly have been shone 
upon by the Speaker’s Eye” (317) when, seeking to ensure the verisimilitude of the 
parliamentary scenes in Phineas Finn, he “humbly” begged permission to observe proceedings 
from a seat in the gallery (321). I am of course not suggesting that we take Trollope’s 
anachronistic claims literally. I do, however, want to take seriously his premise that he achieves 
something in Phineas Finn that he could not in Beverley. The mode of identificatory practice 
that underlies Trollope’s politics fails in praxis but lives more successfully in the imagined world 
of the novel.  
                                               
47 John Halperin. Trollope and Politics: A Study of the Pallisers and Others. London: The 
Macmillan Press Ltd, 1977, p. 134. See also Andrew Sanders. Anthony Trollope. Horndon: 
Northcote House Publishers Ltd, 1998, p. 18. 
48 Phineas Finn was written between November 17, 1866 and May 15, 1867. Frank E. Robbins. 
“Chronology and History in Trollope’s Barset and Parliamentary Novels.” Nineteenth-Century 
Fiction 5.4 (1951): 303-316.  
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The image of a drilled regiment that holds opinions in accordance, rather than in 
agreement, is a dynamic of difference that is dramatized in Trollope’s novel. As Scottishness 
functions in Oliphant’s novel as an imprecise marker of difference – or better, a marker of 
imprecise difference – Irishness functions in Phineas Finn as a signal of difference that is both 
utterly irrelevant and completely meaningful. Jane Elizabeth Dougherty acknowledges as much 
when she claims that Irishness is “both crucial and incidental to Phineas’ characterization.”49 The 
novel opens with the fact of the Finn family’s Irishness, calling attention to their locatedness in a 
way that highlights its distance: “Dr. Finn, of Killaloe, in county Clare, was as well known in 
those parts, – the confines, that is, of the counties Clare, Limerick, Tipperary, and Galway, – as 
was the bishop himself who lived in the same town.”50 That the novel opens in “those” parts 
makes clear that Killaloe, and Ireland, are othered places, removed from the seat of power, the 
center of society, and the imagined community of the novel. Phineas is the Catholic son of a 
Protestant mother, but he wears his Catholicism loosely; it is there when the people of 
Loughshane desire an Irish Catholic candidate, but at other times barely perceptible as 
difference, as the rumours that Dr. Finn “would not be sorry if his son were to turn Protestant” 
indicate (2).  
Trollope was himself famously ambivalent about Phineas’ Irishness, writing in his 
autobiography that the decision to “take” Phineas from Ireland was “a blunder... There was 
nothing to be gained by the peculiarity, and there was an added difficulty in obtaining sympathy 
and affection for a politician belonging to a nationality whose politics are not respected in 
England” (318). I do not read this, as others do, as a wish to disavow Phineas’ Irishness entirely. 
On the one hand, Trollope regrets Phineas’ “peculiarity” on the grounds that it obstructs the 
                                               
49 Jane Elizabeth Dougherty. “An Angel in the House: The Act of Union and Anthony Trollope’s 
Irish Hero.” Victorian Literature and Culture 32.1 (2004): 133-145, p. 133. 
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character appealing or seeming sympathetic to the largest number of people; on the other hand, 
he attributes the novel’s success to readers who could identify with Phineas. What he “intended” 
was that the men “who would have lived with Phineas Finn read the book, and the women who 
would have lived with Lady Laura Standish read it also” (318). Framed as such, Phineas’ 
“peculiarity” makes the book more widely applicable. Had Phineas come from Lady Laura’s 
world, the readers who “would have lived with” the characters would have been limited to that 
world also; Phineas’ narrowed background has the effect of widening the set of readers who 
could identify with the novel. Phineas’ characterization works because he is both narrowly 
specific and has general appeal.  
The novel frames the election as a contest between two kinds of Irishness: the narrower 
sectarianism of the outgoing Morris, the unpopular Orange Protestant Conservative, versus 
Phineas Finn the cosmopolitan, rising Liberal star. Yet even so, the specifics of those 
designations mean very little. By the 1860s, the Orange Order was shifting to a mode of 
respectable politics, rather than the militant sectarianism of its history, and within the context of 
the novel it does not even stand for that so much as function as a meaningless sign of Irish 
conservatism.51 Moreover, the language of the novel institutes a possible distance between the 
sectarian interests with which the candidates are aligned, and the religious values they actually 
hold. For instance, it is not Morris himself to whom the designation applies. He is “the 
representative of the thorough-going Orange Protestant feeling of Ireland” (5). The phrasing 
leaves enough space to wonder whether Morris represents Orange Protestant feeling because he 
is himself an Orange Protestant, or merely popular with those who are. The phrase “Orange 
                                               
51 The Orange Order “still sees itself as a unifying force among Protestants, and as such the 
lodges and their marches throw together people from very different parts of the social and 
political spectrum.” Dominic Bryan. Orange Parades: The Politics of Ritual, Tradition, and 
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 257 
Protestant feeling” further removes the sectarian interest from any individual person: Morris does 
not represent Orange Protestant voters, but their abstract collectivized feeling. Moreover, though 
we are told that in Loughshane an “Irish candidate was wanted, and a Roman Catholic” (6), one 
wonders to what extent Phineas – the son of a Protestant mother – could really be said to fit the 
bill. His father, the narrator tells us, is a man “whose religion was not of that bitter kind in which 
we in England are apt to suppose that all the Irish Roman Catholics indulge” (2). Perhaps the 
most that can be said of Phineas’ religion is that it positions him in between: not Protestant 
enough to belong to the “high-minded” and corrupt establishment, yet not different and “bitter” 
enough to be entirely foreign to the interpolated English reader. As Patrick Lonergan notes, 
Phineas’ Irishness functions to signal Phineas’ dual insider/outsider status: “Phineas’ Irishness 
makes him sufficiently familiar to the English reader to excite sympathy; yet, being an outsider, 
he can indulge in exciting but not quite acceptable behavior.”52 Indeed, the more Phineas 
breathes the rarefied air of English political society, the more his Irishness signals both his 
distance and his inclusion. It is mentioned at Mr. Kennedy’s: “Why was he, Phineas Finn, an 
Irishman from Killaloe, living in that great house of Loughlinter as though he were one of the 
family, striving to kill the hours, and feeling that he was in some way subject to the dominion of 
his host?” (299). It is mentioned again at the gathering at Portman Square that closes the novel’s 
first volume: “There were there great men,–Cabinet Ministers, and beautiful women,–the wives 
and daughters of some of England’s highest nobles. And Phineas Finn, throwing back, now and 
again, a thought to Killaloe, found himself among them as one of themselves. How could any 
Mr. Low say that he was wrong?” (356). In the first instance, Killaloe signals Phineas’ 
difference, his distance from – and resentment at being subjected to –the great men and beautiful 
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women that make up the English landowning class. The second instance registers Phineas’ rise, 
yet also notes that he remains an outsider. He is not “one of them,” but “as one of them.” 
Phineas’ Irishness enables him to do everything that an insider does – go to the right dinners, 
socialize with Cabinet members, propose to a number of their daughters, and yet remain apart 
from the political establishment. Killaloe allows Phineas to take part in the political 
establishment, but remain not of it.  
In response to Trollope’s disavowal of Irishness, Hadley “concedes the narrator’s 
avoidance of Irish details but resists the assumption that an absence of detail and the author’s 
own disavowal of his Irish protagonist in his autobiography imply the irrelevance of all things 
Irish” (235). I’d like to take that approach a step further. The absence of Irish detail and the 
author’s avowal are the very things that make Irishness work in the way it is supposed to work in 
the novel: as generalizable differences rather than absence. Yet it is an aspect of Phineas’ 
characterization that critics often misapprehend. For instance, David A.P. Womble claims that 
the fact of Phineas’ differences make up the sum total of his character: “there is no Phineas to be 
had if you subtract the accidents of his nationality, social position, and physical appearance. It is 
almost an exceptional quality in Phineas that he is so resolutely unexceptional.”53 My point is 
more or less the reverse: the differences add up to nothing, but somehow there is a Phineas there. 
We have a sense of who he is, despite the utter replicability of the details that make up his 
characterization. We are told that Phineas is handsome, and the novel is full of landladies and 
tutors’ wives who swoon at Phineas’ loveliness. But there is almost nothing distinctive in the 
description of what amounts to a very generic physical appearance (and certainly nothing that 
marks him as an Irishman). We learn about Phineas’ physical appearance in relation to his rival 
                                               
53 David A. P. Womble. “Phineas Finn, the Statistics of Character, and the Sensorium of Liberal 




Kennedy, a man “with nothing in his personal appearance to call for remark” (56). The 
suggestion is that Phineas is remarkable in contrast, “six feet high, and very handsome, with 
bright blue eyes, and brown wavy hair, and light silken beard” (56).54 This is, to my mind, an 
underwhelming description of a man that Mrs. Low, the barrister’s wife, finds so dangerously 
handsome. We know that his appearance is lovely because we are told it is, and because we see 
the effect it has on the people around him, but the concrete details that the novel includes of his 
physical appearance are hardly sufficient to make a character out of nothing. His social position 
is similarly generic. Phineas is the vaguely handsome son of the a town doctor of good standing 
in a social world defined in the novel’s first sentence as “the counties Clare, Limerick, Tipperary, 
and Galway” – that is to say, Dr. Finn enjoys a good reputation in a not insignificant 
geographical span of Ireland, yet, as the mention of Dr. Duggin of Castle Connell shows, he is 
not the only doctor in the four counties so positioned. For details that should compose the sum 
total of Phineas’ character, they are eminently replicable.55  
It is somewhat nearer the mark to say that Phineas’ characterization is based on position 
rather than specific opinions. Phineas is certainly no standard-bearer for any notion we have 
                                               
54 Compare, for instance, with the description of St. John Rivers in Jane Eyre: “Had he been a 
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about liberal characterization based on reason, the having of opinions, or cognition generally.56 
For Womble, the imprecision of Phineas’ character coupled with his social and physical 
locatedness makes him a “statistical instrument” that aggregates his social circle; he reads 
Phineas Finn, accordingly, as a novel “held together” by a “kind of information technology” that 
“problematizes face-to-face sympathetic relations” (30). Because Phineas represents interest 
group formation, he stands for the shift away from the consensus-making public of debating 
individuals and towards the public sphere as an arena for competing, contradictory interests. 
What I am arguing in this chapter is rather different: because he is marked by difference enough 
to be “peculiar,” yet imprecise enough to be unremarkable, Phineas embodies the fantasy of 
competing interests becoming consensus. The immeasurability of social difference becomes 
general agreement.  
In that spirit, it is interesting to note, as Patrick Lonergan has, that Phineas’ 
characteristics – which Womble takes to stand for the only kind of specificity about him – mean 
that there is no single historical referent for his character, as there arguably is for the novel’s 
other politicians: Daubeny/Disraeli or Gresham/Gladstone, for instance. In fact, according to 
Lonergan’s research, “Phineas closely resembles at least six real Irish politicians, and is 
comparable to numerous others” (149).57 Lonergan’s point demonstrates in a concrete fashion 
what I am trying to claim overall: the “accidents” of Phineas’ nationality, social position, and 
appearance are not the details that form the basis of his absence of individuality; they are the 
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very details that obfuscate his specificity, and as such ensure that he is more generally relatable. 
It is not that there is no Phineas there, rather that the fuzzy boundaries of his tall, wavy, silken-
bearded personhood enable a kind of condensation of all the men who could have lived with, or 
as, him. He embodies a better form of unity than the Liberal electors of Beverley who failed to 
march in step together. 
 
The politics of the novel 
The suggestion that Phineas run for Parliament is made by his friend Barrington Erle at 
his club. Phineas “blushed like a girl” at the “proposition” (5). Given such language, it is 
tempting to read the scene as a proposal, Phineas the feminized bride betrothing himself to the 
Liberal party. Indeed, critics have read it as such, drawing a connection to the dynamics around 
the Act of Union, another political event metaphorically rendered as a private act between manly 
English and feminized Irish parties.58 What escapes this reading is that the scene in the novel is 
neither purely political nor private in nature; it is markedly social, taking place on the “club sofa” 
(5), a gentlemanly arrangement between Phineas – “a safe and promising young man” (6) – and 
Barrington Erle as the instrument of the party, over the future of the seat belonging to 
Loughshane, a borough owned by the Earl of Tulla, one of Phineas’ “father’s staunchest friends” 
(5). This is a comfortable social arrangement, demonstrating Jacques Berthoud’s claim that 
                                               
58 See Jane Elizabeth Dougherty. “An Angel in the House: The Act of Union and Anthony 
Trollope’s Irish Hero.” Victorian Literature and Culture 32.1 (2004): 133-145. For similar 
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Trollope’s Parliament intertwines the club and the forum, and translates the political process of 
representation into a more social – Berthoud uses the term “humane” – endeavor.59  
That Phineas’ ascendance to Parliament is largely a social rather than a political event 
drains it of ideological significance. The incumbent he replaces, the “unpopular” George Morris, 
is the brother of the Earl of Tulla, “a fine, high-minded representative of the thorough-going 
Orange Protestant feeling of Ireland!” (5). It is not that Phineas – twenty-four years old, recently 
called to the bar, and still financially dependent on his father – possesses any particular qualities 
that make him the Liberal party’s “safe” man. Rather, qualifications are irrelevant, dismissed as 
quickly as they are raised with the vague intention that “if any question were raised, that should 
be made all right” (6). What decides the election is a social and familial matter: Lord Tulla 
refuses to endorse his brother after he gave the deanery of Kilfenora to an illegitimate man rather 
than Lord Tulla’s cousin. He chooses to support Phineas since he is friends with his father, 
deliberately evacuating politics from the question entirely: “I don’t care a ----- for sides!” he 
                                               
59 Jacques Berthoud. “Introduction.” Anthony Trollope. Phineas Finn. 1869. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1991, p. xx. This is the kind of dynamic that D. A. Miller reads, in his account 
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know?” Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick. “Paranoid Reading and Reparative Reading; or, You’re So 
Paranoid, You Probably Think This Introduction is About You.” Novel Gazing: Queer Readings 
in Fiction. Edited by Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick. Durham, NC: Duke University Press: 1-37, p. 3. I 
can offer no better response to how, in Miller’s analysis, all paths lead to the carceral. What if, 
runs the premise of my analysis of Phineas Finn, politicking without politics does not conceal 
disciplinarity but is rather a politics?  
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exclaims, when Dr. Finn nervously points out that Phineas is “on the other side” (13). It is not 
only that Lord Tulla’s endorsement transcends political sides, but that he does it in a manner that 
makes very clear that the Loughshane election, and Phineas’ win, has entirely nothing to do with 
politics: “We won’t discuss politics,” Lord Tulla tells Phineas when he goes to visit; “as I have 
already said, I am throwing aside all political considerations” (16).  
Does the novel, similarly, throw aside all political considerations? An assumption that it 
does – that the politics of the novel is at best a smokescreen for other, literary or aesthetic 
considerations – has always been a part of the criticism of Phineas Finn and Trollope’s political 
novels more generally. In the 1960s, Blair G. Kenney maintained that “Trollope’s originality 
showed itself in his characters, almost never in his ideas.”60 Arnold B. Fox, in the 1970s, who 
saw Phineas Finn as Trollope’s “principal achievement as political novelist and a major example 
of the genre,” nonetheless wrote that political problems “are seen not as large social issues but 
rather as the causes of personal crises,” and that readers “are left with the sense that Phineas 
Finn is a political novel only because the protagonist decided upon a political career, not because 
the novelist had political views he felt urgently impelled to share with his readers.”61 As David 
M. Craig notes, Trollope’s autobiography “conveys the sense of a man literally bursting with 
opinions,” which sits oddly with the critical view of the parliamentary novels that “depicted 
political life primarily in social terms.”62  
To my mind, more questions are raised than answered by such claims. Is it not an 
inherently political position to depict political life in social terms? Can culture – literature – be a 
                                               
60 Blair G. Kenney. “Trollope’s Ideal Statesmen: Plantagenet Palliser and Lord John 
Russell.” Nineteenth-Century Fiction 20.3 (1965): 281-285, p. 285. 
61 Arnold B. Fox. “Aesthetics of the Problem Novel in Trollope’s Phineas Finn.” The Journal of 
Narrative Technique 8.3 (1978): 211-19, p. 212, p. 213. 
62 Craig. “Advanced Conservative Liberalism,” p. 355. 
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form of political practice? If so, what does politics mean?63 By way of an answer, I wish to take 
up Adorno’s point that depicting political life in social terms is always “an apolitism that is in 
fact deeply political,”64 in order to argue that the sense in which Phineas Finn is political 
depends precisely on transposing political questions into social terms. The kind of liberal politics 
that is worked on in the novel has not as an incidental but as a fundamental feature the initial 
evacuation of any political meaning. Phineas Finn, I want to suggest, paints the picture of a 
public sphere in which there are a number of possible ways to form an opinion and modes of 
identifying across the forms social differences the novel establishes. What makes Phineas “just 
the lad for Galway” (6) in the beginning of the novel is not merely his identity – Irish but not too 
Irish, Roman Catholic but Protestant-adjacent – but the fact that his opinions are wholly aligned 
with the party. It is not that Phineas is entirely without opinions of his own, as some critics have 
maintained, but that they are properly aligned with the collective views of the party.65 When 
Barrington Erle tells Phineas that he is the perfect amount of Irish – “not a cantankerous, red-hot, 
semi-Fenian… with views of his own about tenant-right and the Irish Church” – Phineas, 
“blushing,” responds with a childlike protest: “But I have views of my own,” to which 
Barrington responds “‘Of course you have, my dear boy … I shouldn’t come to you unless you 
had views. But your views and ours are the same, and you’re just the lad for Galway’” (6).  
                                               
63 For a related set of questions (that have, it must be said, deeply informed my thinking about 
aesthetics and politics throughout this chapter and more broadly), see Lucy Hartley. 
Democratising Beauty in Nineteenth-Century Britain: Art and the Politics of Public Life. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017. Hartley explores the modalities through which 
“conservative and progressive commitments to beauty meet and intersect and thereby provide a 
basis for imagining the private lives of individual subjects and their roles and responsibilities in 
public life.” The rival interpretations of beauty she explores “illuminate how and why beauty 
matters, and fails to matter, in public life” (233). These are also trenchant questions when 
considered in relation to the literary arts, specifically when they take public life as the explicit 
topic of representation, as this chapter aims to show. 
64 Theodor Adorno. “Commitment.” New Left Review I.87-88 (September-December 1974): 75-
89, p. 76. 
65 For example, Womble. “Phineas Finn, the Statistics of Character.”  
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If Barrington Erle had the last word on how Phineas forms opinions, there would be no 
novel, and, of course, there is Trollope’s little joke for the re-reader when the narrator, 
ventriloquizing Erle, mentions the very two issues (tenant-right and the Irish Church) that spur 
Phineas’ subsequent career crisis. Phineas learns to form opinions differently, but it is important 
that we see the various options presented to him throughout the novel. Erle, for one, is the party 
man par excellence, and the party, for Erle, is synonymous with its leader: “‘the party,’ by which 
Barrington Erle probably meant the great man in whose service he himself had become a 
politician” (6). Barrington Erle is an impassioned politician, but what that means is rigidly 
defined in familial and institutional terms. He aligns himself by expanding his sense of interest 
from himself, to his family (the “great man” is his uncle Mildmay), to the party, and thereafter 
the nation. Erle is “convinced that Liberal politics were good for Englishmen, and that Liberal 
politics and the Mildmay party were one and the same thing,” and he “hated the very name of 
independence in Parliament, and when he was told of any man, that that man intended to look to 
measures and not to men, he regarded that man as being both unstable as water and dishonest as 
the wind” (15). One’s interest and opinion are so firmly aligned with the party leader that 
political debate becomes significant only as a performance. Parliamentary debates are no forum 
for rational people to work out what they think, in Erle’s worldview, but a direct method of 
social influence in a world of top-down politics: “He thought that debates were good, because of 
the people outside,–because they served to create that public opinion which was hereafter to be 
used in creating some future House of Commons; but he did not think it possible that any vote 
should be given on a great question, either this way or that, as the result of a debate” (15). 
Politics, specifically party politics, is the origin and purpose of all opinion; House debates 
“create” public opinion, thus shaping the electorate into party supporters who will elect the party 
in that “future House of Commons.” The public sphere is not agential so much as a mechanical 
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tool of the party in this conception; it is directly acted upon by the political sphere, whose 
bidding it then carries out. Monk is as clear a critic as any on the ways in which the novel shows 
us the dangers of being so wholly identified with the party as Barrington Erle is: “‘There are 
forty or fifty men on his side of the House, and as many perhaps on ours,’ said Mr. Monk, ‘who 
have no idea of any kind on any bill, and who simply follow the bell, whether into this lobby or 
that. Argument never touches them. They do not even look to the result of a division on their 
own interests” (ii.333). Where argument never touches, opinion is not formed, and one does not 
– cannot? – act in one’s own interest. 
If Barrington Erle elides the distinction between public and private life in a particularly 
self-serving and conservative (by which I mean Liberal) fashion, Turnbull offers a similar model 
of identifying on the radical side. As Monk tells Phineas of Turnbull: 
 
His fault is not arrogance, so much as ignorance that there is, or should be, a difference 
between public and private life. In the House of Commons a man in Mr. Turnbull’s 
position must speak with dictatorial assurance. He is always addressing, not the House 
only, but the country at large, and the country will not believe in him unless he believe in 
himself. But he forgets that he is not always addressing the country at large. I wonder 
what sort of a time Mrs. Turnbull and the little Turnbulls have of it? (167) 
 
The problem with this mode of identifying for Turnbull is that he is not able to form opinions at 
all, at least insofar as those opinions pertain to specific matters. As an ideologue, he operates at 
the level of generalities, with a “political catalogue” that runs the gamut of issues from 
“Progressive reform in the franchise… equal electoral districts, ballot, tenant right for England as 
well as Ireland,” but his speeches need only reflect the generalities of his principles and an 
indications of opposition: “Having nothing to construct, he could always deal with generalities. 
Being free from responsibility, he was not called upon either to study details or to master even 
great facts” (163). And, as Monk once again shows, the end effect is that public life engulfs 
private life entirely, to the detriment of the evidently long-suffering Mrs. Turnbull, who even in 
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the privacy of her own home would be addressed not as herself but as the “country at large” 
(167). 
The novel offers us a couple other examples of figures who fail to mediate satisfactorily 
between individual and general opinion, or the one and the many. Monk arguably offers a 
glimpse of what could be possible, but the novel makes clear that, given that his independence 
stems from his wealth, his is not a replicable example: moreover, the efficacy of his self-selected 
role as a “popular politician” – “an exponent, if I may say so, of public opinion” – unfits him for 
office, as he is too wholly aligned with public opinion to mediate between it and the party 
(ii.251-2). Monk holds office, but he is indifferent to it, and thus the narrator tells us his “public 
life was purely political”: he has “great ideas of his own which he intended to hold” regardless of 
party politics (ii.163). This is an interesting use of the word political as a description for Monk’s 
role, defining politics in opposition to procedure, perhaps to bureaucracy, and also to the 
machinations of party politics. Politics here is both a pure form of representation, and a pure 
form of independence, but all that means is that Monk is both too representative and too 
opiniated to be an effective mediator or operate practically within the system of party politics. 
Gresham, the Gladstone figure, offers yet another model of failed mediation. Monk remarks, 
with a slightly accusatory tone, that he is “so just in the abstract, – and in the abstract so 
generous” (ii.298). When Phineas replies that he has found Gresham to be generous to him also 
in detail, Monk replies: “I am not thinking of individuals exactly. His want of generosity is to 
large masses, – to a party, to classes, to a people; whereas his generosity is for mankind at large” 
(ii.298). Gresham is the right man to deal in particulars (individuals) or in absolute generalities 
or abstractions (mankind at large), but where he fails is in the middle: the classes, parties, and 
groups of people that mediate between the individual and private sphere and the grand national 
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political sphere – in short, the public sphere. And it is this form of mediation, I am arguing, that 
the novel establishes as its objective.  
Womble claims that Phineas Finn “presents emotions and opinions not as elements of 
individuated character but primarily in collective form as the shared attributes of political 
factions and social aggregates” (17), and that Phineas, in “continually measuring and modifying 
himself in relation to the composite opinions and expectations of his social circle” (19), 
ultimately collectivizes information from his social surroundings in order to situate himself. 
Womble’s is an intriguing reading of the novel, but ultimately unsatisfying in the conclusion that 
it draws. Phineas Finn belies the concept of a socially aggregate opinion where a private life 
exists; if you try to cultivate one you would be Turnbull, addressing the nation when he asks his 
wife to pass the salt. Part of the issue I take with Womble is what I would suggest is a misguided 
focus on Phineas’ wishy-washiness, a trait Womble associates with his Irishness (19). The idea 
that Phineas is a man of weak opinions comes to us in large part from Mr. Low: “He has always 
meant what he has said, when he was saying it. But he is weak and blind, and flies like a moth to 
the candle; one pities the poor moth, and would save him a stump of his wing if it be possible” 
(64). Low reads Phineas, as Womble does, as a man of “stereotypically Irish irresolution and 
impulsivity” (18). It is not that Phineas is depicted as a man of great ideas, but the process by 
which he forms opinion is less erratic and random than Womble or Low perceive it to be.  
One of the reasons why Phineas is a successful mediator is that he is persuadable, and 
forms his opinions through social relationships rather than through independent thought.  
 
Phineas had made up his mind very strongly that he would always oppose the ballot. That 
he would hold the same opinion throughout his life, no one should pretend to say; but in 
his present mood, and under the tuition which he had received from Mr. Monk, he was 
prepared to demonstrate, out of the House and in it, that the ballot was, as a political 




Phineas’ opposition to the ballot is Monk’s idea, but for the time that he chooses to hold it, it is 
distinctly his opinion: a frame of mind that he occupies “very strongly” for as long as he chooses 
to occupy it. The strength of his opinion, which is not his idea, stands as a counterpoint to the 
effete, feminine position he opposes. Phineas comes to this masculine position by liking and 
disliking, rather than by any process of liberal cognition as such: 
 
He had made up his mind to be Whig Ministerial, and to look for his profession in that 
line. He had been specially fortified in this resolution by his dislike to the ballot,--which 
dislike had been the result of Mr. Monk’s teaching. Had Mr. Turnbull become his friend 
instead, it may be that he would have like the ballot. On such subjects men must think 
long, and be sure that they have thought in earnest, before they are justified in saying that 
their opinions are the results of their own thoughts. … He told himself that he was at 
heart a true Liberal (243). 
 
He “told himself” that he was “at heart a true Liberal”: this is an affective form of liberalism that 
operates at a remove even from his own emotions – it’s not that he is at heart a true Liberal, or 
feels that he is, but he tells himself that he is one. The imprecision here is important to enabling 
that feeling of equality, rather than actual political or material equality, that by now is familiar to 
us, a form of equality that is described first by Lady Glencora: “I am not saying that people are 
equal; but that the tendency of all law-making and of all governing should be to reduce the 
inequalities” (127); and then by Monk: “Equality is an ugly word and shouldn’t be used…. But 
the wish of every honest man should be to assist in lifting up those below him, till they be 
something nearer his own level than he finds them” (128). Neither of these statements advocate 
for actual equality, though they would seem to. How much do laws and governance need to do to 
display a “tendency” to reduce inequality? Why is the tendency to reduce inequality rather than 
establish equality? What constitutes assistance? How much of a gap is allowable under the 
phrase “something nearer his own level”? My point is that this vagueness is what allow liberals 
to be comfortable with the discrepancy between the feeling of equality and its materiality. If 
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Monk were riding on the coach in Felix Holt, he would not be compelled to roll up his sleeves 
and bathe the dirty children if he could simply regard the haggard faces of the handloom weavers 
and wish to lift them up to “something” nearer his own level. The space between the feeling of 
equality and its material reality that Lady Glencora and Monk establish operates under the same 
logic that divorced Liberal feeling from Liberal action in Beverley, enabling the electors to drink 
beer, vote in Conservative members, and yet remain “at heart Liberals.”  
We will return to the feeling of equality, because my contention in this chapter is that it 
serves a more productive purpose in the novel than it does in the electorate, but I have first to 
finish my point on the strength of Phineas’ opinions. Phineas may not have his own ideas, but 
neither is he merely a “statistical instrument,” as Womble would have it.66 He may not have 
come by his opinions honestly, but they become his own individualized opinions, as we see 
when he attends the meeting at Mildmay’s that sets the terms for the liberal party’s strategy. 
Having never attended such a meeting, “Phineas did not understand whether the assent required 
would or would not be an individual personal assent” (153). He thinks that he will be called upon 
to “express individually his assent or dissent” (152). He does, in a manner of speaking, not by 
vocalizing an assent but by indicating it, giving “a silent adhesion” by virtue of his presence 
(153). Whereas under a framework of liberal cognition the idea is typically considered to be the 
                                               
66 Womble: “By continually measuring and modifying himself in relation to the composite 
opinions and expectations of his social circle, Phineas converts the thoughts and feelings of 
individuals around him into a pool of collectivized social information within which he can situate 
himself” (19). Hadley makes the point that Finn lacks his own ideas: “Finn is shown trying an 
occupational leap of faith into the political world without financial support, without his own 
ideas, and without a dense cultural location from which his abstracted embodiment might take 
shape” (271). Lacking his own ideas has consequences for Phineas’s ability to cultivate liberal 
personhood: “Liberal discourse was trying to imagine the design and dissemination of the good 
life, such that the two modalities of abstraction that constituted liberal subjectivity, that distance 
between the private realm of cognition (a place of impersonality) and the public realm of abstract 
politics (a place of nation, citizenship, empire) could be elegantly and effectively bridged” (15). 
The abstracted forms of liberal embodiment are the “sites where the idea becomes opinion and 
does its unique political work” (16). 
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privately conceived and held thing, and opinion its public manifestation, in Phineas Finn the 
having and displaying of an opinion becomes a silent, private, embodied thing. Thus, when 
Phineas is described in the novel’s second volume as a “man with strong opinions, who could yet 
be submissive,” the point is not that he is an aggregate of other people’s opinions, but that he has 
cultivated his own private opinions and can, by virtue of those, participate in the vague general 
agreement that the novel figures as liberal sociality (ii.22). If liberal individualism requires 
masculinity and strength in its opinions, it also requires the ability to submit to other liberal 
individuals with equally strong, masculine opinions (or it would be despotism). It is crucial that 
Phineas has strong opinions; without them, to be submissive would mean to become the kind of 
party man Barrington Erle is, who disappears into the party, follows the bell, and always remains 
untouched by argument. It is only by being able to submit that Phineas’ opinions remain 
democratic, and it is only by having strong opinions that Phineas’ submission remains 
compatible with manly liberal individualism: he can assert himself up to, and never beyond, “the 
point at which self-assertion ceases to be a necessity of manliness” (ii.22).  
At this stage of his career, Phineas achieves the balance of opinions and party loyalty 
Trollope hoped to exhibit had he been successful at Beverley. The language Trollope uses 
strongly anticipates his depictions of duty and agreement in his election speeches. For example, 
when Phineas worries about the ethics of sitting, as an “ardent reformer” for Loughton, the 
borough controlled by his patron Lord Brentford: 
 
Now that Phineas had consented to join the Government [as junior Lord of the Treasury], 
any such considerations as these must be laid aside. He could no longer be a free agent, 
or even a free thinker. He had been quite aware of this, and had taught himself to 
understand that members of Parliament in the direct service of the Government were 
absolved from the necessity of free-thinking. Individual free-thinking was incompatible 
with the position of a member of the Government, and unless such abnegation were 
practised, no government would be possible. It was of course a man’s duty to bind 
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himself together with no other men but those with whom, on matters of general policy, he 
could agree heartily (ii.47).  
 
General agreement trumps individual free-thinking, but it does not negate it in Phineas, whose 
likeability depends on having strong opinions and being able to transcend them when duty or 
allegiance requires it. This may seem like an example of Hadley’s conception of the “formalism 
of midcentury liberalism,” where we encounter a great deal of how Phineas feels when he speaks 
but not the details of what he says; it is an “an embodied form of cognition [that] supposedly 
counts more than its content, where taking a stand is more important than the stand itself” (273). 
In characterizing liberal formalism in this way, Hadley argues Phineas is “without his own ideas” 
(271). Yet we know that he does have his own ideas, or strong opinions, even if we do not know 
what they are.67 Opinions are private, and Phineas can have them while also submitting to the 
general consensus of the party under the guise of “practical usefulness” (ii.22). To say that 
having a stand is more important than the stand itself overlooks the importance of having an 
opinion in order to submit to the general opinion of the group. This form of general agreement 
supersedes, but does not negate, the specificities of particular difference. Phineas can have his 
private manly opinions, and by virtue of a general agreement, can also fulfill his duty in being 
“bound to make himself useful to the party to which he adheres.”68  
                                               
67 Perhaps a better point of comparison is Hadley’s analysis of The Warden, in which she reads 
Harding’s “process of differentiation his own disinterestedness” as a formal organization of his 
thoughts that allows him to exist as himself as well as transcend his own particular identification 
to think through the narratorial third person (“as if Harding himself is thinking in and through the 
third-person narrative voice that thereby enables the hero to refer to himself as ‘he’”) (305). 
Similarly, Phineas can simultaneously have his opinions privately, and think through the party in 
public, and his ability to occupy simultaneously these two different but mutually constitutive 
modes of thinking forms the basis of his liberal character.  
68 Speech printed in Hull & Eastern Counties Herald November 3, 1868, reprinted in Tingay. 
“Trollope and the Beverley Election,” p. 26.  
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What Phineas represents is a form of liberal mediation that ultimately fails as an effective 
form of publicity. The power of the general party position overwhelms his strong opinions, and 
Phineas, as he achieves his official goals, begins to feel “that he was almost constrained to adopt 
the views of others, let them be what they might” (ii.163). As much as I wonder what it means to 
be “almost” constrained, and what actual constraint would look like, what matters more is that 
politics disappoints Phineas in much the same way as it would disappoint Trollope. It is harder to 
change people’s minds on politics. Consider the moment in which he reads Monk’s letter on 
Reform to Mr. and Mrs. Low, a long screed in which Monk champions the character of the 
English, “a people thoughtful, educated, and industrious” (336), extols the beauty of the 
parliamentary system, and argues for the necessity of change: 
 
One great authority told us the other day that the sole object of legislation on this subject 
should be to get together the best possible 658 members of Parliament. That to me would 
be a most repulsive idea if it were not that by its very vagueness it becomes inoperative. 
Who shall say what is best; or what characteristic constitutes excellence in a member of 
Parliament? If the gentleman means excellence in general wisdom, or in statecraft, or in 
skill in talking, or in private character, or even excellence in patriotism, then I say that he 
is utterly wrong, and has never touched with his intellect the true theory of representation. 
One only excellence may be acknowledged, and that is the excellence of likeness. As a 
portrait should be like the person portrayed, so should a representative House be like the 
people whom it represents. (335) 
 
Neither of the Lows are persuaded by Monk’s aestheticized rendering of the principles of 
representation and the need for reform: to him, it is “just the usual claptrap,” and Mrs. Low 
rejects the desirability of a “portrait of ignorance and ugliness” when what “we all want is to 
have things quiet and orderly” (337). Putting aside Mrs. Low’s gross misrepresentation of what 
“we” all want, at least insofar as any character we have encountered in the novel is included in 
that collective, the lesson Phineas learns is that “it is not easy to convince any man or any 
woman on a point of politics” (338). While not often identified as such, this moment is a turning 
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point for the novel – a moment in which Phineas realizes the inefficacy of “an eloquent letter 
from a philosophical Cabinet Minister” in changing people’s minds (338). This is the node at 
which politics happens, in this moment of convincing or failing to convince “any man or 
woman” on a point of politics. It is interesting that women are included in the political realm 
here, though it makes sense if one is prepared to grant my argument that the novel effects social 
solutions to political problems. The eloquent philosophical letter, which stands as the physical 
sign of the entire realm of politics, argument, and rational thought, is best left in Phineas’ pocket. 
It is less successful in uniting people in agreement than his pretty face is.  
It is not common to read the plot of Phineas Finn as a success narrative for Phineas; 
nevertheless, I intend to do so here. Phineas remains a success on the terms established by the 
novel, despite the failure of his political career. Political representation fails, not Phineas’ mode 
of representing. Phineas embodies a fantasy of electoral politics, whether he holds office or not, 
in the form of his person and the particular kind of imprecision he exemplifies, based on general 
affability rather than the kind of locatedness represented by English landowning gentry like 
Kennedy, or Laurence Fitzgibbon’s profligate Irishness. Phineas stands for that which, by 
general consent, ties people together in friendly relations. We have seen how Phineas’ imprecise 
beauty is established through vague description, and thus contributes in no small degree to his 
general ability to please. His is a comeliness that ensures his popularity: “he was a man who was 
pleasant to other men… Nature had been very good to him, making him comely inside and out, – 
and with this comeliness he had crept into popularity” (ii.22). Phineas may have strong opinions 
but he remains pliant, not firm and uncompromising like Kennedy is – Kennedy, who is “as stiff-
necked as an ox” and who tries to browbeat his wife into adopting his opinions. As, for example, 
Kennedy asserts: “I think you will acknowledge that if there be a difference of opinion between 
you and me as to any question of social intercourse, it will be better that you should consent to 
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adopt my opinion” (i.209, ii.113). Phineas is notably and imprecisely pleasant; its elusiveness is 
a defining characteristic of Phineas’ popularity: “It soon came to be admitted by all who knew 
Phineas Finn that he had a peculiar power of making himself agreeable which no one knew how 
to analyse or define” (118). In truth, “no man seemed to know how his reputation had come” 
(ii.22). So general is his appeal that “nearly everybody” who “knew our hero… called him by his 
Christian name. There are men who seem to be so treated by general consent in all societies” 
(43). This quality, not his tallness and blondness or anything else we know about Phineas, is so 
important that the narrator remarks on it twice: “He was aware that the circle of his acquaintance 
had fallen into a way of miscalling him by his Christian name, as one observes to be done now 
and again in reference to some special young man” (302). Of course, as I have argued, what 
makes Phineas special is that he is not particularly special at all, and although – or perhaps 
because – the cause of his popularity evades analysis, he functions as a social equalizer (almost 
everybody who knew him calls him Phineas). As one of the women he loves remarks, “He 
knows how to live easily with men of all ranks, without any appearance of claiming a special 
status for himself. If he were made Archbishop of Canterbury to-morrow, I believe he would 
settle down into the place of the first subject in the land without arrogance, and without false 
shame” (253).  
The problem of inequality is expressed as a social rather than a political problem 
throughout the novel generally, and political problems are in this way translated into social 
terms. A good example is Mr. Bunce, Phineas’ landlord and copying journeyman. According to 
the narrator, Bunce’s “grievances were semi-political and semi-social” (67). The substance of his 
grievances is that “He had no vote, not being himself the tenant of the house in Great 
Marlborough Street,” and that he had “ideas” about “the injustice of the manner in which he was 
paid for his work” (67). His subscription to his trade union and desire “to be doing some battle 
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against his superiors, and to be putting himself in opposition to his employers” is evidently the 
“semi-social” element of the grievance, but the details suggest that his antagonism is not social at 
all (“not that he objected personally to Messrs. Foolscap, Margin, and Vellum” [68]). Bunce’s is 
a highly politicized form of labor politics, but the novel renders it in social terms, reducing it to a 
funny difference in attitude that creates occasional disharmony in the Bunce’s marriage given his 
wife’s toadying inclinations. By substituting relationships or emotions for politics, the novel 
leaches the political out of social problems. Another such example is the moment in which 
Phineas identifies himself as “a reformer at heart,” and justifies running for a borough like 
Loughton, even as he compares it to boroughs like Gatton and Old Sarum that were 
disenfranchised under the first Reform Act (ii.46). His politics are reflected in what is in his 
heart, not in what he does in the House (or to get into the House).  
Similarly, when it comes to the debates about reform, the focus is on the consequences 
for the personal relationship between politicians, rather than the political effects of their 
actions.69 For instance, the question of the ballot in Parliament becomes a personal tussle 
between its advocates and opponents, and Phineas is called upon not to take a position but to rise 
up “before a full House to defend his great friend, Mr. Monk, from a gross personal attack” 
(184). The failure of Mildmay’s reform bill registers not in the effect that it has on the public, but 
on the relationship between Turnbull and Monk: “They might still be intimate friends, but the 
days of confidence between them were passed” (265). Subsequent reform debates dissolve the 
friendship entirely, and they “never again meet as friends” (346). It may seem as though I have 
been arguing that Phineas Finn represents a retreat from politics to the affective or social realm, 
                                               
69 See Kent Pucket’s point that “Dickens and Trollope embed formal concerns about voter 
aggregation not only in the elections they occasionally represent but also in different theories of 
character that rely on the relation between major and minor, the one and the many as relative 
modes of preferential intensity.” “Democracy.” Victorian Literature and Culture 46.3 (2018): 
640-645, p. 644. 
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but the point I am trying to make is a slightly different one. Phineas Finn renders political 
questions in social terms because it reads problems of representation, equality, and difference not 
as political problems but as social problems with social solutions. As Bunce’s class problem is 
expressed as a social, or “semi-social,” one, the novel renders the political problem of 
disenfranchisement as a social problem between friends, who also happen to be Parliamentarians. 
Posing the problem in social terms mean the solution must also be social: reform becomes about 
adjusting relational practices rather than enacting material political change. If politics is what one 
feels rather than what one does, then political practice is less about enacting legislation than it is 
about changing men’s and women’s minds. Reform in the novel is not an act of parliament but a 
shift in the hearts and minds of convincible men and women. As such, politics is not a field of 
competing interests, but a struggle between modes of relating. It is on these terms that Phineas is 
as much of, or more, a success as the County Cork Inspector of Poor Houses as the member for 
Loughshane. 
Perhaps the greatest obstacle to reform in the novel is not that while the London political 
world was “engrossed” in the problem of “the enfranchisement of Englishmen,” the Loughton 
tradesman was “proud of his own personal subjection to the Earl” (297). Nor is it that, as Phineas 
discovers with the Bunces, people are difficult to convince even with the strongest reasoning in 
the form of a Cabinet member’s letter. Rather, the problem is, as Phineas and Monk discuss 
towards the end of the second volume, that people can never truly know the inside of another’s 
minds: 
 
“It has often seemed to me that men in Parliament know less about Ireland than they do 
of the interior of Africa,” said Phineas. 
“It is seldom that we know anything accurately on any subject that we have not made 
matter of careful study,” said Mr. Monk, “and very often we do not do so even then. We 
are very apt to think that we men and women understand one another; but most probably 
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you know nothing even of the modes of thought of the man who lives next door to you.” 
(ii.178) 
 
For liberal representation of the kind Phineas embodies, and which Trollope sought to embody in 
Beverley, where it is possible to disagree about details and yet agree in general, the belief that 
one can enter into the modes of thought of the man next door, and the ability to act on the basis 
of that belief, is not merely a desideratum but a necessary condition. That is, for liberalism to 
work at that site of mediation between the general and the specific, the individual and the many, 
we must be able to believe that we know our neighbors. It is fitting that Africa stands for the 
inscrutable, and Ireland for what should be legible under the auspices of a liberal polity, because 
what the novel shows us is that the only relationship that is possible without the ability to enter 
into another’s thoughts is an imperialist one. Kennedy is the character who is fundamentally 
incapable of entering into another’s thoughts, and the only recourse he has is violence; the threat 
of physical violence, and the psychic violence of attempting to force his wife to think in the same 
way that he does. Relationships premised on liberal fantasies of equality require believing in 
your ability to know your neighbor’s mode of thought. Yet that belief is impossible to resolve at 
the political level. 
In the end, both Phineas Finn the novel and Phineas Finn the character sustain the fiction 
of knowability. How that is achieved is evident in a strange passage that occurs just as the novel 
is reaching its resolution. It is an encounter between Phineas and Madame Goesler, the woman 
he would eventually marry in Phineas Redux, when he visits to tell her that he is leaving public 
life and resigning his seat: 
 
We all know that look of true interest which the countenance of a real friend will bear 
when the welfare of his friend is in question. There are doubtless some who can assume it 
without feeling,--as there are actors who can personate all the passions. But in ordinary 
life we think that we can trust such a face, and that we know the true look when we see it. 
 
 279 
Phineas, as he gazed into Madame Goesler’s eyes, was sure that the lady opposite him 
was not acting. (ii. 316) 
 
This is a moment of excess; there is no evident reason, at the nadir of Phineas’ political career, 
for the narrator to take such pains to reassure us that Phineas knows Madame Goesler’s care at 
the news that he was to leave Parliament was genuine. But it is a significant moment when we 
consider that Phineas gazes into Madame Goesler’s eyes, and is sure of her interest – her modes 
of thought and feeling that we were earlier told it was impossible to know.  
Because it is in private life that these liberal habits of mind are so effective, Phineas’ love 
affairs are an important addition to the politics of the novel. We cannot quite say that his 
relationships with women are as inconsequential as what Hadley terms his “serial constituencies 
(it hardly mattered who or where he represented)” (233). It matters very much who he marries, in 
that it also matters very little who he marries. Mary is important the same way Ireland is 
important, to shape the habits of mind and form of liberalism according to which it is possible to 
be in two different minds at once. It is a mode of relating that he practices with Laura and Violet, 
but he is too changeable, forgetting his love for Laura when he falls for Violet. With Mary, it is 
possible to remain constant and also fall in love with someone else, as two distinct 
manifestations of his personhood: “He felt that he had two identities,—that he was, as it were, 
two separate persons,—and that he could, without any real faithlessness, be very much in love 
with Violet Effingham in his position of man of fashion and member of Parliament in England, 
and also warmly attached to dear little Mary Flood Jones as an Irishman of Killaloe” (330). 
When he makes his final choice between Madame Goesler and Mary Flood Jones, what we see is 
not his indecision, but a distance from himself that allows fluidity – a habit of mind that enables 
him to be in both places at once: “He had not arrived at any decision so fixed as to make him 
comfortable … And yet he knew, – he thought that he knew that he would be true to Mary Flood 
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Jones” (ii. 297). This distance from himself is what ensures his perfect success as a mode of 
liberal identificatory practice, in that he becomes not just himself but a generic man with whom 
all other men can identify, signaled when the end of the love story slips into generic terms. They 
are no longer Phineas and Mary but “a man” and “a girl”: “How is a man not to tell such tales 
when he has on his arm, close to him, a girl who tells him her little everything of life, and only 
asks for his confidence in return? And then his secrets are so precious to her and so sacred, that 
he feels as sure of her fidelity as though she were a very goddess of faith and trust” (ii.353). 
And that is how minds change. The novel leaves us with the hope that changing minds is 
sufficient for political transformation, but the certainty that it is achievable in private life. After 
the failed attempt at reform, Monk argues that though they were no nearer to tenant-right:  
 
Such a debate and such a majority will make men think. But no;—think is too high a 
word; as a rule men don’t think. But it will make them believe that there is something in 
it. Many who before regarded legislation on the subject as chimerical, will now fancy that 
it is only dangerous, or perhaps not more than difficult. And so in time it will come to be 
looked on as among the things possible, then among the things probable;—and so at last 
it will be ranged in the list of those few measures which the country requires as being 
absolutely needed. That is the way in which public opinion is made. (ii.341) 
 
Political change may result from the change in public opinion in due time. In private life, such 
change happens on a more accelerated timeline. After Mary makes up her mind to wait a long 
time to be married, Phineas gets a job and informs her that “your mind must be unmade” (355). 
What requires a long, slow evolution in public life happens instantly in private. When Lord 
Cantrip offers Phineas the job that will allow him to marry, the novel ends by giving the reader a 
curious permission to imagine Phineas’ reply: “What was the nature of the reply to Lord Cantrip 
the reader may imagine, and thus we will leave our hero an Inspector of Poor Houses in the 
County of Cork” (355). This is a very liberal proposition: we have the freedom to imagine the 
“nature” of the reply, but we are told of its consequences. It is an unsatisfying freedom, a 
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freedom of form but not content, a freedom of the heart rather than a material freedom. To the 
very real problem of political inequality, Trollope’s novel offers us a private solution: a mind 
that is easily changed in private life, but the vague compensatory promise of future change in 
public life. The form of collectivity that fails liberals in Westminster, Beverley, and Langham 
Place succeeds in the fictional worlds of Loughshane and Carlingford, but at what cost? Phineas 
Finn is a success, but Phineas Finn’s success reveals the disappointments of liberalism when you 







Leading up to the American midterm elections in 2018, it was possible to purchase a T-shirt 
bearing the phrase “Vote Like a Black Woman” (see Figure 2 below). The online retailer 
advertised the product with the caption: “Next time you’re in the mood to save our democracy, 
shout out the demographic that statistically stays showing up.”1 Reflecting frustration about the 
high percentage of white women voting for Trump in the 2016 election (arguably against their 
own interests as women), the T-shirt was a call to vote based on the kind of disidentificatory 
practices I have been discussing throughout this dissertation. The shirt urged the voter to imagine 
themselves as a black woman, with the interests and commitments that position implies in the 
context of voter turnout. Yet the call to vote “like” a black woman implies that the addressee is 
not a black woman; the simile, not to mention the marketing image, therefore function to 
distance the addressee from the position with which they are called to identify.  
 
Figure 2: Vote Like a Black Woman 
 
                                               




As a call to action based on forging solidary through alignment based on disidentification, the 
shirt suggests that being like a black woman is about the kinds of association and voting 
practices it invites rather than identity as such. In other words, it prioritizes taking a position over 
occupying it.  
This is not a perfect kind of alignment or of solidarity – after all, it is one thing to vote 
like a black woman in Trump’s America, and quite another to be a black woman when you step 
outside the voting booth – and yet, as a political call to action, it seems to be working. As the 
Washington Post’s vice president of communications maintained, the “2018 midterm elections 
made history before a single ballot was cast because of the mobilization and activism of 
women,”2 and the elections quite literally changed the face of Capitol Hill. Historic firsts 
included the first Muslim women in Congress, Rashida Tlaib (Democrat, representing 
Michigan’s 13th District) and Ilhan Omar (Democrat, representing Minnesota’s 5th District); the 
first Native American women, Sharice Davids (Democrat, Kansas’s 3rd District), and Deb 
Halaand (Democrat, New Mexico’s 1st District).3  
In reflecting on the current state of affairs following the most recent structural 
transformation of the American political landscape (and, following Brexit, the European and 
specifically British ones), I do not mean to suggest that we have succeeded in intertwining 
representation and action where Victorian liberals failed. Nor do I mean to draw a concrete link 
                                               
2 “A New Era of Women in Politics.” Washington Post. November 17, 2018. 
www.washingtonpost.com/washington-post-live/2018/11/17/transcript-new-era-women-
politics/?utm_term=.f8b1df63d583. 
3 Danielle Kurtzleben. “A List of Firsts For Women in This Year’s Midterm Elections.” NPR. 
November 6, 2018. www.npr.org/2018/11/06/664951794/a-list-of-firsts-for-women-in-this-
years-midterm-elections. It is worth noting, as the Washington Post did, that a diverse Congress 
is no guarantee for diversity as such. Colby Itkowitz. “Trickle-down representation: Will the 





of causality or equivalence between the debates about reform in the 1860s and those in which we 
are currently engaging. My claim is more modest: that during the years of reform, when the 
anticipatory promise of democratic equality came into conflict with ideas about difference, 
liberal thinkers, organizers and writers developed a mode of representing difference and a 
practice to encounter it.  
There is, perhaps, a moment of afterlife for the kind of statesmanship that Mill and 
Trollope represented. In 2006, Steve Cohen, a white Democratic senator, stood for election to the 
House in Tennessee’s 9th District – a “60 percent black district specifically designed to 
encourage the election of an African-American and protected by the Voting Rights Act,” as the 
Observer reported. During the primaries, Cohen, a white Jewish man, made the claim that he 
would vote “like a black woman” and seek membership in the Congressional Black Caucus 
(CBC), a move that the CBC met with “something between indifference and hostility,” by the 
Observer’s account.4 Cohen’s confidence in asserting his ability to represent those who are 
different than him – with the corresponding concerns that implies – equals Mill’s. The 
difference? In 2010, former Memphis Mayor Willie Herenton stood against Cohen for the 9th 
District seat. Herenton ran on the claim that the seat should be held by an African-American 
candidate. Edward Wyckoff Williams commented for The Grio, a left-wing publication aimed at 
an African American audience: 
 
At 70-years-old, Herenton is using the politics of race in a dated context which is often 
reflective of people of his generation white, black or otherwise. Though we can certainly 
benefit from his knowledge and experience, the electorate should not be limited by his 
perspective. Being black is simply not enough to guarantee the African-American vote.5 
                                               
4 Observer Staff. “Harold Ford and the Yassky Option.” Observer. 7 November 2006. 
www.observer.com/2006/11/harold-ford-and-the-yassky-option/ 
5 Edward Wyckoff Williams. “Memphis Congressional Campaign Shows Limits of Race-





Williams pointed out that Herenton’s desire to “make the election a referendum on 
representation based on race” concealed a desire to profit from holding public office, pointing 
out that “a grand jury has been investigating accusations that Mr. Herenton benefited from his 
private real estate business” while he was mayor. Cohen, The Grio reported, stood for a mode of 
representing that insisted on his ability to represent difference on the basis of his particular 
experience: “I vote like a black woman. I don’t know the black experience, but I know about 
being a minority and being discriminated against because of religion.” This discussion occurred 
during the leadup to the election for the 112th Congress. Cohen still holds the seat.6  
 
Presentism and Difference: Victorian Studies Now 
Why, by way of concluding a discussion of Victorian liberalism, consider the present 
American moment? Presentism has become a topic of debate in the field of Victorian studies 
following the 2015 posting of the V21 Collective’s manifesto, a collection of ten theses 
bemoaning the fact that Victorian studies has “has fallen prey to positivist historicism,” which is 
defined as a “a mode of inquiry that aims to do little more than exhaustively describe, preserve, 
and display the past.”7 To redress the “fetishization of the archival” and attempts to “reconstruct 
the past wie es eigentlich gewesen,” the V21 manifesto called for a “new openness to 
presentism” of a particular kind: “Presentism is not a sin,” read the eighth thesis, “but nor are all 
forms of presentism equally valuable.”  
The manifesto provoked many responses, some of which were collected on the website 
itself as well as in special issues devoted to the topic in Victorian Studies and b2o: an online 
                                               
6 “Biography.” Congressman Steve Cohen. www.cohen.house.gov/about/biography. 




journal. In its call for the “field” to move “from the rear of new literary scholarship,” the V21 
collective made clear its goal of saving literary criticism from the casualties of the neoliberal 
university, and promoting the field of Victorian studies to the forefront of literary studies by 
making its relevance clear and by moving scholarship online to keep up with the fast pace of the 
digital age. David Sweeney Combs and Danielle Coriale’s definition of “strategic presentism” in 
their introduction to the Victorian Studies special issue made that clear: the “strategic ends” of 
the V21 collective included “the reassessing of our existing literary historical periodizations and 
the contesting of the fiscal austerity that threatens the survival of Victorian studies as a 
discipline.”8  
Like many respondents, I enjoy the bold positioning of a manifesto. Yet despite my 
framing of the legacies of liberalism in this Afterword, I remain unconvinced by the V21 
collective’s claim that, “in finance, resource mining, globalization, imperialism, liberalism, and 
many other vectors, we are Victorian, inhabiting, advancing, and resisting the world they made.” 
The manifesto makes a claim for the relevance by prioritizing continuity over change; my 
perception of the risks of this endeavor is addressed by Adela Pinch’s criticism of a slightly 
earlier mode of what she terms “engaged presentism.”9 In her 2014 review of the previous year’s 
scholarship, Pinch notes that scholars were “laboring under a need to justify their work” in 
response to the humanities crisis resulting from the cost of higher education and fear of 
underemployed English majors. For Pinch, the risk of engaged presentism is losing sight of the 
goal of literary criticism of past works: “detailing a literature, and a culture, that is so different – 
even alien – from our own” (944). 
                                               
8 David Sweeney Combs and Danielle Coriale. “Introduction: V21 Forum on Strategic 
Presentism.” Victorian Studies 59.1 (Autumn 2016): 87-89, p. 87.  
9 Adela Pinch. “Recent Studies in the Nineteenth Century.” SEL Studies in English Literature 
1500-1900 54.4 (Autumn 2014): 943-1002, p. 944. Subsequent page references in text.  
 
 287 
Pinch’s point gestures to the challenges of writing about liberalism in historically careful 
ways when we are so clearly still shaped by the premises of liberal thought. One of my aims in 
this dissertation has been to unsettle some of what Elaine Hadley refers to as our sense of 
explicability of “core practices of liberalization” to restore a sense of the “weird and taxing” 
nature of their practices, and thereby to address the kind of presentist scholarship that is surprised 
by their sophistication.10 By this, I mean the kind of scholarship that estimates Mill to have been 
advanced or forward-thinking in his analysis of and activism around gender, or considers the 
LPG to have been ahead of its time for making certain claims – or, for instance in the case of the 
vote for married women, to have sold out for not making certain claims.11 That we are surprised 
by the sophistication of the politics of the past reveals the extent to which we are still operating 
within many of their practices, and how our thinking remains structured by the way they thought 
about and organized around difference. On the one hand, it is a testament to the strength of their 
legacy. On the other hand, it is a kind of presentism that prevents us from seeing the significance 
of past practices and the labor that produced them. This is not to fetishize the archive, but a 
reminder that presentists can be equally guilty of what Hadley, in her response to the V21 
manifesto, characterizes as a “Whiggish and positivist and totalizing” view of the past.12  
It may well be that, as Jesse Rosenthal claims in his contribution to the Victorian Studies 
V21 special issue, “when we discuss texts from the past, we almost always discuss them in terms 
                                               
10 Elaine Hadley. Living Liberalism: Practical Citizenship in Mid-Victorian Britain. The 
University of Chicago Press, Chicago 2010, p. 28. 
11 It is hard to avoid some degree of surprise when encountering the “sophisticated” political 
positions of Victorian liberals; one finds it even in such excellent careful work as Amanda 
Anderson’s Bleak Liberalism: “The analysis of gender subordination in The Subjection of 
Women is similarly sophisticated in its understanding of power dynamics where each subject of 
the dominated class lives in political isolation, as it were, with a member of the dominating 
class.” Amanda Anderson. Bleak Liberalism. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2016, p. 37. 
12 Elaine Hadley. “Closing Remarks.” b2o 1.2 (October 2016). 
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of how we recognize ourselves.”13 This is what Rosenthal calls time traveling, and he finds it to 
be “occasionally hermetic and unsatisfying” as well as “worryingly conservative” (104). His 
piece ends with a call to action that indicates how V21 affiliates see the politics of the good kind 
of presentism: “I don’t think it’s an accident that a field with such worrying logic has been the 
laboratory for so much progressive thought. And the first step to figuring out why, and how, to 
produce more is to understand, for better or for worse, the traditionary premises of what we do” 
(104). The goal is thus to produce more progressive thought by understanding the “traditionary 
premises” of what we do as Victorian scholars and literary critics. This is perhaps the least 
convincing strain of the V21 endeavor; I wholeheartedly concur with Elaine Freedgood and 
Michael Sanders’ declaration that “we will not defeat neoliberalism with literary theory.”14 To 
my mind, the V21 affiliates frequently vastly overstate the case for literary studies as a discipline 
in their attempt to justify the work. Indeed, some of the most compelling criticism of the 
manifesto remarks on its failure to account for studying the past beyond the boundaries of 
disciplinary studies.15  
                                               
13 Jesse Rosenthal. “Some Thoughts on Time Travel.” Victorian Studies 59.1 (Autumn 2016): 
102-104, p. 102. Subsequent page references in text. 
14 Elaine Freedgood and Michael Sanders. “Response: Strategic Presentism or Partisan 
Knowledges?” Victorian Studies 59.1 (Autumn 2016): 117-121, p. 118. 
15 See, for instance, the alternatives proposed by historian Martin Hewitt: “The field can only 
renew its scholarly significance if it is prepared to grasp its extra-literaryness, to shed its 
infatuation with the accretion of readings, to realise that multi-disciplinary conversations are 
unlikely to be facilitated by premises which privilege one discipline and predicate the 
inadequacy of the protocols of others.” Martin Hewitt. “V21 Manifesto: Ten Alternative 
Theses.” Victorian Manchester and More. 27 March 2015. 
profmartinhewitt.com/2015/03/26/v21-manifesto-ten-alternative-theses/. Hewitt’s point that the 
V21 collective has “a particular sort of conversation in mind” in their establishment of a 
historicist “bogeyman” must be granted when one reads, for instance, Caroline Levine’s 
invocation of an arguably imagined “straight line of historical periodization that relies on the 
separation between then and now,” which conveniently serves as the object for the radical V21 
associate to “put kinks in.” “Historicism: From the Break to the Loop.” b2o 1.2 (October 2016).  
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One further response will serve to clarify my point. Andrew Miller poses the following 
questions: “Why study the nineteenth century? And why Britain? Imagine an undergraduate 
devastated by the present injustices around her. Why should she study the Victorian period?”16 
He then imagines that she considers “a career studying the Victorian period as only tangentially 
related to the political activism she engages in when not interpreting culture of the past” (123) 
and “politically secondary” to it (124), but suggests that this “liberal-minded response” would be 
unsatisfying to his audience of Victorian scholars, who “ask of their own scholarship at least that 
it be more immediately responsive to present injustice” (124). Miller’s answer – by way of a 
consideration of how Victorian studies achieved its vibrancy over contesting the “understanding 
of modernity” (124) – is to imagine “not an undergraduate but a graduate student or junior 
faculty member reading these papers” who would find “a sense of a field both politically 
committed and healthily unsettled,” “a rich if under-recognized inheritance of theoretically 
sophisticated ways for understanding our relation to the past,” and “the idealism that Tanya 
Agathocleous hopes to find in collectivities – something that Jameson might call class 
consciousness” (125). To think of a gathering of Victorian scholars as an example of the idealism 
of collectivities is an overreach.17 So is making a claim for the political commitment of Victorian 
studies by imagining an ever smaller and more elite audience for our work (not the politically 
committed undergraduate but a graduate student or junior faculty member whose interests are 
presumably, especially in the latter case, already vested). This is not, to my mind, the way to 
                                               
16 Andrew H. Miller. “Response: Responsibility to the Present.” Victorian Studies 59.1 (Autumn 
2016): 122-126, p. 123. Subsequent page references in text.  
17 Agathocleous was not doing this. Her idealism in collectivities referred to the British anti-
racist journal, Anti-Caste, which was published between 1888 and 1895 and, she argues, along 
with the contemporary activist movement #BlackLivesMatter demonstrates “a stance that rejects 
specific visions of the future in favor of illuminating the persistence of the past in the present.” 
Tanya Agathocleous. “In the Present of No Future.” Victorian Studies 59. 1 (Autumn 2016): 90-
93, p. 93.  
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“think critically about the past in the present in order to change the present,” as the V21 affiliates 
exhort.18 Victorian studies is not politics.19 
Here is my attempt at strategic presentism regarding the activists and thinkers I have 
studied. There remains a lesson to be learned about the failures of their praxis, or indeed several 
lessons about the fact that the Langham Place group could not organize as a collective in the long 
term, although they were extraordinarily successful organizers; the fact that Mill and Trollope 
never intended to leave a legacy that was mainly intellectual or literary, but we neglect their 
praxis because of the failure of their political careers; and the fact that election novels introduced 
a mode of disidentifying that, when we occupy it, allows us to think we are doing something, 
when we are only feeling it. Lauren Berlant’s excellent explanation of the way in which a certain 
kind of recognition requires conscripting difference in order to enable the continued operation of 
power is useful here:  
 
Self-transforming compassionate recognition and its cognate forms of solidarity are 
necessary for making political movements thrive contentiously against all sorts of 
privilege, but they have also provided a means for making minor structural adjustments 
seem like major events, because the theater of compassion is emotionally intense. 
Recognition all too often becomes an experiential end in itself, an emotional event that 
protects what is unconscious, impersonal, and unrelated to anyone’s intentions about 
maintaining political privilege.20  
                                               
18 Combs and Coriale. “Introduction,” p. 88.  
19 There is a Miller’s discussion sounds like a depoliticized version of the debate around theory 
and praxis carried out by the Frankfurt School in relation to the student protests in the 1960s. In 
that debate, theory is what happens in universities and practice is what happens when students 
build barricades in the streets of Paris. The debate was about which was more politically 
effective; Adorno, for instance, saw barricades as an ineffective countermeasure to the bomb, 
and students vandalized his office at the University of Frankfurt, leaving graffiti that called him a 
traitor to socialism for his commitment to theory over action. My point is that a collectivity of 
Victorian scholars, however politically interested in the past, is not political by virtue of being a 
collective. For a discussion of the Frankfurt School and the theory/practice dialectic, see the 
introduction to Stuart Jeffries. Grand Hotel Abyss: The Lives of the Frankfurt School. London: 
Verso, 2017. 




If there is a lesson to be learned from the liberal negotiation with difference in the Victorian 
period, it is about using recognition as leverage for political change, rather than what takes its 
place.  
Much like the current moment, mid-nineteenth century Britain was a moment in the 
history of liberalism when political exigencies demanded new ways of thinking about and 
negotiating the political and cultural fact of difference. These new ways of relating to difference 
were necessary to sustain belief in the fiction of equality and the possibility of cohesion to 
structure collective life, despite the realities of competing interests and inequality. I have 
emphasized the importance not of liberal ideas, but liberal action: that is, the strategies and forms 
of representation that evolved to accommodate new sets of political actors. As such, I have 
attempted to show how publics, as politically effective social spaces, engaged in definitional 
struggles over ways of organizing, representing, and imagining a form of citizenship in its 
expanded sense. The importance of action to my argument reflects the preoccupations of the 
dissertation. In short, the political claims it was possible to make in response to difference were 
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